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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(Italian)
INTRODUZIONE
La  formazione  dello  Stato  e  della  Nazione,  in  Africa  meridionale,  non  ha 
seguito  l’evoluzione europea iniziata  con la Pace di  Westfalia (1648),  consacrata 
dalla Rivoluzione Francese (1789) e affermatasi con il  Concerto Europeo (1815 – 
1856)1. Alla fine del XIX secolo, infatti, gli stati Africani erano ancora basati su un 
sistema che richiama quello feudale di  stampo europeo mantenuto da rapporti  di 
vassallaggio,  qui  sovrapposti  alle  relazioni  di  clan,  e  da  tattiche  di  guerra,  che 
miravano al saccheggio e alla razzia2. I regni più forti tendevano a inglobare quelli più 
piccoli  e  deboli,  mantenendone  struttura  e  tradizioni,  ma  in  un  rapporto  di 
subordinazione rispetto  all’impero che si  stava costituendo.  Il  vassallaggio veniva 
anche rafforzato attraverso legami di sangue, che spesso includevano il matrimonio 
forzato  una  figlia  del  re-imperatore  con  il  figlio  del  conquistato:  questo 
imparentamento  forzato  portava  a  vincoli  di  consanguineità  e  di  fedeltà  al  re-
imperatore,  che  si  traducevano  nell’inserimento  dei  nuovi  capi  fra  gli  induna (il 
consiglio  degli  anziani).  Le necessità  politiche e quelle  economiche si  fondevano 
nella  gestione  del  feudo,  sebbene  esistessero  alcuni  esempi  di  società  in  cui  il 
controllo sull’autorità politica, da parte degli anziani, era un importante bilanciamento 
alla tirannia del sovrano. Questo è il caso dei Barotse nell’attuale Zambia e di Asante 
in Africa Occidentale3, mentre in Africa meridionale prevalevano le dittature militari di 
sovrani  quali  Chaka  Zulu,  Mzilikazi  e  Shoshangane,  che  resistettero  al  dominio 
europeo più di altre società in cui la forza militare non era una priorità. Oltre alle 
normali  necessità  di  sopravvivenza,  infatti,  vincenti  tattiche  di  guerra  hanno 
permesso  ad  alcune  popolazioni  di  prevaricare  clan  più  piccoli  e  servirsene  per 
alimentare la crescente tratta degli schiavi, che i mercanti arabi ed europei avevano 
portato  a  livelli  sempre  crescenti,  nonostante  i  divieti  internazionali.  Poiché  la 
schiavitù  dei  prigionieri  di  guerra  era  comunque  una  tradizione  nei  rapporti  fra 
sovrani in Africa, l’istituzione di un mercato tanto vasto non fece altro che esacerbare 
l’offerta con gravi conseguenze, non solo per la densità demografica, ma anche e 
1Formigoni, 2000.
2 Davidson, 1992 , e Reader, 1994.
3 Davidson, 1992.
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soprattutto per la lenta ma inesorabile distruzione dei pochi regni rimasti. Se da un 
lato i mercanti di schiavi arabi ed europei spopolavano il continente, l’avanzata di un 
sistema coloniale  sempre più  legalizzato permise l’annientamento di  tutti  i  grandi 
regni  del  continente  e  l’asservimento  di  tutta  la  popolazione  ai  nuovi  governanti 
europei o africani di prima o seconda generazione. Nonostante i divieti sulla tratta 
degli  schiavi,  e  il  lento  declino  di  tale  mercato,  infatti,  le  popolazioni  indigene 
continuarono a essere trattate come paria dalla società coloniale ed imperialista, che 
tolse loro gli strumenti della tradizione, le ricchezze (come il bestiame) e, per finire, le 
terre.  Questo  trattamento  ebbe  come  conseguenza  non  solo  l’impoverimento 
economico  delle  popolazioni  ma  anche  quello  spirituale  di  cui,  oggi,  si  sente 
maggiormente l’influenza. Il  fabbisogno di manodopera per le miniere e le fattorie 
sudafricane, infine, contribuì largamente all’istituzione di flussi migratori dalla regione 
verso Kimberly,  Johannesburg e la provincia del Transvaal, creando movimenti  di 
persone che infittirono i legami tradizionali ove possibile, e in ogni caso servirono 
come rito di iniziazione verso l’età adulta e il conseguente diritto a prendere moglie, 
sostituendo la guerra.
La zona di confine di Pafuri, che è il centro geografico del GLTFCA (Great 
Limpopo  Transfrontier  Conservation  Area),  reca  traccia  di  tutte  queste  vicende 
attraverso la sua geografia fisica e umana, nonché il suo paesaggio culturale. Pafuri 
è tuttora il centro di movimenti migratori verso il Sudafrica, e di scambi informali e 
illegali fra i tre paesi su cui si estende: Mozambico, Sudafrica e Zimbabwe. La storia 
di Pafuri riporta allo mfecane di Chaka Zulu4, alle migrazioni del clan dei Kumalo che 
poi si unì a Mzilikazi dominando lo Zimbabwe dopo la civiltà Rozwi-Shona, alla rotta 
dell’avorio che veniva smerciato a Johannesburg, alle guerre post-coloniali contro il 
Mozambico indipendente, infine alla creazione di uno spazio per la conservazione 
dell’ecosistema della  savana africana e dei  suoi  animali.  La storia  del  Sudafrica, 
tuttavia, insegna che la conservazione della natura ha talora servito anche interessi 
politici, strategici e militari, a partire dalla creazione del Parco Nazionale Kruger, fino 
alla sua estensione a nord – proprio nella zona di Pafuri – nel 1969. La tesi, quindi, si 
4Lo mfecane è una fase di guerre scatenate da Chaka Zulu intorno al 1831 che sconvolse la geografia 
umana del Sudafrica orientale, del Mozambico sud-occidentale, e dello Zimbabwe meridionale. La 
leggenda vuole che il dolore di Chaka per la morte della madre lo rese pazzo e quindi si vendicò su 
tutto il suo popolo costringendo molti dei suoi generali alla fuga. Gli storici, in generale, concordano 
sulla necessità di Chaka di ottenere schiavi per commerciare con gli Europei insediati nel Natal e a 
Laurenço Marques (attuale Maputo).
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propone di analizzare quali siano le motivazioni politiche che sottendono la creazione 
del Parco Transfrontaliero, soprattutto vista la sua commercializzazione come ‘Parco 
della  Pace’  (Peace  Park o  PP),  all’interno  di  una  rete  creata  dalla  Peace  Park 
Foundation che mira a unire la conservazione a riflessioni sulla pace, seguendo le 
linee  guida  della  IUCN  (The  World  Conservation  Union)5.  Al  fine  di  produrre 
un’analisi sensata e utile per lo studio dell’GLTFCA e del PP, inoltre, si è deciso di 
presentare la valutazione socio-economica di una comunità che si trova nella zona di 
Pafuri, lato Mozambicano, geograficamente al centro di un crocevia di passaggio fra i 
tre Stati confinanti, e dei movimenti di popolazione che si spingono fino al centro del 
Mozambico e al Malawi. Attraverso uno studio socio-economico e geografico, infatti, 
è possibile valutare quale sarà l’impatto locale del mega progetto, le cui priorità sono 
essenzialmente la conservazione e la sicurezza di uno Stato (il Sudafrica) attraverso 
la  fine  delle  migrazioni  illegali  e  dei  traffici  illeciti  ed  informali  verso  i  due paesi 
confinanti ad Est.
Al  fine  di  facilitare  la  lettura  della  tesi,  questo  riassunto  si  prefigge  di 
evidenziare  i  tratti  salienti  della  ricerca.  In  primo  luogo  verranno  presentate  le 
assunzioni  di  base derivate  dalla  letteratura  scientifica,  in  particolare  le  teorie  di 
geografia politica sulle distinzioni fra Stato e Nazione, confine e frontiera, verranno 
incluse in  un contesto storico-economico,  georeferenziato per  quanto possibile,  e 
riferito alle popolazioni chiave della frontiera orientale sudafricana. In secondo luogo, 
verrà presentata la metodologia, seguita sul campo, e i metodi per l’analisi dei dati. 
Seguirà  una  sezione  che  presenterà  l’area  di  studio:  il  Mozambico,  a  carattere 
generale, e l’area di Pafuri nello specifico. In quarto luogo, verranno presentati i dati 
salienti  rilevati  dall’investigazione  etno-geografica  e  dalle  fonti  primarie.  Infine,  le 
conclusioni dimostreranno o confuteranno le teorie iniziali.
5 Peddle et al. 2004, e Zbizc, 1999.
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STORIA DI CONFINE E FRONTIERE IN AFRICA MERIDIONALE: L’APPROCCIO DI GEOGRAFICO-
POLITICO
La vraie décolonisation passe par le rejet de 
l’État de type européen. La question est donc 
politique et la décision uniquement africaine :  
doit-il  se  séparer  de  l’État-nation  et  de  ses  
mythologies ? (Le Roy, in Tshiyembe, 2001)6
La  geografia  politica  definisce  lo  Stato-Nazione  come  l’identificazione, 
pressoché ideale, di una forma governativa (lo Stato) con l’identità di un popolo (la 
Nazione)7. Tuttavia, come nota Seindman, lo Stato-Nazione si è dimostrato essere 
una finzione8 in termini applicativi per due motivi: (1) la Francia è forse l’unico stato in 
cui  si  fonde  l’ideale  di  nazione  con  il  costrutto  dello  Stato,  identificato  come 
fenomeno sociale9; (2) in Europa è stato sfruttato dall’ancien régime per giustificare 
rivolte  aristocratiche  in  nome  dell’identità  nazionale,  pur  mantenendo  le  divisioni 
sociali10; (3) nella politica coloniale è servito a giustificare le opere di civilizzazione 
che hanno portato all’annichilimento delle tradizioni e delle religioni ancestrali  che 
avevano  caratterizzato  le  civiltà  africane,  gli  embrioni  dello  Stato-Nazione  che 
seguiva i tessuti sociali locali11. Questo capitolo si occupa di illustrare, a partire dalla 
definizione di Stato-Nazione, l’analisi geo-politica dei fenomeni storici e sociali che 
hanno  portato  alla  creazione  degli  Stati  africani  post-coloniali,  con  una  sezione 
dedicata all’Africa australe e la sua specificità politica e sociale.
L’imperialismo in Africa: il declino delle civiltà e delle etnie africane.
Motore  primo  delle  scoperte  coloniali,  lo  Stato  moderno  fu  in  grado  di 
giustificare la crescente ingerenza politico-economica e religiosa degli Europei nel 
continente africano, raggiungendo il suo apice con la creazione della Rhodesia, un 
possedimento  terriero  personale  come  indicato  dal  nome,  sebbene  ufficialmente 
affiliato  alla  corona  britannica,  il  cui  scopo  era  l’arricchimento  di  Sir  Cecil  John 
Rhodes per creare il suo sogno di un impero britannico dal Capo al Cairo. Attraverso 
l’opera dei missionari  e dei commercianti,  si  preparò l’opera di  conquista politico-
6 ‘La vera decolonizzazione passa per il rifiuto dello Stato di tipo europeo. La questione è, dunque, 
politica  e  la  decisione  unicamente  africana:  bisogna  separarsi  dallo  Stato-Nazione  e  dalle  sue 
mitologie?’ (TdA).
7 Glassner, 1995, Pounds, 1992 e Muir, 1975.
8 Seindman, 2004.
9 Tshiyembe, 2001.
10 Formigoni, 2000, e Davidson, 1992.
11 Davidson, 1992, e Reader, 1994.
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militari delle popolazioni indigene divise fra i riti animisti e l’accettazione del nuovo 
Dio cristiano, introdotte agli  eccessi dell’alcool e di  altre abitudini  europee, pronte 
all’uso di armi moderne per le loro guerre tribali, incoscienti del pericolo che la loro 
integrità stava subendo. La Conferenza di Berlino, voluta dal Concerto Europeo a 
seguito  delle  pretese  coloniali  di  Re  Leopoldo  del  Belgio,  infine,  decretò  la 
spartizione  coloniale  dell’Africa  e  avviò  per  molti  paesi  il  passaggio  dall’epoca 
coloniale  a  quella  imperialista,  forti  della  concertazione  diplomatica  nel  vecchio 
continente.  In  questo  modo,  lo  Stato  africano  passò  da  una  divisione  territoriale 
articolata in clan, organizzati gerarchicamente in piccoli regni soggetti a un regno-
impero dominante, che prevedeva un centro politico-religioso circondato da una zona 
di influenza decrescente fino ai territori di frontiera, a una demarcazione territoriale di 
stampo  europeo  che  prevedeva  l’uso  dei  confini  come  linee  di  separazione  fra 
territori confinanti, indiscutibili perché già negoziati in seno alla conferenza. Con la 
fase imperialista, la divisione territoriale e l’imposizione di forme di governo di stampo 
europeo si moltiplicarono fino a includere anche le zone più remote, dove i rapporti 
socio-economici  tradizionali  erano  stati  poco  influenzati  dai  colonizzatori. 
L’imperialismo bloccò definitivamente ogni possibilità di sviluppo politico dello Stato 
Africano, adducendo all’opera civilizzatrice la necessità di una gestione governativa 
moderna della politica e dei rapporti fra indigeni e coloni, che ovviamente andava a 
vantaggio  di  questi  ultimi.  Il  principio  di  sovranità  e  di  identità  nazionale,  che  in 
Europa portarono alla creazione di alcuni stati  moderni, nelle colonie furono validi 
solo  per  le  popolazioni  bianche.  Le  popolazioni  autoctone,  invece,  si  trovarono 
costrette a riconoscere il potere del denaro per la sopravvivenza - quindi a lavorare 
per  i  coloni  bianchi  nelle  fattorie  o  nelle  miniere  -  e  riconoscere  le  autorità 
governative  europee che avevano gradualmente eliminato tutti  i  sovrani  locali  da 
Dingane a Lobengula, a Gungunhane alla fine del XIX secolo12. 
Attraverso l’analisi dei fenomeni storico-politici che caratterizzarono l’influenza 
europea in Africa, la ricerca si propone di fornire un quadro generale in relazione 
all’impatto dell’applicazione dello Stato, nei termini in cui è stato fin qui esposto, sulle 
zone di frontiera lontane dai centri di potere. L’ipotesi, in questo caso, è che le aree 
remote di scarso interesse economico seguissero i meccanismi di centro-periferia dei 
sistemi economici e politici di base, e quindi fossero poco influenzate dalle decisioni 
12 Reader, 1994, Maloka, 1997, e Manghezi, 1998
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del governo centrale. Le popolazioni, quindi, dovevano essere in grado di mantenere 
stili  di vita tradizionali, pressoché immutati, incluse le relazioni fra comunità divise 
dalla Conferenza di Berlino, creando delle aree di frontiera non regolate dalle leggi 
coloniali, dove il confine era una linea immaginaria inutile ai fini della sopravvivenza 
sociale ed economica. 
Il Nazionalismo Africano e il mantenimento dei confini coloniali.
I  confini  coloniali,  sebbene  spesso  criticati  dai  movimenti  politici  in  favore 
dell’indipendenza,  tuttavia,  non  mutarono  quando  i  nuovi  governi  africani  si 
insediarono. Al contrario, l’Organizzazione dell’Unità Africana stabilì senza eccezioni 
il  carattere  di  immutabilità  dei  confini  africani  e  il  divieto  assoluto  di  modificare  i 
confini stabiliti da parte dei nuovi Stati sovrani13. Questa decisione appare sensata 
solo se si considerano gli alti costi economici che i cambiamenti di confine avrebbero 
portato,  tuttavia  sia  seguendo  il  filone  del  Nazionalismo Africano  di  Fanon14,  sia 
aprendosi alla necessità di mantenere rapporti economici con le ex-colonie15, appare 
chiaro che i  fautori  dell’indipendenza africana aspiravano ad un nazionalismo che 
prescindesse  da  differenze  etniche  o  statali,  ma  che  ostentasse  la  forza 
dell’Africanità,  come unica  filosofia  che permettesse  da un  lato  di  riacquistare  la 
dignità perduta dopo secoli di dominio politico e sociale, e dall’altro di negoziare alla 
pari  con gli  ex colonizzatori  per creare delle fondamenta finanziare ai  nuovi  stati. 
L’Africanità celava  il  bisogno,  da  parte  dei  nuovi  governi,  di  costituire  un’identità 
nazionale che garantisse la governabilità dei vari paesi e prescindesse le differenze 
etniche racchiuse entro i confini del territorio. Se, tuttavia, questa impresa si rivelò 
semplice per stati come il Botswana, dove gli Tswana sono l’etnia dominante, con 
pochi gruppi di Boscimani relegati nel deserto del Kalahari, lo stesso non si può dire 
della Nigeria, del Ruanda, della Somalia, dell’Eritrea, dello Zaire, e della maggior 
parte  dei  paesi  africani  dove  gli  stessi  governi  scatenarono,  con  politiche 
segregazioniste o attraverso la forza militare, delle sanguinose guerre civili che talora 
ancora perdurano. Nel contempo, l’espansione della Guerra Fredda sulla scena geo-
politica mondiale coinvolse il continente Africano, le cui élite vedevano nelle teorie 
marxiste  di  giustizia  ed  eguaglianza  l’unico  vero  contributo  alle  loro  lotte  per 
13 Griffiths, 1986.
14 Seindman, 2004.
15 Davidson, 1992.
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l’indipendenza, confermato soprattutto dai forti finanziamenti e dal supporto logistico 
(militare-amministrativo)  provenienti  da  Cina,  Unione  Sovietica  e  Cuba  (con 
riferimento  specifico  all’Angola).  La  scelta  politica  di  molti  Stati  di  adottare  un 
governo,  non-democratico,  fondato  sulle  dottrine  comuniste  sovietiche,  scatenò  il 
contrattacco americano che, dal 1975, coinvolse solo due paesi: la Rhodesia del Sud 
(ora  Zimbabwe)  e  il  Sudafrica,  comprendente  anche  l’Africa  di  Sud-Ovest  (ora 
Namibia). Mentre nel centro-nord del continente si scatenavano guerre civili fondate 
su divisioni etniche, l’Africa australe era devastata dalle guerre di destabilizzazione 
iniziate da Rhodesia e Sudafrica contro Angola, Africa di Sud-Ovest e Mozambico, 
che si conclusero solo nei primi anni Novanta. 
In base ad una lettura geo-politica della storia recente del continente africano, 
è possibile confermare la tesi precedente sulla validità del modello centro-periferia 
per la vita economica, sociale e politica delle aree di confine, e proporre la possibilità 
dell’esistenza di uno spazio umano e geografico di confine che trascende lo Stato 
politico ma riflette l’identità nazionale sdoppiata a sua volta in nazionalismo etnico e 
nazionalismo africano. L’esistenza di questo spazio, teoricamente, permetterebbe di 
affermare che le popolazioni di confine in Africa, qualora esista un legame sociale 
transfrontaliero  antecedente  l’imperialismo  europeo,  sono  legate  sia  alla  società 
tradizionale (che comprende ritualità religiose e sociali, nonché il commercio) sia allo 
stato sovrano, i cui governanti hanno liberato tutta la popolazione dal giogo coloniale 
e avviato la fase di ricostruzione del paese all’interno del Nazionalismo Africano. 
Gli Stati dell’Africa meridionale: indipendenza e guerre di confine.
Un caso particolare, tuttavia, è rappresentato dagli Stati dell’Africa australe il 
cui processo di indipendenza ha seguito fasi e sorti diverse dalla maggior parte dei 
paesi africani nel periodo seguente la Seconda Guerra Mondiale: Angola, Sudafrica, 
Rhodesia del Sud, Mozambico. Anche in questi Stati, come nel resto del continente, 
le  idee  del  Nazionalismo  Africano portarono  alla  creazioni  di  movimenti  per 
l’indipendenza dal giogo coloniale, sebbene sia il Sudafrica sia la Rhodesia del Sud 
fossero già  formalmente indipendenti  dalla  madre patria dall’inizio del  XX secolo, 
mentre il Portogallo, sotto la dittatura di Salazar, rifiutava l’indipendenza alle colonie. 
In tutti i paesi, tuttavia, i movimenti anti-governativi erano di stampo comunista e si 
appoggiavano alla Cina o all’Unione Sovietica (nonché a Cuba per l’Angola) per il 
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supporto militare e politico. Quando Salazar fu deposto nel 1974, il nuovo governo 
concesse l’indipendenza alle ex colonie, ratificata nel 1975. Angola e Mozambico, 
nonostante l’influenza sovietica, erano tuttavia legate rispettivamente agli Stati Uniti 
d’America, per il petrolio, e al Sudafrica per le riserve aurifere attraverso il lavoro in 
miniera.  La  dicotomia  fra  ideologia  politica  e  dipendenza economica,  inoltre,  era 
aggravata dalle divisioni sociali in relazione al Sudafrica dell’apartheid, appoggiato 
dagli Stati Uniti in contrattacco nella spartizione delle aree di influenza per la vittoria 
della Guerra Fredda16. 
Essendo sia il Sudafrica sia la Rhodesia già indipendenti dalla madre patria, 
tuttavia,  si  dimostra  attraverso  l’analisi  storica  e  politica  che  i  movimenti  anti-
governativi non possono essere considerati ‘indipendentisti’ ma ‘riformisti’, in quanto 
avevano come obiettivo le riforme sociali  e il  cambiamento del sistema elettivo a 
maggioranza effettiva.
Similmente  l’evoluzione  politica  dell’Angola  e  del  Mozambico  incluse  la 
creazione  ex-novo e  il  finanziamento  di  movimenti  anti-governativi  da  parte  di 
Rhodesia e Sudafrica che condussero guerre di destabilizzazione, con risvolti simili 
ai conflitti civili, con lo scopo di cambiare l’assetto governativo dei rispettivi paesi17. 
Le cosiddette guerre di confine o ‘bush wars’ iniziarono per la Rhodesia nel 1975 
quando  il  Mozambico  indipendente  diede  appoggio  a  uno  dei  movimenti  per  la 
democratizzazione del  paese:  ironicamente,  lo  ZANU di  Robert  Mugabe,  l’attuale 
Presidente  dello  Zimbabwe.  Nel  Sudafrica,  invece,  iniziarono  alla  fine  degli  anni 
Sessanta con la nascita della SWAPO, l’organizzazione per l’indipendenza dell’Africa 
di Sud-Ovest, e si intensificarono dal 1975 con l’indipendenza dell’Angola. Sebbene 
per il Sudafrica, il fronte angolano fu da sempre il più impegnativo, il confine con il 
Mozambico fu teatro di  scontri  sia durante il  conflitto guidato dalla Rhodesia,  sia 
durante il conflitto sudafricano. In primo luogo, l’appoggio dato allo ZANU da parte 
del governo FRELIMO (Mozambico) scatenò la reazione immediata del governo di 
Ian  Smith  che,  oltre  alle  normali  misure  tattiche  militari,  creò  un  corpo  militare 
specializzato nella guerra di infiltrazione, gli Selous Scouts, e un gruppo militare che 
operasse all’interno del  Mozambico  capeggiato  da un ex leader  della  rivoluzione 
mozambicana di FRELIMO, André Matsangaissa, e dai suoi seguaci di etnia Ndau18. 
16 Hall & Young, 1997, Minter, 1998, Gervasi, 1984.
17 Minter, 1998.
18 Roesh, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005; Honwana, 1997.
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Il movimento fu chiamato da principio NMR (National Mozambican Resistance), poi 
noto come RENAMO dopo la firma degli accordi di pace di Nkomati, 1984, quando 
acquistò  maggiore  indipendenza  organizzativa  e  di  azione.  La  peculiarità  di 
RENAMO,  in  relazione  ad  altri  movimenti  ribelli,  fu  l’aperta  caratteristica  etnica 
imposta su tutti gli appartenenti al movimento. E’ noto, infatti, che soltanto i membri 
di origine Ndau potevano fare carriera all’interno dell’organizzazione, il dialetto Ndau 
era imposto a tutti i membri indipendentemente dalla provenienza etnico-geografica, 
e  i  riti  tradizionali  erano usati  per  infondere  coraggio o impaurire  le  vittime e gli 
schiavi19.  Questo  movimento  venne  creato,  addestrato,  e  finanziato  dal  governo 
Rhodesiano e fu complice di varie operazioni volte a destabilizzare economicamente 
il Mozambico, in particolar modo la provincia di Gaza, attaccando le infrastrutture di 
base del paese e razziando i villaggi rurali secondo le antiche tattiche militari20. Al 
momento dell’indipendenza,  inoltre,  molti  Selous Scouts vennero inviati  alla  base 
militare  di  Phalaborwa  e  il  progetto  RENAMO continuò a  essere  finanziato  dalla 
South African Defence Force (SADF). Il fronte mozambicano, per il Sudafrica, quindi 
fu  impegnativo  solo  nella  misura  in  cui  i  contatti  e  i  rifornimenti  ai  membri  della 
RENAMO si fecero più difficili dopo gli accordi di Nkomati, e il confine lungo il Parco 
Kruger era pattugliato per evitare le infiltrazioni di membri dell’ANC21.  
In  base  all’analisi  storica,  quindi,  il  confine  fra  Sudafrica,  Zimbabwe  e 
Mozambico  è  stato  testimone  di  conflitti  fra  Stati  che  utilizzavano  strategie  anti-
terroristiche  di  infiltrazione con l’obiettivo  di  destabilizzare il  Mozambico.  L’ipotesi 
derivata dalla storiografia è l’identificazione in Pafuri di uno spazio che, riprendendo 
l’ipotesi precedente, non solo trascenda l’ordine costituito, ma crei una coincidenza 
fra luogo geografico e identità culturale, simile all’idea di Stato-Nazione concepita in 
Europa,  per  cui  nonostante  gli  spostamenti  forzati  (migrazioni  canalizzate  per  le 
miniere in  Sudafrica attraverso la  TEBA; dislocazione dovuta  a guerre e conflitti; 
spostamenti  dovuti  a  siccità  e  inondazioni  straordinarie)  le  popolazioni  ritornano 
sempre nel luogo di origine. Se questa ipotesi fosse verificata, l’importanza di Pafuri 
come luogo culturale per eccellenza nel cuore del GLTFCA diventerebbe strategica 
per  la  commercializzazione  del  PP,  come  luogo  di  ritorno  alla  tradizione  e  di 
19 Lubkemann, 2005, Roesch, 1992, e Hall & Young, 1992.
20 Minter, 1998, Lubkemann, 2005, Roesch, 1992.
21 Anon, 1996, and Allport, 2007. Per maggiori dettagli sui rapporti geo-politici in Africa meridionale, 
nonché agli eventi delle ‘bush wars’, vedere il Capitolo 3.1 della tesi.
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comprensione  della  storia  che  ha  generato  alcune  delle  principali  diaspore 
sudafricane. In risposta alla domanda della citazione di Tshiyembe a inizio capitolo, 
infine, lo Stato Africano dovrebbe allontanarsi dall’idea europea di Stato-Nazione, in 
favore  della  percezione locale  di  Stato,  come governo,  e  nazione,  come identità 
culturale,  che  viene  rispettata  dal  governo  centrale  promotore,  come sempre,  di 
un’idea  di  nazionalità  totale  che  abbraccia  tutte  le  etnie:  lo  stato  multi-nazionale 
discusso,  appunto,  da  Tshiyembe  (2001).  Paradossalmente  questa  fu  e,  in 
proporzione minore, rimane la politica di FRELIMO, percepita dai Mozambicani che 
hanno sopportato la guerra e tuttora sopportano la povertà, ma non dello Zimbabwe, 
dove le divisioni etniche furono all’origine dell’eccidio dei Matabele, e attualmente 
delle divisioni politiche e degli abusi sociali.
LA POLITICA DELLA CONSERVAZIONE SUDAFRICANA: I PARCHI TRANSFRONTALIERI.
La lettura attenta della storia del Sudafrica rivela che la conservazione della 
natura  ha  da  sempre  svolto  anche un ruolo  politico,  nella  protezione  dei  confini 
nazionali. La creazione del Parco Kruger avvalla questa teoria dimostrando che, a 
prescindere dall’inconfutabile disegno di conservazione alla base del Parco portato 
avanti  da  Stevenson-Hamilton,  la  preservazione dell’identità  nazionale  e dei  suoi 
confini  ha  avuto  un  ruolo  non  trascurabile  sulla  sua  gestione  ed  estensione.  In 
generale, è bene notare che la conservazione della natura, nata negli Stati Uniti per 
la fruizione turistica22 si sviluppò gradualmente in altri dove, invece, prevalse la logica 
della  protezione  totale,  con  conseguente  esclusione  delle  popolazioni  umane.  In 
Sudafrica, la necessità di conservare il patrimonio naturale derivò dalla caccia non-
regolamentata agli animali da trofeo praticata dai coloni, ma la strategia di esclusione 
colpì  principalmente le  popolazioni  autoctone che usavano le  risorse naturali  per 
sopravvivere23. La presenza di bracconieri di origine europea che, a Pafuri, vivevano 
ai margini della legalità sono sintomatici di un fenomeno degenerato, la caccia per 
trofeo,  che  toccava  prevalentemente  la  comunità  di  origine  europea,  mentre  le 
popolazioni  locali  servivano  come  tracker e  portatori24.  Tuttavia,  furono  queste  a 
subire il maggiore danno, in quanto vennero espulse dalle aree incluse nelle riserve 
22 Warren A e Goldsmith F.B, ed, 1983, Conservation in perspective, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 
Chichester. 
23 Cencini, 1999.
24 Bulpin, 1954.
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che poi formarono il  Parco, e spostate in luoghi più aridi e difficili  da sfruttare. In 
teoria, la rimozione delle comunità locali dalle zone di confine che occupavano può 
anche essere letta come una strategia di  separazione delle popolazioni  locali  già 
smembrate dal  confine fra in due o più Stati.  L’impero di  Soshangaane, infatti  si 
estendeva dalla provincia di Gaza in Mozambico, fino al confine occidentale con il 
Sudafrica,  includendo  il  Bantustan  di  Gazankulo,  oggi  parte  della  Provincia  del 
Limpopo,  creando  dei  legami  di  vassallaggio  con  le  popolazioni  all’interno  di 
quest’ultimo. Il  Parco Kruger servì  a dividere queste popolazioni appartenenti  allo 
stesso impero e includerle nello Stato di nuova formazione. La difesa del confine 
lungo il selvaggio Mozambico, dove i Portoghesi non avevano ancora penetrato tutta 
la vastità dell’entroterra mozambicano, era inoltre di fondamentale importanza per il 
Sudafrica emergente dalla Guerra Boera. Nei decenni successivi, la creazione della 
TEBA come agenzia  unica  per  il  reclutamento  di  minatori  poneva  il  problema di 
fermare gli  adescatori  che facevano clandestinamente emigrare locali  in  cerca di 
lavoro25, il Parco e i suoi rangers formarono un deterrente relativamente forte contro 
le  migrazioni  illegali,  anche  perché  simultaneamente  la  TEBA  offriva  maggiori 
garanzie e al confine era possibile recarsi legalmente in Sudafrica per le relazioni 
socio-culturali  delle  popolazioni  autoctone.  L’estensione  a  nord  del  Parco,  infine, 
venne decisa contestualmente all’indipendenza Mozambicana, al supporto all’ANC, 
nonché  all’imminente  sconfitta  Rhodesiana  a  causa  delle  pressioni  britanniche, 
statunitensi e sudafricane per la devoluzione dei poteri  ai  movimenti  rivoluzionari, 
fino ad allora trattati come terroristi. Inoltre, lo spostamento del clan Makuleke oltre i 
confini del Parco in direzione sud riuscì ad attenuare, almeno temporaneamente, i 
rapporti  fra  comunità  locali  che da un secolo avevano occupato quel  territorio  di 
confine, noto come Crooks Corner data la qualità delle persone che sceglievano di 
abitarvi e dei traffici di locali e stranieri.
Lungi dal costituire un’eccezione alla regola, la conservazione transfrontaliera 
appare  nell’ottica  geo-politica  come  strumento  di  gestione  del  territorio,  che 
necessariamente richiede l’intervento politico per gli accordi fra paesi26. Tuttavia, la 
conservazione transfrontaliera venne accolta e fortemente incoraggiata dalle lobby di 
potere che già supportavano il WWF27, proprio all’indomani delle elezioni che videro 
25 Ibid.
26 Duffy 1997 e 2001.
27 Ramutsindela, 2004, e Dzingirai, 2004.
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Nelson Mandela diventare il nuovo presidente sudafricano, e della fine della guerra 
mozambicana che aveva stremato il  paese e le sue risorse naturali,  ma lo aveva 
incluso nel circuito delle donazioni internazionali28. Nonostante gli anni di guerra, il 
Sudafrica era rimasto un paese ricco la cui economia era solidamente fondata sulle 
industrie nate da anni di isolamento politico ed economico, a causa delle sanzioni 
ONU collegate al regime di apartheid. La permanenza delle miniere e la riapertura di 
alcune postazioni di reclutamento della TEBA, assieme alla crescita di altri settori ad 
alta richiesta di manodopera, dall’industria all’agricoltura, riaccese il fuoco mai spento 
delle  migrazioni,  che  le  guerre  civili  avevano  provocato  specialmente  in  zone  di 
confine. Nell’ultima decade, così, il  tasso di immigrazione illegale dai paesi poveri 
confinanti,  primi fra tutti  il  Mozambico, lo Zimbabwe, lo Swaziland e il  Lesotho, è 
aumentato  tanto  da  focalizzare  la  xenofobia  sudafricana  sulle  connessioni  fra 
crescita della criminalità e dei flussi migratori29. Nel contempo, le transazioni illegali 
sono aumentate, in particolar modo per quanto riguarda armi, vetture e droga con il 
Mozambico30.  E il  peggioramento economico in Zimbabwe e in Mozambico hanno 
acutizzato il commercio informale dal Sudafrica. A partire dalla fine dei conflitti civili, 
quindi, c’è stata una intensificazione dei rapporti informali e illegali fra Sudafrica e 
paesi  confinanti,  specialmente  lungo  il  confine  orientale.  La  conservazione 
transfrontaliera,  quindi,  viene  incoraggiata  da  organizzazioni  nazionali  e 
internazionali  in  un  momento  in  cui  i  confini  nazionali  sono percepiti  come linee 
fragili, e le relazioni transfrontaliere fra popolazioni di confine si sono intensificate per 
ragioni sociali ed economiche. 
Per  quanto  riguarda  il  GLTFCA,  il  trattato  costitutivo  e  le  pagine  del  sito 
internet forniscono un’idea del PP come un area la cui principale utilità ecologica 
indiretta è sollevare il Parco Kruger dalla pressione di elefanti e altre specie animali 
che, localmente, non sono in via di estinzione ma superano la capacità di carico, con 
la scusante di ristabilire antiche rotte migratorie che sono esistite, in base all’unico 
studio esistente, solo per due sottopopolazioni di zebre e di gnu, rispettivamente31. 
Poiché il  culling è vietato, infatti, il Parco mira a condividere i propri animali con il 
28 Hanlon, 1991, è l’iniziatore delle teorie sugli aiuti al Mozambico in epoca di conflitto, tuttavia altre 
sono seguite che vanno da infondate teorie di cospirazione a provate implicazioni politiche. Vedere i 
capitoli 2.4.2; 3.2; 3.4.
29 Bayart, 2006, Crush, 2000, e Thornton, 1994
30 Numerosi rapporti sull’argomento sono stati pubblicati dall’Istituto per le Ricerche sulla Sicurezza 
(Africa) di Pretoria. 
31 Anderson, 2002, fare riferimento per un’analisi più dettagliata al Capitolo 5.3 della tesi.
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vicino Mozambico, privato della fauna locale dalle penurie della guerra e della fame, 
da un lato risolvendo i propri problemi, e dall’altro ripopolando il bush mozambicano. 
Similmente, pur proiettando l’idea di conservazione senza frontiere, è necessario un 
attento controllo ai confini degli Stati ed entro i confini del parco per assicurare la fine 
del  bracconaggio  che  ancora  influenza  queste  zone  soprattutto  in  Mozambico, 
nell’area  a  sud  del  fiume  Oliante,  limite  meridionale  del  Parco  Nazionale  del 
Limpopo32. Lo stesso sistema di controllo, tuttavia, si occupa anche di ogni potenziale 
danno  alla  flora  e  fauna  selvatica,  includendo  i  tradizionali  flussi  migratori  delle 
popolazioni locali  e regionali  verso il  Sudafrica, le attività economiche informali  e, 
indirettamente, i rapporti transfrontalieri socio-economici di base per la sussistenza 
delle  comunità  di  confine  nei  tre  paesi.  Si  tratta,  anche  in  questo  caso,  di  una 
procedura  che  riuscirebbe  a  raggiungere  due  scopi  con  un  unico  mezzo.  Di 
conseguenza,  nonostante  l’obiettivo  dei  favorire  l’unità  culturale  fra  popolazioni 
confinanti  nei  tre paesi,  l’implementazione di  controlli  severi  per la sicurezza e la 
creazione di corridoi ecologici non recintati porterà ad un rilocazione, relativamente 
forzata, delle popolazioni di confine. Il risultato è quello di allontanare sempre di più i 
depositari  della  storia  locale,  creando  discontinuità  culturale  per  favorire  quella 
ecologica.  Considerando il  grado di  pianificazione ecologica  del  GLTFCA,  l’attivo 
coinvolgimento di grandi donatori (FMI e Banco Mondiale) le cui pratiche richiedono 
la partecipazione delle popolazioni locali, le quantità di studi multidisciplinari svolti 
sull’argomento,  e  l’attiva  partecipazione  governativa  sembra  improbabile  che,  nel 
nuovo Sudafrica, un impatto socio-economico e culturale di tale portata sia sfuggito 
alle agenzie governative e internazionali, nonché al comitato di gestione del GLTFCA 
e alla  Peace Park Foundation.  Sembra più  verosimile  l’ipotesi  di  un progetto  dal 
doppio-scopo: la conservazione e la promozione, sulla carta, della pace fra paesi da 
un lato, la sicurezza dei confini sudafricani e della sua economia dall’altro. Seguendo 
questo filone, la ricerca si propose di valutare quale può essere l’impatto seguendo 
l’attuale sistema di gestione, e portare soluzioni derivate dall’analisi di terreno. 
L’approccio di geografia politica per la formulazione delle ipotesi di base per la 
ricerca ha permesso un’attenta analisi storica e antropologica della regione studiata, 
32 Le interviste al Capo Ispettore Coetzer, Polizia di Skukuza, e alla Famiglia DuPont, della Xonguile 
Game Reserve, rivela un tasso non ininfluente di bracconieri a sud del fiume Oliphants, sia in territorio 
privato sia nel Parco Nazionale Kruger, le cui prede principali sono ippopotami ed elefanti nel Kruger e 
antilopi in Mozambico.
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l’Africa Meridionale, e dei rapporti internazionali fra gli Stati coinvolti nell’istituzione 
del  GLTFCA.  A partire  dalle  teorie  sull’affermazione dello  Stato-Nazione,  e  sulle 
differenze  fra  confini  e  frontiere,  si  è  arrivati  a  delineare  la  storia  della  regione 
meridionale seguendo un percorso separato rispetto al resto del continente, sebbene 
incastonato nei vari contesti che hanno formato l’attuale status quo: il colonialismo, 
l’imperialismo e l’indipendenza. Infine, questo approccio ha permesso di rivalutare la 
creazione  del  GLTFCA  attraverso  le  scelte  strategiche  dei  paesi  coinvolti,  in 
particolare  il  Sudafrica,  e  il  ruolo  delle  lobby  di  potere  che  hanno  iniziato  e 
appoggiato la conservazione transfrontaliera.
METODOLOGIA DI RICERCA
La  ricerca  è  stata  ideata  seguendo  il  carattere  multidisciplinare  che 
caratterizza le aree di confine33, e ambisce a produrre una analisi teorica e pratica 
della zona di confine di Pafuri come centro nevralgico dell’economia informale che 
lega il Sudafrica, al Mozambico e allo Zimbabwe, destinato quindi a due scenari: (1) 
l’assunzione di un carattere strategico per l’implementazione di un vero TFCA e PP, 
grazie  alle  sue caratteristiche  geo-fisiche e  storico-culturali;  (2)  venire  annientato 
secondo la logica di sicurezza del GLTFCA, che confermerebbe l’ipotesi secondo cui 
il  Sudafrica mira a una espansione economica ad est,  attraverso l’acquisizione di 
territorio attraverso lo Stato o i privati, pur difendendo l’integrità dei propri confini. In 
questo capitolo verrà presentata la metodologia usata per la ricerca, partendo dalla 
ricerca  bibliografica,  fino  ad  arrivare  all’analisi  dei  dati  raccolti  con  l’indagine  di 
terreno.
Le fonti primarie e secondarie
Lo studio fondato sull’analisi geo-politica dei fenomeni storici ha permesso di 
elaborare  concetti  di  base,  utilizzati  per  la  creazione  di  ipotesi  di  ricerca.  La 
bibliografia usata è composta principalmente di fonti bibliografiche secondarie, che 
partono dagli  anni Sessanta fino ad arrivare al  2007. Le fonti  primarie, infatti  ,  si 
limitano ai testi chiave della Geografia Politica (Muir, 1975, Agnew, 1992, Pounds, 
1992,  e  Glassner,  1995)  per  identificare  le  caratteristiche  generali  degli  elementi 
centrali per la ricerca, cui è seguito lo studio di testi antropologici e multidisciplinari 
33 Donnan & Wilson, 1999.
XIV
sullo studio delle frontiere in generale (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Wilson & Donnan, 
1998)  e  sulle  migrazioni  transfrontaliere  in  Africa  australe  (Whitman,  2000; 
McDonald,  2000).  Infine  i  manuali  sulla  conservazione  transfrontaliera  sono  stati 
analizzati con particolare interesse Peddle et al., 2004, sulla sicurezza nelle aree di 
conservazione transfrontaliera. Un testo prezioso per comprendere le politiche del 
Mozambico indipendente è stata la raccolta dei discorsi pronunciati dal Presidente 
Samora Machel,  durante  la  lotta  politica  armata,  ai  congressi  di  partito.  Le  fonti 
secondarie principali, invece, sono i testi di storia europea e africana, per ottenere 
una visione generale degli eventi che caratterizzarono e unirono i due continenti in 
epoca antica e moderna (Reader, 1994, e Formigoni, 2000). A questi è seguita una 
ricerca approfondita  di  testi  riportanti  indagine storiche sulle popolazioni  principali 
dell’area  studiata,  che  risalgono  agli  anni  Cinquanta  e  Sessanta,  principalmente. 
Successivamente  è stata  effettuata  la  raccolta  di  articoli  sulle  migrazioni  verso  il 
Sudafrica, che colpirono il Mozambico in epoca pre e post coloniale, per valutare il 
risvolto  economico,  politico  e  locale.  Infine  le  ricerche pubblicate  sul  Mozambico 
indipendente sono state studiate per trarre informazioni sull’impatto della guerra nelle 
comunità rurale, sui rapporti est-ovest a scala locale, regionale e globale durante la 
guerra  e  i  risvolti  socio-economici  attuali  (Minter,  1998,  Pitcher,  2002,  e  Hall  & 
Young, 1997). Infine, durante la permanenza in Mozambico sono stati raccolti articoli 
di giornali che riflettessero il grado di informazione sullo stato di avanzamento del 
Parco  Transfrontaliero;  il  Sudafrica  e  i  suoi  rapporti  con  gli  immigrati  e  i  paesi 
confinanti; le politiche di integrazione economica nella regione del SADC (Southern 
African Development Committee).
La cartografia
La cartografia raccolta è frutto di una selettiva ricerca su internet usando il 
motore di ricerca Google. Le mappe delineanti il Parco Transfrontaliero e il Parco del 
Limpopo  sono  state  donate  dall’Unità  per  le  TFCA  del  Ministero  del  Turismo 
Mozambicana.  Infine  le  altre  mappe sono  state  create  utilizzando  i  risultati  della 
ricerca  attraverso  Google  Earth  e  GPSVisualiser.  La  tecnica  di  riproduzione 
cartografica dei dati ha seguito le innovazioni portate dal Community Integrated GIS, 
un metodo realizzato in Sudafrica e ancora nella sua fase iniziale che vuole utilizzare 
il  GIS per l’analisi  di  dati che variano dall’analisi sociologica, a quella economica, 
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all’ecologia e alla geografica fisica, per risolvere situazioni conflittuali fra popolazioni 
e governo, particolarmente in seno alla conservazione transfrontaliera: lo scopo è 
quello  di  creare  semplici   mappe  contenenti  dati  derivanti  da  indagini  etno-
geografiche, tali da permetterne la comprensione da parte delle popolazioni locali e 
iniziare un dialogo sulla gestione del territorio e l’identificazione di potenziali conflitti34.
L’analisi di terreno: metodologia qualitativa
La permanenza di un anno e mezzo in Mozambico ha permesso di creare una 
metodologia qualitativa che non fosse solo basata su interviste programmate e focus 
groups organizzati,  ma  di  creare  dei  contesti  di  discussione  attraverso  la 
pianificazione di  una serie di  incontri  con informatori chiave (Dr. Jorge Ferrão, ex 
coordinatore internazionale dell’GLTFCA), transect walks con persone importanti per 
la conservazione in Africa meridionale (Ted Reilly, fondatore di Big Game Parks, e 
ideatore  della  legge  per  la  conservazione  della  flora  e  fauna  selvatica  dello 
Swaziland), e conversazioni informali con persone coinvolte direttamente o meno nel 
GLTFCA  (la  famiglia  Du  Pont,  proprietaria  della  Xhonguile  Game  Reserve, 
confinante  con  il  Kruger  a  sul  del  Parco  del  Limpopo;  Dr.  Marcus  Wishart,  ex 
Conservation  manager  per  ARA-SUL,  l’agenzia  per  le  acque  del  Mozambico 
territoriale incaricata della ristrutturazione della diga di Massingir; Dr. Harry van der 
Linde dell’African Wildlife Foundation; Chief. Insp. Coetzer, della Polizia di Skukuza, 
a capo del programma di sicurezza transfrontaliera; Dr. John Hutton, dell’agenzia 
mozambicana Impacto; Dr. Billy Swanepoel, capo del programma di ripopolamento 
del  Parco  Nazionale  del  Limpopo).  Con  l’eccezione  degli  ufficiali  di  polizia,  gli 
informatori  chiave  legati  alle  aree  di  conservazione  hanno  una  formazione 
principalmente ecologica e gestionale, come richiesto dalla posizione che ricoprono. 
La geografia, quindi, diventa un elemento territoriale legato all’ecologia, all’idrologia, 
alla geomorfologia e alle necessità gestionali, ed entra in gioco a livello secondario 
solo nella pianificazione. La mancanza dell’impronta geografica, infatti, si rivela alla 
semplice osservazione delle  mappe che illustrano la  pianificazione del  Parco del 
Limpopo e del GLTCA, per quanto riguarda la geografia umana del territorio35. Infine, 
attraverso  varie  esperienze  di  volontariato  locale,  sono  riuscita  a  ricevere  molte 
informazioni su argomenti interenti la ricerca, anche se indirettamente, attraverso i 
34 Jones, undated.
35 Vedi Mappa 1.1 e Mappa 1.2 nel testo della tesi.
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rapporti  continuativi  con persone conosciute in loco, e attraverso alcuni viaggi per 
motivi personali o di lavoro. La creazione spontanea, dato il numero consistente di 
ricercatori sul TFCA, di un gruppo di ricerca locale ha contribuito negli ultimi mesi a 
creare un importante sistema di peer-review. 
Per quanto riguarda le analisi  di  terreno,  infine, le tecniche etnografiche di 
osservazione diretta, registrazione degli eventi in un diario giornaliero, e discussioni 
con  membri  della  comunità  ed  eventuali  visitatori  si  sono  rivelate  molto  utili  per 
creare sia un confronto con i  dati  quantitativi  sia una base di  comprensione e di 
identificazione dei teorie nella prassi quotidiana. In questo senso l’analisi qualitativa 
si è rivelata essenziale per identificare le relazioni fra famiglie all’interno del villaggio, 
nonché le differenze fra rapporti gerarchici governativi, le classi sociali e le divisioni 
famigliari. Inoltre, grazie alla metodologia qualitativa è stato possibile apprendere i 
pochi  frammenti  di  storia  culturale  ricordati  dagli  anziani  del  villaggio,  e  le 
conoscenze tradizionali della flora locale, che sono stati preziosi termini di paragone 
con le descrizioni presenti nella letteratura.
Le informazioni raccolte attraverso l’analisi  qualitativa,  quindi,  hanno contribuito in 
maniera diretta e indiretta alla formazione delle ipotesi e all’analisi delle fonti primarie 
e  secondarie  utilizzate  per  la  stesura  della  tesi.  Non  tutte  le  fonti  sono  state 
direttamente  citate  nel  testo  ma sono  riscontrabili  nei  racconti  storici,  nell’analisi 
socio-economica e nelle interpretazioni di eventi e teorie. 
L’analisi di terreno: metodologia quantitativa
Considerando che nessuno aveva  mai  compiuto  un’indagine  quantitativa  a 
Pafuri,  per  individuare  la  dipendenza dal  confine  delle  varie  comunità  locali,  era 
evidente che qualsiasi aspirazione propositiva per risolvere il presupposto conflitto 
fra priorità gestionali del GLTFCA e sviluppo socio-economico delle comunità locali 
doveva fondarsi sullo studio approfondito della località e dei suoi abitanti. Dopo le 
prime due visite preliminari, seguendo l’approccio etnografico, è stato preparato un 
questionario da sottomettere a un membro per famiglia, durante una permanenza 
estesa  in loco. Conoscendo la tradizione Shangaana e Nguni (il ceppo etnico che 
accomuna gli abitanti del confine orientale del Sudafrica), ogni famiglia corrisponde 
geograficamente  a  un  gruppo  di  case,  monolocali,  ciascuna  ospitante  un  micro 
nucleo famigliare (i  genitori,  il  primogenito  e  la moglie,  i  figli  fino alla pubertà,  le 
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sorelle  e  i  fratelli  non sposati  del  primogenito).  Che il  rispondente fosse uomo o 
donna  era  indifferente  ai  fini  della  ricerca,  tuttavia  fu  sorprendente  avere  come 
interlocutore alcune giovani ragazzine, quando i genitori fossero assenti, per lavorare 
nei  campi.  Poiché  le  interviste  venivano  condotte  prevalentemente  di  mattina,  i 
rispondenti erano spesso anziani che erano sopravvissuti alle guerre e al lavoro in 
miniera,  tuttavia  pochi  furono  in  grado  di  raccontare  le  origini  della  nazione 
Shangaana. 
Il  questionario,  incluso  come  Allegato  7,  è  suddiviso  in  quattro  sezioni, 
ciascuna  riferita  ad  argomenti  precisi.  La  prima  sezione  corrisponde  alla  ricerca 
demografica,  e  si  prefigge  di  capire  il  grado  di  scolarizzazione  degli  abitanti,  le 
strategie  di  sussistenza,  e  il  possesso di  un documento di  identità.  Quest’ultimo, 
analizzato alla luce dei movimenti transfrontalieri, indica il livello di obbedienza alle 
leggi  governative  e  la  percezione  del  confine.  La  seconda  sezione  riguarda  il 
commercio ed è fondata sull’ipotesi che il commercio di prodotti agricoli o provenienti 
dal Sudafrica, con lo Zimbabwe, fosse molto importante per l’economia locale. La 
terza sezione è dedicata alle migrazioni per lavoro e ambisce a differenziare i luoghi, 
le professioni, la frequenza del ritorno, e la frequenza dell’invio di soldi e beni alla 
famiglia. L’ipotesi, in questo caso, è che come in Zimabwe le cosiddette remittances 
(rimesse) costituissero un aiuto sostanzioso alla gestione economica familiare.  La 
quarta sezione riguarda le relazioni familiari fra paesi confinanti e si basa sull’ipotesi 
che se le relazioni lavorative siano più propense verso il Sudafrica, quelle familiari lo 
siano verso lo Zimbabwe, dove l’attraversamento del confine è poco controllato, data 
l’inesistenza di  una frontiera ufficiale a Pafuri,  ma smorzato dalla presenza di  un 
campo  minato  che  si  estende  da  Crooks’  Corner  fino  alla  frontiera  ufficiale  a 
Chiqualaquala.  
I dati ottenuti sono stati analizzati con SPSS (Statistic Package for the Social 
Sciences),  al  fine  di  ottenere  una  visione  comprensiva  dei  vari  fenomeni  e  dei 
collegamenti  fra  loro,  e  alcuni  sono  stati  georeferenziati  con  ArcExplorer  e 
GPSVisualizer  per  testare  alcune  ipotesi  geografiche,  come  la  correlazione  fra 
posizione della famiglia e inclinazione al commercio o alla migrazione verso uno o 
più paesi confinanti.
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AREA GEOGRAFICA DI STUDIO
Il Mozambico si estende per oltre 2000km in direzione Nord-Est dal Sudafrica 
e  lo  Swaziland  fino  alla  Tanzania,  toccando  Zimbabwe,  Zambia  e  Malawi 
nell’entroterra. Lo sviluppo del commercio già in epoca antica si tradusse con l’avvio 
coloniale  nello  sviluppo  costiero  a  discapito  delle  regioni  interne,  difficili  da 
raggiungere se non con trasporto fluviale36.
Mappa 1: La Provincia di Gaza - modificata per gli scopi della presentazione della tesi.
36 Modello di sviluppo riconosciuto da Griffiths, 1986.
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Lo  stesso  modello  economico  si  nota  attualmente,  visto  che  la  maggiore 
concentrazione  si  ha  lungo  la  costa,  grazie  soprattutto  al  turismo rinato  dopo la 
guerra civile. Nonostante il gruppo militare anti-colonialista, FRELIMO, sia cresciuto 
all’interno della filosofia socio-economica Marxista-Leninista, le guerre e le carestie 
hanno  costretto  il  governo  ad  affacciarsi  ad  occidente  per  evitare  il  collasso 
demografico ed economico a partire dalla prima metà degli anni Ottanta37.L’approccio 
liberale  del  governo  è  cresciuto  nel  tempo  fino  all’attuale  gestione  prettamente 
consumistica,  anziché  socialista,  nonostante  le  politiche  votate,  sulla  carta,  alla 
riduzione della povertà assoluta, alla lotta contro l’AIDS-HIV, allo sfruttamento dei 
minori e alla violenza sulle donne e i bambini38.  FRELIMO è riuscita da un lato a 
creare un senso di ‘orgoglio mozambicano’ che però si rivela solo nei giorni di festa, 
durante  le  elezioni  e  in  antitesi  ad  eventuali  ingerenze  non  gradite,  attraverso 
un’efficace  campagna  propagandistica39.  Se  il  ricordo  delle  barbarie  dei  banditi 
RENAMO40 è ormai offuscato dalla propaganda per la ricostruzione, quello del ruolo 
del colonialismo europeo è inscritto nella memoria di molti nelle zone urbane, come 
in quelle rurali, influenzando spesso i rapporti fra locali e stranieri, nonché le strategie 
di investimento straniero promosse dal governo per risollevare l’economia. 
La provincia di Gaza, fra la provincia di Maputo e quella di Inhambane, confina 
ad ovest direttamente con il Sudafrica, a nord con lo Zimbabwe, ed è demarcata ad 
est dalla provincia di Manica e ha come capoluogo Xai-Xai, vedi Mappa 1, un tempo 
zona balenare importante presso le foci dello storico fiume Limpopo, che nasce in 
Sudafrica, e ne costeggia il confine con Botswana e Zimbabwe, fino ad arrivare in 
Mozambico dove devia verso sud e l’oceano. Al momento, tuttavia, Xai-Xai altro non 
è che un capoluogo amministrativo essendo stata superata da altre località turistiche 
quali  Bilene  e  Chidenguele,  e  le  straordinarie  piene  del  Limpopo  del  2000-2001 
hanno peggiorato l’aspetto della città. La provincia di Gaza prende il nome dal nonno 
di  Soshangaane41,  che  fondò il  suo impero dal  Limpopo allo  Zambesi,  una volta 
37 Pitcher, 2002; Hanlon, 1991, Hall & Young, 1997.
38 Vedi il testo del PARPA, per la riduzione della povertà assoluta nel paese (in bibliografia) e Falck et 
al., 2003.
39 Attraverso la partecipazione a tutte le manifestazioni dei giorni di festa sia internazionali (Festa della 
donna)  sia  nazionali  (Festa  della  donna  mozambicana),  nonché  l’osservazione  della  merce 
propagandistica distribuita durante queste occasioni e in vendita in alcuni  negozi  popolari,  è stato 
possibile valutare il grado di controllo sulla popolazione che è tuttora esercitato dal governo.
40 Il termine ‘bandito’ in Mozambico si riferisce solo ed esclusivamente ai guerriglieri della RENAMO, e 
per estensione ai sovversivi e ai criminali, vedi anche Lubkemann (2005) e Roesch (1992).
41 Beach, 1974.
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fuggito da Chaka Zulu durante le ‘guerre degli  Nguni’,  come vengono ricordate a 
Pafuri.  All’apice  della  sua  espansione  territoriale,  Soshangaane  dominava  un 
territorio esteso da Bilene fino a Chimoio, sottomettendo la popolazione Ndau pre-
insediata. Questo elemento non è irrilevante, considerando che la provincia di Gaza 
durante  le  guerre  ospitava  anche  i  guerriglieri  Ndau  della  RENAMO,  i  quali  si 
servivano di questo corridoio per i rifornimenti dal Sudafrica. Nell’estremo nord-ovest 
di Gaza si trova il Posto amministrativo di Pafuri, un nome che indica non solo la 
parte mozambicana, ma anche la controparte Sudafricana e Zimbabwana, a causa 
della continuità etnica fra i tre stati. La popolazione di Pafuri, come spazio geografico 
che  prescinde  i  confini  politici,  infatti  è  principalmente  Shangaan  nei  tre  stati. 
Tuttavia,  sia  in  Sudafrica  sia  in  Zimbabwe,  gli  Shangaan  condividono  le  terre 
comunitarie  con altre  due popolazioni  i  Venda e i  Matabele  (ceppo Makuleke in 
Sudafrica).  Solo  in  Mozambico,  quindi,  la  popolazione  è  puramente  Shangaana. 
L’angolino  di  Pafuri  dove  il  Luhvuhvu  confluisce  con  il  Limpopo  è  più  noto  agli 
appassionati  di  storia  sudafricana  come  Crooks’  Corner (ovvero  l’angolo  dei 
malfattori). Questo angolo apparteneva al territorio dei Makuleke, e proprio a pochi 
passi dall’angolo geografico, si trovava il negozio Makuleke gestito, secondo Bulpin, 
da due europei che si occupavano anche di organizzare il commercio fra bracconieri 
e potenziali compratori, protetti dal Capo Makuleke42. La località era la preferita non 
solo per la vasta quantità di animali da trofei che si incontravano in Mozambico e 
Zimbabwe, ma anche perché bastava spostare il demarcatore di frontiera di pochi 
metri per confondere la Polizia in cerca dei malfattori43. Sebbene quasi un secolo sia 
passato dai tempi dei bracconieri, di Bvekenya (che si è lasciato dietro un numero 
discreto  di  prole)  e  del  negozio  Makuleke,  e  nonostante  il  forzato  trasloco  delle 
famiglie Makuleke nel 1969, la zona mantiene la sua aura e la sua nomea per essere 
il centro di molte attività al confine fra il formale e l’informale, come sottolineano gli 
ufficiali  di  frontiera, la cui  esistenza è direttamente dipendente dalla presenza del 
confine44. Lo stabilimento dell’agenzia della TEBA per il reclutamento di manovalanza 
per le miniere, agli  inizi del XIX secolo, fu il primo segno fisico della divisione fra 
Sudafrica e Mozambico, nonché la prima presenza ufficiale nella zona di Pafuri. La 
42 Bulpin, 1954.
43 Ibid. 
44 Intervista con Chief Insp. Tshambalala (SAPS) e Chefe Serrano (Immigrazione del GoM), vedi 
anche Capitolo 3.3.1 della tesi.
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presenza  della  TEBA,  tuttavia,  incrementò  il  carattere  di  centralità  per  i  flussi 
migratori già mostrato dall’area di Pafuri, raccogliendo gli immigrati provenienti dallo 
Zambia e dal Malawi. Questo carattere di centralità è ancora presente nonostante la 
chiusura  dei  centri  TEBA,  con le  migrazioni  illegali  attraverso  il  Parco  Nazionale 
Kruger, il cui elemento deterrente è quasi totalmente scomparso nella mentalità degli 
emigranti45. L’attale pianificazione del GLTFCA, lungi dallo sfruttare questa ricchezza 
storico-culturale,  rischia  di  uccidere  il  carattere  transfrontaliero  della  località  che 
potrebbe simboleggiare l’intero parco vista la storia di violenza e dislocazione delle 
comunità  locali,  con  la  creazione di  un  corridoio  ecologico  non recintato  lungo il 
confine  fra  Zimbabwe  e  Mozambico,  che  è  stato  recentemente  sminato.  Questo 
danno  sociale,  inoltre,  rischia  di  avere  conseguenze  gravi  sulle  strategie  di 
sussistenza  locali,  rendendo  necessaria  un’analisi  accurata  delle  possibilità  di 
conflitto e delle strategie di mitigazione che la ricerca si è prefissa di individuare.
La comunità prescelta per l’indagine campione è Dumela, un villaggio di 89 
famiglie (allargate) che si trova a nord del fiume Limpopo, a poche centinaia di metri 
dal  confine  Zimbabwano,  lungo  le  rotte  principali  che  dal  Sudafrica  portano  in 
Mozambico, sia in direzione nord verso Chiqualaquala, sia in direzione sud verso la 
costa,  con  un  collegamento  a  Mapai  in  direzione  est  per  raggiungere  il  Parco 
Nazionale  di  Banchine  e  Vilankulos,  sulla  costa.  A  Mapai,  inoltre,  c’è  uno  degli 
ingressi  del  Parco  Nazionale  del  Limpopo,  nato  dalle  ceneri  dell’area  di  caccia 
Coutada 16, che permette di raggiungere attraverso il parco il villaggio di Massingir, 
centro  turistico  prioritario  del  parco,  da  cui  ci  si  ricongiunge  alla  Chokwe-
Chiqualaquala  per  raggiungere  la  costa  a  Macia.  Infine,  esiste  un  sentiero  poco 
battuto  che da Dumela,  in  direzione ovest,  raggiunge la  comunità  di  Sengwe  in 
Zimbabwe, attraverso il futuro corridoio ecologico. La locazione del villaggio rispetto 
alle  vie  di  comunicazione  principali  e  secondarie,  la  sua  storia  di  migrazioni  e 
spostamenti forzati dovuti a guerre e carestie, l’incongruità fra la povertà visibile e 
quella dichiarata durante le visite, nonché la presenza di tre negozi, mentre l’unico 
esistente alla frontiera per  gli  ufficiali  governativi  ha chiuso,  generano ragionevoli 
dubbi  sul  ruolo  ricoperto  dal  questo  villaggio,  apparentemente  insignificante,  nel 
mercato  transfrontaliero  che  unisce  i  tre  paesi  confinanti.  La  povertà  dichiarata, 
45 Mpofu et al., 1999, interviste con giovani adulti di Dumela in preparazione per il viaggio verso il 
Sudafrica (Settembre, 2006)
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infatti,  potrebbe far  pensare davvero  a una zona di  confine remota dagli  instabili 
contatti con il mondo esterno. Al contrario, la sua locazione geografica, al crocevia di 
tre  vie  di  comunicazione  strategiche,  la  presenza  di  tre  negozi,  dove  per 
dichiarazione degli  intervistati  la povertà è devastante,  e la regolarità di  mercanti 
dallo Zimbabwe, dalla Provincia di Gaza, e i flussi migratori, dimostrano il carattere 
centrale di Dumela e, per estensione di Pafuri, nonché la ‘relativa’ povertà rispetto ad 
altre zone limitrofe, più lontane dal confine o dalle vie di comunicazione principali.
ANALISI DEI DATI
Basata sulle informazioni ottenute dall’analisi quantitativa di Dumela, basata 
sui questionari a domande prevalentemente chiuse, e l’analisi qualitativa di Dumela, 
del Posto Amministrativo di Pafuri e delle zone limitrofe sia in Sudafrica, sia lungo il 
confine  con  lo  Zimbabwe,  l’analisi  sarà  comparativa  usando  le  informazioni 
secondarie derivata dalla poca letteratura disponibile su Pafuri, principalmente Mpofu 
et  al.,  1999,  che  hanno  condotto  il  Participatory  Rural  Appraisal  nella  Sengwe 
Communal Land, in Zimbabwe, e indirettamente Koch et al., 1995, e Connor, 2003, 
che hanno condotto alcune ricerche di stampo sociologico su Pafuri in Mozambico.
La demografia
Dumela è composta da 89 gruppi famigliari, per un totale di circa 130 famiglie, 
il 44,3 % dei quali è composto da 6 a 10 persone, mentre solo il 10,2% ha più di 15 
persone. La distribuzione per fascia di età è stata valutata qualitativamente, e si è 
osservato che gli adolescenti maschi sono quasi completamente assenti dal villaggio. 
Più  che  una  causa  delle  migrazioni  causate  dalla  guerra  recente,  tuttavia,  le 
interviste  con  Ana,  l’antica  insegnante  del  villaggio,  e  le  trasformazioni  culturali 
rilevate  dall’analisi  storica,  rivelano  l’importanza  delle  migrazioni  come  rito  di 
passaggio. Quasi certamente, infatti, i ragazzi in età fra i 15 e i 20 anni si trovano in 
Sudafrica a lavorare, mentre le adolescenti  femmine sono al  villaggio.  Il  livello di 
scolarità,  in  relazione  alla  dimensione  famigliare,  è  alquanto  allarmante, 
considerando  che  nel  26%  dei  casi  nessun  membro  famigliare  ha  la  licenza 
elementare e solo l’8% delle famiglie ha dai 3 ai 5 membri con la licenza. Inoltre, 
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Mappa  2:  Densità  demografica  ed  estensione  del  villaggio  di  Dumela.  (Elab.  dati 
quantitativi)
Ana ha affermato che, nonostante gli sforzi per insegnare il Portoghese, la lingua 
ufficiale,  i  bambini  non  riescono  ad  apprendere  la  lingua.Questo  deriva,  senza 
dubbio,  dal  fatto  che gli  stessi  famigliari  parlano solo  Shangaan,  o  il  Fannagalo 
(l’idioma delle miniere). Anche chi ha vissuto all’estero, ha imparato una o due lingue 
dei bianchi (Inglese e Afrikaans) solo se vi è stato costretto per motivi di lavoro, visto 
che lo Shangaan è parlato correntemente nei villaggi confinanti con il Parco Kruger 
ed è intelligibile con gli altri idiomi Nguni (vedi Allegato 5). 
 
1-2
3-5
6-8
No identification
Percentuale di gruppi famigliari i cui membri possiedono 
almeno un documento di identità
95,9%
3,1%
0,9%
Figura  1:  Percentuale  di  gruppi  famigliari  con  documenti  di  identità  (Fonte: 
questionari)
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Degli  89  gruppi  famigliari,  inoltre,  la  stragrande maggioranza non possiede un 
documento di identità, eppure si sposta oltre confine sia verso il Sudafrica sia verso 
lo  Zimbabwe.  Questo  dato  indica  (1)  che  esiste  uno  spazio  geografico  umano 
trascendente  le  regole  governative;  (2)  che  le  persone  sono  identificabili  solo 
attraverso il  riconoscimento dei  loro pari,  quindi  se fermati  alla frontiera possono 
mentire sulle loro origini e identità, qualora convenga loro, se l’ufficiale non è del 
luogo. Tuttavia, il fatto di non possedere un documento di identità è percepito come 
una mancanza, nella maggioranza dei casi (osservazione personale) non una sfida, 
tesi confermata dall’Isp. Capo Tshambalala, Capo della Polizia di Pafuri, il quale ha 
confermato  che  la  presenza  il  loco  di  un  funzionario  mozambicano  apposto  alla 
distribuzione dei documenti di identità contribuirebbe a diminuire il problema, vista 
l’esperienza  di  un’ex-ufficiale,  su  base  puramente  volontaristica.  Si  tratta  di  un 
ragionamento logico considerando il grado di estrema periferia attribuibile a Pafuri, 
tuttavia dimostra il grado di interesse o di capacità gestionale da parte del governo 
mozambicano nell’amministrare l’interno del  Paese.  Infine,  per  quanto riguarda le 
attività redditizie della popolazione di Dumela, la Machamba (ossia le coltivazioni di 
sussistenza) è ancora l’elemento fondamentale, seguito dal progetto del Ministero 
dell’Agricoltura. 
Tabella dati incrociati: Numero di componenti famigliari*Strategie di sussistenza
3 0 0 15 5 23
13,0% ,0% ,0% 65,2% 21,7% 100,0%
3 0 1 34 1 39
7,7% ,0% 2,6% 87,2% 2,6% 100,0%
3 0 0 13 1 17
17,6% ,0% ,0% 76,5% 5,9% 100,0%
2 1 0 6 0 9
22,2% 11,1% ,0% 66,7% ,0% 100,0%
11 1 1 68 7 88
12,5% 1,1% 1,1% 77,3% 8,0% 100,0%
Conteggio
% fra il Numero di
componenti
famigliari
Conteggio
% fra il Numero di
componenti
famigliari
Conteggio
% fra il Numero di
componenti
famigliari
Conteggio
% fra il Numero di
componenti
famigliari
Conteggio
% fra il Numero di
componenti
famigliari
1-5 componenti
6-10 componenti
11-15
componenti
Più di 15
componenti
Numero di
componenti
famigliari
Totale
Commercio Rimesse Impiego Machamba Altro
Strategie di sussistenza
Totale
Tabella  1: Le strategie di sopravvivenza in relazione alla densità del  gruppo famigliare. 
(Fonte: Questionari)
La Tabella 1 mostra che il 68% dei gruppi famigliari ricava il suo fabbisogno, o 
quasi, dalla Machamba, di questi solo il 12,5% si dedica al commercio, ma in 4 degli 
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11 casi, si tratta di 3 famiglie che hanno un negozietto in loco e di un privato che 
vende  vestiti  e  beni  di  consumo  agli  Zimbabwani,  in  un  sistema  di  baratto, 
considerando l’inflazione devastante del Dollaro Zimbabwano. Solo una famiglia ha 
ammesso di ricevere rimesse dai figli all’estero, dato che contrasta con i dati raccolti 
da Mpofo  et al. (1999) a Sengwe, dove le famiglie ricevono fino a 2000 ZAR per 
rimessa, dai famigliari in Sudafrica. 
L’immagine generale di Dumela, quindi, è di un villaggio a densità medio-alta 
considerando la lontananza dai centri di potere, con livelli di scolarità molto bassi, e 
nessun tipo di documento di identità, nonostante le relazioni transfrontaliere, e uno 
stile  di  vita  legato  all’agricoltura.  Tuttavia,  è  importante  notare  che le  risposte  al 
questionario  possono  essere  falsate,  poiché  la  popolazione  si  aspettava  che, 
nonostante  le  mie  specificazione  sul  fatto  che  questo  fosse  uno  studio,  a 
quest’indagine seguisse un progetto di  sviluppo, che ovviamente non è mai stato 
promesso. Quindi la popolazione ha risposto in modo da sembrare relativamente più 
bisognosa rispetto alla realtà, intenzione che è stata notata in varie occasioni per 
incongruenze fra le risposte e il grado di ‘ricchezza’ domestica.
I legami transfrontalieri: migrazioni per lavoro
Le ipotesi  basate sulla ricerca storica di  Pafuri  rivelano dei  forti  legami fra 
questo  territorio  di  frontiera  e,  principalmente,  l’ex-Transvaal,  la  provincia 
Sudafricana  ricca  di  fattorie  e  miniere  dove  la  richiesta  di  manodopera  non 
specializzata  è  sempre  stata  in  crescente  richiesta.  Pafuri  fungeva  da  punto  di 
incontro per gli emigranti provenienti dalle province a nord del Mozambico, nonché 
dal Malawi e dal Mashonaland (Nord Zimbabwe). Dumela svolge ancora questo ruolo 
catalizzatore di emigranti, poiché si trova sulle vie di comunicazione secondarie per il 
Nord, e in posizione favorevole per permettere il riposo prima dell’attraversamento 
notturno.  Durante  le  visite  e  la  permanenza,  infatti,  sono  stati  individuati  flussi 
settimanali  di  emigranti  di  varia  nazionalità  e  provenienza.  L’attraversamento 
notturno è tipico per evitare le guardie di  frontiera, ma è maggiormente rischioso 
poiché è in questa parte del giorno che gli animali si nutrono, e accade che alcuni 
degli emigranti non sopravvivano al Parco Kruger. Tuttavia, l’accettazione del rischio 
è  sintomatica  (1)  della  disperazione  cui  la  povertà  spinge  le  persone;  (2)  la 
percezione,  ancora,  del  viaggio  come  rito  di  passaggio;  (3)  l’incapacità  della 
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conservazione  di  fungere  da  minaccia  contro  i  flussi  migratori.  Questo  dovrebbe 
costituire una lesson learnt per la gestione e l’implementazione del GLTFCA nonché 
un monito a creare una zona che tenga conto delle affinità storico-culturale e aiuti i 
flussi rendendoli legali, anziché chiudersi in posizioni protezionistiche. 
Tabella dati incrociati: membri famigliari permanentemente all'estero*paese di emigrazione
28 24 0 52
53,8% 46,2% ,0% 100,0%
0 24 2 26
,0% 92,3% 7,7% 100,0%
0 10 0 10
,0% 100,0% ,0% 100,0%
28 58 2 88
32,9% 64,8% 2,3% 100,0%
Conteggio
% fra Componenti famigliari
permanentemente all'estero
Conteggio
% fra Componenti famigliari
permanentemente all'estero
Conteggio
% fra Componenti famigliari
permanentemente all'estero
Conteggio
% fra Componenti famigliari
permanentemente all'estero
Zero
1-2
3-5
Componenti famigliari
permanentemente
all'estero
Totale
Nessuno Sudafrica Zimbabwe
Paese di emigrazione
Totale
Tabella  2: Relazione fra paese di migrazione e tipo di permanenza – permanente (Fonte: 
questionari)
Una percentuale minoritaria della popolazione ha dei componenti  che sono 
permanentemente  all’estero,  il  49%  ha  da  1  a  5  membri  famigliari  nei  paesi 
confinanti. Il Sudafrica è, ovviamente, il paese prescelto dato il fattore d’attrazione 
socio-economico  esercitato  sull’intera  regione  (Tabella  2).  Le  due  persone  in 
Zimbabwe sono sposate con un locale: l’unicità di questo dato, altrimenti irrilevante, 
indica che il legame con lo Zimbabwe è sociale, non economico, e fa riferimento al 
mantenimento dei tradizionali sistemi di accasamento, che prevedono la scelta della 
donna fra i  kraal vicini di eguale etnia, indipendentemente dai confini  di  stato. La 
percentuale relativamente bassa di migrazioni permanenti conferma, appunto, che 
esistono dei  cambiamenti  nella  percezione delle  opportunità  che il  Sudafrica può 
dare alla manodopera non specializzata: la chiusura di molte miniere, il sequestro 
delle  fattorie  da  parte  dello  Stato46,  l’aumento  senza  precedenti  degli  omicidi  in 
fattorie,  i  furti  che  hanno forzato molti  proprietari  terrieri  a  chiudere le  fattorie,  e 
l’aumento generale della criminalità, hanno contribuito a percepire la migrazione in 
Sudafrica come un movimento obbligato per  guadagnare denaro,  ma ritornare in 
46 Du Toit, P., 2004, The Great South African Land Scandal, Legacy Pubblications, Centurion, ZA.
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patria  non  appena  la  somma  desiderata  è  stata  raggiunta47.  Le  migrazioni 
temporanee, infatti, sono più frequenti toccando il 61,3% delle famiglie intervistate.
Tabella dati incrociati: Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero* Paese di emigrazione
28 6 0 34
82,4% 17,6% ,0% 100,0%
0 37 2 39
,0% 94,9% 5,1% 100,0%
0 15 0 15
,0% 100,0% ,0% 100,0%
28 58 2 88
33,0% 64,8% 2,3% 100,0%
Conteggio
% fra i Componenti famigliari
temporaneamente all'estero
Conteggio
% fra i Componenti famigliari
temporaneamente all'estero
Conteggio
% fra i Componenti famigliari
temporaneamente all'estero
Conteggio
% fra i Componenti famigliari
temporaneamente all'estero
Zero
1-2
3-5
Componenti famigliari
temporaneamente
all'estero
Totale
Nessuno Sudafrica Zimbabwe
Paese di emigrazione
Totale
Tabella  3: Rapporto fra paese di migrazione e tipo di permanenza – temporanea (Fonte: 
questionari)
Anche  in  questo  caso  il  paese  prescelto  è  il  Sudafrica,  ma  gli  emigranti 
cercano di rimanere nella provincia del Limpopo, la più vicina possibile, per facilitare 
gli spostamenti. Infine, il lavoro di miniera è stato completamente sostituito dal lavoro 
in  fattoria  (62,7%)  e  da  altri  lavori  fra  cui  spiccano  i  muratori,  gli  idraulici  e  i 
meccanici.
I legami transfrontalieri – migrazioni sociali
Come  accennato  in  precedenza  i  legami  sociali  nello  spazio  informale  di 
Pafuri  sono  ancora  forti  e  includono  le  visite  ai  rispettivi  villaggi.  Nonostante,  la 
frequenza delle visite ipotizzata fosse piuttosto alta, la realtà è contraddittoria, visto 
che  sono  gli  anziani  che  dovrebbero  avventurarsi  lungo  questi  percorsi,  e 
chiaramente il viaggio è difficile e faticoso nonostante la vicinanza se effettuato a 
piedi. In termini relativi, tuttavia, è bene notare che il 65,3% delle famiglie visita con 
frequenza trimestrale o semestrale il parenti, e il 62,5% ne riceve le visite. Se poche 
famiglie  hanno  figli  all’estero,  infine,  la  Mappa  dimostra  che  quasi  tutta  la 
popolazione ha parenti in uno o entrambi i paesi confinanti. Solo 10 famiglie su 89, 
infatti, non hanno parenti in nessuno dei due stati. Fra queste eccezioni, notiamo un 
47 Conversazioni con alcuni trentenni a Dumela, che stavano pianificando la prossima migrazione 
stagionale in Sudafrica.
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ragazzo che usava Dumela come base di appoggio, ma le cui origini sono a Xai-xai, 
e una signora anziana che ha perso quasi tutta la famiglia. 
Mappa  3:  La quantità e distribuzione delle famiglie  con parentela in uno nei  due paesi 
confinanti (Fonte: questionari)
I  dati  dimostrano  un  indiscusso  legame  fra  Mozambico,  Sudafrica  e 
Zimbabwe, che si  fonda sull’unità etnica e sulle necessità economiche. In base a 
quanto rivelato dai  dati  raccolti  e dalle fonti  secondarie emerge una realtà socio-
economica che mira  all’indipendenza ma è  ancora  troppo insicura  dati  gli  eventi 
storici lontani e recenti. Il Parco Kruger, e per estensione il GLTFCA, sono percepiti 
come  fastidi  al  normale  svolgimento  della  vita  quotidiana  (poiché  non  possono 
uccidere gli  animali  pericolosi  per la vita umana e per le coltivazioni,  e poiché la 
massiccia  presenza  delle  forze  dell’ordine  impedisce  gli  spostamenti),  non  come 
pericoli.  Inoltre  la  conoscenza  degli  spostamenti  forzati  che  coinvolgono  le 
popolazioni all’interno del Parco del Limpopo fa riaffiorare alla memoria il ricordo dei 
Makuleke, forzati  oltre i  confini  del  Kruger per motivi  ecologici  e politici.  In modo 
indiretto,  quindi  ,  gli  abitanti  percepiscono  i  rischi  che  correranno  a  causa  del 
GLTFCA in quanto non potranno proteggersi  dagli  animali,  i  loro raccolti  saranno 
saccheggiati o devastati dagli animali, le loro relazioni sociali saranno interrotte, così 
come le loro relazioni economiche. Esistono alcuni studi che mirano a evidenziare 
questi problemi e suggerire eventuali soluzioni, che la ricerca ha discusso e ampliato, 
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con  particolare  riferimento  al  rapporto  del  Refugee  Research  Programme 
dell’Università del Witvatersrand (2002), CESVI (2001), Anderson (2002) e Anderson 
e Pariela  (2005),  visti  nel  contesto socio-economico studiato  e dei  dati  qualitativi 
ottenuti in loco e nelle interviste e i colloqui con informatori che conoscono la zona, la 
sua popolazione, nonché le strategie del GLTFCA e delle agenzie ad essa legate.
PAFURI: LA FRONTIERA PAR EXCELLENCE DIVISA FRA STATO E NAZIONE.
La ricerca bibliografica e dall’analisi qualitativa e quantitativa di terreno hanno 
permesso la produzione di informazioni primarie genuine sul villaggio di Dumela e le 
sue interazioni  transfrontaliere.  La visione generale  che ne deriva  è quella  di  un 
paese alla periferia  dello spazio governativo ed economico ufficiale  incentrato  su 
Maputo e sulle località costiere, ma al centro dello spazio economico informale che 
ha legato i paesi confinanti fin dalla metà del XIX secolo. Nello specifico esistono vari 
aspetti socio-economici e politici che dimostrano l’importanza strategica di Pafuri per 
la  sostenibilità  effettiva  del  TFCA,  tenendo  conto  delle  categorie  IUCN,  che 
permettono nelle aree di  conservazione l’uso delle  risorse naturali  da parte  delle 
popolazioni indigene, e delle linee guida generali dei Parchi della Pace, che hanno lo 
scopo unire paesi in conflitto e gruppi culturali transfrontalieri: quest’ultima dovrebbe 
essere un giustificazione fondamentale alla conservazione transfrontaliera viste  le 
perenni critiche al ruolo divisore dei confini di Berlino. Riprendendo le ipotesi elencati 
più sopra nei capitoli precedenti e qui riassunte, verranno di seguito discussi i tratti 
più salienti della ricerca, derivati dalla ricerca bibliografica e da quella sul campo.
1)  Ipotesi: le aree remote di scarso interesse seguono i meccanismi di centro-
periferia dei sistemi economici  e politici  di  base, e sono poco influenzate dal 
governo centrale.
Seguendo la geografia politica di Sudafrica, Mozambico e Zimbabwe sembra 
che il fiume Limpopo demarchi una terra di confine così remota dai centri di potere 
da essere quasi esente a obbedienze gerarchiche statali, e infatti questa fu la realtà 
di  Pafuri  fino  allo  stabilimento  della  TEBA  per  il  reclutamento  dei  minatori.  Pur 
essendo un crocevia di passaggio di uomini e merci, infatti, raramente veniva visitato 
dalle autorità e nonostante le linee immaginarie di  Berlino separassero famiglie e 
campi, la realtà era immutata e il territorio unito dalla tradizione, che voleva i fiumi 
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come catalizzatori di antropizzazione, non separatori di popoli come nella tradizione 
politico  geografica  europea.  Non  essendo  una  via  di  passaggio  adeguata  agli 
interessi dei dominions britannici, né del governo portoghese, che usava il corridoio 
di  Maputo verso il  Sudafrica e i  corridoi  di  Mutare e Beira  per  il  commercio  con 
l’entroterra, la popolazione venne tagliata fuori dagli interessi statali, che a partire dal 
XX secolo venivano rappresentati solo dalla TEBA. La distanza del luogo da tutti i 
centri di potere, ha creato uno stato di risentimento misto a sollievo, perché fino alle 
due  guerre  (contro  la  Rhodesia  e  il  Sudafrica)  anche  il  lato  oscuro  del  potere 
coloniale aveva risparmiato il bacino settentrionale del Limpopo nella zona di Pafuri 
perché  inadatto  all’agricoltura  intensiva.  Tuttavia,  attraverso  le  sue  politiche 
nazionalizzatrici e moderniste, il governo FRELIMO riuscì a creare, nei pochi anni 
antecedenti le guerre, una rete tentacolare di emissari dello stato dal  régulo (grado 
più basso) fino all’amministratore provinciale (grado più alto),  di  posti  di  salute di 
base e di scuole primarie, tanto da ricevere l’encomio dell’Organizzazione Mondiale 
della Sanità per le vaccinazioni. Questa rete, i cui emissari furono contrastati dalla 
popolazione locale in alcuni distretti, consentì a Pafuri di ritrovarsi all’interno di un 
sistema politico  ed economico centralizzato  che stata  tuttavia  erodendo gli  usi  e 
costumi  tradizionali  attraverso  l’opera  modernizzatrice.  Le  guerre,  tuttavia, 
interruppero  l’opera  ‘civilizzatrice’  e  Pafuri  si  trovò  nel  centro  di  due  guerre 
sanguinarie che costrinsero i suoi abitanti alle migrazioni forzate verso i centri per i 
rifugiati a Sengwe (Zimbabwe) e nel vicino Transvaal sudafricano. Al rientro in patria, 
la popolazione ritrovo da un lato i  mezzi  di  sopravvivenza tradizionali,  dall’altro il 
lungo braccio  di  FRELIMO a dirigerli  e  portare lo sviluppo attraverso l’agricoltura 
collettiva, ora visibile nel progetto finanziato dal Ministero sulla sponda meridionale 
del  lago  interno  vicino  al  confine  zimbabwano.  I  legami  transfrontalieri  furono 
rafforzati dal periodo di soggiorno nei paesi vicini, come dimostra il fatto che meno di 
1 famiglia su dieci non ha parentele in Sudafrica o in Zimbabwe (Questionario di 
Dumela). 
2) Ipotesi: le popolazioni di confine in Africa, qualora esista un legame sociale 
transfrontaliero antecedente l’imperialismo europeo, sono legate sia alla società 
tradizionale sia allo stato sovrano.
XXXI
Seguendo le conclusioni della prima ipotesi,  appare evidente che lo spazio 
politico-economico informale  nelle  terre  di  confine  si  crea  solo  qualora  esista  un 
legame altrettanto forte che precede qualsiasi intervento disturbatore, ma non può 
essere creato a posteriori, soprattutto in zone in cui le differenze etniche e i rapporti 
gerarchi hanno un’importanza fondamentale nel costrutto sociale. Nel caso di Pafuri, 
l’arrivo degli Nguni di Soshangaane a seguito dello mfecane di Chaka Zulu creò un 
sistema  di  vassallaggio  dominato  dagli  Shangaan  che  si  estendeva  dai  territori 
Shona (Ndau, Rozwi, Karanga) dei territori attualmente compresi fra lo Zimbabwe 
Nord-Occidentale  e delle  province di  Tete e Manica,  fino ai  Venda del  Sudafrica 
orientale. Nel tempo, confluirono anche i Matabele di Mzilikazi e Lobengula che dalla 
confluenza  fra  i  fiumi  Sashe  e  Limpopo  si  spostarono  a  nord-est  gradualmente 
assimilando le popolazioni Shona, fino a toccare i territori Shangaana presso i monti 
auriferi  di  Chimanimani48.  Le  popolazioni  di  Pafuri,  quindi,  sono  Shangaana, 
Matabele (o ‘Ndebele) di cui fa parte il clan Makuleke in Sudafrica, e Venda, con una 
forte prevalenza dei primi due gruppi. Poiché sia i Matabele sia gli Shangaan sono 
riconducibili  in  linea  diretta  agli  Zulu  di  Chaka,  esiste  una  omogeneità  culturale, 
linguistica  e  socio-economica  fra  questi  gruppi  confinanti,  che  è  molto  più  forte 
rispetto  ai  legami  con  gli  stati  di  appartenenza.  Bisogna,  infatti,  ricordare  che  il 
legame con lo stato di appartenenza si è formato in una relazione causa-effetto solo 
grazie alle lotte di disobbedienza civile per contrastare i governi separatisti gestiti dai 
bianchi. Questo dualismo fra appartenenza etnica e politica è continuato negli anni 
recenti nonostante le guerre e le diaspore, grazie al ruolo accentratore di FRELIMO 
e, in una certa misura, grazie al separatismo etnico perpetrato dalla RENAMO e dai 
suoi  guerriglieri,  le  cui  azioni  spregevoli  contro  le  comunità  rurali  valsero  loro  la 
nomea di banditi,  e i  cui membri volontari  non-Ndau venivano misconosciuti  dalle 
famiglie di  origine49.  Al  momento, sebbene gran parte delle tradizioni pre-coloniali 
siano scomparsa a causa del cambiamento della percezione gerarchica provocato 
dalle migrazioni per lavoro e dall’onnipresenza dello stato, è innegabile che esista un 
legame fra le comunità degli stati confinanti a vari livelli: (1) sociale, il capo di Dumela 
e parente diretto del capo di Dumela, villaggio omonimo situato in Sudafrica a circa 
70 km a sud ovest dall’ingresso di Punda Maria, del Parco Kruger; (2) economico, i 
48 Liesegang, 1970; Beach, 1974
49 Roesch, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005; Virtaten, 2005
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lavoratori mozambicani presenti in Sudafrica creano una rete di supporto per i neofiti; 
(3)  di  sussistenza, chi  ha degli  eccessi  di  raccolto lo vende agli  Zimbabwani  che 
ciclicamente fanno capolino da Sengwe e si recano fino al posto di confine di Pafuri 
per barattare; (4) di importazione, chi lavora in Sudafrica importa beni di consumo 
per  i  famigliari  e  chi  ha  un  negozio  in  Mozambico  se  reca  periodicamente  in 
Sudafrica per i rifornimenti. Con la sola esclusione dell’emigrazione per lavoro e alle 
visite da Sengwe, tutti i movimenti da e per il Sudafrica sono legali, pur rientrando in 
un mercato informale votato alla sussistenza più che all’arricchimento. L’assenza di 
negozi  al  posto di  frontiera,  che lascia  gli  ufficiali  privi  non solo  del  contatto  con 
l’esterno,  ma  anche  di  approvvigionamenti,  crea  un  fenomeno  percettibile  di 
connivenza fra ‘attraversatori’ abituali per il mercato informale e la legge dello Stato. 
In generale, il crimine è solo l’espatrio illegale o il commercio di prodotti illegali, tutto 
il resto viene regolato da un sistema di  do-ut-des che crea una dipendenza quasi 
totale delle popolazioni dal confine e degli ufficiali verso le popolazioni locali, a causa 
della lontananza dal centro politico ed economico ufficiale. Questo spazio dimostra a 
tutti  gli  effetti  l’ambivalenza  delle  affiliazioni  delle  popolazioni  locali  che,  per 
sussistenza, scelgono di non abbandonare le regole tradizionali, pur abbracciando 
l’ingerenza di FRELIMO, che porta i progetti agricoli, e la presenza degli ufficiali di 
confine che fermano le migrazioni, ma comprendono le necessità locali.
3) Ipotesi: lo spazio geografico ambivalente è simile al sistema di Stato-Nazione 
europeo, poiché crea uno stretto legame fra uomini e territorio, simboleggiato 
dal ritorno al luogo di origine dopo ogni movimento migratorio.
In presenza di uno spazio geografico la cui peculiarità è la presenza di un 
confine  che separa  politicamente,  contribuisce  all’economia  di  sussistenza,  ma è 
virtualmente inesistente sul piano sociale, si è in presenza di un’area difficilmente 
valutabile in termini  di  appartenenza al  territorio. Se da un lato il  confine di  stato 
separa l’unita etnica e culturale, infatti, dall’altro la presenza del confine è in modo 
quasi  perverso  fonte  di  reddito.  A  questa  criticità  si  aggiunge  la  fenomenologia 
storica delle migrazioni in Pafuri che hanno visto diaspore volontarie, incanalate e 
obbligate dell’intera popolazione dei vari paesi. Tuttavia, il ritorno è sempre seguito 
agli spostamenti. Emblematico è il caso riferito dal Capo Muklave, Dumela, secondo 
cui precedente Capo portò il villaggio al sicuro oltre le sponde del Limpopo, durante 
la  ‘guerra  di  Ian  Smith’  (così  nota  ai  locali),  ma  quando  decise  di  stabilirsi 
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permanentemente nel nuovo territorio la popolazione non accettò e fu ricondotta nel 
sito  originale  dal  nuovo  Capo  della  famiglia  Muklave.  Sebbene  entrambi  i  siti 
offrissero le stesse risorse,  la  popolazione volle  tornare al  confine.  Similmente,  il 
rientro spontaneo dopo la fine della guerra indiretta con il Sudafrica, nel 1992, venne 
aiutato dalle agenzie internazionali ma non forzato. Pochissimi decisero di restare in 
Sudafrica e,  in ogni  caso non sciolsero mai  completamente il  legami  con Pafuri, 
come dimostra  la  famiglia  di  Lydia  (interprete  di  campo)  che ha parenti  diretti  a 
Dumela, dove Lydia passa molto tempo per aiutare gli zii nella gestione del negozio 
più fornito del paese.  Il tema del ritorno anche dopo i mesi e gli anni trascorsi in 
miniera è, a parere personale, fondamentale per capire perché gli adulti di Dumela 
vedano ora la migrazione, nonostante l’illegalità e i  rischi  da affrontare,  come un 
modo efficace per guadagnare denaro in poco tempo (3 o 6 mesi) e poi tornare a 
Dumela  dalla  famiglia.  Questo  atteggiamento  mostra  l’espansione  di  una  nuova 
tipologia  di  emigranti  che  non  ambisce  alla  cittadinanza  Sudafrica,  quindi  al 
raggiungimento  delle  facilitazioni  scolastico-sanitarie50,  ma  a  garantirsi  mezzi  di 
sussistenza  temporanea  da  godersi  a  casa.  Gli  adulti  che  emigrano 
permanentemente sono pochi e normalmente si riferiscono a coppie sposate. 
Tale  attaccamento  al  territorio,  analizzato  nell’ottica  dell’identità  nazionale 
sdoppiata  (Shangaana  e  Mozambicana),  dimostra  la  formazione  di 
un’organizzazione  politico-sociale  simile  allo  stato-nazione,  caratterizzato 
dall’unitarietà fra territorio e identità linguistico-culturale. Tuttavia, in questo caso, il 
territorio corrisponde a un’area geografica che si estende per lo meno alla comunità 
Shangaana di Sengwe, e non si limita al territorio Mozambicana. Durante le visite e 
la  permanenza  sul  campo,  tuttavia,  è  stato  notato  un  forte  orgoglio  Shangaana 
collegato all’orgoglio mozambicana,  che si  è rivelato essere genuino,  al  contrario 
dell’ipotesi  iniziale.  L’ambivalenza,  quindi,  dimostra  che il  vero  concetto  di  Stato-
Nazione,  così  raro  nel  suo  continente  di  origine,  non  può  essere  applicato  con 
successo in Africa dove le identità etnico culturali  sovrastano la geografia politica 
ufficiale di uno stato, confermano la necessità di una alternativa politica o sociale: nel 
primo caso, lo stato multi-nazionale, nel secondo caso un spazio che trascenda la 
politica e l’etnicità. 
50 Crush, 2000.
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4)  Ipotesi:  la  conservazione  transfrontaliera  ha  due  scopi  dichiarati,  la 
conservazione della natura da un lato e la sicurezza del Sudafrica dall’altro, 
mentre  la  promozione  culturale  passa  in  secondo  piano,  nonostante  il 
potenziale offerto da Pafuri.
I TFCA e i PP sono nati all’interno di un contesto ecologico di protezione degli 
ecosistemi, in quanto territori naturali uniti da un  unicum naturalistico che possono 
trascendere  le  frontiere  tra  stati51.   Il  significato  di  Parco  della  Pace,  tuttavia, 
aggiunge  lo  scopo  etico  di  riunire  stati  e  popolazioni  in  conflitto  fra  loro  per  la 
promozione della pace sotto l’egida della natura52. Nel caso del Grande Limpopo, 
quindi, troviamo da un lato la denominazione di area di conservazione, che include 
aree interstiziali dove le popolazioni locali possono vivere e usare le risorse naturali 
per la sussistenza, nonché partecipare in attività redditizie compatibili con gli scopi 
dell’area di  conservazione e la sostenibilità,  dall’altro la denominazione di  PP per 
rimarcare l’unità politica dei tre stati coinvolti in un conflitto durato quasi vent’anni. 
Conoscendo la storia di Pafuri, inoltre, è palese che il centro geografico del PP abbia 
le qualità etnico culturali per formare un vero polo di attrazione per i visitatori visto 
l’ambiente  naturale  intatto,  la  presenza  di  tre  gruppi  etnici  in  pace  da  secoli,  la 
presenza di edifici che ricordano la storia recente del Sudafrica (centri reclutamento 
TEBA) e i luoghi delle guerre recenti. Il GLTFCA, quindi, potrebbe offrire la possibilità 
di  cancellare  la  geo-politica  di  confine  e  ricreare  uno  spazio  fondato  sull’unione 
culturale in seno all’area di conservazione che riproduca lo spazio socio-economico 
attuale. Tuttavia, le priorità di sviluppo del Mozambico si incentrano su Massingir, 
l’ingresso principale del Parco del Limpopo, e snodo principale fra Letaba, il centro 
del Parco Kruger, e la costa mozambicana, attraverso la frontiera di Giriyondo, la 
prima fra i due parchi. Inoltre, non esistono accordi su (1) l’estensione del corridoio 
ecologico di Sengwe, lungo il confine fra Zimbabwe e Mozambico; (2) la presenza di 
recinzioni  e  gli  scopi  delle  stesse,  vista  la  necessità  ecologica  di  contenere  le 
malattie,  quali  AIDS felino e Afta,  alle  popolazioni  sudafricane;  (3)  la  tipologia  di 
attività permesse nelle zone interstiziali, in particolare il trophy hunting per quota. Le 
giustificazioni contro la pratica della caccia da trofeo, inoltre, si basano sul contrasto 
della pratica nei confronti dello scopo primario di conservazione, sebbene le autorità 
51 Van der Linde et al., 2001.
52 Zbicz, 1999.
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mozambicane  non  trovino  contrasti  fra  questo  e  la  concessione  di  aree  per  la 
prospezione  mineraria  sulle  colline  che  dal  parte  settentrionale  del  Parco  del 
Limpopo  scendono  nell’area  interstiziale,  che  eventualmente  deturperebbero  un 
panorama unico, composto da foreste chiuse naturali intatte, mai sfruttate dall’uomo.
Se lo scopo della conservazione pare essere flessibile alle logiche di potere 
politico e finanziario, così lo scopo della sicurezza per gli animali sconfina nella sfera 
della sicurezza umana e della protezione dell’unicità sudafricana nei confronti della 
povertà  degli  Stati  confinanti.  Il  grado  di  controllo  al  confine  richiesto  per 
l’encomiabile lotta al bracconaggio, infatti, include l’aumento delle forze di polizia su 
entrambi i lati, con lo scopo di fermare il flusso migratorio illegale dal Mozambico al 
Sudafrica,  dove  i  crescenti  tassi  di  criminalità  hanno  generato  forti  sentimenti 
xenofobi  in  tutti  gli  strati  sociali.  La  protezione  dello  spazio  socio-economico 
nazionale  sudafricano  è,  quindi,  il  secondo  motore  dell’obiettivo  di  sicurezza, 
diventato prioritario negli ultimi tre anni, rispetto al ricongiungimento culturale fra gli 
Stati confinanti. L’impatto diretto di questa misura è ovviamente la diminuzione dei 
flussi  migratori,  che  risulta  nella  mancanza  dell’unico  reddito  monetario  per  le 
famiglie rurali (nonostante i questionari rivelino una scarsa importanza delle rimesse 
economiche,  per  la  vicina  Sengwe  sono  fondamentali),  nonché  l’annullamento 
dell’unico rito di  passaggio per i  maschi,  sostituitosi  alla  guerra.  Se è vero che i 
movimenti  illegali  sono  atti  penalmente  perseguibili,  è  altrettanto  vero  che  (1)  le 
migrazioni sono temporanee e localizzate; (2) non necessariamente includono atti 
criminosi; (3) la criminalità organizzata non usa i canali del parco ma quelli  semi-
ufficiali  per  lo  smercio  di  armi,  droga  e  refurtiva;  (4)  la  criminalità  sudafricana è 
prevalentemente formata da cittadini sudafricani, in risposta alla mancanza di diritti 
umani politici e socio-economici di base, nonché alla potenziale impunità di fronte al 
delitto  compiuto53;  (5)  gli  atti  criminosi  e assassini  nei  confronti  dei  ‘farmer’  nelle 
campagne dell’ex Transvaal sono state valutate come atti precedono un genocidio54, 
quindi  interessano  prevalentemente  le  comunità  nere  del  paese.  Durante  la 
53 Du Toit,  2004,  intervista  con il  Prof.  Neels  Moolman, criminologo della University of  the North, 
Sudarfica, che ha collaborato con il corpo di Polizia sudafricano (SAPS) in indagini sulle violenze nelle 
fattorie, disponibile al seguente link http://www.carteblanche.co.za/Display/Display.asp?Id=2265.
54 Un’analisi delle implicazioni sociali delle violenze sui ‘farmers’ sudafricani nelle zone ad alta densità 
agricola sono stati analizzati da Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, leader di Genocide Watch (mandato ONU), il 
quale ha dichiarato in un’intervista per Carte Blanche (29 Giugno 2003) che le modalità delle uccisioni 
sono atti  di violenza ‘de-umanizzante’ in grado di degenerare in genocidio. Nel sito esistono varie 
pubblicazioni sulle uccisioni dei ‘farmers’ bianchi, soprattutto di origine Boera.
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permanenza a Dumela, è stato riscontrato che molti dei potenziali o effettivi migranti 
del paese sceglierebbero le vie legali se non fosse così faticoso (viaggiare fino al 
capoluogo di provincia sulla costa) e costoso ottenere il passaporto, dichiarando così 
che per arrestare o diminuire i flussi illegali basterebbe rendere meno burocratici i 
meccanismi per il rilascio del documento. 
La rivalutazione della culturale locale, quindi, non solo passa in secondo piano 
nella pianificazione del GLTFCA ma viene oscurata dall’impatto che le strategie di 
conservazione e la sicurezza sudafricana hanno sulla popolazione locale in termini 
sociali, di allontanamento dovuto al corridoio ecologico, ed economici per l’arresto 
delle migrazioni e la mancanza di attività redditizie alternative, visto che le priorità 
turistiche  non  passano  da  Pafuri  e  il  recente  bando  per  l’assegnazione  di 
appezzamenti  per  il  turismo  lungo  la  strada  che  da  Pafuri  porta  alla  costa  non 
forniscono garanzie di sviluppo sufficienti in quanto manca la coordinazione effettiva 
del  parco.  Si  potrebbe  trattare  quindi  di  un’occasione  perduta,  che  poteva 
trasformare il PP di punta di diamante della Peace Park Foundation, con un PP per 
antonomasia, dando un esempio concreto di conservazione partecipata e gestione 
delle  risorse  naturali  per  lo  sviluppo sostenibile,  anziché fossilizzarsi  su  interessi 
protezionistici  che  rischiano  di  esacerbare  i  conflitti  socio-economici  nazionali  e 
transnazionali, considerando che Dumela è solo uno dei paesi che si dislocano nel 
posto  amministrativo  di  Pafuri,  e  che  il  carattere  transfrontaliero  include  le 
popolazioni ad ovest del Parco Kruger, nonché i villaggi nella terra comunitaria di 
Sengwe, in Zimbabwe.
CONCLUSIONI
Alvarez ricorda che i confini evocano, nell’immaginario collettivo, il geo-politico 
e il metaforico, il letterale e il concettuale55, e quando si tratta dei confini interni del 
continente africano queste evocazioni si rafforzano a mano a mano che si scopre la 
storia  dei  gruppi  etnici,  le  tradizioni  socio-culturali,  l’influenza  dei  crescenti 
insediamenti  europei,  la storia coloniale e l’eredità lasciata dall’imperialismo e dai 
governi segregazionisti. In Africa meridionale, il ruolo carismatico di Chaka Zulu, le 
migrazioni e l’imposizione militare delle etnie di origine Nguni sugli altri gruppi, le lotte 
fra Inglesi e Boeri per il dominio territoriale, la figura controversa di Sir C.J. Rhodes, 
55 Alvarez, 1995, p. 448, in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 36.
XXXVII
e le recenti guerre, che hanno vessato le popolazioni attraverso strategie più simili 
alle  guerre  Nguni  che alle  moderne tattiche  militari,  hanno contribuito  a  dare  un 
fascino particolare all’Africa australe, percepito dagli studiosi come dagli appassionati 
lettori di Africa. Il confine fra Sudafrica, Mozambico e Zimbabwe, rientra in un gruppo 
elitario di località che nell’immaginario collettivo di alcuni, militari, ex-coloni, ecologi, 
ecc.  rappresentano il  confine per eccellenza.  L’indagine storica e geo-politica qui 
presentata riassume i motivi principale per cui Pafuri rappresenta ancora la frontiera: 
(1)  la  lontananza  dai  centri  di  potere;  (2)  la  difficoltà  di  raggiungimento  dal  lato 
Mozambicano  e  Zimbabwano;  (3)  la  presenza  di  popolazioni  che  ancora  vivono 
secondo antichi costumi (più per costrizione che per volontà); (4) la fama di territorio 
di informalità e illegalità, data la posizione periferica; (5) l’assenza della ‘civiltà’ intesa 
come occupazione da parte  della  popolazione bianca;  (6)  la  vicinanza del  Parco 
Kruger, primo baluardo della conservazione, causa recente di contestazione con lo 
spostamento dei Makuleke, e potenziale causa di scontro per le popolazioni di Pafuri. 
Pafuri non è mai stata conquistata o dominata, perché non esistono risorse naturali 
attrattive per il commercio proficuo, perché la morfologia del suo territorio è tale da 
non permettere lo sfruttamento agricolo intensivo, perché la sua geografia è tale da 
rendere economicamente insostenibile il commercio di beni di consumo se non volti 
alla  sussistenza,  ora  che  anche  i  grandi  elefanti  e  gli  animali  da  trofeo  non 
frequentano più quelle foreste incontaminate. Eppure Pafuri è entrata in un progetto 
mastodontico per la creazione del TFCA più grande dell’Africa, esteso attraverso un 
corridoio  ecologico  che trafiggerà  lo  spazio  socio-culturale,  per  unire  uno spazio 
ecologico  semi-inesistente,  visto  che dei  decantati  antichi  percorsi  migratori  degli 
elefanti non esiste traccia rilevante56. Rimane, invece, l’ipotesi che la creazione del 
GLTFCA sia frutto di strategie ecologiche, solo nella misura in cui la popolazione di 
grandi mammiferi (in particolare elefanti) nel Parco Kruger necessiti di un’area ben 
più  vasta  per  scongiurare  il  rischio  di  insostenibilità  delle  popolazioni  sempre 
crescenti. Inoltre rimane l’ipotesi politica e strategica per questa estensione a nord-
est, che ha forzato la creazione del Parco Nazionale del Limpopo, Mozambico, dove 
esisteva l’area di  caccia Coutada 16, e sta forzando la creazione di  un corridoio 
ecologico ben più vasto del necessario nelle terre comunitarie di Sengwe. 
56 Anderson, 2002
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La  prima  ipotesi,  infatti,  è  confermata  innanzitutto  dal  fatto  che  tutte  le 
migrazioni forzate di animali dal Parco Kruger al Parco del Limpopo hanno coinvolto 
solo  o  prevalentemente  elefanti,  a  partire  dal  primo  spostamento  (a  carattere 
pubblicitario) del 2001, fino a quello più recente del marzo 2007 (comunicazione del 
Dr. Jorge Ferrao, ex Coordinatore Internazionale del GLTFCA). Inoltre, il censo del 
2005  stabilisce  che  nel  solo  Parco  Nazionale  esistevano  12.467  elefanti,  il  cui 
numero è ovviamente aumentato dato il rapporto iniquo fra natalità e mortalità nei 
gruppi,  allorché  la  popolazione  sostenibile  è  di  7.000  –  7.500  appena57.  Il 
superamento  della  capacità  di  carico  di  un  dato  territorio  mostra  quanto  nocivi 
possano essere gli elefanti all’ecosistema danneggiando alberi e arbusti, a discapito 
di altri erbivori meno possenti. Con l’eccezione delle pratiche di contraccezione, per il 
blocco delle nascite, e del culling (caccia selettiva) che prevede l’uccisione di gruppi 
selezionati in base alla tipologia di popolazione e area di foraggio, l’unica soluzione a 
questo  problema  è  l’allargamento  dello  stesso  Parco.  Tuttavia,  non  potendo 
occupare  i  territori  oltre  il  confine  occidentale,  rimane  come  unica  possibilità 
l’espansione a est in un territorio che era una zona di caccia, e la cui popolazione di 
animali selvatici è stata azzerata durante la guerra civile e di confine: l’ex Coutada 
16, ora Parco Nazionale del Limpopo. Al di là di ogni disquisizione politica, questa è 
verosimilmente la ragione principale per l’ideazione del Parco Transfrontaliero. Dal 
punto di vista strategico e politico, inoltre, appare evidente che per tamponare i flussi 
migratori illegali di persone e merci quali armi, droga e mercanzia rubata, il Sudafrica 
necessiti di poter controllare meglio i propri confini, soprattutto in aree remote dove la 
rete  di  comunicazione  fra  comunità  della  stessa  etnia  o  ceppo  etnico  è  estesa 
capillarmente.  La  creazione  di  zone  cuscinetto  che  separino  ulteriormente  le 
popolazioni di confine e necessitino di continuo controllo da parte della polizia e dei 
guardia-parco  è  una  soluzione  che  permette  di  portare  avanti  una  politica  di 
sicurezza frontaliera necessaria,  pur mantenendo i  rapporti  politici  e diplomatici  a 
livello regionale e internazionale grazie all’obiettivo della conservazione della natura.
Come evinto dall’analisi geo-politica e storica, il Sudafrica è stato l’elemento 
trainante  nella  storia  politica  ed  economica  dell’Africa  australe  fin  dai  primi 
insediamenti  Europei,  ruolo  che  continua  a  svolgere  ancora  oggi  con  rinnovato 
interesse vista  l’importanza fondamentale acquisita  nella storia  recente attraverso 
57 Purdy, 1998, Contraceptive Safari, University of Georgia Reserach.
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figure emblematiche come l’ex Pres. Nelson Mandela e il magnate votato all’ecologia 
Mr.  Anton  Rupert.  Questi  due  personaggi  sembra  incarnino  le  profonde 
contraddizioni della Nazione Arcobaleno, pur creando percorsi che sembrano avere 
l’unico  scopo  di  ristabilire  gli  equilibri  perduti.  Unica  vera  potenza  politica  ed 
economica, in un continente dilaniato da guerre etniche per la supremazia, dittature 
sanguinarie, e semi-democrazie alquanto stabili, il Sudafrica post-apartheid è riuscito 
a crearsi un ruolo di potere in seno alle più importanti organizzazioni sudafricane, 
talvolta modificandone la costituzione (l’Unione Africana) o dando impeti riformatori i 
cui benefici socio-economici sono ancora in discussione, come la creazione di uno 
spazio  economico  transfrontaliero  all’interno  del  Southern  African  Development 
Committee,  basato  sull’Unione  Europea  che  permetta  la  libera  circolazione  di 
persone, beni e servizi. Per quato riguarda l’area di interesse per la ricerca, se lo 
Zimbabwe sta vivendo un periodo di forte crisi politica, sociale ed economica causata 
dal regime instauratosi con gli accordi di Lancaster, guidato in modo assolutistico dal 
Pres. Robert Mugabe, il  Mozambico è riuscito a superare le divisioni della guerra 
contro la RENAMO e contro i  suoi vicini,  instaurando una repubblica democratica 
nominale, perché monopartitica, che è in grado di garantire la stabilità politica e la 
ripresa economica grazie soprattutto alle numerose agenzie internazionali presenti 
sul territorio e agli investitori stranieri, principalmente sudafricani. La creazione di uno 
spazio economico di stampo europeo, quindi, mira ad abolire i confini per coloro che 
già operano in ambito internazionale, mentre l’allargamento non porterebbe vantaggi 
per la popolazione, visto che comunque i controlli alla frontiera devono perdurare al 
fine di garantire la sicurezza. Allo stesso modo, il TFCA del Great Limpopo abolisce i 
confini per la fauna selvatica, ineccepibilmente protetta nel Kruger, nonché per turisti 
e  investitori,  limitando  i  flussi  migratori  incontrollabili  se  non  lungo  il  confine.  Il 
corridoio ecologico, infine, non farebbe altro che allontanare ulteriormente le uniche 
due popolazioni originarie di Pafuri e legate dalle stesse origini:  gli  Shangaana di 
Sengwe e di Pafuri (Mz); i Venda di Sengwe e di Pafuri (SA). L’estensione a nord del 
Kruger, infatti, ha già allontanato i Matabele di Sengwe e Pafuri, e il documento che 
stipula la vittoria del Makuleke Land Claim non fa altro che stabilire la priorità della 
conservazione su qualsiasi altro uso del territorio nella zona. Nonostante il territorio 
sia nominalmente di  proprietà della comunità  Makuleke, infatti,  la  popolazione ha 
dovuto accettare il Parco Nazionale Kruger come gestore dell’ecologia dell’area per 
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50 anni, rinnovabili, noché l’obbligo di sviluppare il triangolo per l’ecoturismo secondo 
il modello imposto dal Parco Kruger. L’unico potenziale beneficio per la popolazione, 
quindi, è il  lavoro offerto dai due resort turistici aperti  nel triangolo: l’Outpost, e il 
Pafuri Camp di Wilderness Safari. Tuttavia, dato il basso livello di scolarità effettiva, il 
personale ha accesso a impieghi  di  servizio  (pulizie,  servizio  ristorante e bar)  e, 
grazie al training fornito da Wilderness Safari, potranno migliorare solo all’interno di 
quelle  mansioni58.  E’  facile  presumere,  quindi,  che  le  popolazioni  di  Pafuri,  in 
Mozambico, schiacciate fra il Corridoio Ecologico e il Parco Nazionale del Limpopo 
debbano  rinunciare  alla  propria  terra,  un  minaccia  fortemente  sentita  dalla 
popolazione  di  Dumela  se  non  adeguatamente  protette.  Gli  incontri  comunitari59, 
infatti, hanno rivelato il forte contrasto sentito dagli abitanti di Dumela verso il Parco 
Nazionale del Limpopo, poiché si ricordano della rimozione forzata dei Makuleke e 
sanno che le popolazioni che ora vivono all’interno del Parco del Limpopo saranno 
spostate  in  altre  zone.  Inoltre,  da  quando  il  GLTFCA  è  stato  implementato  sul 
territorio di  Pafuri,  con l’arrivo dei Guardia Parco al  confine, è stato impedito alle 
popolazioni locali di uccidere gli animali pericolosi che danneggiavano il raccolto (non 
sono avvenute, infatti,  morti  recenti  dovute ad animali  selvatici,  ad esclusione dei 
coccodrilli del fiume Limpopo). In alcune occasioni, quindi, si è già verificato che gli 
elefanti  si  spingessero  verso  i  campi  coltivati  del  progetto  del  Ministero 
dell’Agricoltura,  e  che  i  babbuini  attaccassero  i  campi  seminati.  In  questo  caso, 
l’uomo messo a guardia dei  campi ha sparato in aria per allontanare gli  animali, 
quando in precedenza avrebbe ucciso l’animale proteggendo il raccolto e ottenendo 
carne per  nutrirsi.  Il  conflitto  con il  Parco (termine che per  la  popolazione locale 
indica,  indiscriminatamente,  il  Parco  Nazionale  e  quello  transfrontaliero)  è  già 
percepibile  nelle  conversazioni  sull’argomento  e  si  basa  su  giustificazioni  che 
derivano dalla praticità della vita quotidiana, ma che rimangono inascoltate da chi ha 
il potere decisionale. A comprova della mancanza di analisi di terreno sia geografica 
si  etnografica,  da  parte  del  comitato  di  gestione  dell’ACTFGL,  infine,  basta 
individuare sulla mappa le aree destinate a scopo turistico lungo la strada Pafuri-
Mapai,  e  le  aree  destinate  all’esplorazione  mineraria  a  ridosso  del  Parco  del 
Limpopo, che sono quasi coincidenti. 
58 Intervista con la sig. Collen Mullen, manager del Pafuri Camp di Wilderness Safari, Pafuri: 11 
Dicembre 2006.
59 Avvenuti il 7 marzo 2005 e il 6 settembre 2006.
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Il mantenimento della continuità culturale, inoltre, non è più uno degli obiettivi 
del GLTFCA e PP, (1) nonostante i dati qualitativi e quantitativi su Dumela e Pafuri 
dimostrino uno stretto legame transfrontaliero fra le popolazioni di confine (legami di 
parentela  e  frequenza  delle  migrazioni  per  lavoro),  (2)  sebbene  la  storia  di 
migrazione e dislocazione abbia rafforzato l’identificazione fra spazio geografico e 
spazio  culturale,  attraverso  il  ritorno  degli  emigrati  alla  località  di  origine.  Grazie 
all’identità  geo-culturale  di  Pafuri,  infatti,  lo  spazio  transfrontaliero  fisico  potrebbe 
coincidere con lo spazio transfrontaliero etnico-culturale, creando un caso esemplare 
di armonia uomo-natura in un ambiente dove entrambi vengono protetti, attraverso 
una pianificazione territoriale che tenga colto delle necessità socio-economiche di 
entrambi, per esempio con la creazione di un sistema di recinzione che riesca sia a 
evitare  la  diffusione  di  malattie  quali  l’AIDS  felino,  l’afta  e  la  tubercolosi  alle 
popolazioni  sane  rimaste  nello  Zimbabwe,  sia  a  proteggere  la  popolazione  di 
Sengwe e di Pafuri. In questo modo, per esempio, si tamponerebbe il timore reale di 
spostamento forzato che crea i maggiori contrasti fra popolazione e Parco. In base a 
quanto evinto dalla ricerca con la popolazione locale, infatti, basterebbe che un vero 
processo partecipativo fosse in atto nelle zone rurali periferiche come Dumela, e che 
si  eliminasse  la  percezione  del  binomio  parco-rilocazione  che  ha  da  sempre 
caratterizzato la storia della conservazione africana. La mancanza di questo segnale 
dimostra  quindi  che  lo  scopo  del  GLTFCA  non  è  tanto  nel  mitigare  le  passate 
mancanze  verso  le  popolazioni  locali  attraverso  politiche  di  conservazione 
ambientale che portino allo sviluppo sostenibile,  ma di  usare la possibilità offerta 
dalle teorie di conservazione transfrontaliera basata sulla gestione degli ecosistemi 
per protegge i confini dello stato Sudafricano da attacchi esterni, nella forma di flussi 
migratori  e  traffici  commerciali  illegali.  In  questo  senso,  la  diffidenza  della 
popolazione locale verso il Parco è giustificata, come lo è l’accusa rivolta al Sudafrica 
di voler usare il  Parco come  cordon sanitaire militarizzato per la salvaguardia dei 
propri confini a discapito degli Stati confinanti. In base all’esperienza dei Makuleke, 
con il Pafuri Camp e l’Outpost, infine, si può affermare che il turismo non può portare 
sviluppo neanche nel lungo periodo, a meno che le popolazioni locali non ricevano 
un’istruzione di base adeguata e l’accesso a livelli superiori di scolarizzazione. Se 
questo potesse diventare uno scopo nel lungo periodo, bisogna comunque ricordare 
che  per  evitare  la  degenerazione  del  conflitto  esistente,  le  popolazioni  locali 
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necessitano  di  vedere  miglioramenti  economici  a  breve  termine,  per  poter 
appoggiare la conservazione, attraverso attività ad alta-redditività e basso impatto 
ambientale  quali  la  caccia  per  trofeo  che  non  richiederebbero  una  formazione 
scolastica specifica del personale impiegato.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Some things can only occur at borders… 
(Donnan & Wilson, 2001, p. 41)
The thesis was originally thought of as a document able to provide the theoretical 
framework and informative background to a development project for Community 
Based Natural Resource Management to be carried out in the stretch of land that, in 
Mozambique, goes from Pafuri to Chiqualaquala, bordering the Sengwe Communal 
Land  in  Zimbabwe.  This  is  the  geographical  centre  of  the  Great  Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation Area, which is the biggest Protected Area in the world, 
attracting millions of tourists in the South African component, the Kruger National 
Park,  and  dragging  Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe  towards  proactive  conservation 
strategies,  whilst  addressing  the rural  communities  living within and without  its 
boundary. However, such conception shifted through time spent on the field into a 
more academic analysis of frontiers and borders. The broad aim was to  address the 
failure of the GLTFCA management to reach local communities in the establishment 
of the protected area, in a historical and political context. 
The thesis was approached and written as a learning process, as a space where all 
academic and life-based knowledge could convey and produce a realistic account of 
the issues discussed, from history to politics, from conservation to development, to 
the  relative  argumentations.  This  holistic  approach  sought  to  cover  a  gap  in 
Geographic  research,  identified  by  Donnan  &  Wilson,  whereby  few  studies  on  
nationalism […] deal with the cultural aspects of international borders, the frontiers with  
which they are associated and the physical and metaphorical borderlands which stretch away  
from the legal borderlines between states2. This introductory chapter will present the key 
themes that were combined to define field research and reach plausible conclusions 
on the relation between conservation, community and development which has been 
much  debated  in  the  last  decade.  Beginning  with  the  introduction  of  political 
geography, embracing political ecology, as the more apt conceptual  framework to 
1 Italics in the original.
2 Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p.2
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create  triangulation  patterns,  the  chapter  will  move  on  to  critically  evaluate 
Transfrontier Conservation and NRM, with reference to the GLTFCA, followed by 
the historical patterns of the Pafuri border area, from pre-colonial times to present-
day post conflict implications. Secondly, it will present the theoretical foundations to 
the study, embedded in Political Geography, and the conceptual framework which 
draws from the  Géstion du Terroir  approach developed in North West Africa.  The 
description of the study area where the local field work was conducted, will follow: 
this  will  justify  the  choice  of  both  Mozambique  and  Pafuri  as  case  studies.  The 
research will be outlined presenting the aim and objectives of the project, and the 
structure of the thesis will be explained. The chapter will proceed with a section on 
the use of terminology in reference to the various denominations for TFCAs, TFP, 
Peace Parks and so forth; native ethnic groups and languages; and historical events. 
Finally, the thesis will be presented in order to give a concise outline of each chapter.
1.1 KEY RESEARCH THEMES
Research  on  TFCAs  has  often  analysed  cross-border  conservation  initiatives 
under  the  spectrum  provided  by  political  ecology,  by  framing  case  studies  into 
conservation polities that are modern, by definition, as they have developed since the 
1987 Bruntland Report. All the academic researchers, who had witnessed the failures 
of  CBNRM in  devolving  empowerment  at  the  local  level3,  posited  the  failure  of 
TBNRM on the basis that global political and economic interests would prevail on 
strategies for local development4. Obviously, considering that what differs between 
the two conservation strategies is the scale only, one would not expect a success of 
the latter, unless lessons learnt were put into practice, while overcoming governance 
problems  with  the  transfrontier  approach.  The  understanding  that  drives  such 
projects  is  that  conservation,  based  on  the  environmental  scale,  has  shifted  the 
attention away from Political Geography, despite the key factor in the analysis of 
such processes pertains directly to this field, particularly in Southern Africa.
3 See for  instance  Berkes,  2004;  Campbell  and Vainjo-Mattila,  2003;  Cencini,  2002;  Twyman,  2000; 
Wolmer et al, 2003.
4 See Duffy, 1997 and 2006; Ramutsindela, 2004; Wolmer, 2003.
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1.1.1 The Political geography of Africa and African conservation
The  analysis  of  the  development  of  nation-states  in  Africa,  in  a  Political 
Geographical  perspective,  has  so  far  been  conducted  (a)  with  the  purpose  of 
presenting  the  existence  of  those  African  civilisations  which  the  historical  and 
anthropological XIX century revisionism had attempted to delete5; (b) by historians 
of a specific areas6; (c) by researchers on border studies7. This thesis aims at filling a 
gap into current analysis, by placing Political Geography at the centre of studies into 
TFCAs  in  Southern  Africa  and  by  discussing  it  in  a  historical  perspective  of 
nationhood and states formation at the regional scale, beginning with the acceptance 
of the differentiation between the concepts  of  nation and  state,  as  summarised by 
Muir (1975) and widely received by academics8: 
Whereas the ‘state’ refers to a particular form of organisation of people and  
territory,  a  nation is  formed by a  human group whose  members  usually  
share a range of objective cultural  characteristics,  values and aspirations,  
and a close political association with a particular piece of territory. (p. 84)
Ideally, as Donnan & Wilson (1999) confirm, the State should represent a Nation. 
This  status,  however,  was  never  achieved  in  Europe  where  minorities  are  still  a 
major political and economical issue, suffice to mention that Catalans, in Spain, who 
have been recognised as an ethnic group and their language has become one of the 
official languages of the European Union, or the ethnic French and German border 
minorities,  in  Italy,  who have been  granted a  special  status  which entails  higher 
devolution  from  the  central  government,  minor  taxation  and  increased  financial 
contribution,  taken  from  the  coffers  of  the  state.  It  is  therefore  unthinkable  to 
consider  African  countries  any  different,  particularly  when  acknowledging  the 
variety of ethnic groups enclosed by each state’s border which remains the heaviest 
colonial  inheritance,  although never  challenged by the independent  governments. 
5 As presented by Reader, 1994 and Davidson, 1992, with exhaustive argumentations over the impact 
of  European  influence  in  Africa,  whilst  acknowledging  that  trade  of  all  goods  had  pre-existed 
European domination and slavery was embedded in the African culture.
6 As best exemplified by Hall & Young (1997) for Mozambique. 
7 See Doherty & Doyle, 2006; Radcliffe, 1998.
8 Similar theories on the state and the nation state have been proposed by Pounds, 1992; Glassner, 
1995; Wilson & Donnan, 1998.
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On the contrary, many a war has been fought to maintain the status quo, because of 
natural  resources  (as  it  was the case in Nigeria and now in Darfur),  or of  ethnic 
hatred (in Rwanda and Zimbabwe).
The political-geographical context  serves two key assumptions of the research. 
Firstly,  by  accepting  that  the  African  continent,  specifically  Southern  Africa,  is 
composed  of  a  number  of  states  within  whose  governmental  and  geographical 
organisation  lays  a  greater  number  of  ethnic  minorities,  it  will  prove  that  such 
minorities have accepted the state whether by enforcement or by surrender to reality, 
whilst maintaining a strong cross-border connection. Secondly, by appreciating the 
fact that borders are the typical economic milieu for illegal and informal activities9, it 
will show that in terms of Political Geography such problem might transform the 
border into a frontier where the arm of one’s law can extend its power by exploiting 
the common governance of a space, as exemplified by TFCAs. 
1.1.2  Transfrontier conservation and socio-economic development
Transfrontier  Conservation  and  Natural  Resource  Management,  as  mentioned 
above,  are  directly  derived from CBNRM strategies  to  combine conservation and 
rural development, particularly in areas where natural resources are palatable tourist 
attractions. In most cases, however, existing local populations encroach on wildlife 
and spoil the environment by cutting trees, burning grasses, cultivating fertile land 
for subsistence and killing the occasional wild animal for either defence or economic 
return, in a word,  live. As Bell rightfully pointed out CBNRM originates from two 
strands. The first one is the conservation strand, to which he belonged as a biologist, 
based on  the realisation that government control of wildlife and other biological resources  
was  not  working,  in  fact  conservation  only  exacerbated  the  divide  between  social 
strata  in  Southern  Africa  by  depriving  native  population  of  land  and  natural 
resources,  in  the  name of  wildlife  protection.  The  second one is  the  social  equity  
strand, to which I belong, aiming to redress the problems of rural poverty and inequitable  
9 Stated also in Duffy, 2001.
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access to resources10 by means of allowing local communities to actively participate in 
conservation and, generally,  in the management of the territory and its resources. 
Unlike most supporters of this theory, however, I believe that a first distinguo should 
be made between private  and governmental  conservation projects,  particularly  in 
borderline case studies  such as Swaziland,  where the most effective conservation 
areas originate from private initiative and are managed with a mandate from the 
King, but remain de facto private institutions.  Community participation, as posited by 
most academics  and policy-makers,  should be suggested for  private  conservation 
projects,  where  viable,  but  sought  only  in  government  funded  projects,  which 
become, in developing countries, donor-funded conservation projects, where none of 
the stakeholders have anything to loose, and can claim failures on local constraints. 
This  is  due to  the fact  that  community participation in Southern Africa,  whether 
sought by joint-venture or partnership or contractual agreement, has resulted into a 
general failure, because once the community could not gain immediate benefit from 
the  project,  the  people  lost  interest  without  loosing  capital  or  wealth,  as  the 
investment capital was put forward by international donors and NGOs at no risk for 
the  community11.  This  was,  for  instance,  the  internal  paradox  of  the  CAMPFIRE 
strategy in Zimbabwe, where devolution of decision-making power to the local level 
was effective only when the benefits from safari hunting were so great as to trickle 
down to the communities involved, that is only when the costs of conservation had 
paid for themselves12. 
It is clear, therefore, that the relation between land and natural resources on the 
land  is  the  conundrum  which  must  be  solved  in  order  to  implement  CBNRM 
successfully. However, since conservation was the main political and economic drive 
for  the  idealisation  of  CBNRM,  as  a  poverty  alleviation  strategy13,  conservation 
10 Bell, 1999, p. 3
11 Reilly,  2006. In  The Bandwagon,  Mr. Reilly aptly describes the impediments into full  community 
participation into private investments for  conservation,  which are true for  all  the private reserves 
visited during the field research.
12 Critique over CAMPFIRE is broad, however the arguments are best exemplified by Cencini, 2006, 
Wolmer et al. 2003; Shackleton et al., 2002; Madzuzu, 1996.
13 Cencini, 2002
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paved the  way for  a  new paradigm that  focussed on land,  in  the  perspective  of 
ecosystems. Ecosystems, by definition,  are  communities of plants, animals,  and other  
organisms,  plus  their  physical  environment14,  and  thus  encompass  human-made 
boundaries.  With this approach, it became clear that only TFPAs could effectively 
contribute to saving fragile ecosystems, and TBNRM was to counteract CBNRM as a 
strategy for socio-economic development of those communities which were absorbed 
by such projects15.  More land signifies more resources and higher carrying capacity, 
thus allowing for medium to long term strategies in addressing controversial issues 
such as livelihoods and human-animal conflict,  with the African justification that 
rural population had been  implementing TBNRM at a local level for a long time16,  by 
living in a cross-border social and natural network. Ramutsindela has expressed such 
theory perfectly by stating that the architects saw ‘scale’, rather than decentralisation, as  
the solution to conservation and community integration and development (p. 5), which can 
be read between the lines in all the institutional publications on the subject, including 
van der Linde et al. (2001); Griffin et al. (1999).
TBNRM  emerged  with  TFCA  and  Peace  Parks,  as  a  substitute  approach  to 
CBNRM whose  aims are  to  safeguard  the  ecosystem and to  support  local  socio-
economic development, in rural and peripheral areas where natural resources are the 
only  resource.  Because  it  is  so  manipulated  by  international  donors,  hence  by 
international public opinion, the resulting paradox is that the theory fails to address 
real issues since it aims to enforce community participation in private or semi-private 
protected areas to redress  social injustices  of land access,  but softens the idea for 
government  projects,  since  it  is  difficult  to  justify  ‘killing  for  conservation’17 in 
western societies. 
14Definition  from  Briodiversity  Hotspots  (http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/Hotspots/ 
resources/glossary.xml? KNC-adwords&gclid=CPCbgpbYvIoCFRBSZwoddnoImQ#e)
15 Ramutsindela, 2004
16 van der Linde et al., 2001, p.3.
17 The expression is  taken from the title of an inspirational book written by Rosaleen Duffy,  2000, 
Killing for Conservation: The Politics of Wildlife in Zimbabwe, (Oxford: James Currey). 
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1.1.3  Borders in between: conservation and livelihoods in Pafuri
The  mainstream  literature  of  border  studies  is  focussed  on  the  USA-Mexico 
border,  and looks at  other  realities  only when attracted by major  political,  socio-
economic and ethnic issues rising from the thin line dividing two or more countries18. 
All  the literature concerning the border  areas  of the GLTFCA is limited to either 
present historical migration patterns19 or discuss conservation politics, as if they were 
mutually exclusive. Only recently there have been a few studies which look at the 
implication  of  historical  narratives  into  the  formation  of  the  border  areas,  and 
address the TFCA project in this context20. Yet the border is still marginal, compared 
to the key theoretical frameworks.  In this research, instead, the border is seen as a 
crucial element in history and therefore in conservation strategies, since they both 
belong to the national and regional political sphere of decision-making. 
The Pafuri border area was neglected for years by the respective governments of 
South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique, had it not been for the occasional poacher 
being sought after by the national police force and Rhodesian rangers. Border patrol 
was made effective at the turn of the XX century by the creation of WENELA, the 
mining recruitment service,  whose aim was to control influxes of immigrants into 
South Africa and regulate employment in the mines, to the benefit of both the South 
African and the Mozambican governments.  With the creation of the Sabie reserve 
and  its  successful  extension,  the  Kruger  National  Park  and  its  conservation 
requirements were a substantial drive to keep on extending further north, in order to 
halt  poaching in  the strip of  land between the Luvuhvu and the Limpopo River 
inhabited  by  the  Makulekes.  The  timing  of  such  decision  was,  coincidentally, 
optimum for the establishment of a people-free buffer zone at a time when political 
instability, resulting from Mozambican independence and the insurgence of military 
18 Anselmi and Erni, 2001, provide a meaningful selection of case study from contested borders. 
19 See McDonald, 2000; Whitman, 2000.
20 Thanks to the TBPARI initiative, a number of researchers and student have dedicated time and 
effort  to  explain  the  impact  of  the  GLTFCA  on  the  border  areas  from  Pafuri  to  Massingir.  All 
information  is  available  on  the  webpage,  http://www.wits.ac.za/tpari/Researchers.htm, 
however, it is worth noting amongst others Dr. W. Dressler, Mr. M. Schoon, Mr. C. Dear, Mr. W. 
Wande, Ms. H. Hansen.  
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groups for the independence of both South Africa and Rhodesia, was threatening the 
status quo of segregationist regimes. Rhodesia, instead, resorted to military strategy 
alone by relocating people into Protected Villages, forming an ad hoc contras battalion, 
the legendary Selous Scouts, and mining the border to reduce infiltrations from the 
rebels  hosted  in  Mozambique.  War-time  decision  making,  whether  justified  by 
conservation or not, deeply affected livelihood strategies in the area particularly in 
terms  of  displacement,  that  strengthened  social  and  cultural  bonds  pre-existing 
colonial rule, rather than nationalism as imposed by the independent governments. 
Without reaching the extent of conspiracy theories on the Peace Parks Foundation 
and the real justification for TFCA21, one is left to wonder if history is repeating itself. 
After the war, people were moved back into the country, helped by UNHCR through 
the Pafuri Border Post, and left to recreate their livelihood strategies whilst being 
abandoned by their  government,  had it  not  been for the military  presence  at  the 
border post.  After a period of peace and adjustment,  interrupted by the floods in 
2000,  however,  conservation  is  again  imposing  itself  on  people  with  the 
establishment of the Limpopo National Park, the Sengwe Ecological Corridor, right 
on the doorstep of the border communities in Mozambique, and the GLTFCA. The 
political agenda is of course a renewed bond between independent countries who are 
at peace with each other and will prove so by cooperating on common interests22, 
namely  the  conservation  of  fragile  ecosystems  and  the  re-population  of  the 
Mozambican  and  Zimbabwean  bush,  depredated  by  decades  of  poaching.  This 
agenda, however, digs deeper into the needs of the South African component of the 
GLTFCA, as (a) the number of elephants is increasing beyond carrying capacity, but 
culling has been stopped on account of Western animalist movements,  manly, (b) 
South African tourists want to reclaim the bush, instead of driving through the tarred 
and graded roads of the Kruger and most of other national parks, (c) the levels of 
21 Namely van der Reijden, 2005; Ellis, 1994; and Ramutsindela, 2004, with reference to the latter.
22 The  aim  and  objectives  of  the  GLTFP  and  TFCA  are  well  exposed  on  the  official  website, 
http://www.greatlimpopopark.com
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illegal migrations into South Africa are threatening the fragile political situation23. In 
the  meantime,  communities  are  barely  discussed,  and  livelihood  creation  is 
postponed as a self-solving problem. Furthermore, at the time this thesis was being 
reviewed, the Limpopo National Park has launched a bid for private investors to 
plan for  tourism in the park and the whole area  from Pafuri  to  Mapai  has  been 
plotted24. Despite mentioning the need to involve rural communities in the bidding 
document,  the  simple  fact  that  a  governmental  institution  withdraws  from  its 
primary role of addressing the needs of its  citizens shows the attitude offered by 
Mozambique and the main donors of the LNP and GLTFCA (the World Bank and 
GTZ) towards one of the key objectives of the project:
…this park will provide jobs and opportunities to generate revenue for many of  
the thousands of local people affected by decades of civil war. Improving the lives  
of these rural communities will in turn further contribute towards biodiversity  
conservation  by  demonstrating  the  economic  and  social  advantages  to  be  
achieved through conservation as an alternative and viable land-use option. 
d. develop frameworks and strategies whereby local communities can participate  
in and tangibly benefit  from the management and sustainable use of  natural  
resources that occur within the transfrontier park or TFCA25
The two sentences show how much the TFCA paradigm has borrowed from socio-
economic development and CBNRM theories, although failing to implement them as 
part of the project, which defers the development of such frameworks to the private 
sector.
1.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
The research is fully embedded in Political Geography theories over the meaning 
attached to the State and to its borders, and their development since the colonisation 
of the African continent.  The inter-relation of  borders and  frontiers is  of particular 
interest,  in  the  context  of  transfrontier  conservation,  because  it  helps  addressing 
issues  in  political  ecology  over  the  ownership  of  natural  resource-management 
23 Hussein, 1996; underlying discourse in Whitman, 2000. 
24 See the bid launched by the Limpopo National Park, anon. (a), 2007. 
25 Both are extracts from the GLTFP web page, 2006
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projects  in  post-independence  Southern  Africa  and  the  role  to  which  native 
populations are relegated by broader political strategies.
Accepting  Glassner’s  definition  of  State  as  an  effectively  politically  organised 
territory  by  a  native  population,  or  a  resident  population,  having  provided  a 
government  of  the effective  control  of  the territory26 (1995,  p.15),  the analysis  of 
colonisation first and imperialism later runs the risk of being skewed since the colonies 
acquire  legitimacy,  especially  in  the  British  area  of  influence  where  protectorates 
encouraged  the  local  governments  systems,  i.e.  Botswana,  Malawi,  Northern 
Rhodesia  and  Swaziland.  The  historical  process,  which  in  Europe  led  to  the 
conceptualisation  of  the  Nation-State27,  however,  balances  the  approach  on  the 
grounds that, whereas in the ‘Old Continent’ the concept of independent state shifted 
from the medieval  idea of an area of  political-economical  influence to  the formal 
acceptance  of  the  nationalistic  drive28,  the  colonies  were  denied  such  right  as 
colonialism turned  into  imperialism.  The  difference  between  the  two  processes,  as 
identified by the literature29, is essential to understand the contemporary history of 
Southern  Africa,  whose  unique  development  is  explained  by  the  shift  in  the 
perception of state and nation occurred in post-independence Africa and leading to 
the  idea  of  the  multinational  state30.  The  African  states  of  the  final  phase  of 
Imperialism, in fact, were European modelled nation-states in a regional contexts, 
but  medieval  areas  of  frontiers  on  the  international  level,  as  the  Commonwealth 
demonstrates.
Transfrontier  Conservation  and  NRM,  therefore,  are  perceived  as  a  modern 
geographical  approach to  older  political  border  issues.  Despite  acknowledgement 
that conservation, like most environmental issues, is transboundary31 and therefore 
26 Translation from the original: ‘lo Stato è un territorio organizzato politicamente in maniera effettiva 
da  una  popolazione  indigena,  o  comunque  ivi  residente,  avente  un  governo  dotato  del  controllo 
effettivo del territorio stesso’.
27 See Formigoni, 2000, and Davidson, 1992.
28 See Muir, 1975; Davidson, 1992.
29 See Marx, K., in Seidman, 2004; Glassener, 1995 and Pounds, 1992.
30 Tshiyembe, 2001
31 See Agnew, 2002 ; Doherty and Doyle, 2006.
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needs an international approach rather than a localised one, it must not be forgotten 
that as African borders were drawn and frontier zones disappeared32, protected areas 
could also served as buffer zones between states. This provided  a utilitarian scope to 
remote untouched areas surrounded by native communities. It is not by accident, in 
fact, that out of 132 total PAs in Africa, 55 share either one or two borders33. This is 
particularly  true  for  dry  lowveld and  highveld savannahs  and  deserts,  a  typical 
southern African landscape. Theories expressed by political ecology, however, seem 
reductive when zooming down from a global to a local scale, as they do not make an 
allowance for the historical and political implications of both ethnic segregation and 
politicised  conservation  in  the  three  countries  that  were  the  last  stronghold  of 
imperialism, like the systems which impose their law over indigenous people, thus 
transforming ideas, institutions and products34.
This research, therefore, draws from two sets of theories which have rarely come 
together in literature, if not to blindly criticise Transfrontier Conservation35. The first 
is the understanding of African borders as legacy of colonialism, the second adopts 
conservation  as  a  solution  to  overcome  such  problems,  despite  its  political 
embedding both on the regional and continental scale. 
1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The phenomenology of African borders, in a historical, geographical and political 
frame, leads to the conceptualisation of transfrontier conservation as a tool to solve 
problems arising along borders which are political, in function, and superimposed, in 
demarcation.  This  multidisciplinary  approach  to  the  theoretical  frame  is  also 
reflected in the mixed methodology used in field-research. 
The starting point of the research was the attempt to understand how dependent 
border  communities  are  on the  existence  of  the  border,  and how changes  in  the 
32 See Griffiths, 1986; and Glassner 1995.
33 These figures are taken from Zbicz, 1999, however,  the comments provided do not clarify whether 
the 123 PA taken into consideration are along borders or not, which would drastically  change the 
impact of the statement.
34 Borrowed from Cohen, in Glassner 1995, p.237
35 See Moore, 1997.
11
functionality of  the  border  for  the  states  did  influence,  if  at  all,  their  livelihood 
strategies. Within the umbrella of Sustainable Livelihood Approach, promoted by the 
FAO, it was found that the  Géstion de Terroirs  approach36 could frame the research 
and allow for the objective contextualising of present problems, particularly in terms 
of  access  to  natural  resources  and  socio-economic  development.  Stemming  from 
research on rural development for Francophone West Africa, this approach would 
geographically  fit  the  localities  of  the  GLTFCA  because  of  their  common 
characteristics:  (1)  rurality;  (2)  peripheral  location,  both  geographically  and 
institutionally; (3) history of war and displacement. 
The weakness identified by one of the authors37, by contrast, proved a strength in 
this case as it  was accepted,  within the theoretical foundations, that the failure of 
CBNRM models was due to its lack of localisation, and that TBNRM aggravates the 
problem, instead of concentrating on the cross-border nature of cultural  milieux in 
Africa.  In fact,  the pragmatism of theories was never abandoned in favour of the 
creation of models that would fit one locality only, as the sole conception of CBNRM 
and TBNRM were portrayed as infallible solutions. The  Géstion de Terroirs approach, 
instead, works on a local scale and can be extended only to a region sharing the same 
environmental and socio-economic characteristics38. Furthermore, by addressing the 
Terroir, and in some publications the Terroir villegois39, the assumption of managing a 
localised territory, in order to achieve sustainability and development, confirms that 
comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  locality  is  essential  to  be  successful.  Political 
ecology,  instead,  like CBNRM and TBNRM, places  too much stress  on the cross-
border  issue  and  the  glocal  implications  to  provide  sustainable  local  solutions. 
Géstion du Terroir,  finally,  relies  heavily on participation,  communication between 
stakeholders and the accountability of local institutions40, thus proving very much 
site-specific as opposed to generalist NRM approaches. 
36 Cleary, 2003
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 PSEP, 2006; FAO, 1995
40 PSEP, 2006; Cleary, 2003; FAO, 1995
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Obviously, by providing ambitious aims and relying on the nature of both people 
and politics,  the  Géstion  du  Terroir approach  is  as  costly  as  it  is  risky.  However, 
because of the type and value of the interests at a stake in the GLTFCA, it was felt 
that by framing the research with this approach, the obtained results would have 
been  able  to  influence  both decision-makers  and professional  on the field with a 
comprehensive outlook of the issues at the stake. The research, therefore, contributes 
firstly  to  the  academic  literature  with  a  localised  human  geographic  and 
anthropological study of a specific border and its communities, thus tampering the 
gap identified by Donnan and Wilson41 (1999, Introduction). Secondly it will provide 
a  new set  of  data  for  the  human geographical  mapping of  a  problematic  border 
village, which will  contribute locally to anti-poaching practices  and prevention of 
informal activities.  Thirdly, it  will  present  a valuable analysis  of  a locality which 
should benefit all stakeholders in the implementation of the GLTFCA, and related 
objectives. 
1.4 THE STUDY AREA
The GLTFP was established with an MoU in  2001 to  create  a  Protected  Area 
spanning  the  Kruger  National  Park  in  South  Africa,  the  Limpopo National  Park 
(former Coutada 16 hunting reserve) in Mozambique and the Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe. The GLTFCA, subsequently, was born as part of the ecosystems 
approach, with the creation of ecological corridors and interstitial areas to connect 
the  Parks  and  create  a  buffer  zone  allowing  high-density  tourism,  around  the 
isolated core for wildlife protection. The GLTFCA project, therefore, encloses several 
sub-projects differentiated by acronyms, geographical scale and levels of protection 
according  to  the  IUCN categories  for  Protected  Areas:  (a)  the  GLTP,  once  Gaza-
Kruger-Gonarezhou TFP, is the smallest unit which encompasses the three National 
41 Donnan & Wilson, 1999, Introduction, quoted in p.1 of this thesis.
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Map 1.1: The GLTFP, conservation area and full Heartland extension (Source: AWF, 2006).
Parks and the Sengwe Corridor still unsettled; (b) the GLPP covers the same area of 
the  GLTFP  but  with  the  Peace  Park  denomination  entails  a  social  objective  for 
security and cross-border cooperation, which has now been taken over by the TFP 
project as the two entities are increasingly inter-dependent, under the umbrella of the 
Peace Parks Foundation42; (c) the GLTFCA encompasses both the GLTFP area and the 
42 The  PPF  operates  mainly  in  South  Africa,  where  most  of  the  PP  are  located:  the  |Ai-|
Ais/Richtersveld, the Kgaladi, the Limpopo/Sashe, the Maloti-Drakensberg, the Great Limpopo and 
the Lubombo. However, it has recently opened up to the region with the Malawi-Zambia.
14
‘interstitial  zones’,  that  is  the  broader  area  which  connects  the  three  Parks  in 
Mozambique only, and which has grown to encompass two other national parks in 
the country, the Banhine and the Zinave43); (d) the GL Heartland, name assigned by 
the AWF as part of their ‘Protecting Land’ programme touching eight of the main 
TFCA and PP areas in the continent44. As a Heartland the GLTFCA extends from the 
KNP to the West to the Mozambique coast in the East. 
Amongst the immediate difficulties the three governments had to face, there was 
firstly the establishment of the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique (see Map 1.2), 
in  the  former  Coutada  16  hunting  area  which  was  heavily  affected,  in  terms  of 
wildlife numbers, by the  national war and the South African and Rhodesian contras, 
and where people had been living in sparse and close settlement since Colonial and 
pre-colonial  times.  Changing  the  status  from  hunting  reserve  to  National  Park, 
therefore, implied dealing with the eight (8) substantial communities living within 
the  park  boundaries,  as  shown  by  Map  1.2,  three  of  which  in  the  high-density 
tourism area, close to the sanctuary which had been created to build the herbivores 
populations and functioned until the first semester of 2006, when the protective fence 
was taken down. 
Secondly, another strip of land had to undergo changes in its legal status in order 
to  create  the  Sengwe  Ecological  Corridor,  running  from  Pafuri  to  the  Southern 
Border of the Gonarezhou National Park along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, 
as shown in Map 1.1. Also this project, as envisaged by the Peace Park Foundations 
and other stakeholders, should entail the forced relocation of some 15,500 people if 
the corridor measures 26 Km wide at the two most distant extremities45. 
43 World Bank, 2004
44 The AWF is an NGO operating throughout the continent with the main purposes of protecting 
animal  species  and supporting  human development.  Following  the  creation  of  TFCAs and Peace 
Parks,  AWF has been working in  some of  the  selected areas  in  parallel  with  the  institutions,  by 
creating the Heartland Programme, involving Congo, Virunga, Samburu, Kilimanjaro, Maasai Steppe, 
Zambesi, Kazumgula, Limpopo (http://www.awf.org/section/land, 2007)
45 CESVI, 2001
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Map 1.2: The yellow circles show the communities within the LNP boundaries (Source: LNP, 2006)
The process has been negotiated since 2001 with little results, and was threatened by 
landmine contamination in the Zimbabwean side, which was never discussed with 
the  community  or  the  media,  despite  extensive  research  and  mapping  had  been 
carried out by GTZ46. 
46 Bocchino, 2006
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In  order  to  show  the  degree  of  secrecy  behind  some  hidden  agendas  of  the 
GLTFCA project, it was found through field work, that demining had started in the 
Southern section in the spring of 2006, but no publicity was given to such an event 
which people had long been waiting for and no one would  have contrasted.
1.4.1 Mozambique as a case study: justifications.
The decision to focus on the Mozambican side of the tri-national park derives 
from the fact that the area extending from the Pafuri to the Chiqualaquala Border 
posts,  the  northernmost  part  of  the  interstitial  zone,  was  not  being  sufficiently 
addressed by the management committee of the TFCA, as demonstrated by the small 
amount of literature available on the locality47. This lack of interest, was assumed, 
would deteriorated the fragile relation with the establishment of a protected area on 
their  doorstep.  Additionally,  the  area  is  historically  notorious  for  cross-border 
activities which can be perceived as either informal or illegal according to the type, 
the extent in volume and time, and its perpetrators. Considering that cross-border 
security is one of the main objectives in the establishment of TFCA and TFP, it was 
deemed  important  to  investigate  and  evaluate  such  activities  in  the  context  of 
livelihood  strategies  in  the  area.  Furthermore,  despite  being  currently  at  peace, 
Mozambique came out of a national conflict which began in 1976 against Zimbabwe 
and continued throughout the Eighties until 1992 against South Africa, in a  contras 
war which reduced the country to its knees. A simple geographical analysis of the 
parties involved in the war show that one of the affected border areas would have 
been  Pafuri  in  a  North-Eastern  direction  to  Chiqualaquala,  the  border  with 
Zimbabwe, and in the Southern Direction to Massingir. Before that time, the slave 
and ivory routes, the migrations towards the mines and the movement of foreign 
poachers in the area left a legacy that is only indirectly linked to colonialism. The 
peripheral political and economic positionality of the area allowed local communities 
with  liaisons  across  the  border  to  maintain  their  traditional  practices,  such  as: 
choosing a wife, visiting relatives in a near-by village, or reach agricultural fields and 
47 Bulpin, 1954; Koch et al., 1995; Connor, 2003.
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fishing spots, regardless of the country under which they fell. Just before World War 
I,  furthermore,  when the  Witwatersrand  Native  Labour  Organisation  (WENELA) 
was created to regulate workers into the Johannesburg minefield and keep the cost of 
labour at a low standard, local inhabitants received permits to travel across the KNP 
to visit relatives in the Gazankulo area48.
Mozambique,  therefore,  presented  an  interesting  historical  and  political 
background to NRM whose influence is still  visible, whilst rendering an image of 
progress  towards  conservation  practices  for  sustainable  rural  development.  The 
analysis of informal livelihoods, of migrations and cross-border relations, as well as 
the influence of governmental decision-making in remote areas would need to be 
based on data collected along the main route, which leads from Zimbabwe to South 
Africa via Mozambique. The closest official border post on this road would be Pafuri. 
1.4.2 Physical geography and ecology of Pafuri
Map 1.3: The area of Pafuri (Software Google Earth; Source: field work)
Pafuri is part of the northernmost lowveld area of the Kruger National Park. This 
Aanglo-afrikaans term indicates the lower sections of the South African savannah 
where  the  temperature  is  high  and  the  climate  is  dry,  with  low  rainfall  levels 
(between 325 and 500 mm per year) normally concentrated between November and 
March, the core of the rain season. 
48 (Koch et al, 1995)
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Type of animal present Linnaean nomenclature
Buffalo Syncerus caffer
Burchell’szebra Equus quagga
Bushbuck Tragelaphus scriptus
Chacma Baboon Papius ursinus
Crocodile Crocodylus niloticus
Eland Taurotragus oryx
Elephant Loxodonta africana
Giraffe Giraffa camelopardalis
Hippopotamus Hippopotamus amphibius
Impala Aepyceros melampus
Klipspringer Oreotragus oreotragus
Kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros
Large-spotted genet Genetta tigrina
Leopard Panthera pardus
Lichtenstein’s Hartebeest Sigmoceros lichtensteinii;
Alcelaphus lichtensteinii
Lion Pantera leo
Nyala Tragelaphus angasii
Porcupine Hystrix cristata
Reedbuck Redunca arundinum
Sable antelope Hippotragus niger
Steenbok Raphicerus campestris
Vervet Monkey Aethiops sabeus
Warthog Phacochoerus africanus
Waterbuck Kobus ellipsiprymnus
White Rhinoceros Ceratotherium simum
Table1.4: Animals found in the Makuleke Concession (Source: field work and WS, 2006)
The area is split by the Lebombo Mountain chain in a  North to South direction and 
cut  across by the Limpopo River,  on whose sandbanks it  is  formed.  The poorly-
drained sandy-clay soil  found in  lowveld section generates  close savannah forests 
along the River which is a favourite refuge for animals, but becomes dry mopane 
(Colophospermum mopane) shrubveld as it comes near the granite hills of the highveld 
sections of the TFCA. The general biome found in the area is the mixed Transvaal 
bushveld with a vegetation composed of tall trees on Riverine flood plains, Thorn 
Bushes  in  dryer  spots  and  baobabs49 which  stand  out  as  landmark  of  ancient 
civilisations and beliefs. The presence of the ‘great grey-green greasy Limpopo River’ 
as poetically described by R. Kipling in the story of  The Elephant’s Child, and its 
affluent  the Luvuhvu River  generate  a dense Riverine forest  which extends from 
South Africa to Mozambique, past the village of Pafuri, and it is rich in Fever Trees 
amongst other Acacia species. 
49 Tainton, 1999
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In the KNP, because of the relocation of the Makulekes from Crooks’ Corner in 
1969, the forest is still very pristine and extends for many kilometres on both sides of 
the  River  up to  their  conjunction,  with  the  exception of  the area  once inhabited, 
where the paths and dwellings sites are still clear of vegetation. As shown by Map 
1.1, the forest is reduced to a mere few hectares in Mozambique; however, south of 
the Limpopo River, it is much thicker than in the northern side and in the KNP. The 
impenetrability of the forest remnants makes it a perfect area for the family of some 
ten (10) elephants, which have been spotted drinking at the River in the evening and 
followed back to the site early in the morning. Whereas in the communal lands the 
variety of animals is reduced to crocodiles, baboons and vervet monkeys, only, due 
to human density and predation, the KNP side hosts an enviable richness in wildlife, 
particularly antelopes, and birdlife. The rhinoceros, it is worth noting, were recently 
reintroduced,  thanks  to  a  repopulation  programme  implemented  by  Wilderness 
Safari, the owner of one of the two lodges in the Makuleke Concession, Pafuri Camp 
on the Luvuhvu River. Unfortunately the number of predators are still low, and it 
would be very rare to have a big five seeing in the area. However, it must be said that 
the whole area is populated by a variety of birds which is worth of note. In this rare 
and delicate environment, in fact, a multitude of species is found from the endemic 
Yellow-billed Oxpecker (Buphagus africanus), ridding animals of ticks and flies, to the 
common  helmeted  Guinea  fowl  (Numida  meleagris),  from  the  majestic  Fish  Eagle 
(Haliaeetus  vocifer) to  the  long-tailed  Pintailed  Whydah  (Vidua  macroura).   Some 
species, furthermore, are endemic to the Pafuri area, such as the Mottled Spinetails 
(Telacanthura ussheri), the Racket-tailed Roller (Coracias spatulata), the Three-Banded 
Courser  (Rhinoptilus  cinctus),  the Southern Hyliota (Hyliota  australis),  Pel’s  Fishing 
Owl (Scotopelia peli), Meve’s Starling (Lamprotornis mevesii)  and the Tropical Boubou 
(Laniarius aethiopicus).
1.4.3  The human geography of Pafuri
Part of the Shoshangane kingdom whose origins and sites are still controversial 
and will be discussed further in Chapter 2 and 3, the area of Pafuri is predominantly 
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Tsonga-Shangaan speaking.  This  mixture is  a  Nguni language,  deriving from the 
Congo-Niger Bantu ethnic group. At present two groups of common language and 
culture populate the area: (1) Maluleke in South Africa, which were relocated from 
Crooks’ Corner in 1969 to extend the KNP, and now live at Makuleke some 25 kms 
South  of  Punda  Maria  Gate;  (2)  Shangaan  in  both  Mozambique  and  Sengwe 
Communal Land in Zimbabwe. However, in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the area of 
influence is shared with the Venda, a non–Nguni group who populated the Limpopo 
basin before the arrival of Soshangane and his kraal. In Zimbabwe and Mozambique, 
instead, the presence of the Ronga, of the Shona group, is still consistent. The familiar 
connection between the three Tsonga-Shangaana communities are of two types: (1) 
marital  and social  between Zimbabwe and Mozambique;  (2)  economic and social 
with South Africa. This difference, of course, is due to the pulling factor exercised by 
South Africa as a wealthier country with job opportunities in the mines first and as 
manpower  second.  Recently,  women  have  been  migrating  as  well,  mainly  to 
accompany their man, and look for jobs in housekeeping50.
The human geography of Pafuri changed particularly because of (a) relocation in 
South  Africa,  which endangered  social  relations  and trade,  (b)  and displacement 
during the wars, when entire villages changed site within Mozambique, or moved to 
the two other countries where refugees camps had been organised. At present, the 
remnants of the old Makuleke village are still visible at Crooks’ Corner, and so are 
the rests of the military occupation during the last war. Pafuri, however, had been 
populated by white  South Africans and Europeans in the second half  of  the XIX 
century because of the availability of game, particularly elephants, and of people to 
be  informally  recruited  for  the  mines.  The  landscape  of  the  area  changed 
impressively with the creation of two WENELA51 (later TEBA) recruitment posts and 
50 Field work: visit to Gyiani and Makuleke, and discussion with Cecilia Muklave, Dumela, September 
2006.
51 The  Witwatersrand  Native  Labour  Association  (WNLA  or  WENELA)  was  funded  in  1902  to 
regulate the flux and costs of migrants from outside South Africa, into  the mines. In agreement with 
the Portuguese government in Mozambique, WNLA established a series of recruitment posts as far 
North  as  Maxixe.  The  name  was  later  changed  into  TEBA  and  the  relations  with  Mozambique 
changed with its independence. All the offices, in fact, were closed and the recruitment halted when 
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with  the  creation   and enforcement  of  the  border  in  the  last  years  of  the  1980s. 
Currently, people are used to the border post, although it is only the people with a 
valid passport who cross the border legally, alongside with the adventurous tourists 
over Christmas and Easter holidays.
At this stage it is relevant to note that, despite the area is generally very dry and 
hot,  particularly  in  the  summer,  it  was  hit  by  a  devastating  flood  in  2000.  The 
downfall of the devastation reached the coast were damages are still recognisable. In 
Pafuri, notwithstanding damages to wildlife and cultivations, the flood deprived the 
local populations of shelters for many days, and some people lived on tree branches 
for up to three days before being able to climb down again52. On that occasion, all the 
basic infrastructure at the border post (electricity and telephone poles) were swiped 
away  thus  leaving  the  government  representatives  without  light  and 
communications until the present time.
1.5 RESEARCH OUTLINE
The research aims at investigating the influence of TF conservation politics in the 
livelihood  strategies  of  border  communities  at  Pafuri  Administrative  Post, 
Mozambique, whilst taking into account the geography of the area and the zoning of 
the  GLTFCA  in  the  three  adjoining  countries.   In  order  to  achieve  exhaustive 
conclusions,  able  to  influence  decision-makers  and  stakeholders  over  the 
management of the Pafuri locality, three different objectives have been identified.
1.to critically evaluate the impact of recent history into traditional livelihood 
strategies;
2.to present the political agenda of conservation in South Africa, in the past 
century, and assess its influence on NRM and socio-economic development;
3.to understand how TF Conservation can effectively transform a border into 
a frontier and sacrifice community livelihoods to political targets.
the country gave open support to the ANC movement for the independence of South Africa (Koch et  
al.,  1995).  At  present,  only  five  offices  remain  in  Mozambique,  and  TEBA  still  regulates  the 
recruitment of people, although the company is now looking into tourism as well with the renovation 
of the Pafuri site in South Africa and the Quissico site, on the coast of Mozambique.
52 Interview with Simon Chaukwe, Dumela, 2007
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The  underlying  discourse  in  the  research  is  the  Géstion  do  Terroir,  with  the 
Sustainable Livelihood Approach of the FAO, since the aim is to present a positive 
approach to NRM, within the territory, based on both primary and secondary data 
sources on the history of Pafuri  and the relations among the three countries.  The 
historical  section concentrates  on three main periods:  (1)  pre-colonisation and the 
origin of the Shangaana ethnic group; (2) colonisation, from poachers’ paradise to 
recruiting territory; (3) the border (or bush) wars with Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Similarly, the field investigation focuses on the evaluation of community livelihood 
strategies,  both formal and informal,  with a mixed methodological approach. The 
findings are compared with former research in the broader Pafuri area53 in order to 
evaluate the two economically-dependent countries in relation to South Africa, the 
pulling element for trade and migrations. 
1.6 TERMINOLOGY AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.6.1 Transfrontier Conservation: policies and acronyms
At this stage, it is essential to introduce a brief discussion over the terminology 
used  in  this  text,  beginning  with  the  acronyms  referring  to  cross-borders 
conservation  and  natural  resource  management.  Firstly,  as  explained  in  the 
Theoretical  Framework,  Natural  Resource  Management  (NRM)  derives  from 
Sustainable Development practices for socio-economic development in rural areas, 
and draws mainly from the CAMPIRE experience in Zimbabwe, for Southern Africa. 
All other acronyms, instead, are referred to conservation only, which of course has in 
time shifted towards participative approaches, involving local communities around 
protected areas again for socio-economic development, as shown in Table 1.2. 
Transboundary Natural Resource 
Management Area (TBNRM Area)
An area in which cooperation to manage natural resources 
occurs across boundaries (Griffin et al 1999). Note
that this concept does not necessarily involve any formal 
protected areas.
Transfrontier Conservation Area 
(TFCA)
An area or component of a large ecological region that 
straddles the boundaries of two or more countries,
encompassing one or more protected areas, as well as 
53 The information is derived from CESVI, 1999 and Koch, 1995, as well as Connor, 2003.
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multiple resource use areas (as defined in the SADC
Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, 
1999). This is a term used particularly in southern
and eastern Africa, with more or less the same meaning as 
TBCA (see below)
Transboundary Conservation Area 
(TBCA)
An area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more 
boundaries between states, sub-national units such as
provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas 
beyond the limits of national sovereignty or
jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are especially dedicated 
to the protection and maintenance of biological
diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, 
and managed through legal or other effective
means (Sandwith et al 2001).
Transboundary Protected Area 
(TBPA)
An area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more 
boundaries between states, sub-national units such as
provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas 
beyond the limits of national sovereignty or
jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are especially dedicated 
to the protection and maintenance of biological
diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, 
and managed through legal or other effective
means (Sandwith et al 2001).
Transfrontier Park (TFP) Essentially the equivalent of a TBPA, implying that all or 
most of the areas comprising the jointly-managed
Transfrontier Park are high-status formal protected areas, 
usually of National Park status, with perhaps one or
more smaller areas serving as linking corridors.
Parks for Peace
(also Peace Parks, PP)
Parks for Peace are transboundary protected areas that are 
formally dedicated to the protection and
maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and 
associated cultural resources, and to the promotion of
peace and co-operation (Sandwith et al 2001).
Table 1.5: Terminology associated with cross-border initiatives (Source: Peddle et al., 2004) 
The terminology debate stems, of course, from the field implications of each type 
of initiative,  which is where IUCN categories  for protected areas  come into play. 
Through the years,  in fact,  IUCN has produced a system which is internationally 
recognised and approved for the establishment of protected areas based on land use 
and natural resources management. Of course, there are exceptions to this system, 
such as Great Britain’s oldest National Parks, but generally speaking the world, with 
the coordination of WWF and other donors has agreed to adopt the classification 
when establishing a new area for conservation. In the light of these observations, 
therefore, it is relevant to note that the study was conducted on the GLTFCA, and is 
it focussed on the interstitial areas, which includes potential corridors or buffer zones 
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around the GFTFP, and the Banhine and Zinave National  Parks  in Mozambique. 
Considering that the Peace Park foundation includes the interstitial areas in the GL 
Peace Park project, both GLTFCA and GLPP will be used as synonyms whenever the 
frequency of usage in a paragraph will require so and unless otherwise meant by the 
context. The acronym GLTFP will only be used in reference to the Kruger-Limpopo-
Gonarezhou cluster. TBCA and TBPA will not be used in reference to the GLTFCA 
because it does not apply to the case, considering the delicate issue of sovereignties 
and security involved. 
Table 1.6: IUCN categories  (Source: IUCN, 1994)
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1.6.2 Native languages and populations
Names are artificial constructs which are bestowed by humans to understand the 
world around them, and the cases of African languages and ethnic groups are no 
exception. In fact, historians often argues that the name give to each African ethnicity 
is derived from European need to identify and categorise each group as part of their 
dividi et impera imperial strategy54. This process, however, proved to be very useful 
for researchers to understand the history of the continent, decades after imperialism 
had re-created its human geography.
Origin Name of the group Language55
Nguni Zulu isiZulu
Nguni Shangaan xiTsonga
Nguni Matabele isiNdebele
Venda Venda tshiVenda
Shona Karanga (of Zimbabwe) chiShona
Table 1.1.7: People and languages mentioned in the text (Source: bibliography and field work)
For the purpose of the text, actually, it is necessary to point out that there exists 
extensive  but  not  exhaustive  literature  explaining  the  history  and  the  origin  the 
population object of this research: the Shangaan. It is agreed that they are an Nguni 
group, as classified by Guthrie and confirmed by their affiliation to Shaka Zulu56, and 
that  they  speak  a  Niger-Congo  Bantu  language.  But  the  exact  origins  of  the 
Shangaana could not be exactly traced. Of the Zulu, for instance, it is acknowledged 
that  the  use  of  this  appellative  in  pre-Shaka  times  would  be  an  anachronism57, 
similarly as the ethnic name Shangaan derives from the military chief Soshangane, 
despite  the  many  other  names  he  was  known  for,  this  population  was  either 
inexistent or a kraal within a bigger kingdom (the Zulu) before the mfecane. As for the 
Nguni, Marks (1967) briefly states in a footnote that the Xhosa are the only group 
which should be called Nguni, since they can trace a direct ancestral line to the leader 
Mnguni, unlike any other. In order to simplify explanations in the text, therefore, it 
54 See Reader 1994; Liesegang, 1969; without forgetting Gothrie’s classification discussed in Chapter 3.
55 The prefix in all names means language.
56 Aside from bibliographical and cartographical research, the discussion groups in Dumela, and the 
interviews with Police officers from the Gyiani areas have corroborated this fact.
57 Marks, 1967.
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has been decided to comply with the general indications and refer to the concerned 
ethnic groups following Table 1.4.
Alongside these key names, others are important to the history of Pafuri, but their 
origin is still debatable as it is the case for Tsonga and Maluleke. In a web article on 
the Tsonga people, it is told that Makuleke are one of the last remnants of the Tsonga 
group,  once occupying territory  extending as far  south as Northern Zululand,  as 
descendants of the Mabhudu (Zulu for Maputo), now counting Xikundu, Xigalo and 
Mingha, only 58. From the field work investigation, instead, the Maluleke have been 
presented as a clan of the Matabele of Zimbabwe, who were separated by the border 
along the Limpopo. The naming of Matabele, in turn, was bequeathed by the Tswana 
onto the people of Mzilikazi. The term was generally used to indicate people coming 
from the South East. After 1840, however, when Mzilikazi crossed the Limpopo and 
gradually form Matabeleland, the term indicated his kingdom only. Their name was 
later changed to Ndebele, artificial Zulu, which bears no meaning but is still used to 
indicate their ethnicity59. As for the Shangaana, instead, history and field work has 
shown  that  the  Shangaana  language  has  been  associated  with  isiTsonga.  In 
interviews with local people in Pafuri and Dumela, the explanation provided was 
that the Tsonga were culturally and linguistically assimilated by the Shangaana who 
moved north along the Limpopo River, into South West Zimbabwe to reconstruct 
their  empire after having been challenged by Dingane’s  Zulu army60.  Despite  the 
term Shangaana is  used in South Africa,  Mozambique and Zimbabwe to indicate 
both people and language, Guthrie and the succeeding classificators have omitted it 
in favour of Tsonga. The conclusion taken by the author, therefore, is that Shangaana 
may  refer  to  the  people  (deriving  from  its  original  leader  Soshangane)  but  the 
language  is  Tsonga,  regardless  of  current  location.  This  decision  might  come  in 
contrast with Johnston, who explains that the lack of clicks in the Tsonga language 
indicates a later arrival in the area, thus escaping influences from the original Khoi 
58 Anon. 2007 (b). The three names refer to the villages on the main road from Giyani to Punda Maria 
Gate.
59 Etherington, 2004.
60 See Liesegang, 1969 and 1970.
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and  San  languages61.  However,  field  work  has  shown  that  self-called  Shangaan 
groups in the Gaza province do not have the tongue clicks either, thus reinforcing the 
assumption that Tsonga and Shangaan are two names indicating the same group. 
The questions over the double-name for the people were answered, in Pafuri, with 
the  indication  that  those  Shangaan,  who  found themselves  in  South  Africa  after 
border  demarcation,  chose  to  be  called  Tsonga  to  avoid  any  confusion  with 
Mozambican Shangaan, which would also explain the abandoning of the toponym 
‘Gazankulo’, after the end of apartheid62.
Finally, in order to avoid confusions, the term ‘racial’ will be used in the text only 
when confronting Black and White populations, whereas the term ‘ethnic’ will be 
used for Black African groups. This is just to avoid confusion over which types of 
populations are involve in the argument, and has no judgemental implications over 
positivists theory of racial division and classification. 
1.6.3 African toponyms and history
Contemporary  history  has  greatly  affected  African  toponomastic  due  to  the 
European need to know and understand the territory, as well as to leave a mark of 
their presence. Recent history, however, has not been less productive particularly in 
independent  states  with  the  example  of  Zaire  or  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo, 
changing  due  to  the  endless  civil  conflict.  In  South  Africa,  Mozambique  and 
Zimbabwe, toponyms have been changed to suit the new government in the name of 
African tradition, as well as to give a strong sign to mark the end of an era. This is 
how Pretoria became Tshwane, Louis Trichard became Makhado, Messina became 
Musina; Laurenço Marques became Maputo and Vila Salazar became Chiqualaquala; 
and Salisbury became Harare, to name but a few. 
61 Johnston, 1973, introductory paragraph. 
62 The general opinion that those Shangaan born or bred in South Africa would look down on their 
Mozambican origin, hence the choice of using a different ethnic identification, is not to be disregarded 
as the theory of local rural villagers. As research in the Manica area (Shona speakers), in fact, reveal 
the same pattern on those Mozambicans raised in Zimbabwe (Virtanen, 2005).
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Since the historical  context  is  very important  to  contextualise  this  research  by 
positing that conservation has always served political and security purposes along 
the eastern South African border, which was at once a border and frontier for both 
white  and  black  communities,  it  was  deemed  important  to  relate  history  and 
toponimy. Therefore, the name of a place will relate to the historical phase discussed: 
hence the name Rhodesia will be used for events up to the year 1980, and Zimbabwe 
for the following years. 
The  history  presented  is  based  mainly  of  secondary  sources,  particularly 
Davidson (1992) Reader (1994) and Minter (1998) for the general overview and the 
bush  wars,  with  integrations  from  journal  articles  and  specific  publications.  The 
bibliography shows that many articles on the history of African populations dates 
back to the time between the 1960s and the 1970s, and their bibliography goes back to 
the beginning of the last century and beyond. This is because modern publications 
refrain from historical analysis thus taking for granted a history of human conflict 
alongside  the  increased  protection  of  natural  resources,  which  creates  unsolved 
dissents amongst local populations over land and NRM management.  In order to 
provide a deeper understanding of actual  conflicts,  instead,  history will  encroach 
most of the text from the first chapter discussing the meaning and implications of 
nation and state, continuing with the second chapter presenting an abridged version 
of the contemporary history of wars and independence, in the attempt to understand 
why the European nation-state model  cannot be applied to  Africa.  In the second 
section, history will serve to present the border object of the research, and the case 
study areas, so as to frame the data discussed. 
1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis is organised in two parts separated by the methodology chapter. The 
first part will discuss Political Geographical and historical issues with the aims of 
presenting African history, its  relation to contemporary European history and the 
post independence period. The State formation is the main thread which this part 
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will follow, in order to understand the implications of colonial borders in Africa, the 
differences between nationalism and African nationalism which have led a partial 
interpretation of historical event, and the role played by conservation in the current 
political geographical situation in Southern Africa. The structure is quite symmetrical 
and proposes, for each chapter, three sections on historical, geo-political and human 
geographical analysis, with the fourth section discussing the role of conservation in 
South Africa as a political tool.
The second chapter  will  begin by addressing the cause-effect  relation between 
borders and nation-state in European contemporary history. The effect of European 
transformation will  then be transposed on the African history,  to show the inner 
contradiction of a political system which was expected to work in Africa, whilst it 
never attained full success in Europe. The Scramble for Africa will be analysed as the 
climax of European geo-political influence in the African continents, which will lead 
to the argumentations over why was the Berlin status quo not challenged by African 
independent  states.  The  chapter  will  end  with  the  presentation  of  Transfrontier 
Conservation as the panacea for solving the question of African borders.
The thirds chapter will address questions of nationhood in Africa, by arguing that 
the  raise  of  African  nationalism  as  a  movement  against  Imperialism  has  given 
Africans a continental dream to be followed within ethnic divisions, thus generating 
political and social havoc at independence in the most divided countries. In order to 
focus the attention on the case study area, the wars which shattered the region since 
1975,  when  Mozambique  attained  independence  are  presented  to  show  the 
dichotomies  in  official  historical  terminology  for  concept  such  as  civil  war  and 
national struggle. Secondly, the Peace processed in South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe will be discussed to demonstrate how politics imbue all the spheres of a 
state,  particularly  when  border  security,  hence  sovereignty,  is  concerned.  The 
permeability of the borders in the Limpopo River basin will then be discussed in 
relation to the human use of geomorphology in Southern Africa, in the attempt to 
show that the interpretation of  frontiers, hence borders, in Africa is different from 
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the European concept due to the conformation of the landscape. Furthermore, the 
traditional movements of people will not stop because of the enforcement of a strong 
Western  border,  as  they  are  firstly  cultural  and  secondly  necessary  for  local 
livelihoods. Finally the GLTFCA will be presented in the context of migrations to 
understand priorities and challenges of this mega-park.
The fourth chapter will present the methodology, which uses both geographical 
and  ethnographical  methods  in  order  to  produce  a  detailed  account  of  border 
communities in the case study area. The case study area will firstly be presented by 
describing  it  physical,  political  and  human  geographical  traits.  The  use  of 
quantitative  data  will  be  discussed  to  which  qualitative  data  will  follow.  The 
contextualisation of the data will conclude the chapter.
The fifth chapter will describe Crooks’ Corner, Pafuri, the broader historical area 
which is  the geographic  core  of  the GLTFCA.  It  will  first  attempt  to  provide  an 
account of the main people who populate this area:  the Shangaana, in relation to 
other local populations, the Venda and the Makuleke. It will also present its inter-
cultural nature by discussing all the categories of people who have been using the 
border,  to  show that  human mobility  in  Pafuri  is  not  new,  nor easily  stoppable. 
Secondly, an attempt will be made based on ethnographic research and secondary 
data to understand what type of border is Pafuri and what does its functions imply 
for the livelihoods of local people.  Thirdly, the reality of moving wildlife will  be 
discussed in the light of the geographical planning and zoning of the GLTFCA. This 
will  lead to the final section on the role of TFCAs and Peace Parks in promoting 
peace  at  the  regional  level,  considering  the  politicisation  of  the  process  and  the 
animalist lobbying.
The sixth chapter is entirely dedicated to understanding the case study, Dumela, 
and its relation to the presence of the border. Firstly, the population will be presented 
using demographic data on family numbers, identification, education and livelihood 
strategies. Secondly, the influence of the state through hierarchy and policies will be 
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discussed  in  relation  to  the  contribution  it  give  to  local  livelihoods.  Thirdly,  the 
degree on dependency on the border will be evaluated using the data collected on 
trade and migrations, as well as personal observation and interviews at the border. 
Finally, the human-wildlife conflict will be discussed in the light of the GLTFCA and 
the Sengwe Corridor as potential threats to human survival in the area, which will be 
crashed between a rock, the TFCA, and a hard place, the Ecological corridor.
Finally,  the conclusions will  draw from the main argumentations presented in 
each chapter and will focus on the influence that the local history of violence and 
displacement had on social and economic cross-border relations at Pafuri. Secondly, 
the idea of TFCA as the catalyser of socio-economic cohesion will be discussed and 
evaluated. Thirdly, a the impact of the GLTFCA will be evaluated against a ‘what if’ 
scenario. The fourth section will be a summary of the main findings and the potential 
for further research stemming from this work.
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2. AFRICAN BORDERS FROM MYTH TO REALITY
La plus extravagante idée qui puisse naître dans la tête d'un 
politique est de croire qu'il suffise à un peuple d'entrer à  
main armée chez un peuple étranger pour lui faire adopter ses  
lois et sa Constitution. (Maximilien M.I. de Robespierre)1
La vraie décolonisation passe par le rejet de l’État de type  
européen. La question est donc politique et la décision  
uniquement africaine : doit-il se séparer de l’État-nation et de  
ses mythologies ? (Le Roy, in Tshiyembe, 2001)2
Part of the modern social theory suggests that the nation-state is an artefact, that 
exists only by recognition from a network of other nation-states. This pattern creates 
social networks that are defined by ‘distinct boundaries and histories’3. Developing 
Marxist views on the connections between imperialism and capitalism, Wallersteins 
define such networks ‘world-systems’, thus implying that, throughout history, there 
has been and there is a world order.   This is formed by political and economical 
networks  of  groups  of  entities  recognising  each  other  as  sovereign  states  with  a 
delimitated  territory,  but  always  in  conflict  with  each  other  because  of  socio-
economic inequalities. Such theory explains not only imperialism or colonisation as it 
occurred since the second half of the XIX century, but also globalisation as we know 
it today.  The major contemporary history events were dependant on two key factors: 
politics and economics, both affecting the degree of power a state held, and therefore 
the degree  of  power  it  might  or might  not have exercised over  another  country. 
These factors contributed to the rise and affirmation of European nation-states, but 
also to the colonisation of other states or cultural entities in the periphery4 of the world 
1 Translation by the author: ‘The most extravagant idea which could be born out of a politician’s mind 
is to believe that it would be sufficient to enter the territory of a foreign people with an army, to force 
it  to  adopt  their  laws  and  Constitution’.  This  quote  is  part  of  the  speech  held  by  M.  M.  I.  De 
Robespierre,  as  a  senior  deputy  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  and President  of  the  Revolutionary 
Jacobin Club, at the meeting of the latter, on 2nd January 1792.   
2 Translation by the author: ‘The true decolonisation goes through the refusal of the European type of 
State. The matter is therefore political and the decision solely African: should it be separated from the 
nation-state and its mythologies?’
3 See Seidman S. 2004, p. 263.
4 As Wallerstein suggests, three zones characterise all world orders: (1) the core, with the wealthiest 
and most diversified economies; (2) the periphery, with the poorest and less advanced economies; and 
the semiperiphery, with traits belonging to both previous groups. It is relevant to note that states can 
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system. It is surprising, however, that at a time when Europe was discovering the 
importance of  nationalism and self-determination for  the creation of  independent 
sovereign states, as the Conference of Vienna (1814-1815) after Napoleon’s defeat at 
Waterloo tried to exemplify, it was also so adamant to subjugate half of the world in 
a  core-periphery  political  and  economic  relation,  as  the  Conference  of  Berlin 
brilliantly  demonstrated  (1884-1885).  Ironically,  it  was  the  role  taken  up  by  all 
European  leaders  in  Vienna  with  the  formation  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  as 
defendant of (1) borders to define sovereign states; (2) nationalisms, to demarcate 
such borders; (3) self-determination, to liberate people from the joke of oppressing 
regimes, which contributed to the creation of a culture of moral superiority, whose 
role was to extend their sense of justice and development to all people still living in 
the dark ages. What could have been a highly humanitarian sense for politics became, 
instead, the major justification for the perpetration of a world system of influences 
and  conquest  which  radically  changed  the  political  geography  of  the  world, 
particularly of a whole continent which had been largely unexplored. 
A simple glimpse at a political map of Africa, in fact, leaves the observer with the 
impression  that  something is  missing  from the  general  interpretation  of  borders. 
Classical  theories  in  the  political  geographical  study  of  borders  show  that  such 
divisions are normally created using natural elements such as rivers and mountains, 
with  a  specific  function  such  as  defence5.  And despite  most  African  borders  do 
follow the natural elements, the straight lines cutting across deserts and the shape of 
some  countries  (for  example  in  West  Africa)  tell  us  a  different  story:  one  of 
occupation that survived for less than a Century but left  a legacy that is  hard to 
overcome,  particularly  because  of  borders.  Africa  shows  an  obvious  incongruity 
between the predicaments  of  the Concert  of  Europe and their  implementation in 
overseas territory. Notwithstanding the criticised process of the Scramble for Africa, 
however, there must have been strong political reasons for the maintaining of the 
move from one zone to another according to their performance, since the world order is a dynamic 
system. See Seidman S. 2004, pp. 261-273. 
5 See Glassner, 1995; Pounds, 1992
34
status quo at independence, which in turn triggered civil fights in the whole continent 
and regional wars in East Southern Africa, along contested borders.
By tracing a story of the European influence in the continent, this chapter aims at 
proving that there are two stages of influence, colonisation and imperialism, to which 
two separate types of human geographic legacy are associated: frontier and border, 
respectively. Therefore as colonialism became imperialism, so the frontier became a 
border. The two sets of terms, however, must be placed in the Political Geography 
and Historical context of XIX century Europe in other to understand the paradox of 
imperialism and the cultural devastation it caused. The first section, therefore, will be 
used to discuss the relation between the modern State and borders, and introduce the 
politics of African colonisation up until the Conference of Berlin. The Scramble for 
Africa will, then, be presented to explain the difference between borders and frontier 
in the continent. The third section will critically evaluate suggestions as to why were 
the colonial borders not discussed at independence and present the new conception 
of the African state. Finally, the Peace Parks project will be introduced as political 
ecological solution to the border issues of the continent. 
2.1 BORDERS AS SYMBOLS OF THE NATION STATE
The state is a socio-political European construct derived from the transition from 
the Medieval to the Modern political system, where a  state  was in existence when a  
people is settled in a  territory under its own  sovereign government6, as theorised by the 
German  school.  This  evolution,  however,  was  neither  easy  nor  quick  to  be 
accomplished. On the contrary the process had to go through a series of stages that 
began with the independence of medieval lords from their king, or the Pope, and the 
formation, in continental Europe, of a network of small geographically demarcated, 
as  opposed  to  the  wider  kingdoms  of  France  and  Prussia.  The  principality  of 
Monaco, a French-Italian enclave on the Côte d’Azur is but an example of the small 
mutations  undergoing  in  the  later  medieval  period.   With the ascendance  of  the 
6Muir, 1975, p. 79, the underlined section corresponds to italics in the original.
35
Modern  State,  in  the  XIII  century,  so  changed  the  notion  of  frontiers,  gradually 
becoming borders.  This  section  will  provide  a  small  historical  excursus  over  the 
achievement  of  sovereign  nation-states  in  Europe  and the  shift  from frontiers  to 
border. 
2.1.1 The sovereign state: areas of influence and buffer zones
The characteristics of the Modern state were (a) the separation in principle of the 
temporal and spiritual powers; (b) the creation of an administrative and defensive 
apparatus; (c) the progressive generation of a national language. Its natural evolution 
was  towards  a  fully  independent  state,  developed  in  the  XVI  century  with  the 
sovereign state, which superiorem non recognoscens, ruled by a king who is imperator in  
regno suo7. The perception of such a ‘one-man’ sovereignty lead to the formation of a 
political  system  funded  on  God-descended  monarchs,  whose  power  was  both 
temporal and spiritual, as best exemplified by King Henry VIII after the schism with 
the Church of Rome. In the Christian Catholic world, however,  the monarch was 
under the political influence of the Pope, as the only warrant of its divine heritage. 
Where the two powers did not converge onto one man, therefore,  they were still 
strongly connected to the extent that when the slave trade began in the XV century, it 
was  the  Papal  Bull  Dum  Diversas,  written  by  Pope  Nicholas  V  in  1452,  which 
authorised Portuguese navigators to reduce to  hereditary slavery any unbeliever.  To 
this, the Romanus Pontifex followed in 1455, which granted Alfonso V of Portugal and 
all Christian kingdoms of Europe the right of dominion of all lands discovered8 in the 
explorations  of  the  world.   Temporal  and  spiritual  powers,  therefore,  were  still 
converging in the Modern European state, at a time when the Asante and the Barotse 
kingdoms of West Africa and Zambia, respectively, were governed with a system of 
checks-and-balance9,  a  concept  theorised  by  Montesquieu  within  the  theory  of 
separation of powers in  The Spirit of Law, published in 1748. Another characteristic 
prevailing from the Medieval system, was the concept of area of influence, whereby 
7See the introductory chapter of Formigoni, 2000. 
8 Reader 1994, p. 333. 
9 Davidson, 1992, pp. 55-64; 74-85. 
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states were separated by frontier zones10. These were areas of decreasing influence 
over the people, far from the core of the state and not cost-effective to be managed. 
The  frontier  was  a  buffer-zone  between  two  or  more  states,  and  was  ready  for 
conquest at the occurrence, as well as being a safety belt in case of war. Ironically, 
those peripheries became the most contested areas between European powers and 
one, specifically, was one of the many causes of the two World Wars: the Franco-
German frontier zone running along Alsace and Lorraine. 
2.1.2 Nationhood and sovereignty: subverting the ancien régime
The system created by the implementation of the sovereign state was to be known 
as  ancien régime, in the retrospective argument that indicated a political and social 
regime  which  was  unsustainable  for  the  masses.  The  areas  of  influence  where 
expanding over seas with Portuguese and Spanish discoveries in the new world (the 
Americas)  and  the  Black  continent  (Africa),  trading  goods  and  slaves  to  the 
frustration  of  France,  Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands,  whose  religious 
disagreement with Rome left them out of the deal. In addition to the Bulls mentioned 
above, the Inter Caetera of 1493 of Pope Alexander VI had divided the world into two 
spheres of influence: 1. the Spanish sphere was to the west and south of the Pole of 
Pole line, 100 leagues to the west and south of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands; 2. 
the Portuguese sphere was the rest of the world, that is Africa and all the markets it 
could bring about. The demarcation line, rather than orderly dividing the world, was 
interpreted by all the other European countries as a frontier zone, and battles were 
fought on the sea between corsairs11, with a commission from a sovereign state, and 
merchant ships, with a mandate from the Pope. 
While the Dutch and the British ships were gradually reducing the Portuguese 
influence in Africa, Europe was re-defining its political geography once again. The 
French revolution, of 1789, accelerated the transition to modernity and moved it a 
10 This theory belongs to Kristof, but it is found in Muir, 1975; also in Pounds 1992, p.77.
11 Although often used as synonyms, a corsair (or a privateer) was different from a pirate as he had 
commission from a sovereign state,  and when assaulting another ship could not  be charged with 
piracy. 
37
step forward, with the introduction of the  nation. Found in popular literature as a 
synonym of the state,  in political  geography this  term defines  a group of  people 
sharing the same language, culture and symbols which distinguish them from others, 
on the same territory12. To continue with the example, the fight of a whole country, 
uniting peasants and intellectuals, against the established regime of the State was an 
act  of  total  civil  disobedience  which  gave  this  people  the  right  to  claim  their 
nationhood. Hence, the French school of Political Geography affirms the fusion of the 
State and the Nation, considering the State a social phenomenon13 rather than a political 
construct. No other continental country at the time could boast such strong a sense of 
nationhood, which would succeed in destroying a political system that was not only 
sovereign but ordered by God. The events that followed the revolution are of little 
relevance here, suffice it to say however, that after this period the French sense of 
nationhood dwindled only during the Second World War, when the hero of the First 
World War, Gen. Pétain, handed its country over to the Hitler’s Germany. 
2.1.3 Consecrating the Nation-state: the Concert of Europe
Kohn  interestingly  suggests  that  nationalities  emerge  only  when  some  objective  
boundaries delineate a social  group14, implying that only when a form of constriction 
whether  physical  or  metaphysical  is  forced  over  a  set  of  people,  they  will  find 
strength to fight back within features that unite them. This description fits perfectly 
the case of the French revolution, as well as the insurgencies of all ethnic minorities 
vis  à  vis the  attempts  to  annihilate  them  by  majority  sovereign  states.  The  mere 
existence of ethnic minorities within European states, such as the Basques in Spain 
and  the  Südtirol in  Italy,  refutes  the  French  acceptation  of  the  state  as  juridical  
personification of the nation15, in favour of the more pragmatic German approach of the 
Nation and the State as two separate entities, which only ideally coalesce. The result 
of the French revolution, in terms of Political Geography, is therefore the Nation-
12 Muir, 1975; Glassner, 1995; Punds, 1992.
13 Tshyembe, 2001, p.40 – 44. 
14 Kohn in Punds, 1992, p. 19, translated from the Italian ‘Le nazionalità vengono alla luce solo quando 
certi confini oggettivi delimitano un gruppo sociale’.
15 Carré de Malberg, in Tshiyembe, 2001, p.41.
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State, a sovereign entity whose raison d’être lays in the supremacy of centripetal forces, 
that is its common language, culture and symbols in which the nation identify itself, 
over  centripetal forces, that is cultural and geographical division16. The geographical 
innovation  of  the  Nation-State  construct,  however,  is  the  disappearance  on  the 
European map of frontier zones. As the State unites people in a specific area, this 
area must be demarcated so as to coincide with the power of the state whose priority 
is to protect the nation. The concept of border replaces the one of frontier, and thin 
lines are now separating Nation-states, marking the limits of their jurisdiction17. The 
shift from power over people to power over land was facilitated by nationalism, as it 
became widely accepted that people were the main promoter of the nation-state. 
These theories are funded on a historical event which followed turbulent years in 
the heart of Europe: the Napoleonic Wars.  After the battle of Waterloo, when the 
French Emperor was finally defeated, the European states gathered together for the 
Peace Agreement,  and later for the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) which in itself 
was a masterpiece of diplomacy in bringing together civil aspirations of nation and 
political  interests,  whilst  enforcing  the  Restoration  of  the  pre-Napoleonic  setting. 
The  outcome  of  the  Congress  was  the  ‘Concert  of  Europe’  a  political  system, 
involving all the European leading powers18, which aimed at maintaining the status quo 
of countries (demarcated nation-states) whose actions and interests were validated 
by a system of treaties and consensual agreements, rather than by war. As Formigoni 
notes, no state would have been able to unilaterally consider its territory, regardless 
of the network of international treaties and agreements, any longer19. This was the 
first  modern  example  of  geopolitics  and  binding  international  law,  with  a 
humanitarian touch as the slave trade was condemned for the first time.
16 Drawn from definitions in Muir, 1975; Glassner, 1995; Punds, 1992.
17 Glassner, 1995, p.96. 
18 This was the symbolic definition given by Viscount Castlereagh, the British representative to the 
Congress, in Formigoni, 2000, p. 83. 
19 Formigoni, 2000, p. 85.
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2.1.4 Focussing on the world: the Concert of Europe in Africa
The peace established in the Old continent with a general  agreement over the 
need  for  Restoration,  allowed  all  the  leading  powers with  an  interest  overseas  to 
concentrate their political and financial resources on the new frontier zones. The rest 
of  the  world,  in  fact,  became  a  frontier  to  be  conquered  and  explored,  and  by 
extending the old Medieval  concept of  area of  influence to the new continents,  the 
power of the nation-state would have been accrued beyond imagination. Africa, at 
this stage, had only barely been explored and yet, the richness of its natural resources 
had been visible in Europe ever since the first merchants came back with slaves, gold 
and ivory.
Map 2.4: This map was published in 1787 – present border overlaid (Source: Google Earth, 2006)
At the time of the Concert of Europe, Africa was covered by an aura of myths 
concerning the Golden Meadows of Sofala, where yellow and black gold had been 
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sold for  centuries  to  the Arab world;  the kingdom of Prester  John,  the Christian 
Emperor separating Muslim areas of influence in Egypt and Tanzania and warden of 
the most powerful Christian treasures; the kingdom of Asante in the West, whose 
riches grew with trade, and Monomotapa in the South, whose wealth increased with 
war and conquest, as well as agreement with European explorers20. The map above, 
shows the extent of information available for the coast of Southern Africa, and the 
general  knowledge  acquired  over  the  native  peoples  and  the  territory  they 
controlled. The embryonic state of political geography in the continent shows again 
the  presence  of  areas  of  influence,  based  on  control  over  people  and  land, 
particularly as the most ancient populations,  the Khoi and the San were nomads, 
thus  heavily  reliant  on  natural  resources21.  The  progressive  European  conquest 
implied the gradual reduction of territory available to the native populations, hence 
the  increased  difficulty  in  pursuing  a  traditional  livelihood,  which  forced  many 
natives to seek work in the colonies. The only tribal groups able to resist were those 
occupying inner remote areas, and those relying on the military power to impose 
their  status  quo.  The  Zulus  were  emblematic  as  they  succeeded  in  temporarily 
halting the Voortrekkers advance into present-day northern Natal22. The Great Trek, 
leading Cape Afrikaaners out of their colony into the continent to avoid the British 
ban over the use of  slaves, was the first attempt to colonise non-coastal areas in the 
Southern part of Africa. The movement of people seeking land for establishing new 
colonies, together with the increase in the slave trade from Delagoa Bay (Maputo) 
which pushed native populations inland looking for refuge, increased competition 
for  those  few  territories  offering  water  and  suitability  for  settlement.  If  those 
Voortrekkers  moving  north  easily  defeated  all  resistance  from native  population, 
those moving south into Natal had to face the Zulus of Dingane. It was not until the 
Battle of Blood River, in 1838, in fact, that the Boers managed to impart a severe loss 
20 The history of Africa is described by Reader (1994), some of the civilisations, furthermore, have been 
analysed in detail by Davidson, 1992.
21 Burger, 1997, pp. 171-173.
22 In Reader, 1994, pp. 484 – 488.
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to the Zulu army, thus conquering the land and find the cooperation of Mpande, 
Dingane’s and Shaka’s half brother, to take control over the people as well23.
The idea of nation-state, therefore, transposed in the post Waterloo period a new 
stage in the European diplomacy and political decision-making. Firstly,  sovereignty 
became inextricably linked to the demarcation of borders,  which consolidated the 
innovation of the Treaty of Westphalia. Secondly, by agreeing on the European set-
up of the Restoration, all leading powers moved to the only territory which was left 
to explore: Africa. In the light of European transformation and ambitions, Africa was 
increasingly divided into Black and White  frontiers,  fighting for land and people 
respectively24, and still threatened by the personal aspiration of European monarch, 
triggered by the political cartography of the known continent.  King Leopold I  of 
Belgium best exemplifies this threat with his will to conquer, for his personal gain, a 
meaningful piece of Africa which would grant resources and access to the sea, at the 
Congo Delta25. The enterprise of securing an inland river port, however, was spoilt 
by the French who had sent an exploration team coming from the North. This event, 
particularly,  prompted the Concert  of  Europe to  discuss the areas of  influence in 
Africa26.
2.2 THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: FINALISING AFRICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
The Scramble for Africa was a long process of occupation and demarcation which 
begun with the Imperialist aspirations of European leading powers over a continent, 
whose natural resources were promising to be durable and income-generating. The 
conflicts generated by European greed,  however,  forced the Concert  of Europe to 
meet  once again and discuss  the partition of  the territory.  As  Griffiths rightfully 
states, few of the present boundaries of Africa existed, prior to the Conference of Berlin27 , 
however the continent was not devoided of nations and states whose societies were 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. pp. 456 – 467.
25 Burger, 1997, p. 163.
26 Ibid, pp. 517 – 520.
27 In Griffiths, 1986, p. 204.
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just as politically developed as the European state28. The simple geographic inference, 
about colonial borders, however, hides a deeper disruption of social systems, linked 
to the territory, which triggered post-independence conflicts. 
2.2.1 Civilisations and states in pre-colonial Africa
African  kingdoms  developed  thanks  to  a  combination  of  (a)  geographical 
positioning along rivers and the coast, (b) the presence of natural resources to be 
traded  and (c)  the  development  of  the  ruling  elite  into  an effective  military  and 
political hierarchy able to defend and extend its boundaries. The emergence of the 
best known five indigenous African states, with a vertical society, in fact, coincided 
with the increased use of gold for economic trade both in the Mediterranean and 
other areas,  after the third century AD29.  The modern concept of  raison d’être of a 
State, which saw in the defence and expansion of the state the primary objective of a 
king, in XVI century Europe, was also valid for African civilisations, from the Iron 
Age until imperialism. These states, however, enforced a supervision over the king’s 
decision-making through the elders whose powers of mitigation maintained the Igbo 
society in Nigeria, the Asante in Ghana, and all the Nguni30 kingdoms of Southern 
Africa.  The map below shows these civilisations,  whose future  development  was 
deeply affected by European imperialism, and whose generated incongruences still 
affect current national politics.
Northern Africa had been accustomed to trading with Muslims for centuries and, 
with time, expertise was gathered on the trade with Europe. The initial easiness in 
commercial  relation  and  cheapness  of  goods,  exchanged  for  precious  slaves  and 
African products,  was replaced by an acute conception of the benefits  Europeans 
could bring to the economy and military power of a State and its ruler. At the same 
28 In Davidson, 1992.
29 Reader, 1994, pp. 272 – 273 and 278 – 279.
30 Nguni is the name of a Congo-Niger Bantu language which spread in East-Southern Africa and 
includes Ibo, Ndebele, Ronga, Shangaana, Swati, Xhosa, Zulu. Ngoni (found in Reader, 1994, p. 463) is 
not a synonim but a group living in Malawi, descendant of the South African Group. From the Nguni 
derivers the Nguni cattle a specific type of cow, which is now almost extinct and protected at Mkhaya 
Sanctuary, of Big Game Parks, Swaziland.
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time,  the  progressive  condemnation  of  slavery  in  the  European  world  deprived 
merchants of a high-valued market resources. The same governments who, on the 
one hand abhorred slavery, found in imperialism the only solution to maintain some 
profitability from their colonies. 
Map 2.5: Main kingdoms of Africa before the Conference of Berlin (Source: Gaydish, 199831)
31 The map is an alteration of the original in R. O. Collins, J. M. Burns, and E. K. Ching, eds., 1994, 
Historical Problems of Imperial Africa (Princeton: Markus Wiener,), 6D.
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2.2.2 Changing geographies: from colonialism to imperialism
The broadest definition of colonialism is derived from Strachey and describes it as 
a  process  through  which  peoples  and  nations  conquer,  subjugate  and  consequently  
permanently rule over other people and other nations32. This generalisation, however, is 
very dangerous as it does not distinguish between colonialism, as the establishment 
of settlements, and imperialism as the system of domination. It is true that for some 
countries  such as France, the two processes coincided in the politics of extending 
nationalism from the  metropole  to  the  dependencies33.  However,  for  most  of  the 
colonial powers, the systematic ruling over their possessions was a gradual process 
which varied according to the colonial power and the localities of the dominion. The 
British, for instance, implemented a policy based on native rule, whereby, with the 
exception  of  strategic  ports  such  as  the  Cape  and  present-day  Durban,  they 
acknowledged in the Roman acceptation of hic sunt leones: a territory ruled by native 
kings, friendly to the European administration if military threatened by other ethnic 
groups. It is by no coincidence, in fact, that the Boer war was fought over commercial 
needs and that the Rhodesia were conquered by Cecil Rhodes with the British South 
Africa company, not the British Army, in pursue of his own dream to extend the 
British Empire. Of course, the Crown obliged this generosity, but Sir Rhodes was first 
and foremost a genial tradesman with a dream. 
The  creation  of  the  first  colonies  did  not  exert  any  influence  on  the  political 
geography  of  Africa,  rather  on  its  human  geography,  by  enslaving  or  confining 
native population to the lands outside the colonies34. Imperialism, instead, paved the 
way for all transformations that generated Africa inner contradictions. The reports 
coming from visitors in Africa, be them explorers, priests or navigators, depicted a 
continent of pagans whose barbarian lifestyle was in need of European good will to 
bring  civilisation.  This  conception,  of  course,  thrived  over  the  historical  and 
anthropological revisionism over the nature and development of African states and 
32 Found in Pounds 1992, II, p. 146.
33 Ibid. pp. 161 – 165.
34 Burger, 1997, pp. 163 – 165.
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induced  a  substantial  differentiation  in  the  aims  of  colonialism:  the  economic 
opportunity,  the  moral  obligation  and  geopolitical  strategy35.   Each  motive, 
coincidentally, represented each of the powers within the European Nation-state: the 
government, the Church and the tradesmen. It is, however, through the emphasis on 
moral obligation that colonisation could turn, with the approval of all social strata, 
into imperialism, which played also on national pride. 
Imperialism, in the view of Cohen, imposes the law of the mother country onto 
the  natives  and  transforms  their  ideas,  institutions  and  products36,  through  military 
supremacy,  it  should  be  pointed  out.  If  on  the  one  hand  the  European  colonial 
powers  were  repudiating  slavery,  their  colonies  were  funded  on  the  slave-like 
condition of native workers and the unfair  deals  with the few remaining African 
kings, who were utterly subjugated by the new products introduced on the market, 
particularly weapons, and by the power of religion, which brought along education 
and sanitation. The harsh conditions and the violence of the Belgium domination 
over the Congo for the collection of rubber, for example, were no myth37 and forced 
Europe to come to terms with an unpredicted reality.  Elsewhere the hypocrisy of 
white rule allowed for appearances to be kept, but the discoveries of the mines at 
Kimberly changed, yet again, the human geography of Southern Africa, by attracting 
an ever increasing amount of migrants from Europe in search of fortune and from 
Africa in search for work. Having been forced outside their land, survival strategies 
of native population were challenged by the environment, the new power-relations 
within and without their group, the higher competition for natural resources and the 
general contingencies brought by nature. Working for the White seemed a feasible 
solution for young men, who considered that gaining money would allow them to 
buy the food and goods they needed by the minefield and bring them home. People 
came from as far as Congo, Malawi and Zambia to work in the mines, and continued 
to pour in as new sites were open for prospecting. The creation of a mine language, 
35 Ibid. 146 – 154.
36 Cohen, 1963, in Glassner, 1995, p. 237.
37 Reader, 1994, 517 – 542; Burger, 1997, see above; and Davidson, 1992, p. 219. 
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which is a mixture of Zulu,  English and Afrikaans, the three most representative 
linguistic groups, is symptomatic of the magnitude of the phenomenon. Fanagalo was 
so  common  that  is  still  spoken  by  former  miners  and  most  white  people  to 
communicate with Black Africans, without speaking their ethnic language.
2.2.3 Borders in Africa: the Congress of Berlin
Map 2.6: Africa as divided at the Congress of Berlin (1884-1885).38
The  climax  of  the  whole  invasion  process  of  the  African  continent  was  the 
Congress of Berlin (1884-1885) which was called by the European  leading powers  to 
resolve  diplomatically  the  conflicts  over  land.  The  solution,  of  course,  was  the 
division of  the continent  into  areas  of  influence  which were  based on the actual 
conquests of each country, and the only way to categorically define such areas was, 
38 Source: http://www.homestead.com/wysinger/berlinconference.html
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once again, by drawing borders. All the frontiers had been conquered by Europeans 
on the field, what was needed then was a ratification and the Congress of Berlin 
provided it, despite leaving enough disputes to contribute to the First World War.
The post-Berlin Africa was heavily marked by British and French presence, with 
Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia as the only independent countries, although Egypt was 
under the British Protectorate because of the Suez Canal. All possessions had access 
to the sea, and the only land-locked countries were still under the protection of the 
same European country,  such as Bechuanaland,  Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
and Nyassa, all under Great Britain as was South Africa. The following table will 
attempt  to  summarise  the  characteristic  of  the  Berlin  borders  by  taking  into 
consideration European interests and objectives only, which proves the ‘weakness’ 
inferred by Griffiths (1986).
Broadly speaking, however, it was the first time that African people were dealing 
with borders separating states, rather than a frontier zone, and since those borders 
had been drawn in Europe they took into little account the reality on the field, they 
had rather followed astronomical lines, as Barbour indicated in 196439. However, as 
Griffith  points  out,  African  indigenous  borders  were  taken  into  consideration 
whenever supported by treaties with local chiefs and kings, hence becoming assets in 
‘territorial bargaining’ with other states40. The issues raised by this division of Africa 
are, nonetheless, related to borders only in so far as they separated ethnic groups. 
True enough, the Berlin borders were not enforced right away on the territory and, in 
peripheral areas, natives still enjoyed the environment and their societal relations as 
they used to. However, this changed with the independence of the African States, 
whose elites  had accepted both the  status  quo and the European construct  of  the 
nation-state. 
39 This theory was later discarded by scientists, but it is metaphorically very significant (Griffiths, 1886, 
p. 205).
40 See Griffiths, 1986, p. 207.
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Classification Type Justification
Geographical
All (mountain, river, 
lakes)
Most  of  the  borders  use  natural 
geographical  features,  although  the 
shapes taken by the country reveals  the 
needs  of  colonisers  (eg.  West  Africa). 
(Griffiths, 2001)
Historical & 
cultural
Superimposed
Even  when  previous  kingdoms  were 
present,  they  were  disregarded  by 
Europeans,  with  the  exception  of 
Ethiopia,  the  only  Christian  Empire, 
ruled by Prester John. (Reader, 1997)
Transboundary 
interaction
Separation
The  main  objective  of  the  African 
partition  was  to  create  spheres  of 
interests, and trade was prolific with the 
spheres or with friendly areas. 
Duration
From  1885  to  the 
1960s
Despite  previous  presence,  such  as  the 
Cape  Colony,  the  border  demarcation 
was effective only after the Conference of 
Berlin,  and  lasted  until  1975  when  all 
countries  were  independent  from  the 
Mother country41.  
Pressure level on 
boundary
Dead
The borders  were the African theatre  of 
the two World Wars;  and pressure  was 
put on them only in war time, during and 
after colonisation.
Relationship to 
landscape
Artificial
In agreement  with Muir that,  as human 
product  all  boundaries  are  artificial  and 
do  no  fit  the  natural  and  cultural 
environment.
Gen. S.W. 
Blogg’s 
classification
Complex
Assuming  this  will  entail  a  mix  of  the 
other  types :  physical ;  anthropo-
geographical and geometrical.
Table 2.8: Characteristics of African borders, derived from Muir (1975, pp. 126–130). Source: 
bibliography.
41 It must be noted that, for historic precision, one cannot accept theories that propose Zimbabwe 
independent in 1980 and South Africa in 1995. The fights which followed the unilateral declaration of 
independence in the two countries are to all effect civil fight for majority rule, against the national 
government.  Mozambique  and  Angola,  instead,  were  under  Portuguese  control  until  the  Fascist 
dictatorship in the mother country was subverted, and the new government warranted independence 
to the colonies. 
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2.3 MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO AT INDEPENDENCE: INTERNAL CONFLICTS
The Berlin Conference was Africa's undoing in more ways than  
one.  The  colonial  powers  superimposed  their  domains  on  the  
African continent. By the time independence returned to Africa in  
1950, the realm had acquired a legacy of political  fragmentation  
that could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily.  
(de Biij et al. 1997, p. 340)
The  European  influence  in  Africa  brought  theories  and  practices  that  were 
sometimes contradictory, as the anti-slavery spirit, but were mostly forced upon the 
territory and its people. Firstly, the use of cheap goods to trade in natural resources 
(minerals,  animals  and vegetal  products)  dismantled the ancient relation between 
natives and their land. Secondly, the occupation of growing portions of land forced 
locals into harsh inhabited areas,  thus disrupting their traditional  livelihoods and 
pushing them towards towns in search for work. Thirdly, religion offered sanitation 
to  improve health  and education to  compete  with  the  White  man,  at  the cost  of 
traditional  beliefs  and  culture.  Fourthly,  the  construction  of  the  railway  roads 
increased the exports of precious materials, gold and diamonds, and goods such as 
trophies, ivory and animal skins, at a high cost for nature, and people as working 
conditions in the mines worsened. Fifthly, the separation of society based on race 
triggered a hatred which is  still  felt  today in areas  where  former  White  rule  has 
stayed  on  after  independence  (South  Africa  and  Zimbabwe).  Sixthly,  within 
imperialism lied the biggest hypocrisy of all, as natives were denied all rights in their 
own continent,  but were forced two fight in two World Wars,  both at  home and 
abroad, defending a state that was not their own. Finally, borders separated cultural 
groups  by  placing  them  under  different  states  and  administrative  systems,  thus 
generating a class division according to the type of government and the wealth of the 
state,  a  community  was falling under.  Similarly,  borders  brought  together  ethnic 
groups whose history was one of war and conflict, hence creating time-bombs waiting  
for  a  change  of  political  circumstance  to  ignite  the  fuse42 and  this  is  precisely  what 
happened  as  States  were  acquiring independence  in  the  1960s.  And since  all  the 
42 Griffiths, 1986, p. 209.
50
major philosophers of independence agreed with this vision43, the question is why 
did the new African elite not challenge the colonial borders at independence? 
2.3.1 The rise of African Nationalism
Davidson defines African Nationalism has a sentiment which originates from two 
different  sets  of  people  who,  like  in  European  countries  at  the  turn  of  the  XIX 
century, had the common goal of the nation but with a different socio-political idea 
for its implementation: the educated and the non-educated44.  In the case of Africa, 
however, there are two further implications in the development of nationalistic ideas. 
The  first  is  political  and  embedded  into  colonisation,  hence  fomented  the 
misconception that freedom and independence from the European yoke would bring 
development45. The second is social and draws from the cultural gap between rural 
communities still relying on traditional polities, despite adjusting to modernisation, 
and the urban elite with a European education46. In between the two extremes, of 
course, there is a small but determinate group  of people who aimed at liberation, but 
relied more on practicalities and left the solution of the divide till when the fights 
were over, but drew from the perceptions of both groups in the meanwhile47.
The degree of education brought to Africa by the missions increased to the extent 
of  including University training in Western  countries,  mainly British,  French and 
North American, where students learnt of philosophies talking of equality of all men 
(particularly Marx and Engels), of policies discussing the right to self determination 
of people, and experienced the benefits of living in a developed country48. This group 
of people, including the assimilados, typical of Portuguese and French colonies49 and 
43 See Farnon and Said in Seidman, 2004. 
44 See Davidson, 1992, pp. 21-51.
45 As confirmed by Tshiyembe, 2001; Davidson, 1992, central chapters; and Pounds, 1992, II, p. 175. 
46 Davidson, 1992, Chapters 1 and 4.
47 Refers to para-military groups, theory drawn from Hall&Young, 1997, pp. 61 – 80. 
48 Reader, 1994, pp. 619-630. 
49 Assimilados were those native who manged to go through all stages of colonial education, hence 
proving  worth  of  being  assimilated  within  the  ‘European’  elite.  Assimilados were  still  treated  as 
inferiors  and  mocked  by  both  natives  and  European  for  wanting  to  be  something  different.  In 
Rwanda, all Tutsis were ‘assimilated’ and took over the administration of the country, much to the 
discntent of the Hutus who looked for revenge as soon as European contorl was over.
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the children of the recaptives50 of the Western coast, came to form the intellectual and 
revolutionary elite, who praised for maintaining the European type of nation-state 
within existing boundaries,  so as to exploit both their knowledge of and position 
within the system. 
Map 2.7: African independence51 (the independence of South Africa and Zimbabwe is arguable)
50 Found in Davidson, 1994, recaptives were the liberated slaves who found home along the coast and 
had to ad just to new cities, custom and language, since they were unable to reach their original home. 
They gradually occupied niches in trade and administration, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Their  wealth allowed them to give education to  their  children,  who were ready to take over  the 
control of the country at independence, arguing for modernity and a European type of nation-state.  
51 Source: http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/students/curriculum/m10/activity4.php
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Such decision was dictated on the one hand by the easiness of continuity. Since all 
the administrative  tools  were  in place,  including borders,  to  change them would 
have meant the investment of huge capitals which the countries did not have. On the 
other,  hand,  to  have maintained the  status  quo would have signified  to  maintain 
cooperation with the mother country, and Europe, by proving that all past was to be 
forgotten once independence was granted52. 
Despite all calculations over how to reach independence and maintain relations 
with  the  colonial  powers,  however,  the  influence  of  Marxism  and  equalitarian 
theories53 lead to the creation of para-military groups for independence who were 
persuaded  that  the  only  way  to  achieve  full-independence,  hence  freedom  and 
development, was through armed struggle54. One issue, however, associated both the 
elite  and  the  guerrilla-fighter,  the  need  to  create  a  nation  within  the  colonial 
boundaries, while refusing any idea of federalism55.
African  Nationalism,  therefore,  relied  first  and foremost  on the  conception  of 
Africa as a nation, which shared a common past and must build a common future 
based  on  political  and  social  independence  from  the  coloniser.  In  this  sense  the 
situation  of  both  South  Africa  and  Zimbabwe  is  open  for  argumentation  as 
technically the former had been self-governing, under the status of dominion, since 
1910, and both had been independent from the mother land since 31st May 1961 and 
11th of  November  1965,  respectively.  Of  course,  what  was  missing  from  the 
independence discourse was democratic and socio-economic rights for the majority, 
that  is  all  Black citizens.  The  struggles  which  followed,  therefore,  led  not  to  the 
independence of the country but the establishment of a democratic government of 
majority rule, rather than a segregationist regime.
52 Davidson, 1994, pp. 113 – 114. 
53 Reader, 1994; Seidman, 2004; Masolo, 1994.
54 Fanon in Seidman, 2004, and Masolo, 1994. 
55 Davidson, 1992, p. 113.
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2.3.2 The implementation of African Nationalism
As African colonial states were granted independence, the real implications of the 
‘weak’ superimposed borders and of the differences between tribalism and modernity 
were surfacing and causing major disruptions to the development process. Despite 
being yet another European construct, tribalism is used here to indicate those groups 
of Black Africans who were looking at independence as the possibility to create the 
African nation-state rooted into traditional structures and hierarchies, particularly in 
Western  Africa  were  the memories  of  the Asante kingdoms and Igbo civilisation 
were still visible56. As this dream was shattered and federations opposed, the Igbo 
secessionist movement seeking to fund the independent state of Biafra was promptly 
repressed by the Nigerian military. This was the first of a long series of civil fights in 
post-independence Africa57 which proved that,  despite  Marxist  demagogy against 
the Western states whose capitalism was the climax of imperialism, the  status quo 
was not being questioned.
Furthermore, the Organisation of the African Unity, funded in 1963, made a point 
of clearly stating in its Charter that all member states pledge ‘respect for the sovereignty  
and territorial integrity of each state’58. This pledge, of course, grants the new sovereign 
states  the  duty  to  create  a  nation  out  of  the  patchwork  of  communities,  which 
compose the state, and the right to defend those borders for its security and integrity, 
which according to Tshiyembe is the principle behind the creation of the European 
nation-state59. And the number and types of national conflicts which devastated the 
continent from independence until present demonstrate the validity of this theory. If 
Nigeria  shows  the  difference  between  tribalism  and  modernity,  Zimbabwe 
determines  the  importance  of  tribalism even  within  those  groups  who  aspire  to 
modernity. Despite having been united in anti-segregation fight, Shona and Ndebele 
groups  had  separate  training  centres  and  patrons  (Mozambique  and  Zambia, 
56 Ibid; and Reader, 1994.
57 A fully comprehensive list can be found in Burger, 1997, pp. 164 – 165. 
58 Quote from Paragraph 3, Art. III, of the Charter of the OUA, in Griffiths, 1986, p. 213; see also 
Burger, 1997, p. 163.
59 Thsiyembe, 2001, p. 44-45.
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respectively), as well as belonging to different spheres of influence: ZANU PF were 
Marxist  and  ZAPU  were  Maoist.  After  the  signature  of  the  Lancaster  House 
Agreements  in  1979,  the  two parties  lead the  government,  despite  disagreement, 
under Pres. Robert Mugabe. The majority of the ZANU PF members, including the 
President, are Shona, the dominant ethnic group in the country under Monomotapa 
until the arrival of the Ndebele of Mzilikazi, in the mid XIX century. Under the OUA 
pledge, Pres. Mugabe created a case against possible insurrections in the South and 
asked North Korea to train his military, despite argumentation from Joshua Nkomo 
of ZAPU. In the second half of 1981, the President called for the Gukurahundi, which 
in Shona means ‘the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains’. 
The situation worsened and in 1983 the Korea trained Fifth Brigade, answerable only 
to the Prime Minister, followed the command of eradicating of dissidents, of course 
Ndebele  people  in  the  South.  It  is  curious  how  metaphores  repeat  themselves 
throughout African countries, suffice it to mention the Hutu call to ‘cut down the tall 
trees’  and  ‘crush  the  Inyenzi’,  thus  beginning  massacres  in  Rwanda60.  The 
Zimbabwean genocide counted between 3,000 and 4,000 deaths,  plus tortures and 
detentions61, and almost an entire generation of Ndebeles was slaughtered to create 
Shona supremacy both in government and in population numbers. The invention of 
the Shona Zimbabwean nation-state,  in fact, began with the choice of the country 
name, which means ‘the house of stone’, referring to the Great Zimbabwe site home 
of  the  old  Shona  king,  continued  with  the  adoption  of  the  Zimbabwe bird,  also 
symbol of the Monomotapa kingdom, and concluded with the elimination of most of 
the non-Shona members of the government, as well as the physical elimination of 
thousands of Ndebeles.
If the creation of African Nationalism, in the idea of Fanon, as the violent struggle 
against  colonisation  lead  to  the  misjudgement  that  independence  would  bring 
freedom and prosperity, the implementation of African Nationalism in a European 
60 See Reader, 1994, pp. 665 – 668; and the movie ‘Hotel Rwanda’ directed by Terry George and 
distributed by Lions Gate Films MGM Distribution Co., released on 11th September 2004. 
61 Legal Resources Foundation and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 2007, part II. Numbers 
are undervalued. 
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style nation-state confirmed that African boundaries were markers of no state. With a 
few exceptions, such as Botswana and Zambia, all independent countries have faced 
brutal internal conflicts to define supremacy, hence sovereignty. In many cases, such 
conflicts were fomented by the Cold War, not only in terms of  political theories but 
above all in terms of financial and military support, thus suppressing all attempts to 
peace and development. 
2.3.3 The multi-national state
The  failure  of  imposing  the  European  model  of  nation-state  in  post-colonial 
Africa,  despite  attempts  to  legislate  the  established  borders,  lays  in  the  many 
conflicts  generated  to  define  power-relations  between  conflicting  ethnic  groups 
within the same country, as it has been the case for Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and is the 
case for Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somaliland, and Sudan to name 
but a few. Geographically, most issues could be solved by shifting borderlines so as 
to group together ethnic group with a common heritage and separate  those who 
have been in conflict. Politically, however, the situation is more complex as the OUA 
only allowed one border change between Swaziland and South Africa in 198262, and 
generally prefers non intervention over border issues. Furthermore, the inference of 
international political and economical interests validates all theories on a new type of 
imperialism, through economic dependence. 
The solution to the failure of the nation-state in Africa, as posited by Thsyiembe 
(2001), is the creation of multi-national states, by acknowledging that within existing 
borders many nationalities coexist. Therefore, if the borders cannot be challenged, the 
construct  which they protect  should be.  Multi-national  states  are  not  new to  the 
Political  Geographical  scene,  suffice  it  to  mention  Switzerland,  the  Russian 
Federation,  pre and post  1989,  former  Yugoslavia,  China,  Belgium,  but  few have 
survived the turmoil of political  change,  either  because of  a strong undemocratic 
government  or because the shared contemporary history has created a bond that 
overcomes ethnic differences. In Africa, however, the presence of many ethnic-based 
62 Griffiths, 1986, p. 214.
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military dictatorships has failed on the one hand to construct a nation most citizens 
could  identify  with,  and  on  the  other  to  deliver  development  by  plunging  the 
continent into economic and political enslavement to either economic lobbies (oil, 
diamonds, IT minerals) or to international organisations (the creation of a UN system 
dedicated to Mozambique only is emblematic). Yet, the presentation of South Africa 
as a  rainbow nation, encompassing of all ethnic representations in society, could be 
seen as the first attempt to drop ethnic rivalries and past conflicts, so as to establish a 
future of cooperation and growth. Were it not for the intrinsic xenophobia of South 
Africans  of  all  colours  and  religions,  the  country’s  aspiration  to  oversee  African 
development,  and  the  racial  issues  visible  in  everyday  life  (exemplified  by  the 
existence  of  a  law  defining  racial  quotas  for  employers,  until  Spring  2006)  the 
rainbow nation would succeed in producing a political model for the continent. The 
role of South Africa behind the creation of the African Union from the ashes of the 
OUA, and its lobbying for the new interventionist philosophy vis à vis violations of 
funding principles, show that Africa has entered a new phase, where sovereignty is 
no longer in the hands of the nation-state only, but it is shared with supranational 
entities whose decision-making may change the course of events. This is a challenge 
to  the  European  model  of  nation-state,  it  must  be  said,  but  again  it  follows  the 
Western model of concerted decision-making, and reminds more of the Restoration 
and the Concert of Europe, rather than of the European Union. 
In areas of economic and political stability, however, the idea of a multinational 
state has surfaced with the promotion of cross-border cooperation, thus taking the 
multinational  issue  a  step  further.  Ideally  one  could  posit  that  by  accepting  that 
borders divide communities, which are at one time part of  a nation yet bound to 
localities, to reduce border formalities where encroachment occurs would entail the 
creation  of  a  multi-national  cross-border  community.  Reality,  however,  is  less 
influenced by social politics, and more by geopolitics and economics.  The one issue, 
as old as Imperialism, of access to sea, for trade, and the need to create a competitive 
economic  space  which  relies  on  the  balance  between  developed  and  developing 
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countries may effectively lay behind the shift of the Southern Africa Development 
Committee toward a EU type of organisation, centred  again on the role of South 
Africa. Letting security, read immigration, issues for others to solve, South Africa has 
opened  doors  for  trade  within  and  without  the  country  in  the  SADC  region, 
beginning with the abolition of visa permits for SADC residents and the reduction of 
import-export fees for goods, with a final aim of creating a space of free movements 
of people, goods and services, by 2010. The multinational state, therefore, has been 
by-passed to create a cross-border community, whose integration though is arguable.
2.4 THE PEACE PARKS: OPEN BORDERS ACROSS SOUTHERN AFRICA
When  the  African  frontiers  changed  into  borders,  these  have  been  contested 
because they took in little consideration native populations and theirs space. When 
independence struggles began, fights occurred mainly along the borders to reach the 
core of the state in an attempt to define the new state. At the turn of the XXI century, 
African borders had been swinging from national core to periphery settling finally 
somewhere in between as conservation areas, which had been established to create 
buffer zones or to give remote areas a purpose, and became increasingly important in 
developing political strategies both nationally and internationally.  The Peace Parks 
of Southern Africa  quickly embodied the ambitions and challenges of  the region, 
which still await resolutions, such as security.
2.4.1 From conservation to natural resources management.
From  ‘exclusive’  conservation,  which  entailed  excluding  native  people  from 
fenced areas to protect African wildlife, to participative conservation, which imposed 
conservation  and  related  business  as  a  socio-economic  development  strategy  for 
previously excluded native communities, South Africa and neighbouring countries 
had to reconsider regional wildlife protection and economic development in terms of 
cooperation63. Each decision had to be effective and symbolic had the same time, so 
63 Büscher and Dietz, 2005, pp. 2-3.
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as to guarantee international political and financial approval, and conservation was 
to make the heyday of post-liberation Southern Africa.  
The  conservation  paradigm  shifted  from  ‘state-centric’  fortresses  for  animal 
protection  to  CBNRM64,  due  to  the  social  and  ecological  unsustainability  of  the 
concept. On the one had, in fact, communities could no longer be excluded from the 
use of  natural  resources  in the New South Africa,  and on the other hand animal 
populations were exceeding the carrying capacities of protected areas. Furthermore, 
culling  could  not  often  be  justified  in  the  light  of  radical  Western-style 
environmentalism and animal protection.  These issues had to be inscribed in the 
regional context whereby, with the exclusion of Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, and 
Zambia, all countries had recently ended horrific wars of destabilisation living the 
population poorer  and traumatised,  and wildlife depleted because of hunger and 
illegal trade65. When the first CBNRM projects began to fail, due mainly to the lack of 
decision-making  devolution  at  the  grass-root  level,  another  concept  which 
accidentally would have helped very well the South African strategy of inclusion and 
protection was internationally approved: Trans-boundary NRM. The basic definition 
of TBNRM as any process of collaboration across boundaries that increases the effectiveness  
of attaining an Natural Resource Management or biodiversity conservation goal(s)66 implies 
the existence of a combined political will to manage or preserve the environment 
across the borders, thus renouncing to part of their sovereignty over their territory. 
TBNRM  developed  into  conservation  strategies  that  would  enhance  the  existing 
protected areas to form the typically South African concept of TB Protected Areas, 
with the purpose of strengthening the ownership of the concept67 and take it a step 
further with Peace Parks. The concept of Peace Park, however, is not uniquely South 
African, contrary to popular belief, as it can be traced back to the establishment of the 
Waterston-Glacier  Park,  in  1832,  between  the  USA  and  Canada,  and  to  the 
64 Dzingirai, 2004. 
65 The trade of ivory, particularly, was conducted by the military in exchange for payment, see Ellis , 
1994.. 
66 Van der Linde et al., 2001, p. 10.
67 Wolmer, 2003, van der Linde et al., 2001 and Griffins et al., 1999.
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theorisation of ‘Parks for Peace’ by IUCN in the 1980s68. The creation of the Peace 
Parks Foundation, however, by Mr. Anton Rupert with Prince Bernhard of Belgium, 
centred the ‘Parks for Peace’ discourse over the Southern African regions whose past 
of war and exclusion was to be forgotten in the name of conservation and sustainable 
socio-economic development, all supervised by the New South Africa, the  Rainbow 
nation. 
Map 2.8: In the green circles all the TFCAs overseen and funded by the PPF (Source: PPF, 2007)
2.4.2 Origins and objectives of the Southern African Peace Parks
Much  discussion  has  been  carried  out  in  scholarly  papers  and  technical 
publications about the importance of correct terminology, for the correct objective, in 
dealing with TFCAs and Peace  Parks.  Specifically,  the use of  IUCN categories  to 
68 Derived from van Amerom and Büscher, 2005, see also van der Linde et al., 2001, and Budowski, 
2003.
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identify the degree of required protection in a specific area to either plan or discuss 
planning was exploited to the point that, based on field experience and literature, 
IUCN  began  to  work  of  a  new  category  that  would  accommodate  the  needs  of 
conservation and the rights to development, beginning with considerations over the 
real possibilities offered by TFCAs69. The aims and objectives of this project, instead, 
bear  a  different  meaning  in  so  far  as  land  management  and  secutiry  issues  are 
concerned.
The Peace Parks Foundation, as the umbrella organisation, was created with the 
general  objective of  ‘securing space’  for  transfrontier  conservation,  by Mr.  Anton 
Rupert  with Prince Bernhard of Belgium, also co-founders  of WWF South Africa, 
with Pres. Nelson Mandela. Following from the international lead over the need to 
manage  ecosystems  for  conservation,  whilst  allowing  local  communities  around 
protected areas to pro-actively enjoy the benefits of conservation by working for it70, 
the PPF took over the role of supervisor and fundraiser for TFPA projects on the 
South African soil, recently looking at the region with Zambia and Malawi, as shown 
by map 2.5. The idealistic vision stated by the organisation is rather a dream of a 
fenceless Africa, that is an Africa without borders:
Dream of ancient migration trails trodden deep by an instinct that time has never  
contained. Dream of a wilderness where the elephant roams and the roar of the lion  
shatters the night. Dream, like us, of experiencing Africa wild and free, where people  
can reap the benefits of nature and in turn support her. This is the dream of Peace  
Parks Foundation. A dream that will only be realised through the establishment of  
peace parks71.
This concept is perfectly in line with the African nationalism theories which see the 
continent as a country, sharing positive and negative issues, but it also justifies the 
criticism on the possibility of a new Cape-to-Cairo colonisation project, in the name 
of conservation72, as well as the more cautious view of a top-down land and resource 
management  approach  disguised  by  the  ‘socio-economic  development’  and 
69 Nhantumbo and Magane, 2005.
70 From Duffy, 2001, van der Linde et al., 2001; Sandwith et al., 2001; Wolmer, 2003, 
71 See official website: http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?mid=6&pid=5&m=3_1
72 Moore, 1997. 
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‘community  participation’73 plans  which  recur  in  all  project  planning.   In  fact, 
transboundary conservation is the central objective of the Peace Park Foundations 
and the main attraction for donors, as clearly stated also in the official publications74. 
Furthermore, the key objectives of the PPF foundation in fostering TFPAs may be 
summarised as follows:
1)to help the protection of biodiversity;
2)to re-establish migratory routes for animals;
3)to promote the image of a peaceful region;
4)to help the local communities that live within or near the area.
Whereby, the protection of biodiversity is the main objective75, the re-establishment 
of  migratory  routes  is  a  by-product76 eventually  linking  the  whole  region,  the 
promotion  of  a  peaceful  region  is  a  consequence  and  the  contribution  to  local 
communities  is  a  recent  addendum due  to  the  critical  reviews  over  the  failure  of 
TFPAs  in  the  whole  region  (a)  to  actively  involve  local  populations  in  the 
conservation process, (b) to allow for participation in income-generating activities, (c) 
and to include traditional NRM into land management for conservation. On this last 
remark, however, it is worth noticing a new vision of the PPF, whereby  peace is no 
longer  promoted  as  the  opposite  of  war in  the  regional  context,  but  as  personal 
internal peace with the environment. One is  left to wonder if this change in ideals 
might underpin  the acknowledgement  that  (a)  the region is  not peaceful;  (b)  the 
failure  to  directly  address  development  issues  within  conservation  and  security 
priorities might impair the original idealism, whereby the area will no longer see 
conflict.
73 The most productive critics of the GLTFCA project in a Political Ecology perspective are Wolmer 
and Duffy, extensively quoted in literature. The ODI has also published a few papers on the issue with 
a general view of TFCA projects. Recently, two IUCN officers,  Nhantumbo and Magane, have co-
authored an unpublished paper, on the impact of TFCAs on local livelihoods. Finally, Jones deals with 
land use and protection conflict along the Southern side of the South African and Mozambican border. 
74 See mainly van der Linde et al., 2001; Griffin et al.,1999; the GLTFP treaty in Peddle et al., 2004.
75 See the website www.peaceparksfoundation.org, and publications within.
76 See conclusions from Anderson, 2002
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2.4.3  The security challenge of Peace Parks
Developed  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  conservation  in  the  new  context  of 
ecosystems protection within a bio-region, some TBPAs were incorporated by the 
PPF into the new dream of nature preservation for the benefits of wildlife, visitors 
and local populations. It is of no surprise, therefore, that one of the key events which 
marked the new conservation philosophy of Southern Africa would be the Makuleke 
Land Claim.
Map 2.9: The Makuleke store pointer indicates the former village and military post during the 
bush war.
The Makuleke used to live near Crooks’ Corner in Pafuri, the northernmost area 
of the KNP, and were forcibly relocated outside of the park in 1969. In the 1990s, the 
community began a law suit to claim the land back on the basis of the Nama claim 
for  the  Richtersveld  National  Park  in  Namaqualand,  Cape Province.  In  1998,  the 
Makuleke won the claim and the land77, but there is a sheer discrepancy between 
what was publicised in the media and the real settlement deal. On the one hand, the 
77 Mahoney and Van Zyn, 2001. 
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Makuleke’s became the success story of people over conservation in the New South 
Africa, but in reality the SANP remained a partner in the land management for fifty 
(50)  years,  renewable,  as  the  area  became  a  Contractual  Park.  Furthermore,  the 
Makuleke, unlike the Namas, were not allowed to move back to their original Kraal, 
or to use natural resources, but had to commit themselves to develop the area for 
tourism and accept conservation as the only land use78. So despite the legal form of 
the Contractual Park, a big novelty at the time of the Nama concession, the Northern 
section of  the Kruger  may be seen  as  reductive  in  terms  of  benefits  to  the  rural 
communities.
The Makuleke Land Claim, which could have appeared as settlement of a past 
injustice, is in fact a reminder that conservation is a priority, especially along border 
areas  where  human geography is  so  contrasting with political  geography:  where 
communities are united across boundaries. Whereas it is obvious that in a protected 
area  conservation  should  be  paramount,  in  fact,  one  can  only  explaining  the 
contractual  differences  between the Namaqualand and the Makuleke example by 
looking at the geographical context of the contested area. Being still the wealthier 
and more developed country of the region, with ethnic groups that represent the 
whole SADC thanks to  the mine-related immigrations  of  the past  century,  South 
Africa attracts millions of migrants in search for a job or a fortune. The continuous 
influx  of  people  into  a  political  and  economic  systems  which  is  precarious,  and 
perceived as such by its citizens,  has generated a sort of xenophobia towards the 
alien  people  who  come  to  depredate  the  country  and  make  it  unsafe79. 
Unemployment  rates  and  criminality  are  often  perceived  in  South  Africa  as  by-
products  of  illegal  immigration from poorer  countries;  ironically,  however,  South 
Africans are in turn perceived as the criminals in neighbouring countries such as 
Mozambique  and  Swaziland80.  Nonetheless,  illegal  immigration  and  illegal 
78 Ibid.; interview with Colleen Mullen, Manager of Pafuri Camp for Wilderness Safari.
79 MacDonald, 2000, p. 2-3; Nduru, 2005. 
80 Conversation with Ms. Ana Leão, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Research, Pretoria, 
and  qualitative data collected through informal conversation in both Mozambique and Swaziland. 
Mr. Garreth Evans, owner of the Engen Petrol Station in Mbabane, Swaziland, remarked that the 
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trafficking particularly on South African Eastern border from Zimbabwe all the way 
down to Swaziland, along Mozambique, are reaching concerning levels in terms of 
stolen vehicles, weapons, drugs and wildlife by-products. The refusal to allow the 
Makuleke people back into their traditional kraal close to other Shangaan people, in 
this context, fits the governmental need to reduce and halt this movements of goods 
and people,  despite regional SADC politics say otherwise,  particularly when they 
occur through protected areas. 
2.5 CONCLUSION
Conservation, in the past decade, has opened the border which were had been 
frontier  lands  of  war  since  the  1970s  with  the  aim  of  preserving  the  African 
environment  and  contributing,  with  income-generating  activities  to  the  socio-
economic development  of border  communities living outside the Parks,  but often 
inside the Conservation Areas. The Peace Parks are the marketable tip of the iceberg 
in such huge project as it aims at combining such objectives,  while generating an 
image  of  peace  and  cooperation  between  countries  previously  at  war.  This  aim, 
however, is in stark contrast with the security needs of South Africa as the economic 
centre of developing peripheries. The Rainbow Nation, in fact, feels threatened by 
the numbers of immigrants who mostly illegally cross borders to find work, and may 
end up joining existing criminals. As Mac Donalds points out, however, job seeking 
is not ‘the only reason that people go to South Africa’ for, more common is shopping 
and  visiting  friends  and  family81.  The  close  relation  between  people  within  and 
without South Africa is to be found in the history of planned migrations for mines 
and farms, and of course to the demarcation of borders which divided ethnic groups. 
Of course, the close net of people often engages in informal, at times illegal, cross-
border  trade,  but  because  the  political  and  economic  regional  trend  is  towards 
integration on the basis of the EU model, conservation is asked once again to serve 
number of theft experienced in the area had increased after the elimination of the visa requirement to 
cross the border. The criminal records also escalated in Maputo where, in the year which followed the 
opening of the border, car hijacking, armed bank robberies and armed burglary had increased from a 
figures that were close to irrelevant.
81 MacDonalds, 2000, p. 8.
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the political purpose of separation and border patrol. Whilst opening up frontiers for 
animals and tourists, the Peace Park may end up closing borders for local people and 
begin the cycle of exclusion.
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3. THE BORDER WARS: NATIONAL STRUGGLE OR CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE?
All men recognise the right to revolution: that is  
the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist the  
government when its tyranny or its inefficiency  
are unendurable. (Thoreau, 1986, p. 389)1
The modern history of Africa is constellated by movements of resistance to the 
establishment, being it the French ruling in the North, the German, Portuguese and 
Belgian domination in the centre and the East, or the British and Boer command over 
the  South.  Such  movements  were  varied,  according  to  locations  and the  type  of 
domination,  and  involved  different  ethnic  groups.  Despite  peaceful  resistance, 
operated by a few African monarchs throughout the continent2 and the adjustment of 
liberated slaves in both Liberia and the Gold Coast3,  the first and most important 
resistance  to  foreign dominance  was the  Nama and the  Herero  rebellion  in  1904 
against the German military regime in modern-day Namibia (West-South Africa)4. 
The  rebellion  ended  up in  an  overwhelming  victory  for  the  German soldiers,  of 
course, followed by a semi-total extermination to extinguish any last flame of the fire. 
This, however, was not a national struggle as land and culture were only a secondary 
issue compared to the frustration of hierarchical relations; it was rather an act of civil 
disobedience,  of  rebellion  against  a  system  –  colonialism  –  that  was  no  longer 
endurable. 
Nationalism is still a delicate issue when discussing the native rebellions to the 
colonial  regimes,  especially  during  the  independence  wars.  In  a  political 
geographical  perspective,  in  fact,  nationalism  characterises  those  movements  of 
people  united  under  linguistic  and  cultural  backgrounds,  which  aspire  to  self-
1 H.D.  Thoroeau  wrote  ‘Civil  Disobedience’,  where  this  statement  is  taken  from,  was  printed  in 
Elizabeth Peabody’s Aesthetic Papers, published by Ticknor and Fields, Boston, 1866, in order to clarify 
his position on slavery and the injustices perpetrated by the American government. 
2 Reader, 1994, pp. 573 – 577.
3 Davidson, 1992, pp. 21 – 35.
4 Reader, 1994, 587 – 590. 
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governing5. Ethnicity, for instance, may be considered the fundament for a nation; 
but, if Africa had to be divided into ethnic groups, the continent would become a 
puzzle of little states, such as Lesotho and Swaziland, most likely at war between 
them for boundary issues. As it was in pre-colonial time, each border would be a 
frontier to break with a population to conquer and/or enslave and resources to raid6. 
To this the Colonial power superimposed boundaries which […]are so nonsensical that  
without our sense of unity they should be a cause of friction7, in the words of the Kenian 
President Julius Nyerere.   And yet, this sense of unity only works on a continental 
level as an expression of African Nationalism, not on the local level where ethnicity 
has proved to be a strong discriminator in post-independence state-formation.
Ironically, if we consider ethnicities as nations at the embryonic stage only, the 
first national struggle in Southern Africa was the Anglo-Boer war. Having been cut 
off from the mother country, the Boer people of South Africa created a nation of their 
own within the land they had occupied in the Cape Colony first, and in Orange and 
Trasvaal  after  the British  occupied the Cape and Natal.  The  Boers  represented a 
nation  of  their  own,  as  they  shared:  culture,  societal  structure,  and  land, 
notwithstanding  the  belief  in  a  God-sent  mission  to  civilise  the  natives,  as  still 
represented in modern monuments8, and above all a language, Afrikaans, which was 
no longer Dutch, rather a mixture of all  European minorities which were in time 
incorporated into the Boer society and became one nation. The British wanted the 
land, because of its natural resources (gold and diamonds), and were prepared to go 
to  war  for  it.  The  Afrikaaners,  therefore,  defended  their  nationhood  and  nation 
against a different culture and establishment. It is only by a historical accident, one 
may say, that the Afrikaaners considered their own a land that belonged to all the 
5 See definition in Pounds, 1992, p. 19
6 Reader, 1994, pp. 283 – 290. The system of raid and loot is typical of pre-colonial inter-ethnic wars, 
and has been replicated in post-independence conflicts.
7 Reader,  1994, p.  659, Julius  Nyerere was the first  leader of independent  Tanzania,  and a strong 
supporter,  with Mozambique,  of the SADCC as the platform to complete the independence  of all 
Southern African states. He pronounced these words at the first meeting to form the Organisation of 
African Unity (O.A.U.) in Addis Abeba, May 1963.
8 Reader, 1994, pp. 479 – 490. Also not the Afrikaanse Taal monument in Pearl, Franshoek, Western 
Cape.
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other  ethnic  groups  they  were  annihilating  trough  enslavement  and  religious 
teaching. The British, on the other hand, were engaging a nation-state into war in 
order to break through the frontier and incorporate the rich lands of the Rand9. Since 
the British victory, however, instead of engaging into acts of civil disobedience, the 
Afrikaaners  entered  the  new  political  and  economical  system,  based  on  white 
minority ruling, and to an extent dominated it on a local level first, then on a national 
level after the unilateral decision to leave the Commonwealth and pursue a policy of 
racial segregation, apartheid, in order to maintain the status quo in South Africa.
Other  countries  in  the  region  adopted  the  same  segregationists  policies  and 
refused to abide by the new sense for political democracy and ethnic justice which 
followed the horror of concentration camps and the Holocaust in Europe: namely, 
Angola  and  Mozambique,  under  the  dictatorship  of  Salazar  from  Portugal,  and 
Rhodesia, under the political leadership of Ian Smith. This decision motivated the 
embargo from the Western countries  on all  goods, including weapons, trade and 
worldwide competitions, and this is how South Africa (at the time including also 
South-West  Africa)  and  Zimbabwe  became  industrially  and  agriculturally  self-
reliant.  Apartheid, however, had a deeper long-term impact in the region, which is 
only being measured now in terms of perception, psychological and physical damage 
yet, as it sparked off from acts of civil disobedience: the border wars (or bush wars). 
By  focussing  on  the  South  Africa,  Zimbabwe  and  Mozambique  border  wars, 
though mentioning the full extent of the military operation by placing them into a 
broader  geographical,  political  and  economical  context  that  is  both  regional  and 
international,  this  chapter  aims:  on  the  one  hand  at  suggesting  the  use  of  the 
expression  independence  fights (stemming  from  civil  disobedience)  as  a  more 
appropriate term to indicate the struggles in Angola, Mozambique (from Portugal), 
Namibia,  South  Africa  and  Zimbabwe  (from  apartheid);  on  the  other  hand  at 
demonstrating  the  politicisation  of  the  South  African  conservation  processes, 
9 The Rand is the geographical area around Johannesburg where all the diamonds and gold mines 
were found. 
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including the Great Limpopo TFCA. It will firstly discuss the origins of the wars, the 
development on the field and the changes which in time shifted the course and the 
impact of the conflicts. Secondly, it will discuss the effects of the war on the frontiers 
between the three  countries,  which defines  one aspect  of  the permeability  of  the 
Pafuri border area. Finally, it will discuss the outcomes of the peace process for both 
Mozambique and the two other countries involved, thus introducing the theme of 
migration in the GLTFCA.
3.1 THE IMPACT OF APARTHEID IN THE REGION
Regimes of racial segregation were not uncommon in the colonies, regardless of 
the European country of affiliation, however, they could no longer be condoned after 
the extremes to which Nazism took the theories of the race. Despite this change in the 
ethical morality of the international opinion, racial segregation was still perpetrated 
in many countries but in one place a name was created to define the political system 
it was based on:  apartheid. In a conversation with a group of young South African 
people, held in Maputo in November 2006, everyone agreed that the big mistake of 
South Africa was not to have based a social system on racial segregation, but to have 
given a  name to  this  socio-political  structure  that  was  refuted  by the rest  of  the 
world, although widely practised between the lines. This is true in the sense that 
racial discrimination is still a considerable problem in the whole world but, unlike 
the South African, Rhodesian and pre-independence Mozambican governments, the 
rest  of  the world tries  to  fight it,  not  to  regulate  it.  In fact,  while the world was 
supporting majority  rule  in  the  colonies,  the Southern  tip  of  Africa  continued to 
perpetrate  colonial  policies,  which  in  turn  prompted  acts  of  civil  disobedience, 
leading to independence fights. Apartheid, as enforced in Rhodesia and South Africa, 
actually,  had the greater impact in the contemporary history of the region, as the 
countries organised themselves to protect both their boundaries and their economy 
and instigated a series of wars that shattered the regional economy, deranging its 
population. What triggered such deployment of military force was, of course,  the 
independence of both Mozambique and Angola after the end of the Fascist regime in 
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Portugal,  and  the  threat  posed  by  FRELIMO  political  affiliation,  as  well  as  its 
successful nationwide policies10.
3.1.1The first Border War: Rhodesian defeat
FRELIMO  was  the  only  organised  rebellion  group  during  the  fights  for  the 
colonial  independence  of  Mozambique,  consequently  it  is  of  no  surprise  that  its 
hierarchical elite took power after the Lusaka agreements with Portugal’s democratic 
government,  in 1975.  As part  of  a  network of  parties  and military groups which 
aimed at establishing national independent governments in Africa under the aegis of 
Communism,  FRELIMO  supported   rebellious  groups  in  the  region  specifically 
ZANU  led  by  Mr.  Robert  Mugabe  and  the  South  African  ANC,  as  well  as  the 
respective  armed  wings  (ZANLA  and  MK),  by  allowing  them  both  to  establish 
training camps in the country11. When in 1975, Having let slip one chance after another of  
reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seemed to  
have made the tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than  
the conference table12, South Africa and Mozambique were beginning to feel the threat 
a Rhodesian conflict would impinge over their economy. 
South Africa and the USA, at that stage were favouring a diplomatic resolution of 
the controversy, but Ian Smith shared a different opinion as the 800-mile-long border  
with  Mozambique,  [was paved with]  3,000 armed,  trained  and increasingly bold  black  
Rhodesian guerrillas stand[ing] ready to attack. [And on the opposite side of the border,] 
At least 5,000 more, in a half-dozen camps, are being trained by Chinese and Mozambican  
advisors to make deadly forays back into their white-dominated homeland13.  The province of 
Gaza,  bordering  both  South  Africa  and  Rhodesia,  became  both  a  stronghold  for 
ZANLA rebels and a battle ground for the parties involved, particularly in the area 
10 Hanlon, 1991, as well as Hall & Young, 1997, and Pitcher, 2002, describe in detail FRELIMO’s post 
independence policies and agree that on education and sanitation, the government managed to reach 
unprecedented levels without foreign aid. On vaccination, especially, the country receivde a mention 
from the World Health Organisation. 
11 Find more information in both Hall & Young, 1997, and Minter, 1998.
12 Rand Daily Mail Editorial, May 1976, in Anon. 1976, p.2.
13 Anon, 1976, p.2.
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between Chiqualaquala and Chokwe. Regardless of what happened in the rest of the 
countries, war was waged in this border area for over ten years, where the winds of 
nationalism were only blowing with new military attacks. 
Map 3.10: Supply routes to Rhodesia (Source: Selous Scouts website, 2006)
The Rhodesian response to the civil disobedience was repression and, even before 
Mozambique took the unilateral  decision of closing the borders with Rhodesia in 
1976, thus cutting off the two most straightforward supply routes for the land-locked 
country,  the regime of  Ian Smith exacerbated both national  politics,  by  grouping 
native communities into Protected Villages that were easier to control (based on the 
Portuguese  aldeamento),  and international  politics  by creating,  in  1974,  the Selous 
Scouts - the Tracker Combat Unit - responsible for most of the events of the Bush 
War. Aside from the conscription system enforced, free-lance combatants were hired 
from abroad, and included Vietnam war veterans from the USA and Australia.
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After Mozambican independence, in fact, Rhodesia’s military strategy changed to 
adjust  to  the  new  situation.  The  rebel  movements  were  being  supported  both 
militarily and logistically by two neighbouring countries (Mozambique and Zambia), 
it was therefore essential to protect the borders and to adapt conventional war tactics 
to guerrilla warfare whose aim was not just to fight the terrorists but to destabilise 
the one country which had altered regional balance, i.e. Mozambique.  
The  Selous  Scouts  were  engaged  and  became  operative  for  the  first  time  in 
August 1976 with their first mission across the border,  and their ruthlessness was 
such  that  the  unit  was  dismantled  straight  after  independence.  Furthermore,  a 
deeper and more effective strategy of creating a Mozambican insurgency movement 
was sought with the Project MNR, whose first leader was André Matsangaissa, an 
Ndau  (Shona  speaker)  and  ex-FRELIMO  army  commander14.  Project  MNR  was 
essentially the creation of a military force whose role was to complement the Selous 
Scouts  into  destabilising  Mozambique.  In  fact,  whereas  the  Selous  Scouts  were 
operating  mainly  along  the  borders  and  conducted  ‘hit  and  run’  attacks,  MNR 
members were spread inside Mozambique to recruit new members, while terrorising 
civilians and destroying infrastructures.  Both Selous Scouts and MNR forces were 
soon to incorporate native people in order to infiltrate rebel groups and begin a real 
propaganda campaign in Mozambique. The MNR recruitment,  despite what some 
may argue15,  was not always based on volunteering, as detailed by Minter’s field 
research16, and relied on the implementation of a contras strategy in the neighbouring 
country.
Conversely, to define the Zimbabwean resistance as a national struggle is not so 
straightforward for many a reason. The most basic  one is that three parties  were 
14 The ethnic affiliation was very important to RENAMO as, unlike FRELIMO, they maintained the 
importance of ethnical divisions amongst the Mozambican population. The RENAMO elite was Ndau, 
and all recruits had to learn Ndau as the only language spoken amongst the militia. This naturally 
affected  popular  support  to  RENAMO, particularly  in  Gaza where  the  Shangaan population  had 
demonstrated military supremacy over the Ndau under Soshangane (Roesch, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005)
15 See Anon, 2002, and field work: conversations with former Selous Scouts members, Maputo, May 
2006. 
16 Minter, 1998.
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involved  in  the  contest  for  the  country:  ZANU,  ZAPU  and  the  segregationist 
government, each fighting for their own nation. Secondly, despite different Russian 
and Maoist affiliations, respectively, ZANU and ZAPU were fighting for the same 
aim: native rule, or at least majority rule, that is power to the native people. History 
shows  that  nationhood  was  never  a  drive  for  the  struggle  thus  suggesting  the 
assumption that what has been called  national struggle was, actually, an act of civil 
disobedience. 
Map 3.11: Selous Scouts external operations17 (Source: Selous Scouts website, 2006; field work)
Theoretically,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  otherwise  explain  the  almost  total 
extermination of the Ndebele people in the South, carefully planned by the Shona 
leaders. Similarly, one is left to ask which country were MNR, later RENAMO, and 
FRELIMO fighting for. On the one hand, Minter claims that the FRELIMO idea of 
that state was funded on people, particularly peasants, which is why, as it is often 
pointed out, the policies were aiming at breaking away from traditional customs and 
17 The letters in red refer to targets: on C and D, the areas of the GLTFCA, a series of operation were 
conducted from 1976 to 1979, namely Operation Detachment against the ZANLA base in Chigamane; 
Operation Long John, ZANLA base in Mapai; Operation Maradon, against ZANLA and FRELIMO at 
Jorge  do  Limpopo  and  Massengena  respectively;  Operation  Aztec  against  both  ZANLA  and 
FRELIMO at Jorge do Limpopo, Mapai, and Madulo Pan.
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move towards a positivist approach into education, health and work organisation18. 
However,  by  seeking  support  at  the  local  level  first  and  by  enforcing  such 
modernising policies19, FRELIMO created internal divisions which were exploited for 
a little but sufficient time by RENAMO,  an advocate of ethnicity and traditional 
practices,  including witchcraft  and magic20.  On the other  hand,  RENAMO would 
never have been created had it  not been for the Rhodesian involvement,  and the 
amount  of  support  it  had  acquired  both  militarily,  at  the  time,  and  political  at 
present, is not sufficient to define it a national movement, as people were generally 
afraid  of  its  members  rather  than  agreeing  with  their  cause21.  The  whole  project 
seems more like an extension of  the Rhodesian frontier  into Mozambique,  as  the 
Zimbabwean – Shona rebels were hosted and supported by FRELIMO and NMR was 
supported by Rhodesia. 
To conclude, the Selous Scouts and MNR, were militarily responsible for the end 
of the Zimbabwean internal conflict, with yet an operation that deeply affected the 
Gaza  Province:  Operation  URIC/Bootlace.  Considering  the  frequent  and 
uncontrollable incursion of ZANLA militants into Rhodesia, a major operation was 
devised to persuade the Mozambican government to discontinue their  support  to 
ZANLA fighters. This was obviously a  contras style of attack, detailed in Map 3.3, 
which also included non-military objectives, such as the mining of roads, in the area 
from Chiqualaquala  (then Vila Salazar) to Chòkwe. The general aim of the operation 
was  to  force  ZANLA  out  of  Mozambique,  and  to  an  extent  out  of  the  war,  by 
18 Minter, 1998, p. 126; such theories are shown into Hall & Young, 1997, but were clearly expressed by 
first and unforgotten leader Samara Moisés Machel (Machel, 1975, pp. 32-35; 50-58). In addition, the 
creation of the Mozambican national identity follows the patterns discussed in Ch. 1. 
19 Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 89 - 137
20 See Roesch, 1992; Hownwana, 1997.
21 According to the literature, only Ndau people did follow RENAMO militas willingly by accepting 
the ethnical  approach. In the northern provinces,  where conflicts  between the FRELIMO affiliated 
Muslims  and the  locals  clans  were  stronger,  the  latter  sided  with  RENAMO to protest  again the 
government. Apart from these two exceptions, however, RENAMO was joined by youngsters who 
saw in the lure of the militias the end of poverty and subjugations, regardless of ethnic affiliations. 
These were banned from their family and clan, because they chose to become ‘bandits’, as RENAMO 
fighters were called by the people. (See Roesch, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005; Honwana, 1997)
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showing the Mozambican government the damage that Rhodesia could inflict onto 
its country and people22. 
Map 3.12: The extension of Operation URIC into Mozambican soil (Source: Rhodesian Forces 
website23)
22 Binda, unknown.
23 Detail of Operation URIC can be found on the sites belonging to former Rhodesian army members, 
such  as  the one where  this  map was taken.  However,  to  give  an example  of  the type of human 
resources Rhodesia could count on, it must be said that in this operation 15 Selous Scouts died, against 
300 ZANLA and FRELIMO. 
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The plan worked, and after this operation Robert Mugabe was forced to sit at the 
negotiating table at Lancaster House. Much to the Rhodesians’ dismay, however, the 
Lancaster House meeting was not a surrender of ZANU, but a devolution of powers 
which was enforced in 1980. Similarly, however, Ian Smith was forced to negotiate 
due  to  the  pressure  of  South  Africa,  which  was  no  longer  going  to  support 
logistically and militarily the Rhodesian struggle. Operation URIC was, therefore, the 
last Rhodesian attempt to affirm their supremacy.
Far from being over, however, the internal conflict in Mozambique was just at the 
beginning of a 12 year war, as the ANC/MK was still enjoying the support of fellow 
Samora Machel, and South Africa took over the MNR project and the Selous Scouts, 
then based at Phalaborwa, to continue the contras war of destabilisation with the help 
of the CIA.  The border war was incorporated in the ‘Total war’, which South Africa 
waged on the Eastern and North-western front (until the independence of Namibia), 
but Mozambique, unlike Angola, had to fight it alone, with the logistic support of 
Tanzania and the ideological support of the Soviet Union.  
3.1.2 South Africa’s total war: the geopolitical contexts
Mozambique counts some 10 ethnic  groups,  divided into subgroups and sub-
languages: if Zimbabwe dominated by two main groups only (Shona and ‘Ndebele) 
cannot  be  a  nation,  it  is  rather  unlikely  this  could  happen  in  Mozambique. 
Paradoxically,  FRELIMO  original  policy  of  ‘Mozambicanisation’  was  the  only 
solution to create a nation within its boundaries, which is fully contextualised within 
African  Nationalism  and  the  post-independence  pressure  to  adopt  the  European 
model  of  nation-state,  instead  of  adjusting  to  the  African  traditions  and  reality. 
Admittedly,  as  argued  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  nation-state  allows for  major 
control over people and this is exactly what post-colonial governments needed in 
order to become operational within a short lapse of time. However, as the African 
borders are the never-ending legacy of colonialism, although define the embryo of a 
nation-state, one must agree that fights cannot have a nationalistic character so long 
as the ethnic divisions are the cause of internal conflicts and massacres, as the recent 
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history of both Mozambique and Zimbabwe show. Similarly, the war engaged by 
South Africa in the 1980s, as the only survived enclave of White domination in the 
continent, cannot be classified as a national struggle, firstly because the majority of 
the  population  was  cast  outside  the  nation,  secondly  because  the  South  African 
whites themselves were not sharing the same idea of nation, but of state (as in the 
government).  South  African  apartheid  regime  was  mainly  in  the  hands  of  the 
Afrikaaner population, although most of the other white minorities shared the same 
political  view.  With  the  shift  in  regional  geopolitics,  towards  Communist  native 
governments, South Africa was facing economic isolation and political threat from 
the increasing ANC activism. As Olton rightfully states, the ‘Defence White Paper’ of 
197724 marked a turning point in the future of the region. By acclaiming P.W. Botha at 
the head of the state and by acknowledging the SADCC, dominated by the Front 
Line  States25,  as  the  catalyser  of  economic  development  strategies,   South  Africa 
opened the way for a ‘Total War’ as the ultimate means to re-establish itself as  a 
leading power in the region. 
In the regional geopolitical context, therefore, the ‘Total War’ strategy pursued by 
South  Africa  on  the  Mozambican  and  the  Angolan/Namibian  fronts  from  the 
beginning of the 1980s could be seen as a suicidal attempt to maintain a state that 
was  politically  anachronistic,  yet  economically  self-sufficient.  Having  suffered  a 
tightening embargo since the unilateral decision of 1961, South Africa proved to have 
a  strong  economy  able  to  manufacture  all  that  was  required  for  the  country  to 
progress,  whilst  heavily  financing  the  military  sector  to  support  Rhodesia  and 
eventually prepare to fight its own war. Of course, sharing benefits amongst a little 
percentage of the population only, did help balancing the sheets,  nonetheless  the 
24 Olson, 1990, p. 21.
25 The  Front  Line  States  defines  the  group  of  Southern  Africa  States  which,  after  acquiring 
independence, began to work for a common future for economic development within the umbrella of 
the OUA. The group features Mozambique,  Angola and Tanzania  as  leaders.  These  constituted a 
political  front line,  as they were affiliated to the Soviet Union (with the exception of Lesotho and 
Botswana), and eventually a military front line as they supported the insurrection movements against 
South Africa,  thus  becoming  involved in  the  contras  war  against  the  apartheid  government  and, 
indirectly, the U.S.A. (Gervasi, 1984; Olson, 1990; Reader, 1994; Minter, 1998; Anon. (a), 2006)
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collapse of the system in the New South Africa does tell  a great  deal about state 
management. 
In the international  geopolitical  context,  therefore,  the ‘Total  War’  is  inscribed 
into  the  Cold  War  system  of  areas  of  influences.  As  discussed  in  the  previous 
chapter, furthermore, the new wave of African nationalism and independence shared 
the  only  aim  of  ridding  the  continent  from  imperialism  and  racial  segregation 
regimes, with theories that were based on Marxist philosophy and Communist ideals 
of justice and equality26. It does not surprise, therefore, that when in need of financial 
and political support,  the dissident groups and the new independent state would 
turn to either the Soviet Union or China for help in implementing their preaching. 
This allowed the Communist block to create a growing area of influence in Africa, 
thus influencing the bi-polar division of the world, much to the USA dismay. As the 
only  anti  Black-rule  and  anti-communist  country  left  in  Southern  Africa27,  South 
Africa attracted invariably the attention of the USA as a means to halt the spreading 
of Communism in the region, without engaging a direct war. The military support 
through  the  CIA to  the  SADF,  in  the  Reagan  years,  and  the  public  and private 
financing  of  operations  both  on  the  Angolan  and  Mozambican  fronts  increased 
through time,  regardless  of  international  condemnation of  South  African politics. 
After  Reagan,  in  fact,  it  was  the  most  conservative  wing  of  the  Senate  and  the 
Congress  which  privately  sent  money  with  the  help  of  the  CIA28.  Such  great 
contribution also explains how South Africa could continue to thrive economically, 
despite the heavy toll of two wars. 
3.1.3 The Angolan and Mozambican fronts of South Africa
After Rhodesian defeat, therefore, capitalist South Africa was surrounded by new 
majority rule governments, within a communist frame, hosting and supporting the 
26 Reader, 1994, pp. 623 – 630.
27 Malawi was ruled by a Black puppet government, affiliated to the USA, which also contributed to 
South Africa military operation during the war with Mozambique, whereas Swaziland and Lesotho 
were too weak to fight against South Africa (Minter, 1998, pp.152-155, 220 – 252).
28 Minter, 1998, Chapters 1 and 2.
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terrorist movements which were aiming at subverting the establishment. On the east 
front  Mozambique  was  supporting  the  ANC  whereas,  on  the  north  west  front, 
Angola was supporting SWAPO, of Namibia. Three important differences must be 
drawn between Angola and Mozambique, at this stage. 
Firstly,  in  the  independence  fight  against  Portugal,  Angola  had  two  separate 
movements, both referring to a communist cause: FNLA, the National Front (1957), 
and MPLA, the People Movement (1956) for the Liberation of Angola. Only at a later 
stage, FNLA lost power to Unita, a politically independent military movement which 
was funded by Jonathan Savimbi in 1966. Faithful to the African tradition of post-
colonial politics, each party had a different ethnic affiliation, but it was the MPLA 
which came to form a government. Savimbi, then, used Unita to trigger a civil war 
within Angola,  and thanks to his  lack of political  affiliation easily found support 
from South Africa and the USA in the fight against communism. Strategically, in fact, 
Savimbi  wanted power,  the  USA wanted  sympathetic  governments  to  extend its 
political  influence  and  maintain  the  oil  supplies,  and  South  Africa  wanted  to 
maintain its position in the region. The cooperation between the three parties was, 
therefore,  a  win-win-win  situation  in  principle.  Since  the  Second  World  War, 
however, Angola had been very close to Europe and North America, because of the 
oil resources it could provide, and this relation continued even after the soviet-style 
people’s republic was installed after 197629. The USA therefore were on the one hand 
supplying  Unita  with  weapons  and  funds  to  defeat  MPLA,  and  on  the  other 
politically supporting the MPLA official government to maintain oil supplies. On its 
side,  the  Angolan  government  was  politically  affiliated  to  the  Soviet  block,  but 
economically obliging to the capitalists powers. Mozambique, instead, was far from 
the  economic  scene  of  the  Cold  War  and  barely  implied  politically,  because 
FRELIMO took the Marxist turn at its 3rd Congress in 1977, only30. Furthermore, the 
civil war stemmed from the involvement of a foreign country successfully tapping 
29 Minter, 1998.
30 Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 61 – 72.
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into localised discontent and the resulting military group was acquiring consensus 
by terrorising people, more than by proposing a viable government alternative. 
Secondly,  Mozambique  had  the  political  support  from  the  Soviet  Union,  but 
never  a  consistent  financial  or  military  contribution  to  the  war  or  against  the 
droughts and famines, which hit the country since 198131. As a matter of fact, in 1983, 
the  country  was  refused  entrance  in  the  COMECON,  the  Russian  economic 
cooperation agency32.  Angola, instead, managed to get financial contribution from 
Russia and part of the Cuban army regularly on duty along the borders, where the 
South African  contras were dislocated. The centrality of the Angola situation to the 
power-balances of the Cold War and the regional position of South Africa,  which 
was risking of loosing both South West Africa and the war against communism, can 
be inferred from the international involvement in the geopolitics of Southern Africa. 
Furthermore, the suggestion made by Olson that the years 1989-1990 might mark a 
third change in regional geopolitics, due to the relaxation of the USA-USSR relation 
and the foreseen independence of Namibia33, shows that on the Western front people 
were fighting for self-determination along one of the frontiers of the Cold War. The 
difference in type and amount of support received by Angola and Mozambique is 
critical in analysing the two fronts and the South African strategies. Bearing in mind 
that ‘Total war’ was accepted by the Apartheid government only in 1978 with the 
appointment of P.W. Botha as Prime Minister, South Africa had been suffering from 
the  official  embargo  on  weapons  since  197734 and  had  to  define  a  cost-effective 
military strategy which would allow it to maintain a strategic position. As Olson also 
points  out,  the  creation  of  contra-insurrection  groups  composed  of  Angola  and 
Mozambican  nationals,  respectively,  would  allow  South  Africa  to  maintain  a 
detachment from the two  civil wars35. At the same time, however, the SADF could 
focus on more strategic operations in the hotspots, whilst organising logistics for the 
31 Hanlon, 1991.
32 Anon, 2006. 
33 Olson T., 1989, p. 24. 
34 Ibid., p. 20.
35 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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affiliated  groups.  On  the  Angola  front,  in  fact,  the  major  and  most  infamous 
operations, such as the Askari and the Protea occurred. Whereas, considering that 
Mozambique had to rely on its own army, with little contribution from Zimbabwe, 
SADF was mainly concerned with supplying and training RENAMO, from its base at 
Phalaborwa, through the Fifth Reconnaissance Regiment, and patrolling the border, 
with  the  Sixth  Reconnaissance  Regiment,  with  the  important  contribution  of  the 
Rhodesian Selous Scouts36. 
Thirdly, Angola had been engaged in a war knowing exactly who the enemy was, 
thus  allowing  for  more  efficient  tactics.  Despite  having  to  face  a  contras type  of 
conflict, in fact, the number and quality of SA military operations, together with the 
support  given to  Unita,  were  ‘balanced’  by the support  MPLA was getting from 
Cuba in the defence of its own government and the support given to SWAPO of 
South-West Africa. In Mozambique, instead, the situation changed dramatically after 
1984, when the ‘Nkomati Non-Agression Pact’ was signed between the two parties, 
which pledged both sides to prevent "armed bands" from organizing within their respective  
territories37, with reference to RENAMO for South Africa and MK, the ANC armed 
wing for  Mozambique.  The first  four  years  of  the  1980s,  brought  havoc  into  the 
country with the occurrence of two major droughts, with consequential famines, in 
the  rural  areas38.  Because  of  the  destabilisation  perpetrated  by  RENAMO,  which 
focussed on the destruction of  communications,  roads and bridges,  hospitals  and 
other  basic  infrastructure,  it  was  very  difficult  for  the  FRELIMO  government  to 
devise emergency plans to tamper the situation and, by 1984, the country was forced 
to the negotiating table both politically, by adopting politics that were more inclined 
towards the West in the hope of help39, and militarily with the agreement at Nkomati 
36 See Anon. 1996, based on the CIA World Factbook and the Library of Congress Country Studies – 
South Africa. From now on these regiments will be called 5th Recce and 6th Recce. The Selous Scouts 
flag, in fact, was officially standing with the SADF ones at this base, where most of the Rhodesian 
soldiers were taken straight after the Lancaster House agreements, by silent agreement between the 
two countries (Allport, 2007). 
37 Ibid; see also Anon, 2006;  Pinto & Huber, 1985.
38 Hanlon, 2001.
39 Ibid.
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between Presidents Samora Machel and  P.W. Botha. The Agreement, of course, also 
included an economic plan which would help both the South African economy, by 
distributing  exports  with  Mozambique  (thus  avoiding  competition)  and  the 
Mozambican economy, by entering in the sphere of a powerful neighbour40. Finally 
could it be just a coincidence that, after three years of pledges, it was only in 1984 
that Mozambique was granted its first IMF loan and became the largest recipient of 
the U.S. Food Aid Program41?  Nonetheless, whereas Mozambique did respect the 
pacts, South Africa continued its contribution to RENAMO, though to a lesser extent. 
This resulted into an unfair conflict as Mozambique, having lost the support of MK 
guerrillas in the Maputo province, saw the Zimbabwean contribution reduced to the 
Mutware-Beira corridor for the transports of goods between the two countries, whilst 
RENAMO managed from the Gorongosa National Park, its headquarters, to increase 
its  activities  in  the  Gaza,  Inhambane  and  Zambesia  Provinces,  with  excruciating 
violence. The 5th Recce continued to train new RENAMO members and to carry out 
brief  infiltrations across the border,  whereas the 6th Recce was responsible for the 
supplies of goods and weapons. The events, which could have had a positive turnout 
for  both  countries,  instead,  developed  an  unfair  conflict  to  the  detriment  of 
Mozambique, and specifically its southern provinces which could guarantee air and 
land contact with South Africa, whilst the withdrawal of Malawi from supporting 
RENAMO42,  through  the  SADF,  smoothed  the  overall  situation  in  the  northern 
provinces. 
3.1.4 The ‘Total war’ along the Mozambican border
The South African – Mozambican border along the KNP from Pafuri down to the 
Indian  Ocean  was  seldom  theatre  of  important  military  actions  other  than 
reconnaissance trips in the South. However, the permanence of contacts between the 
SADF and RENAMO continued after 1984, thus requiring new strategies for support 
to the Mozambican soldiers.  By this stage,  in fact,  RENAMO had become a fully 
40 Pinto & Huber, 1985.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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Mozambican army, whether by will or by force,  with a separate agenda from the 
South African destabilisation plans. The formation of a solid hierarchical group of 
combatants, in fact,  had prompted aspirations in the future ruling of the country, 
once FRELIMO had been defeated. If on the one hand South Africa had hoped to 
install RENAMO as puppet government and accrue its regional powers, on the other 
hand the RENAMO elite felt ready to respond to such call43. Ironically, therefore, the 
role  played by the Army base of  Phalaborwa became even more strategic  in the 
aftermath  of  the  Nkomati  Agreement,  since  the  contacts  between  SADF  and 
RENAMO had to be carefully planned, and could no longer freely rely on air bridges 
to  the  Gorongosa  National  Park.  In  the  Gaza  Province,  therefore,  RENAMO 
converged in the areas close to the border to intensify contact with South Africa; at 
the same time, in the central areas north-east of the Gorongosa soldiers had to rely on 
looting  from  already  impoverished  villages  which  exasperated  the  situation  to 
actions of sheer cruelty and cannibalism44. 
Although local villagers at Pafuri remember moving location because of the Ian  
Smith’s war45, the presence of SADF military and SAPS along the Limpopo River in 
the  Venda  and  Makuleke  sections  of  the  present-day  Limpopo  province  was 
irrelevant as non-disruptive,  although remnants of their presence are still visible at 
Crooks corner, where they had a semi-permanent camp both before and after 1980. 
Training  camps  for  the  44  Parachute  were  also  carried  out  in  the  area46,  thus 
enforcing  the  idea  that  military  presence  at  the  Pafuri  border  had  become 
increasingly acknowledged since the end of the 1970s and the creation of a border 
post during the ‘Total War’ was but an actual proof of the sensitivity of the area47. On 
43 The lack of  a RENAMO political programme at present (interview with Ms. Paola Rolletta, free-
lance journalist,  media advisor for the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, Maputo), in fact, shows that the party 
has never grown apart from the military targets and objectives it was given by Rhodesia and South 
Africa.
44 Stories of cannibalism perpetrated by RENAMO fighters are widely told in the Provices of 
Inhambane and northern Zambesia in particular, for sources see Newitt, 1994.
45 As referred to by all interviewees in Pafuri, and on many occasions by Simon Chaukwe, elder of 
Dumela.
46 McAleese, 2000.
47 Before 1996, in fact, the UNHCR began repatriation from South Africa, the border was just a military 
post, close to transit (interview with Chief Tshabalala, Pafuri BP, 12 December 2006). 
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the one hand, the traditional social and economic bounds between populations in 
both Zimbabwe and Mozambique, hence the movement of people across the border, 
posed a security threat to South Africa, since any native could have been a potential 
terrorist affiliated to MK. The presence of an area filled with wild animals, far from 
becoming the hoped for buffer zone against illegal migrations, was perceived locally 
as the law-less frontier zone it used to be in the previous century, thus requiring 
systematic  patrolling.  Simultaneously,  the  creation  of  refuge  camps  intensified 
migrations into South Africa and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the security issues 
were also allowing the contacts between SADF and RENAMO, who used the bush as 
a hideaway. 
No  evidence  was  found  during  the  course  of  the  research  of  important 
operations, of the magnitude of URIC/Bootlace, to have been carried out by South 
African troops in the Pafuri area, or in the Gaza Province, other than patrolling and 
supplies.  However,  this is not surprising considering the type of conflict  engaged 
with Mozambique, whereby South Africa’s role was reduced to training and weapon 
supply to RENAMO. Furthermore, South Africa’s direct involvement had to be kept 
particularly  secret  after  the  Nkomati  agreement,  not  to  incur  in  a  breach  of  a 
multilateral agreement brokered by the U.S.A. Within the context of the ‘Total War’ 
engaged by South Africa, therefore, the Mozambican border was only marginal to 
the broader geopolitical context.  However,  it  reconnects  to the discourse of using 
conservation  for  political  geographical  aims,  as  the  KNP  did  facilitate  military 
operations in the sense that it was a problem-free buffer zone, unlike other populated 
areas. Furthermore, it facilitated the extension of the SADF operational territory in 
the Mozambican state. In both cases of the Rhodesian and the South African war, 
therefore, Mozambique lent itself to be a frontier land. 
3.2 THE PEACE PROCESS AND REGIONAL INDEPENDENCE
The  mid  1980s,  despite  the  deceit  of  the  Nkomati  Agreement,  brought  new 
international  political  geographical  conditions  which  contributed  to  smooth  the 
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situation  in  the  region  and  negotiate  the  peace  in  Southern  Africa.  Firstly,  the 
involvement of UN agencies for emergency relief programme and the establishment 
of  organised  refugee  camps  in  South  Africa,  Zimbabwe,  Zambia  and  Tanzania 
contributed to bring to international attention a war which had been avoiding the 
spotlight since its commencement, thus showing on the one hand the incongruences 
of apartheid and on the other the tragedy of what became known as the Mozambican 
civil  war.  At  the  same  time,  international  civil  pressure  on  the  injustices  of  the 
apartheid  regime  gathered  momentum  and  impact  on  both  U.S.A.  and  U.K. 
governmental strategies48.  Secondly, after the closing down of the Reagan era,  the 
tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. were allayed, and the gradual dissents 
of the civil society in the Soviet Block brought winds of change in Eastern Europe, 
thanks to the sensible leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. Thirdly, the moderate civil 
society of South Africa began to protest against apartheid side by side with ANC 
affiliates,  as  Nelson  Mandela  was  praising  for  abandoning  the  armed  fight  and 
resorting to peaceful civil disobedience only. At the end of the Eighties, the whole 
world was changing and this directly impacted on the ‘Total war’ strategy.
3.2.1 The last two years of a decade: international geopolitics and regional  
impact
In 1989 the world witnessed the most meaningful geopolitical event since the end 
of the Second World War: thousands of people dismantled the Berlin Wall, which 
had been separating a continent in the name of political philosophies, and the world 
at a high human cost. As it has been shown, the ‘Total war’ was fully embedded into 
the Cold War scenario, on both fronts, and would possibly not have been happening 
without this  international  context.  The most important  influence on the Southern 
African conflict, however, concerned South Africa only, as with the end of the rivalry 
between the East and the West, the main reasons for the U.S.A. support to Botha’s 
government  were undermined.  In fact,  the only financing sent,  by then, from the 
States was produced by private politicians, not by the government. Therefore, less 
48 Hufbauer et al., 2006.
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funding  meant  less  feasibility  of  carrying  on  a  war  which  most  of  the  citizens, 
regardless of skin colour, were no longer approving. 
In  1989,  President  Botha had a small  heart  failure which prevented him from 
maintaining his position, and F. W. De Klerk was voted as his successor49. De Klerk 
was a dove, which placed him in contrast with the military type of government which 
Botha had been running for over  ten years.  His  political  vision led to  two major 
changes which constituted landmarks in the recent history of the country, and by 
and large to  the region:  the independence  of  Namibia  and the release  of  Nelson 
Mandela,  from  his  prison  in  Franshoek,  Cape  Province,  with  five  other  ANC 
members.
Both events happened in the 1990 but were announced as soon as De Klerk took 
office, thus reinforcing the anti-sanction faction in the West led by President Bush 
senior and P.M. Thatcher50. The progressive disarmament of the Angolan border and 
the loosening of relations with RENAMO were directly imputable to this political 
decisions.  At  this  stage,  however,  as  mentioned  in  the  former  section,  the 
involvement  of  South Africa  was barely  influential,  as  RENAMO had acquired a 
status of its own within the country. Furthermore, on the international scene another 
event influenced South Africa. Despite being strongly supportive of the Angolan war 
because of its interests in oil, the Bush administration had to fight a direct conflict 
thus cutting down on the financing to Savimbi51, and by extension to South Africa. 
Already at the end of 1989, in fact, the First Gulf War was looming over the U.S.A. 
and the Western countries were called to defend Kuwait, a major USA-friendly oil 
reserve in the Middle East. The States military expenditure was expected to soar over 
the next year, and Bush senior could not loose the Angolan oil reserves. Therefore, in 
November 1990, both Russia and the States became directly involved in the peace 
negotiations between Unita and MPLA, and Mozambique indirectly52. A year later, 
49 Minter, 1998, p. 64.
50 Hufbauer et al., 2006.
51 Minter, 1998, p. 68.
52 Ibid.
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the MPLA refuted its Marxist-Leninist approach, which FRELIMO had done in 1990 
already. 
In  1990,  according  to  international  requirements,  FRELIMO  adopted  a  multi-
party  system  based  on  democratic  elections,  so  as  to  eventually  incorporate 
RENAMO as a second political party. This event marked the complete abandonment 
of any soviet-style political ambition and opened up the negotiation table, under the 
aegis of the Roman Catholic  Comunità di Sant’Egidio, which was persuaded by the 
Mozambican government to hold the peace negotiations in Rome. In 1991, the first 
round  of  agreements  allowed  for  the  ceasefire  on  the  Limpopo  and  the  Beira 
corridors.  In  October  1992,  finally,  a  total  ceasefire53 was  agreed  upon  and 
Mozambique began to look at the future. 
At the same time, De Klerk gave a strong signal of the direction South Africa was 
taking with the liberation of  Nelson Mandela.  This  began the peace  negotiations 
between the government and the ANC, including MK. Escalated violence in 1990, 
due to De Klerk’s refusal to consider majority rule and the permanence of apartheid 
regulations in local municipalities, however, did not make the process easy. In the 
same year, in fact, Mandela also threatened to unleash ANC violence through MK, if 
problems did not stop in Natal, where Battalion 32 was also briefly involved, Soweto 
and other problematic areas. The gradual lifting of all sanctions, instead, promoted 
the inclusion of South Africa into the post-Cold War socio-economic system, and in 
1993 De Klerk and Mandela were awarded the Nobel Price for Peace. In 1994, finally, 
South Africa saw its first democratic elections, much to the dismay of all the soldiers 
who went back to civil society in a different world.
3.2.2 South Africa withdraws from the frontier and protects its borders
In  order  to  reach  its  political  strategy,  South  Africa  extended  its  frontier  in 
Mozambique  and  Angola  for  over  a  decade,  with  direct  and  indirect  military 
operations.  Post-apartheid  South  Africa,  instead,  had  to  monitor  what  was 
53 Ibid. pp. 68 – 69.
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happening within its borders and build a nation over a past of racial discrimination. 
Of the possible liberated South Africa scenarios, posited by Davies, the outcome was 
an  attempt  towards  democratisation  based  on  ‘non-racist  socialism’54,  that  could 
manage the country politically and economically under the great  umbrella  of the 
rainbow  nation.  What  is  of  interest  to  this  thesis,  however,  is  the  widespread 
xenophobia which developed in South Africa amongst people of all colours and races 
due to immigration from neighbouring countries. Despite being unable to provide 
for its own citizens, despite the employment quotas set within the frame of the Black 
Empowerment and the failed promises for extended socio-economic rights, in fact, 
South Africa is still wealthier than Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where most of the 
aliens come from55. The paradox of post-apartheid South Africa therefore is that it acts 
as  a  pulling  factor  for  jobseekers  abroad,  whilst  being  unable  to  satisfy  its  own 
citizens  thus  generating  conflict  situations,  particularly  in  the bigger  cities  of  the 
former Transvaal area, where most immigrants concentrate. Studies have suggested 
that the type of migrant has changed during the years, and has conformed with the 
general movements of people imposed by globalisation, to include professionals who 
move around the region and the continent56. In addition, visiting friends and families 
is another reason why people go to South Africa from the region, yet the idea that 
foreigners are the cause of all crimes is instilled in the minds of all South Africans to 
the point of generating violent reactions towards immigrants. 
Social  debates  aside,  the  migrations  are  perceived  by  the  government  as  a 
national  security  threat,  as  it  is  often  impossible  to  control  these  movements, 
particularly in permeable border areas,  hence the need to enforce stricter controls 
without  loosing  credibility  within  the  region,  the  continent  and  the  world.  The 
question, however, was how could the rainbow nation close its door to the people in 
need? The solution to the conundrum lied into finding a way to extend the frontier 
once again, whilst continuing with the politics of regional economic cooperation and 
54 Davies, 1990, pp. 145 – 146.
55 Term borrowed from Whitman, 2000
56 Ibid.
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integration which South Africa supported within the SADC and the AU. Once more, 
the interests  generated by the savannah environment and its endangered wildlife 
provided the perfect solution: by promoting transfrontier conservation and natural 
resource management, in fact, there would be the need for serious border patrol in all 
countries  involved  in  order  to  halt  poaching  and  create  a  safe  environment  for 
tourists.  Furthermore,  the  removal  of  population  along  borders  areas  to  create 
protected areas would extend the frontier zone between the countries that would be 
more difficult to cross because of wildlife and policing.
Without creating a cause-effect scenario, therefore, it is relevant to point out that 
the implementation of TFCA in post-apartheid South Africa would serve the security 
objective on the one hand, and the economic objective on the other by promoting 
Southern Africa as a peaceful area, where freedom is enjoyed by all, at last.
3.3 PERMEABLE BORDERS IN EAST SOUTHERN AFRICA
The  previous  sections  have  presented  the  historical  events  leading  to  self-
determination  of  Southern  African  countries,  within  a  regional  and  international 
geopolitical context. By now, it is clear that South Africa always played a key role, 
since colonial times,  in shaping the political and economical future of the region. 
Furthermore,  the international  politicisation of  anti-apartheid movements and the 
appointment  of  Nelson Mandela  as  the personification of  African nationalism, as 
posited by Fanon57,  have contributed to create an image of the country as an ‘all 
welcoming’ place embodying the new and successful liberated Africa. Of course, the 
level  of  political  stability  and  development  of  post-apartheid  South  Africa  is 
comparably higher than in the rest of the region, particularly in respect with Angola 
and  Zimbabwe,  for  great  political  instability,  and  Mozambique  and  Malawi,  for 
poverty and unemployment. However, the socio-economic issues the ANC had to 
address once in power were clearly beyond their managerial limits, as the country is 
experiencing (1) lack of local development, (2) failure to deliver effective health and 
57 See Chapter 2, section 3.2, Fanon envisaged armed struggle, alongside political action to reach full 
independence from Imperial powers (Seidman, 2004) 
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sanitation measures, (3) soaring crime rates, which could even impact on the choice 
of  South  Africa  as  the  host  country  of  the  2010  Football  World  Cup,  as  the 
government  is  failing  to  actively  solve  the  situation58,  (4)  a  consistent  breach  in 
human rights both socio-economic and political. Migrations from the SADC region, 
in the form of jobseekers, refugees and potential criminals, furthermore is worsening 
the relation between the people and their government, in that xenophobia is a cross-
cultural  and  cross-social  feeling  which  is  not  being  addressed.  But,  it  must  be 
stresses, the border separating South Africa from the rest of the region was never a 
strong one.
Borrowing from the geographical approach followed by Bukowczyk et al. (2005) 
in  their  study  of  the  U.S.-Canadian  permeable  border,  this  section  will  aim  at 
explaining the migrations patterns of the region, with a special focus on the South 
Africa-Mozambique-Zimbabwe  border  by  illustrating  the  regional  human 
geography,  in  a  historical  perspective,  the  ‘pull’  factors  exercised  by  extensive 
farming and mining, the ‘push’ factors caused by regional wars and conflicts, as well 
as the conflict situations South Africa is experiencing at present due to the permanent 
influxes of people both legally and informally.
3.3.1 The Limpopo River: a natural border or a cradle for settlements?
In the descriptive section about borders, it was stated that African borders drawn 
in Europe use natural landmark to define a territory, but this does not necessarily 
acknowledge the population patterns of the area. Being Africa, specifically the desert 
and  the  lowveld areas,  a  particularly  dry  place  in  relation  to  Europe,  water  is  a 
precious  resource  and people tend to settle  close-by it.  The catchment basin of  a 
River  therefore  becomes  a  natural  enclosure  for  settlements,  and  the  River  a 
58 The new USA Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. Eric Bost, has expressed his concerns over security 
issues with regards to the 2010 World Cup, considering the high rates of crime throughout the country 
and the governmental failure to address the situation (Anon, 2006b). Mr. Charles Nkagula, the Safety 
and Security Minister addressed the South African Parliament on soaring crime rates and popular 
concern by saying  that ‘they can continue to winge until they are blue in the face, they can continue to 
be as negative as they want to, or they can simply leave this country’ (ENews, South African television 
channel,  the  footage  is  available  online  at  http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=C2QK1PBZo5Y&mode=related&search=, added on the 25th October 2006)
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landmark of unification instead of a barrier. The settlement pattern on both sides of a 
River, in this view, simply defines a clan separation within the same ethnicity and 
follows the land use of agro-pastoral societies, which place agriculture and grazing 
land on the River bank to simplify irrigation schemes.  
Map 3.13 Land formations of the Limpopo River basin (Source: ARC-LNR & IWMI, 2003)
The Limpopo River  basin,  separating  Botswana,  South  Africa,  Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique (in a west to east direction), boasts a catchment area of about 413,000 
Km2 hosting a population of 14 millions59.  This population belongs to the Congo-
Niger  Bantu  speaking  group,  but  is  divided  into  three  main  ethnicities  (Sotho-
Tswana,  Nguni  and Venda),  whose location and affiliation has  changed over  the 
years.  Considering  the  wealth  in  natural  resources,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
Limpopo  basin  saw the  raise  of  two  main  civilisations  of  the  African  Iron  Age: 
Mapungubwe,  at  the  conjunction  between  the  Sashe  and  the  Limpopo  Rivers 
(Botswana - South Africa - Zimbabwe), and Thulamela, just a few kilometres south of 
the conjunction between the Luvuhvu and the Limpopo Rivers. These civilisations 
thrived between 500 AD, with the first settlements at Mapungubwe, and 1000 AD 
with Thulamela60.  Furthermore,  findings  at  these sites  demonstrate  not  only   the 
natives’  ability  to  manipulate  metals,  including  gold,  and  to  carve  River  shells, 
59 ARC-LNR & IWMI, 2003. 
60 The third great civilization was, of course, the kingdom of Monomotapa at Great Zimbabwe.
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ostrich egg shells, ivory, bones and wood, but also the existence of a trade network 
linking  the  inland areas  with  the  coast,  as  proven by the  discoveries  of  Chinese 
porcelain and glass beads61. The presence of precious minerals, such as gold, in fact, 
provided the best  exchange currency  until  the  increase  in  demand of  a  different 
resource changed livelihoods and migration patterns in the area: slaves. Practiced by 
the  Arab  since  750  AD,  the  slave  trade  never  reached  the  numbers  required  by 
Europe and the Americas from the XVI century onwards62, despite official bans.
Considering  the  livelihoods  necessities  imposed  by  a  harsh  environment, 
therefore,  it  seems  clear  that  there  was  a  major  misunderstanding  as  for  the 
definition of frontier between the natives and the Europeans, who applied their geo-
political construct in the division of the continent. As it was the case for all major 
African Rivers,  the Limpopo was a catalyser of human settlement and activities63. 
Dwellings, in fact, might have occurred on each side of the River, but these were not 
comparable  to  the village polity as  we know it,  and posited it,  in Europe.  These 
settlements were  kraals headed by a military chief or an  Induna (elder, also chief in 
Tsonga), and hosted his extended family, including slaves64. Each kraal was under 
the leadership of a common chief, therefore all kraals were administered by a single 
person  and  its  councillors.  The  Shona  kingdom,  for  example,  was  ruled  by  the 
Monomotapa, but extended for kilometres in all directions from the area now known 
as Great Zimbabwe (the administrative and religious centre). This explanation helps 
to place the human geography of the Limpopo basin in an African political context, 
which differs from the traditional European administrative divisions, whilst being 
comparable  to  medieval  polities.  The  River,  therefore,  was  never  interpreted  in 
African tradition as a barrier between people, but a place where people could live 
61 Visit to Thulamela archeological site, with KNP ranger and guide, 12th December 2006.
62 Withman, 2000, p.12; Reader, 1994, symbolically in Chapter 28, Merrie Africa, and in the following 
chapters.
63 The field research of Mpofu  et al., 1999, also confirms this theory by stating that from the group 
discussions carried out in Sengwe Communal emerged that water attracted the first settlers because of 
direct and in direct benfist, such as the River basin vegetations and the good soils.
64 As Reader,  1994,  points  out  the  practice  of  having  slaves  was  always  in  use  in  Africa.  In  the 
traditional society, however, slave were subject to a family after  their population had been conquered 
and could aspire to become free subjects.
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and thrive, notwithstanding the presence of wildlife threatening both human beings 
and crops. The African frontiers were not visible as land marks, but were indicated 
by barren areas where no people could live. 
3.3.2 Migration Patterns in the Limpopo River Basin: needs and traditions
The western side of the River basin was part of the cyclical migration territory of 
the Khoisan populations, who now are split between hunters gatherers in the Namib 
and  the  Kalahari  desert  and  sheep-herders  in  Namaqualand,  but  once  formed  a 
distinct language group: the !Kung. Having acknowledged that both the !Kung and 
the Niger-Congo Bantu are two of the four most ancient languages in the world (the 
two others being the Nilo-Saharan of the Maasai and the Afro-Asiatic of Ethiopia), it 
is worth noting that to speak one of [the Khoisan languages] fluently is to exploit human 
phonetic ability to the full65. The typical Khoi sound obtained by the clicking the tongue 
on the palate has been incorporated in the majority of Congo-Niger Bantu languages 
in South Africa, thus providing more information on the order of arrival of the Bantu 
speakers in the area and the degree of contact and assimilation with the Khoisan66. 
Contacts,  in  fact,  could  not  be  avoided  as  the  Khoisan  were  the  first  people  to 
establish a cyclical migration pattern from Southern Zimbabwe to the Cape Coast.
The second migration pattern  was formed by the arrival  of  first  Niger-Congo 
Bantu speakers67, from the area now spamming South Nigeria and Cameroon, and 
their  ‘colonisation’  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa68.  These  ‘people’  settled  in  the  area 
included within present-day South Africa, to the west, and Tanzania, to the East, and 
generated various ethnic groups which had an undeniable impact on the population 
patterns of the area. The first classification of the Bantu groups was published in four 
volumes  by  Malcom  Guthrie,  between  1967  and  1971.  Guthrie  produced  both  a 
65 Ruhlen in Ross, p. 71, and in Robert Wright, p. 67, as quoted in Reader, 1994, p. 107.
66 Johnston, 1973, differentiates Nguni languages in terms of permanence in the area, by the influential 
click of the tongue, typical of original South African languages.
67 The  term Bantu  was  created  by  the  German philologist  Wilhelm  Bleek  to  describe  a  group of 
languages amongst which the word-stem ntu, meaning some thing or person, is universal [and the] prefix ba 
denotes the plural, so literally ba-ntu means ‘people’ , see Reader, 1994 p. 176 (underlined words indicate 
Italics in the original).
68 Reader, 1994, pp. 175 – 178; see also map in Attachment 4.
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genetic  classification  and  attempted  to  reconstruct  the  Proto-Bantu,  that  is  the 
common  language  shared  by  a  very  heterogeneous  group  of  people.  The  most 
succinct and recent operation of classification, however, has been compiled by Jouni 
Filip Maho69, and shows the ethnic affiliation of each language group from Rwanda 
to  the  Cape,  thus  contributing  to  the  historical  understanding  of  forced  and 
traditional migration patterns within the Bantu. 
In so far as the Limpopo basin is concerned, one anomaly is worth mentioning, 
though, and that is the absence from all three classifications of Shangaana, the Nguni 
language brought to the area by Soshangane, the Zulu general who occupied the 
actual Gaza Province in Mozambique. In all publications,  Shangaana is associated 
with Tsonga, but a historical explanation of affiliation is never provided70. As both 
Tsonga and Ndebele are present in the three classifications structured by Maho71, and 
both languages pertain to the history of the Pafuri area, it would be consequential to 
suggest  that  the  Tsonga  language  represents  the  Shangaan  and  not  vice  versa. 
Therefore, the population in Sengwe and Gaza, self-defined Shangaana, should be 
Tsonga speakers,  whose first  leader  was Shoshangane.  Consequentially,  the term 
Shangaana  should  simply  indicate  the  historical  origin  of  this  group,  not  its 
language72.  Furthermore,  the  Ndebele  people  are  often  associated  to  the  eastern 
section of Zimbabwe, which is not correct if we agree with Etherington’s study on 
African  cartography73 and historical  events.  The history of  both the Ndebele  and 
Shangaana group, in fact, may be seen as emblematic of motives and occurrences of 
migrations in Southern Africa. 
69 Maho, 2002, the relevant pages from the Guthrie classification is found in Attachment 5. 
70 Connor, 2003; Wolmer et al., 2003; Jeater, 2001;  Johnston, 1973.
71 Maho, 2002.
72 On this subject, more information is required to understand if Shoshangane was given to Manicusse 
as a name upon his arrival in Mozambique, or rather if  Shoshangane gave the name to its people and 
the River Changana, running through the Gaza Province.
73 Etherington, 2004, conducted a study on the false information provided by cartography based on 
missionaries and first explorations and printed up until the 1850. As used by modern researchers, they 
provided a skewed image of historical human geographical patterns in the Limpopo River basin.
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The third migration pattern was established by a well  known historical event, 
Shaka Zulu’s mfecane (the crushing). The Zulu settled in present day Kwa-Zulu Natal 
are part of the Nguni linguistic group (which extends through Mozambique all the 
way to  Malawi)  and the  makers  of  XIX  century  history  of  Southern  Africa.  The 
climax of the Zulu kingdom was reached under Shaka, the illegitimate son of the 
previous king Dingiswayo, because born out of his illicit affair with Princess Nandi 
kaBebe, a relative from the eLangeni clan74. Shaka was a despot whose strength in 
fighting and brightness in military strategy allowed him to conquer, within the first 
two  years  of  his  reign,  fifty  (50)  neighbouring  independent  kingdoms  with  the 
exception of the Basotho, whose king Morena Moshoeshoe -  the African Socrates75 - 
managed  to  maintain  amicable  relations76.  At  one  stage,  however,  his  strategy 
became fury and that is when the big migrations towards the north and away from 
coastal  areas  began.  Du  Preez  places  the  beginning  of  Shaka’s  crushing  at  the 
moment his beloved mother died77.  However, this explanation seems rather naïve 
when looking at what was happening around the kingdom in the early XIX century, 
that  is  the  intensification  of  the  slave  trade  around  Delagoa  Bay,  where  the 
Portuguese fort was built. Within the first half of the 1820s, it is known that one of 
Shaka’s general had left because threatened by his king. Mzilikazi migrated north 
with kraal, and in line with Nguni traditions he conquered all the groups he met on 
the way, eventually settling around the Magaliesberg mountains north of  current 
Pretoria. The Tswana gave him and his people the name of Matabele, a general term 
to indicate people coming from the South East. However, faithful to the tradition of 
vassal relationship and military conquest, Mzilikazi and his people moved north and 
crossed the Limpopo River, thus entering the Shona kingdom of Monomotapa78. The 
74 Du Preez, 2004, pp. 93 – 109. The eLangeni clan was an Nguni clan, occupying part of present day 
KwaZulu Natal,  together  with  other  clans  such  as  the Zulus who,  at  the  time,  were just  a  small 
community.
75 Ibid. pp. 43 – 56. 
76 Ibid., p. 105-106.
77 Du Preez, 2004, pp. 93 – 109 and Walter, 1966. Both authors discuss Shaka’s mental insanity,  Du 
Preez dedicates a whole chapter to a theory which seems plausible,  but possibly secondary to the 
lucrative slave trade perpetrated from Delagoa Bay, Maputo.
78 Etherington, 2004.
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Shona were gradually defeated and confined to the northern sections of present-day 
Zimbabwe, as well as stripped of their status as a military power. After 1840, when 
Matabeleland was formed, the term indicated Mzilikazi’s kingdom only. The name 
was later changed to Ndebele,  artificial  Zulu, which bears no meaning yet is still 
used to indicate the ethnicity79. 
The fourth migration pattern can be identified with the finalising of settlements in 
South Africa. The need to employ workers for extensive agriculture, first, and the 
mines,  second,  forced  settlers  to  look  everywhere  for  workers,  to  the  point  of 
engaging in agreements with local chiefs for the supply of labour. Prisoners of tribal 
conflicts, which traditionally would be slaves, could therefore be sold to the settler, 
or  the slave  traders  on the  coast.  Towards the end of  the XIX century,  with  the 
growth of the Kimberly mines, the beginning of gold mining Witwatersrand, and the 
implementation  of  the  agricultural  production  to  supply  the  increased  food 
demand80, provoked a sudden need for unskilled workers that were not expensive 
and, above all,  not regulated.  Native population again supplied the demand, and 
within less than a year of the opening of the mines, every black society south of the Zambesi,  
with the exception only of the Venda and the Zulu, was represented in the diamond fields,  
whether  by  independent  businessmen,  artisans,  or  labourers81.  Of  course,  the 
understanding of employment by native population was derived from decades of 
direct economic deals with Europeans, which taught them that money or precious 
minerals (gold) and stones (diamonds) were the best exchange currency to buy food, 
cows and and weapons, thus improving their status and strength back home. The 
years of the cowry shells were over82, and settlers soon realised that native people 
might  have  been  cheap  labour  but  needed  to  be  checked  thoroughly  to  avoid 
stealing.  In  1872,  a  Government  Notice  established  that  all  workers  had  to  be 
employed for at least three months, and had to register upon arrival, hence received 
79 See Beach, 1974.
80 Whitman, 2000, pp. 13 – 15. 
81 Reader, 1994, p. 499, with reference to the Kimberly mines.
82 The first ‘currency’ used in Africa in transactions between natives and foreigners, still used in 
African jewellery and artefacts for decoration. (Reader, 1994, pp. 383 – 390, and field work)
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an  entry  pass  and  required  an  exit  pass  to  leave83.  This  thinking  resulted  in 
‘concentration camp’ style of settings, which De Beers invented and still uses in its 
most productive mines84.  Work conditions aside,  the monopolisation of Kimberly, 
and the acquisition of the Witwatersrand mines after the Anglo-Boer war, led to the 
creation of a  system for the recruitment  of  workers  which was supported by the 
national government to avoid touts, operating individually: WENELA/TEBA85. This 
migration  pattern,  therefore,  is  related  to  the  economic  growth  of  South  Africa, 
through natural resources, and initiated as a spontaneous movement yet developed 
into a channeled migration due to the disruption of traditional livelihood strategies 
and the increased perception of money to acquire wealth and status, as well as to pay 
the hut tax, implying a Westernisation of customs. 
To  conclude,  for  the  purpose  of  this  research  the  massive  forced  migration 
provoked  by  the  Atlantic  slave  trade  will  not  be  considered  because  it  involves 
frontiers and border perception only in so far as slaves were acquired inland through 
territorial  conquest.  However,  towards the end of  the XIX century,  the economic 
patterns of the native societies had been so transformed by Europeans desire for land 
that the slave trade was perpetrated only by those who did not belong to any societal 
group.  Slavery,  in fact,  became a threat  to all  populations,  and the inland forced 
migration from the area of provenance to the coast, does not impact on the migration 
patterns envisaged in this research to understand the porosity of Southern African 
borders. 
3.3.3 Modern migrations across a permeable border
Movements  of  people  were  never  sporadic  events  in  Southern  Africa  history, 
rather  they  were  the  most  feasible  solution  to  overcame  social  and  natural 
83 Reader, 1994, views this act as the first legal foundation of the apartheid system (pp. 502 –503). 
84 With the arrival of Cecil Rhodes on the Kimberly mines, all concession owners were bought out and 
the De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd was funded to acquire the monopoly of the area. From this 
moment on, tight regulations on workers began and resulted in the creation of fenced villages for 
workers, who were checked thoroughly on their way in and out to avoid theft (Reader, 1994, 504 – 
511).  
85 Ibid; Whitman, 2000; Crush, 2000; Koch et al., 1995, p. 127;  and Bulpin, 1954
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constraints. In time, however, migrations changed in direction and cause: with the 
exclusion of the Nguni southward migration, the first big waves was the difecane, the 
scattering  which  involved  former  Zulu  generals  and the  populations  crushed  by 
Zulu power, in south to north direction. As a consequence of social conflict, migrants 
could be considered refugees in search for a suitable land to settle, and since the land 
was already scarce due to the growing number of white settlements,  the refugees 
replicated Shaka’s  polity and subjugated the defeated groups,  as  was the case of 
Mzilikazi in the north, and Soshangane in the east. The second big wave was the 
north to  south movement  caused by the opening of  the mines and the increased 
poverty  or  rural  populations,  which  follows  a  typical  core-periphery  pattern, 
exercised  by  pushing  factors  (poverty)  and  pulling  factors  (employment  and 
money)86. This pattern is still very much present today, and despite attempts have 
been made to regulate  the influx of  people into South Africa,  with TEBA for the 
mines,  as well  as border patrols and post for general movements,  the border still 
proves to be very permeable. 
The causes for this perception are to be found firstly in history, as mentioned 
above.  What  Europeans  consider  a  border,  the  River  or  a  higher  mountain,  the 
Africans  consider  a  resource  and  a  safe  place  for  settling.  Both  Thulamela  and 
Mapumgubwe, in fact, were built on the higher hills, close to a River. Secondly, the 
waves of  difecane have generated not only migrations,  but  new relations between 
groups who shared the same area. Both the kingdoms of Mzilikazi and Soshangane, 
for instance, ended up in the Limpopo River basin, despite having taken different 
roads when leaving Shaka. Having incorporated other tribes on the way, the familiar 
Zulu-Nguni bond in the language was again a unifying factor, as proven by the fact 
that Tsonga (spoken by Soshangane people) is more similar to ‘Ndebele,  which is 
86 Lubkemann (2005) also suggests labour migrations into South Africa as a disengagement from the 
war,  both the Luzo-Gaza and the RENAMO wars:  a  typical  popular  reaction to very violent  and 
fragmented wars. As a form of passive resistance, moreover, Roesch suggests that migration was also 
a means to escape the harshness of Portuguese colonial practices particularly in the colonados (Roesch, 
1991 and 1992). 
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spoken  in  Zimbabwe  and  South  Africa,  than  to  Ronga87,  spoken  in  the  Maputo 
Province, separating Soshangane’s Gaza88 from Shaka’s Zululand.  Furthermore, the 
two border wars between Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa, contributed to 
strengthen  the  social  relations  of  local  populations,  with  the  creation  of  refugee 
camps for Mozambican in the areas where familiar bonds were traditionally strong. 
What the war sought to separate and hinder, i.e. the illegal migrations of people from 
and into the three countries, the war itself has later united and helped, by threatening 
the lives of border communities. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that for many people border crossing is perceived 
more as a stroll across a dangerous River (because of crocodiles) and a dangerous 
bush (because of wild animals), since these impediments have always been part of 
rural survival strategy. The presence of police officers and parks officials, instead, is 
perceived  as  a  threat  because  of  the  subsequent  punishment,  be  it  jail  or  the 
confiscation of all his/her goods. However, as both bibliographical and field research 
show, the movements  continue when the poverty strikes very hard as a pushing 
factor,  and the big South African cities  still  attract  people in need or wanting to 
improve  their  lives,  which  is  a  major  pulling  factor.  Despite  internal  problems, 
therefore, South Africa becomes the economic core of the region, with Mozambicans 
preferring to risk their lives jumping across the border at Pafuri, rather than looking 
for work in Maputo89. The pre-existence of familiar connections in South Africa both 
87 Ronga language belongs to the  Tswa-Ronga group, and it  is  intelligible with Tsonga mainly in 
greetings  and  basic  daily  descriptions  with  some  important  differences,  in  terms  of  word  use. 
(Fieldwork)
88 Unlike  most  areas  which  are  named  after  the  ethnic  group  which  occupies  it,  the  name  of 
Shoshangane  Empire,  Gaza,  was  bestowed  by  Shoshangane  in  honour  of  his  grandfather.  This 
information was sought after in secondary sources and with primary data collection but was found 
only in Beach, 1974.
89 The field work, both in Pafuri and South Africa shows that Mozambicans from as far as Inhambane 
(the tourism capital of the Gaza Province) travel one thousand kilometres to reach Pafuri and cross, 
instead of going to Maputo and cross at Ressano Garcia, if South Africa proves to be the only solution. 
Furthermore,  the  former  Ganzakulo  area  (prevalence  of  Tsonga-Ndebele  speakers  from  the 
Soshangane and Makuleke groups) is still attracting young Mozambican workers from the villages 
along the Limpopo River on the Chókwe-Chiqualaquala road, possibly crossing both the Limpopo 
and Kruger parks to reach Giyani (the main city) as the crow flies. (Giyani, Dec. 2006; Pafuri, Sept. and 
Dec. 2006).
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in Witwatersrand and in the Limpopo Province, of course, contributed greatly to the 
migrations. 
The development of the manufacturing sector, alongside the increase in mining 
and agricultural activities, provided an image of South Africa as a land of plenty, and 
attracted regime hundreds  of  thousands of  people from countries  as  far north as 
Congo, despite the apartheid. In an estimate provided by Whitman, in 1964 there 
were some 497,000 legal migrant workers,  half  of whom were employed through 
TEBA90. To this number, however,  border jumpers must be added, considering it is a 
common practice along the Limpopo River in the trait along the Zimbabwean and 
Mozambican border.  In  the case of  Mozambique,  particularly,  they do not  speak 
English,  only  Tsonga  or  other  local  languages,  and  Funnagalo,  learnt  from their 
fathers  or  relatives  who  worked  in  the  mines.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  among  the 
interviewees in Dumela, one boy had been working as a gardener in South Africa for 
years, had a South African ID card, and spoke Tsonga and Afrikaans only, whereas 
his mother who was born in Xai Xai and was a house keeper at the Pafuri border, 
was  fluent  in  Portuguese  and  Tsonga  (Dumela,  Sept.  2006).  Modern  migrations, 
therefore, have a tendency to disrupt state affiliations, in terms of both language and 
culture, whilst maintaining intact the traditional inter-group relations. 
3.3.4 The informal sector across permeable borders
Through the years, the legal and illegal migrations escalated, particularly in so far 
as neighbouring countries are concerned, namely Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe. This generated two by-products, again derived by the proximity of 
an economic core: illegal and informal cross-border trading. The informal sector is 
symptomatic of a developing country undergoing the transition from a traditional to 
a modern economy, as stated by Mhone91. In the light of field experience, however, it 
could be argued that the informal sector can signal a stall in the national economy of 
a  developing  country,  to  which  people  react  by  either  selling  their  produces  or 
90 Whitman, 2000.
91 Mhone, 1996, introductory chapter. 
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manufactures,  or  selling  goods  available  on  a  nearby  market.  Therefore,  to  have 
relatives in South Africa for Mozambicans and Zimbabwean in Pafuri, or simply to 
have a car and petty cash for an initial investment in Matabeleland South, means to 
have the opportunity to go to South Africa, buy the most required goods and sell 
them across the border with a mark-up. Visiting Musina, on the only border between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, or Nelspruit, a few kilometres away from the Ressano 
Garcia commercial border with Mozambique, on a weekend,  one can observe the 
amount of cars with a Zimbabwean and Mozambican number plate,  respectively, 
loaded with food and other necessities ready to get their VAT back and cross home92. 
Even if most of this ‘one-day’ border shoppers93 had valid documentation, the law is 
still against some of them in the regulation of types and quantities of non-taxable 
goods in the country of provenance. The strictness of the law, of course, is applied 
only in so far as the officers can benefit from it, thus triggering illegality, as goods are 
‘paid  out’  to  an officer  in  kind or  without   a  receipt  for  the fine.  The degree  of 
corruption  amongst  government  officers  in  Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe,  unlike 
other  wealthier  countries,  is  both  structural  (as  the  salary  corresponds  to  the 
minimum salary by-law and there are no benefits) and contingent, since officers are 
in  some cases  living in  remote  areas  without  contact  with  the  rest  of  the world. 
Pafuri,  for  instance,  exemplifies  this  situation.  The  standards  of  living offered  to 
South African officials are definitely higher than their Mozambican counterparts’, in 
that they have (1) houses with running and drinkable water, (2) satellite TV, phone 
lines and (3) cars. On the Mozambican side, instead, government officers have no 
electricity, the lodgings are very basic, no officer has a car, and there is not a phone 
line. Furthermore, the only spaza shop in the village closed down, so the government 
representatives have to rely on those regular border crossers (and the SA police, of 
course) to obtain basic food and necessities94. Such exchange of favours could and 
92 Alongide people with a small  car,  it  is  very common to find people on foot  waiting  for public 
transport and walking. (Field work: Pafuri,  March and May 2005; September and December, 2006; 
Musina, September 2006; Ressano Garcia, August 2005 – September 2006)
93 Defined in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, pp. 117 – 122 
94 I was given a shopping list every time I was going to South Africa with provisions to bring back for 
the chief officers, who also grow a vegetable garden behind the immigration offices. Like me, many 
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does  generate  a  form  of  structural corruption,  in  the  sense  that  by  bringing 
necessities, traders are less checked for permits, licensing and so forth. However, a 
line should be drawn according to the context,  in the sense that  the lacks of  the 
government are tampered by contingency. This, of course, contributes to strengthen 
bonds  that  are  beyond  the  state  affiliation,  and  enter  the  sphere  of  traditional 
community ethics, opening a wide gap between patriotism and human relations. 
Alongside the informal trade, of course, there exists a vast amount of illegal trade, 
particularly  in  weapons,  cars,  alcohol95 and luxury  goods  (for  instance,  the  solar 
panels  used by the Pafuri  administrator came from South Africa  at  a  time when 
several solar panels disappeared from the KNP: most were recovered96). The controls 
on cars  at  the three  border  posts  with  Mozambique are very tough because  it  is 
logically considered that criminals would prefer to use trails  and untarred roads, 
rather than national and toll roads, which are permanently patrolled by the Police. At 
Giriyondo  and  Pafuri,  therefore,  the  Police  takes  extra  time  in  controlling  new 
comers  for  car  contents  and  engine  numbers.  After  the  SADC decision  to  allow 
regional  movements  of  people  without  visas,  the  criminal  cross-border  activities 
have intensified,  even at  Ressano Garcia,  which resulted  in higher  crime rates  in 
Maputo  and  tourist  locations97.   This  trade,  of  course,  is  neither  condoned  nor 
facilitated by officers both at Giriyondo and Pafuri. 
Migrations in the past have favoured contact between people of different groups, 
resulting also in supports  to  the self-determination struggle in  South Africa98.  At 
others bring back the shopping without asking to be paid back, particularly those who need a break 
on taxes on the imports and on the visa permits. (Pafuri, Sept. and Dec. 2006)
95 Crush, 2000, gives a detailed explanation of the phenomenon, resulting in the establishment of 
border posts with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland for the first time in the early 1960s (pp. 17 – 19). 
96 Conversation with the former administrator of Pafuri (March 2005) and with Dr. B. Swanepoel of the 
LNP conservation and security unit (December 2005)
97 In the last six months of 2006, in fact, Maputo has seen a steady increase in armed robberies on 
pedestrians and in houses, rapes and car theft with the traditional South African method, of following 
the victim home and attack at the house gate with guns. Many have been killed or severely injured, 
but local newspapers are reticent in publishing news, only  Savanna, the independent weekly paper, 
has mentioned the occurrences. Furthermore, an arsenal of small weapons have been found in the 
house of an identified robber in Marracuene, Maputo Province, all of South African provenance. (Field 
work: Maputo, 2005-2006).
98 Whitman, 2000, Introduction.
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present,  however,  there  is  a  clear  cut  difference  between  migrants  and  informal 
traders from rural areas, and criminals. Nonetheless, the South Africa perception of 
assimilating all  migrants  as  aliens,  only  exacerbates  conflicts,  without  solving the 
problem of cross-border criminality.
3.4 SUPPORTING MIGRATIONS IN THE GREAT LIMPOPO TFCA?
As part  of  the Transfrontier  Conservation strategies  implemented in  Southern 
Africa  at  the  turn  of  the  last  century,  with  the  coordination  and  funding  of 
international organisations such as the WB, through the GEF fund, the WWF, the 
IUCN, through the locally-based Peace Park Foundation, the Great Limpopo Peace 
Park  and  TFCA is  the  biggest  project  in  the  world  encompassing  three  national 
parks, via an ecological corridor, and enclosing a wide conservation area, as a buffer 
zone. A further extension of the project includes the Banhine and Zinave National 
Parks, in Mozambique, with unique environmental features, such as wetlands both 
inland and along coastal areas. As a follow up from the last section of Chapter 2, this 
section  will  present  the  GLTFCA  in  terms  of  historical  development  and  the 
objectives  set  in  the  establishing treaty.  Finally  it  will  discuss  the  issue  of  cross-
border movements and migrations, thus explaining that on top of the protection of 
nature,  there is  a hidden agenda regarding border  security  which will  eventually 
impair the transfrontier cultural bonds of border communities. 
3.4.1 From GKGTFCA to GLTFCA: a history of names and place
This  project  was  first  known  as  the  Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou  TFP,  from  the 
names of the two parks in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and from the name of the 
province in Mozambique. Gaza, in fact, defines the territory funded as a result of the 
mfecane by  Shoshangane (also  known as  Manicusse)  until  his  grandson and new 
emperor, Ngungunhane, was defeated and captured by the Portuguese army on 28th 
December  1895.  Originally  the  Gaza  empire  extended  from  the  Limpopo  to  the 
Zambezi  and  the  capital  was  near  present  day  Chimoio,  hence  implying  the 
subjugation of  over  200 local  groups by Soshangane and his  generals.  Following 
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traditional Political Geography, therefore, the TFP should rightfully encompass both 
Banhine and Zinave, reuniting the old Gaza kingdom. It is really because of cultural 
heritage,  however,  that  the name was changed into Great  Limpopo in 2004,  thus 
shifting the focus from the human to the physical geography, also foreseeing the 
possible unification with the Limpopo-Sashe TFCA. The main reasons behind this 
decision, however, are (1) the presence on the territory of communities who do not 
belong to the Gaza – Shangaan group, such as Venda99, and (2) the desire amongst 
the South African Tsonga speakers in the former Gazankulo Bantustan100 to get rid of 
their Mozambican origin and of the memories of apartheid political and geographical 
divisions (Source: conversation with Mr. S. Chaukwe and Chief Muklave, Dumela, 
May 2006).  
The GKG began to be talked about in 1997, a few years after the end of apartheid 
in South Africa, and the settling of post-civil war Mozambique, and after three years 
of project planning and fundraising (as shown by Map 3.5). The tri-nation treaty was 
signed on 9th December  2002,  in Xai-xai,  Gaza Province,  under  the new name of 
GLTFP. The inauguration of the GLTFP saw the presence of the two main political 
and economic drives for the creation of  the Park:  Pres.  Nelson Mandela and Mr. 
Anton  Rupert,  with  Pres.  Joaquim  Chissano  for  Mozambique  and  Pres.  Robert 
Mugabe for Zimbabwe. Five years on, the only survivor of that first treaty is Pres. 
Mugabe,  whose  involvement  with  the  TFCA project  has  been  decreasing,  almost 
jeopardising the rotation of the management and the inauguration of the Giriyondo 
Border Post, which was delayed by more than a semester. 
99 See official website - http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?mid=164&pid=147&m=1_5_3
100 The Bantustan (Bantu = people; stan = land of) were tribal reserves for Black natives enforced from 
1951,  as  part  of  the  racial  segregation  policy,  with  the  ultimate  goal  of  refusing  South  African 
citizenship to any black person, because Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated  
in  some  independent  new state  in  this  honourable  way  and there  will  no  longer  be  an  obligation  on  this  
Parliament  to  accommodate  these  people  politically (Ms.  C.  Mulder,  Minister  of  Plural  Relations  and 
Development, addressig the House of Assembly, on 7th February 1978, in MacDonald, 2006, p.5). Four 
Bantustans acquired administrative independence since 1976 (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and 
Ciskei) whereas KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa were only awarded partial autonomy. Gazankulo 
never received independence.   
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Map 3.14: The first map ever of the GKG TFCA (Source: The Peace Park Foundation, 2006)101
The  political,  economical  and  social  will  to  implement  the  Great  Limpopo 
Transfrontier  Conservation  Area,  however,  has  not  dwindled  but  increased  as 
tourists began to come through both the Pafuri and the new border post from the day 
it unofficially opened on 7th December 2006. The initial problems, related by tourists 
and personally experienced, regarding the choice of officers on both sides of the new 
post, however, were threatening the social viability because the officers on the South 
African side were white, while on the Mozambican side were black. As MacDonald 
(2006) meticulously shows in his book, race still matters, both in South and Southern 
Africa, and as soon as the ethnic origin was uniformed on both sides, things began to 
run smoothly, although some tourists have been complaining about the attempt on 
the Mozambican side to twist the law on taxable imports, such as food and alcohol. 
This  was reported to Dr.  Billy Swanepoel,  head of  conservation for the Limpopo 
101 PPF, 2006, The first ever map of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, web article, 
www.peaceparksfoundation.org.
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National Park102, in the first semester only, while the border traffic was still constant. 
Furthermore, it is true that South African holiday-makers tend to bring everything 
they need for the whole holiday from  their home country, thus easily incurring in 
excess of import. This is because they are aware that basic goods are luxury good, if 
they can be found, once outside of Maputo.
Notwithstanding daily management petty problems, however, it is true that the 
GLTFCA is still a reality on paper only, whilst its implementation is running slowly 
due to field contingencies, and the TFP has not officially opened yet, as stated in the 
official web page of the park103. This is a gigantic project aiming at bringing, under a 
uniformed  management  for  conservation,  tourism  development  and  security 
controls,  a 1 million hectares  area encompassing three states,  whose political and 
economic development is still hampered by the lack of socio-economic rights. 
3.4.2 GLTFCA: aims and objectives of a Peace Park and its TFCA
The  GLTFCA  is  the  diamond  project  of  Southern  African  transfrontier 
conservation  because  of  its  size  and  the  countries  it  brings  together,  and  whose 
conflict  history  has been thoroughly discussed in the two previous chapters.  The 
GLTFCA aims primarily at collaboratively establish and manage, on a sustainable basis, a  
viable Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park with full stakeholder participation, including local  
communities,  fostering  regional  co-operation,  biodiversity  conservation,  and  cross-border  
socio-economic  development104.  The vision stresses  the value  attached to  stakeholder 
participation, in the prospect of socio-economic development for local communities.
The objectives, however, show a major concern with conservation issues, which is 
understandable  as  the  crucial  argumentation  for  eliminating  frontiers  is  the  re-
establishment of wildlife migratory routes. Cross-border security, which is one of the 
main threats to the whole project,  is only marginally and allusively mentioned in 
objective 3. Such theoretical approach is in stark contrast with the implementation 
102 Personal conversations held in Massingir, between December and March 2006.
103 See website http://www.grealimpopopark.com
104 Overview of the GLTFCA, see www.greatlimpopopark.com
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constraints that the GLTFP and CA have to face, in the regional socio-political and 
conservationist  context.  Illegal  cross-border  migrations  and  informal  (and  illegal) 
transnational activities are threatening the fragile equilibrium of South African
Objective 1 To foster transnational collaboration and co-operation between Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe in implementing ecosystem management, through the 
establishment, development and management of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Park 
Objective 2 To promote alliances in the management of biological natural resources by 
encouraging social, economic and other partnerships among the parties, private 
sector, local communities and NGO's; 
Objective 3 To enhance ecosystem integrity and natural ecological processes by harmonising 
environmental management procedures across international borders and striving 
to remove artificial barriers impeding the natural movement of animals; 
Objective 4 To develop frameworks and strategies whereby local communities can participate 
in and tangibly benefit from the management and sustainable use of natural 
resources that occur within the transfrontier park or TFCA; 
Objective 5 To facilitate the establishment and maintenance of a subregional economic base by 
way of appropriate development frameworks, strategies and work plans; 
Objective 6 To develop trans-border eco-tourism as a means for fostering regional socio-
economic development.
Table 3.9: Objectives of the GLTFP (Source: http://www.greatlimpopopark.com/)
society, despite a regional political will to open borders and facilitate movements of 
people and goods. Poaching in the area has never stopped, despite raising level of 
private and public wildlife protection projects, particularly in the Southern part of 
the Kruger  and the  Limpopo National  Parks105.  Border  communities  traditionally 
move in and out of a country to carry out normal day-to-day activities, including 
visiting friends, choosing a wife and cattle grazing. It is, therefore, rather surprising 
that security does not appear as one of the key objectives, whereas it treated as an 
operational  priority,  as  opposed  to  community  participation  and  development, 
which is lagging behind both in Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
105 Conversations with Chief Insp. Coetzer (Skukuza Police – KNP) and Mr. Adré Du Pont (owner of 
Xonghile  Game Reserve  –  Massingir)  have confirmed that  the  poaching  of  rhinos  and gazelles  is 
practiced,  and requires  daily  patrols  in  the  private  reserve  in  Mozambique.  In  Dumela  only  one 
person from a different clan, but living in close proximity, practices poaching as the number of skins 
around his dwellings confirm. 
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3.4.3 Security and migrations in the GLTFCA
Having discussed the cultural and political history of the area which the GLTFCA 
will encompass, it is obvious that security should be a major concern for conservation 
planners, in so far as both animals, on the local level, and the political economy of the 
countries, on a regional scale, are concerned. As Peddle et al. point out, a TFCA is not 
a no man’s land106, unlike frontier zones, and the law of each country must still be 
respected,  alongside  the  limitations  deriving  from  nature  protection.  However, 
factors such as (a) the presence of a multi-levelled jurisdiction, (b) the removal of 
protective  fencing along the border,  (c)  the limited number  of  patrolled  roads in 
relation to the territory show that there is potential for an increase in illegal cross-
border  activities  as  a  result  of   transfrontier  conservation  and  peace  parks. 
Furthermore,  in  the  specific  case  of  the  GLTFCA,  the  demining  of  the  Sengwe 
Ecological corridor will leave a 65 km long stretch of land completely unprotected, 
where  both  the  border  populations  and  the  wildlife  will  be  free  to  roam,  thus 
generating  human-wildlife  conflict.  Within  the  planning  of  the  Corridor,  it  was 
required by the Sengwe, Chipise and Dite 2 communities in Zimbabwe, to have a 
protective fence on the northern side to prevent conflict with elephants, buffalos and 
carnivores.  The  fence,  in  reality,  should  also  prevent  the  spreading  of  Foot  and 
Mouth Disease and Tuberculosis into healthy Zimbabwean herds of buffalos, lions 
and impalas107.  However,  this is a secondary level  of protection which transcends 
community requirements,  which in turn defeats  the purpose of  a  fence-less  park. 
Within the same geographic area, in addition, the people living along the border in 
Mozambique would be highly threatened by wildlife presence, as a protective fence 
has not been planned. This part of the GLTFCA is the interstitial zone, where people 
have the right to live, not a national park, which excludes settlements according to 
IUCN categories, and a plan is not being made to deal with these security issues.
106 Peddle et al., 2004, chapter 2.
107 CESVI, 2001.
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The security  for  communities  has  only  been  proactively  discussed  within  the 
management committee, with reference to the eight villages in the LNP. These, in 
fact, will be soon relocated after an arbitrary consultation process, on the legitimate 
grounds that  is  it  not  safe  for  people to  live in  protected areas,  because  wildlife 
would  threaten  theirs  lives  and  crops.  One,  however,  is  left  to  wonder  what 
happened to the principles set in Objectives 2 and 3. The outlook provided both by 
literature  and the field,  in  fact,  is  that  the  only  migratory movements  which are 
protected  by  the  GLTFCA  and  Peace  Park  management  involve  animals,  and 
tourists  by  extension,  as  income-generators,  hence  source  of  development. 
Communities, instead, are perceived as a security threat to both categories because of 
poaching and of illegal cross border migration and informal – illegal activities.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
The independence struggles which occurred in Africa, both before and after the 
dismantling of European empires, have been often referred to as national struggles, 
by inferring that as the majority of the population of a country was against a type of 
government, it should also share a sense of nationhood. Nothing was further away 
from the truth as post-independence civil wars and dictatorial regimes have shown. 
This was of course the result of the division of Africa at a conference table in Europe, 
back in 1885. However, as it has been argued, the mistake was made not just on the 
account that local communities did not have a weigh in decision-making, as Griffiths 
(1986) points out referring to protectorates and agreements with local chiefs, but also 
on the account of a different interpretation of land marks such as Rivers, which in 
Europe are often used as barriers  between people,  but in Africa are catalysers  of 
settlements hence a source of life in a dry land. Paradoxically, therefore, it is argued 
that  fights  for  independence  carried  out  by native populations  were  acts  of  civil 
disobedience against a form of government, which was no longer endurable. Despite 
theories of African nationalism, in fact, the civil wars and genocides which followed 
independence and in some countries still affect the population show that there was 
no sense of nation-building in the people. On the contrary, it was imposed by the 
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post-independence government as part of the nation-state building process on the 
European model.  The sense of  nationhood,  which implies in Political  Geography, 
unity of language, culture and aspirations, was instead very much felt by the White 
communities of Rhodesia and South Africa in their fight against the perceived enemy 
threatening the status quo. 
Bearing  history in  mind,  therefore,  the creation of  TFCAs and Peace  Parks  in 
Southern  Africa  structures  itself  as  an attempt  to  create  ex-novo a  peace  between 
people  who had been  at  war  within each  other  in  pre-colonial  times  (the  Nguni 
colonisation and the mfecane), during colonialism and imperialism (the Boer War, the 
defeat of Ngungunhane, the segregation and the Bush wars) and in the post-colonial 
era  (the  Ndebele  genocide,  the  Mozambican  war;  Angola  civil  wars;  the  endless 
changes  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo).  Furthermore,  the  borders  risk  of 
being perceived again as  a no-man’s land,  unless  real  community involvement  is 
carried out to create income-generating activities. As eco-tourism is placed as the last 
objective of the GLTFCA, it is feared that the prolonged indifference towards field 
problems  will  aggravate  the  human-animal  conflict.  The  GLTFCA  is  the  most 
challenging of all the projects, considering the size the new land uses in communal 
and former hunting areas, and the security threats it poses in borderlands, for both 
people and animals. However, the steps which have been taken already for security 
seem either inadequate (Sengwe corridor) or unfair (forced relocation) for the local 
populations which are most affected, and this is in sheer contrast with the GLTFCA 
objectives. Furthermore, considering the role South Africa aspires to play within the 
SADC and the AU, it seems plausible to suggest that the leading role played in the 
GLTFCA project will not be limited to a joint supervision of borders and its crossers, 
despite treaty’s provisions on sovereignty and security108. 
In the chapters which follow the Methodology, all the issues discussed so far in 
terms of political geography, history and conservation practices for TFCAs will be 
used to present and discuss Pafuri and Dumela, as case studies.
108 See annexure 2, pp. 8 – 10, in Peddle et al., 2004.
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4. RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE CASE STUDY
Nobody who followed the ‘scientific method’  
ever discovered anything interesting  
(Keesing, 1981, p.4)1
The impact of transfrontier conservation policies in Southern Africa was, initially, 
the key subject of this research. The assumption argued that the IUCN definition of 
conservation areas, as a planning system which provides for the maintenance and 
improvement of livelihood strategies of local populations, was not implemented on 
the grass root level2. As a matter of fact, it was assumed that the lack of action on the 
field was not only failing one of the main principles behind transboundary and peace 
parks as such, but also worsening the relations between the management and the 
population by further severing the fragile equilibrium between communities and dry 
savannah environments.  Having chosen,  since the very beginning to  conduct  my 
research with a mixed methodology, however, I was able to adjust to changes in the 
focus of study, from a pure socio-economic analysis to a broad investigation on the 
Pafuri border area, which was aiming at proving the historical permeability of the 
border as an advantage for the GLTFCA and Peace Park project, instead of a threat to 
its implementation.
4.i Aim and objectives
The aim of  this  research,  therefore,  became the examination of  how historical 
patterns and political decision-making lead to carve the Pafuri area, in terms of both 
human and political geography, and what the impact of the GLTFCA would be if 
culture is not valued in land use and management planning. The study had three 
objectives:
1. to analyse the pre-colonial and contemporary history of the three countries 
involved in the TFCA and critically evaluate the influences on local people and 
livelihoods;
1 The author recollects this statement made by a friend of his, a biologist.  
2 See the IUCN website for the categories of protection. 
2. to evaluate the role of politics into conservation strategies on a regional level, 
and  use  the  GLTFCA  as  a  means  to  understand  the  implications  for  local 
communities;
3. to create a detailed account of the Pafuri area as a symbolic place of national 
unity and state division, where present history has been written by nature, both 
within the GLTFCA or without conservation policies.
4.ii Mixed methodological approach
Both primary and secondary data sources were essential for the research but had 
to  be  framed  within  a  mixed  methodology  approach3 that  could  encompass 
disciplines on the one hand, and tools on the other.  Shifting the main focus onto 
border  studies,  in fact,  led me to infer my assumptions with the help of political 
geographical cartography, both ancient and modern. Such theories, however, had to 
be  argued  against  history and politics  in  order  to  provide  a  strong basis  for  the 
research. In fact, as Thomas Khun proved  in 19624, the historical context is essential 
to understand both philosophical and scientific theories, as well as changes; and in 
my case, the historical context provided rather than a frame, a real explanation to the 
evolution  and  application  of  conservation  sciences  in  Southern  Africa.  A  hybrid 
approach, therefore, was sought to provide a multi-disciplinary research frame, with 
the use of various sets of data, relying both on qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Within the basic principles of the  Gestion do Terroir,  discussed in the introductory 
chapter,  the  mixed  methodology  was  based  on  the  cultural  anthropology  and 
ethnographical field research, which was applied to Human Geographical methods, 
through the geo-referencing of all data collected. By adopting the basic principles of 
ethnological field research, I was allowed, in the words of Marc Augé, to deal  with at  
least two spaces: the former  being the place I study;  the latter, and broader one, being 
the place in which it is inscribed, from where are exercised the influences and the bonds which  
are  not  deprived  of  effects  on the  internal  game of  local  relations  (the  ethnic  group,  the  
3 Brannen, 1992.
4 Khun, 1962.
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kingdom,  the  State).5 This  methodological strabismus,  as  Augé  refers  to,  led  me  to 
implement a flexible hybrid approach, whose pattern would adapt to contingencies 
in the field research and to the incorporation of new viewpoints in the analysis of 
process  and policies.  In  fact,  I  was  able  to  incorporate  local  knowledge  into  the 
historical  and  political  analysis,  not  only  in  the  specific  perceptions  related  to 
conservation and the role of the GLFTCA in the sustainable development of local 
communities.
4.iii Field work: timing and localities
The mixed ethnological approach integrated structured and informal interviews, 
transect  walks  with  key  informants,  a  quantitative  survey  and  cartographical 
analyses. Considering the time frame of the field work, one year and a half, there is a 
relevant  differentiation  to  be  made  between,  (1)  local  field  work,  carried  out  in 
Dumela and the Pafuri area, including the Kruger National Park; (2) and the regional 
field work,  conducted in Maputo,  but  also throughout  the country,  as  well  as  in 
South  Africa  and  Swaziland.  If  the  data  collection  was  planned  to  provide 
information to NGOs and government-based organisations working in the GLTFCA, 
the broad aim gradually became of academic interests as it was clear that the full 
potential of the Pafuri area was not in the priority agenda of any party involved, 
whereas  the  risk  of  failing  again  all  agendas  for  sustainable  development  was 
increasing, thus following a core-periphery political relation pattern that Pafuri had 
seen before. Nonetheless, the local field work created  a set of data that may have 
proven precious for zoning in the CA between Pafuri and Chiqualaquala, along the 
Sengwe ecological corridor.
At this stage, it is important to note that the first person singular will be used in 
this  chapter,  as  it  refers  to  a  personal  experience,  despite  all  issues  on  the 
positionality of the researcher and objectivity, which were nonetheless pursued. It is 
worth  to  reiterate,  in  fact,  that  the  research  became,  in  fieri,  a  process  of 
understanding rather than analysing, which is the reason why its initial aims and 
5 Augé Marc, 1998, p.108, in Rossi, 2003, p. 50, translated by the author. 
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strategies were abandoned for a more theoretical approach grounded on history as 
told by academics and on history as perceived by people. The thesis, therefore,  is 
developed and written accordingly.  
4.iv Chapter outline
This chapter  will  firstly present the reasoning behind the selection of the case 
study,  considering  a  historical  perspective,  the  GLTFCA project  and  the  cultural 
issues, within the frame of the basic geographical core-periphery modelling for the 
development  and  devolution  of  power.  Two  sections  on  methodology  and  its 
unstructured process, which allowed for deeper investigation, will follow: the first 
one will discuss the use of quantitative methodology; the second one will analyse the 
qualitative methods applied both at the local and regional scale. The final section will 
present the data and summarise the field work. 
4.1 SELECTING THE CASE STUDY: CORE AND PERIPHERY
As  mentioned  in  the  Introduction,  this  thesis  was  conceived  after  a  visit  to 
Sengwe  Communal  Land,  Zimbabwe,  when   the  community  leader  vehemently 
discussed  the  problems  related  to  the  creation  of  the  GLTFCA for  the  lives  and 
livelihoods of his people, with a specific reference to the demarcation of the Sengwe 
Ecological Corridor,  which would take most of the Riverine forest away from the 
community and involve the relocation of up to 15,000 people if carried out according 
to  the  PPF  plans6.   The  overlooking  of  local  interests  in  the  establishment  and 
management of the biggest and best known Peace Park in the world prompted me to 
first look at the literature available on the subject, secondly to investigate how was 
the Peace Park perceived in the other inhabited areas in Mozambique. The Pafuri 
area,  as it  is  known in the three states,  provided an excellent case to research on 
Transfrontier Conservation, because (1) the GLTFCA is the largest conservation area 
ever planned; (2) Pafuri has a truly transboundary history in terms of cultural and 
6 CESVI,  2001. This  paper is  the second draft  of a  concept  paper on the Sengwe Corridor, which 
followed the  second meeting  of  the  Greater  Limpopo  Transfrontier  Conservation  Area Tri-nation 
Community Workshop Group, Malilangwe, 12th-14th November 2001, p.9. 
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economic  relation;  (3)  conservation  strategies  will  directly  impact  on  the 
communities living on the field, running the risk of jeopardising any proposal for 
community  involvement.  Furthermore,  placing  the  original  assumption  into  the 
geographical  perspective  of  a  core-periphery  model  entailed  that  all  disciplines, 
describing  different  issues  at  stake,  could  contribute  to  justify  the  choice  of  the 
locality as a case study. The next paragraphs will therefore illustrate the reasons and 
reasoning behind the choice of Pafuri as the focus area and of  Dumela as the case 
study for this research, which were based on assumptions inferred from literature 
and Personal Observation as I began to live in Mozambique.
4.1.1 The historical and political geography of a frontier
In terms of location, Pafuri is the geographical heart of the GLTFCA, a core that 
bears a strategic significance for the creation of both the Peace Park and the TFCA 
and is charged of history both in ancient and contemporary times: it was always a 
frontier, never a border.
The Limpopo River marked, in the South, the area of influence of the Kingdom of 
Monomotapa,  one of  three  major  civilisations  of  Southern  Africa  nested in Great 
Zimbabwe. However, many groups lived along the River banks, including the Venda 
in  the  south  and  Tswana in  the  east.  Pafuri  was  also  the  expansion  frontier  for 
Mzilikazi and his Matabele fleeing the wrath of Shaka Zulu in the South, as well as 
for the Gaza Nguni of Soshangane. Before the Europeans even knew of its existence, 
Pafuri  was  already  a  multi-cultural  cradle  hosting  communities  from  different 
origins and languages. Later, when the first Europeans settled at the Cape and in 
Natal, and the English protectorate impaired the Afrikaans style of life, Pafuri was 
the ultimate frontier also for the Voortrekkers in their attempt to find a land to call 
their  own and rule  according to  their  religious  and political  believes7.   After  the 
Conference of Berlin, eventually, the borderland between the three countries became 
7 Reader, 1994, discusses extensively the dichotomies between the British colonial government and the 
Afrikaaner practices, as well as the role religion played in forming the Afrikaaner spirit and nation. 
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the frontier land where people could live and operate on the verge of the law, always 
a beacon away, as described in the famous biography of Bvekenya8. 
After years of abandonment, in 1969, the Makuleke of South Africa were forcibly 
relocated to extend the Kruger National Park, thus creating a buffer zone along the 
border  with  Mozambique  to  the  East  and  Zimbabwe  to  the  South.  Despite  all 
arguments for conservation strategies, which of course are relevant in so far as the 
human  pressure  on  the  Limpopo  Riverine  forest  was  taking  its  toll  on  the 
environment and the local fauna, it must be noted that the decision to extend Kruger 
Park was taken at a very delicate time in African history. Towards the end of the 
1960s, in fact, most African countries were awarded independence on the grounds of 
the prime rights   recognised in the aftermath  of  the Second World War and the 
holocaust, justified by the supremacy of the pure Arian race: these were the right to 
self-determination of  people,  to  non-racial  political and social  systems,  as  well  as 
equality. South Africa (including Namibia at the time), Rhodesia, Mozambique and 
Angola were the only countries not to abide by this new political philosophy and 
maintained their governments of racial segregation. However, it would be very naïve 
to  suppose  that  the politicians  were  unaware  of  the discontent  generated by the 
exacerbation of the apartheid system in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the Fascist 
regime that  Portugal  was extending to its  colonies.  It  is  more likely,  in fact,  that 
attempts were being made to tamper the creation of independent movements and 
prevent any potential for transfrontier union in the case of independence of one of 
such countries9. Therefore, conservation was very astutely used, by the South African 
government, to create an area deprived of people and very difficult to cross, because 
of wildlife, thus discouraging attempts of transfrontier migration10. This is the period 
8 Bulpin, 1954.
9 The  existence  of  a  ‘gentleman’s  agreement’  between  Portugal  and  Rhodesia  to  enable  ‘their 
respective troops to cross the common border in pursuit of FRELIMO or ZANLA guerrillas’ (p. 34) 
was in fact disclosed by Gen. Kaúlza de Arriaga in April  1973. Whereas South Africa was always 
involved directly in  the protection of the Cabora Bassa Dam, in  the Tete Province,  and indirectly 
supporting the Rhodesian army. (Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 33-35)
10 It  may  be  argued  that  such  ideas  could  be  part  of  ‘conspiracy  theories’  that  are  so  popular 
nowadays. However, as the section dedicated to the recent border history and the involvement of both 
SA and the USA in the destabilisation war of the 1970s till the 1990s proves, conservation could never 
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when Pafuri  became a  border,  and a heavily demarcated one as well,  in order  to 
protect  the  wildlife  from  poaching,  while  prevent  human  migrations  and  the 
gathering of  potentially  threatening  organisations.  In  the  meantime,  South  Africa 
was extending its military frontier into Mozambique by supporting RENAMO in its 
fight. Of course, with the independence of Mozambique in 1975 and Zimbabwe in 
1981, South Africa was isolated in a region it used to lead and as the border became a 
war zone, the Kruger Park became a military headquarter11. Only in 2001 was the 
defensive electric fence along the border taken down in order to give a real signal of 
peace  between  the  three  countries  and  allow  the  international  community  to 
celebrate transboundary conservation as the new frontier for peace process in the 
aftermath of conflict12.
Despite having been the periphery of three states for many decades, Pafuri found 
itself to be the core of military strategy in the second part of the last century, and 
ended  up  as  the  semi-periphery  of  the  same three  states  with  new independent 
governments because of conservation and political issues. Ironically, it must be said, 
history repeats itself eventually. Conservation, in fact, was the first justification for 
the interruption of socio-economic relations at Crooks’ Corner with the relocation of 
the Makulekes, and it is now again, with the potential relocation of Sengwe people 
for the ecological corridor, whereas the destiny of Mozambican communities along 
the Sengwe border is still unclear. At the same time, the militarization of the border 
attempted to stop all illegal migrations through the Kruger Park, as wildlife was not 
a strong enough deterrent, and the current increase in patrolling aims at improving 
security at the border by stopping illegal migration and preventing poaching which 
is still practiced, but mainly in the southern zone. Pafuri is therefore a strategic semi-
periphery for the establishment and the good functioning of the GLTFCA, as well as 
for the protection of South African borders.
be such a strong argument for land demarcation and people relocation at times when things were 
changing so dramatically throughout the continent and the world.
11 See Minter, 1998; Ellis, 1994. Personal conversation with a former SA soldier patrolling the border at 
Pafuri and Crooks corner, Nelspruit, 3rd December 2006.
12 Godwin, 2001.
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4.1.2 Geographical core and development periphery
It  is  surprising  how  ambivalent  can  a  locality  be  if  placed  under  different 
perspectives. Pafuri epitomises this ambiguity very well as it is the geographical core 
of  the  Great  Limpopo  Transfrontier  Conservation  Area,  but  a  developmental 
periphery for the Mozambican government. This location is strategically important 
for the movements of tourists in the TFCA, and this is the reason why there have 
been  talks  about  opening a  border  very close  to  the  existing one  between South 
Africa and Mozambique,  thus improving access into Zimbabwe13.  Surprisingly,  in 
terms  of  economic  development  in  the  Mozambican  side  of  the  TFCA,  however, 
Pafuri  is  a  peripheral  area which is  being neglected by policy-makers  within the 
TFCA management unit of the Ministry of Tourism. 
The opening of the Giriyondo Border Post, in December 2005, made it clear to the 
national and international community that on the one hand the TFCA was officially 
going across the borders, and on the other hand that South Africa and Mozambique 
were leading the way. The location of the new Border Post is of course strategic into 
routing traffic to Mozambique and its beach destinations from the wealthy Gauteng 
Province (Johannesburg and Pretoria) and the Northern provinces, whilst promoting 
the country as a safe place where even conservation has found its dimension. Despite 
the presence of all three heads of state at the inauguration ceremony, which took 
place almost one year later, however, it is clear that Zimbabwe, and by extension, its 
borderlands  are  lagging  behind  in  terms  of  integration.  This  is  the  Pafuri  semi-
periphery, where the state is present to control but absent in leading. The extension 
of the Sengwe corridor has not been decided yet and the demining of the corridor 
only began in great secrecy in summer 2006. Furthermore, Dumela is now visited by 
Limpopo  National  Park  (LNP)  rangers  if  a  problem  animal  is  spotted,  but  the 
community struggles to understand that elephants cannot be killed, while the people 
in the south of the LNP are being moved out without options. Efforts to promote 
tourism development, in fact, have been focussed on the southern section of the LNP, 
13 CESVI, 2001; and personal information discussed in 2001 with the late Dr. R.H.V. Bell and Mr. G. 
Soncini, of CESVI, in Bulawayo.
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possibly also in the hope to hasten the relocation of the three villages on the road 
connecting the Border Post to the main gate at Massingir. After an observation of the 
official  transit  moving  through  the  border  at  Pafuri,  it  is  plausible  to  state  that 
touristic movements intensify only during Christmas and Easter holidays, whereas 
Giriyondo has witnessed a constant flow, with peaks during school holidays, thus 
justifying the strategy. Unless actions are taken, Pafuri will soon be the core of all 
discontent, exasperated by lack of action and explanations.
However,  the  relegation  of  Pafuri  to  a  development  periphery  is  not  justified 
when  analysing  the  implications  improved  infrastructure  would  have  on  border 
government officers, locals and tourists. First of all, as the geographical core of the 
TFCA, it should be an attraction in itself. In addition, its unspoilt Riverine forests, the 
quantity and variety of wildlife, and its location on the road from the South African 
northern provinces  to major sea destinations in Mozambique, on graded roads and 
4x4 trails,  would make it  a  successful  combination with South African tourists,  if 
infrastructure on the road was available for emergencies. In order to reach Macia, the 
first main town on the EN1 to Bilene, Inhambane and Vilankulos, one must drive for 
over 700 Km on an untarred road, 250 Km of which are not graded. The only petrol 
station on the road is at Chòkwe14, some 70Km before Macia, and along the road there 
is no mobile phone coverage, which means that any break-down of a car would leave 
people utterly stranded. Conversely, from the Giriyondo Border Post, there is a 70 Km 
long 4x4 trail  to  reach  the main gate  at  Massingir,  the  150 Km of  tarred  road to 
Chòkwe. From Pafuri there is also an alternative road to get to Vilankulos, which 
almost circumnavigates the Banhine National Park on graded roads and 4x4 trails, 
stretching  for  almost  1000  Km  to  reach  the  coast,  without  meeting  with  a  town 
offering  facilities15.  Developing  Pafuri  would  of  course  mean  improving 
infrastructures on the road, whilst respecting the natural ‘isolation’ and ‘remoteness’ 
of the area. In addition, plans for the building of a bridge over the Limpopo River at 
14 This excluding the informal sellers on the main road from Pafuri to Mapai, then to Chòkwe.
15 Informal interview with people who use the road for both tourism and business, met at Maputo, 
Pafuri and Pemba. 
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Mapai have been discussed between the GoM and the donors, but nothing has been 
planned, yet. This, of course, would be the first step towards facilitating access to the 
area.
Secondly, the recent history that characterised the place, including the importance 
of employment in South African mines through the creation of WENELA/TEBA and 
the recent wars,  could become exceptional justifications for tourism into the Peace 
Park. People living in Pafuri still remember displacement, migrations, the mines, the 
war16 and could be involved in cultural tourism routes that would benefit not only 
Africans  but  also  other  people.  If  peace is  the  main  claim  for  transfrontier 
conservation,  and  cross-border  cooperation  is  called  upon  to  enhance  relations 
between  states  and to  promote  cultural  bonds,  while  protecting  the  environment, 
Pafuri  could become the  real  core  for  the  TFCA showing its  long history of  pre-
European multi-cultural environment, its transformation through the legalisation of 
migrations to South Africa alongside the numerous ones who remained illegal, and 
finally the impact of apartheid ruling in such a remote area.
Thirdly,  the  lack  of  support  that  governmental  officers  get  from  the  State 
contributes  to  the  maintenance  of  informal  survival  strategies  that  encompass  all 
affiliation  to  the  government  and  national  legislation.  The  government  officials 
working at  Pafuri  Border  Post  have  no access  to  transport,  other  than traditional 
machibombos17,  phone communication,  running water  and electricity.  The  floods of 
2001  exasperated  a  situation  that  was  already  hard  to  bear,  also  considering  the 
comfort  and  relative  luxury  in  which  the  South  African  counterpart  lives. 
Furthermore,  there  is  not  a  shop  available  in  the  area  to  buy  groceries  from. 
Abandoning  Pafuri  to  a  condition  of  periphery,  therefore,  also  entails  that  the 
Mozambican State cannot ask its own representatives to be strict in respecting the 
law, if survival is at stake. In fact, officers rely on legal border-crossers to bring food 
16 See Connor, 2003; H. Hansen, MSc dissertation from the University of Witvatersrand, Johannesburg.
17  This term is common to refer to public transport, an alternative term is chapa, but it is only used in 
Mozambique. It normally indicate small to medium size minibuses. The most typical of all cars used 
for this transport is the Toyota Hiace.
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back,  thus generating a mechanism of barter  which could easily degenerate  if  the 
leading officers had different moral standards. 
Such is the ambiguity of a very remote area, the periphery of three nations which 
is very remote from all centres of power, but which has attracted and will attract the 
interests  of its governors because of its geographical position and cultural  history. 
This is the reason why, despite the feelings attached to a frontier land one experiences 
upon  reaching  this  area,  it  must  be  seen  as  a  semi-periphery  where  the  core  is 
represented by the police, the immigration and the customs officers at the border, as 
well as the administrative and local governors. Thus said, it is peripheral due to the 
lack of decision-making about its present and future, and here again the geographical 
position plays a major role. It is plausible to claim, in fact, that until Zimbabwe will 
progress in joining the tri-national park, Pafuri will always be cast out of planning for 
development. The opening of the Giriyondo Border Post and the creation of touristic 
facilities around the Massingir dam in the LNP, actually, prove that the management 
is concentrating on the South, which is on the one side the most visited area of the 
KNP and on the other the most accessible route to the beach. 
4.1.3 Dumela, where the informal blends with the cultural
Pafuri  is  the  most  relevant  area  to  this  research  on  border  issues  within  the 
creation  of  the  GLTFCA,  since  it  is  where  the  Border  Post  is  on  the  main  road 
connecting South Africa and Mozambique, with secondary roads to Chiqualaquala 
(the official frontier with Zimbabwe) both to the north and the south of the Limpopo 
River, and where donkey-trained carts from Zimbabwe sell and buy goods on the 
road. Pafuri is where the government is somehow present and where TEBA has left 
an unforgettable inheritance on top of the hills bordering the LNP. However,  this 
was not the village I was described in Sengwe as it was on the road to South Africa, 
not to Zimbabwe.  The village I  was looking for had to be very close to the spot 
known  as  Crooks’  Corner,  where  the  three  countries  meet;  had  to  be  mainly 
composed of Shangaan people; and had to be a historical settlement on the roads 
connecting the three countries  in this very remote part  of the country. Therefore, 
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upon my first scoping visit, I moved on, crossed the Limpopo River and found the 
official periphery, which was meant to be the centre of all informal activities (from 
trade to migration), assuming that all I had learnt and theorised from my experience 
in Sengwe was true. I must admit I could have looked at maps before going that far 
up north, but this was also a challenge to test my analysing and navigating skills. 
The name of this village is Dumela, although Connor refers to it as Thobela18, and 
is composed of about 800 people, some of which live permanently or temporarily 
abroad,  mainly  in  South  Africa.  Dumela  lies  within  walking  distance  of  the 
Zimbabwean border, which is marked by two wooden poles and not often patrolled 
by Zimbabwean soldiers19. At present, actually, the patrolling has stopped because 
the demining of the strip of land across the border is considered a sufficient deterrent 
to illegal movements, which of course is not the case. 
The history of Dumela is not written anywhere, and the elderly people do not 
remember clearly their origins or the milestone events in their history, apart from the 
last forty years. What is known is that the name derives from the leading family who 
is related to the chief of Dumela, in South Africa, past Giyani on the way North. Most 
of the older men of Dumela used to work in the mines in South Africa and they all 
passed  through  the  WENELA/TEBA  recruitment  stations  at  Pafuri.  During  the 
Mozambican  internal  war,  however,  they  moved  again  for  their  safety  and  the 
diaspora followed  family  ties  first  and  refugee  camp  sites  second.  Some  went  to 
relatives and refugee camps both in South Africa, and in Zimbabwe, a few stayed 
and hid in the bush, surviving on fruits and roots. An old woman, who married very 
young to a Zimbabwean, belonged to this last group and lost both her husband and 
18 See Connor, T., 2003. The geographical description of Thobela makes it  correspond exactly with 
Dumela, which is the official name used in Portuguese maps as well. During my research I learnt from 
the elders and the chief, that the village derives its name from the original leading family (Dumela). 
However, during the war against Zimbabwe, the village relocated on the southern banks of the River 
further down on the road from Pafuri to Mapai. Chief Dumela was not interested in coming back to 
the original area after the war and the Muklave family were   named as the new leaders. 
19 The political and economic situation of a state, however, is irrelevant to the Pafuri border people 
unless it does make a recognisable change to their lives (such as a war or a real improvement in their 
economic situation).  Therefore, the presence of patrolling along this border is  only influential  if  it 
effectively stops a relevant activity.
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her son to the war20. Migrations and cross-borders visiting is endemic in the area, and 
whereas South Africa is the main pulling factor for employment, Zimbabwe is still 
important for marriage and visiting is more feasible.
Dumela  falls  under  the  Pafuri  Administrative  Post,  in  the  District  of 
Chiqualaquala, a town 67 Km to the north-east which is the last stop of the railway 
line  going  from  Maputo  to  the  official  border  with  Zimbabwe,  across  the  Gaza 
Province.  Fridays and Saturdays are trading days and what normally looks like a 
ghost  town comes to  life  with  all  sorts  of  products  both new and second hand. 
Following the post-independence  hierarchical  settings,  the traditional  leader  (July 
Muklave) works in conjunction with the  videchane (secretary of the party), but the 
former  (also  called  Nduna)  is  recognised  both  traditionally  and  by  the  state.  If 
Dumela, due to its remoteness, is at the periphery of the nation-state, it is also at the 
centre  of  traditional  human  migratory  routes  in  search  of  a  better  future  and 
provides a sense of nationhood based on ancestry which transcends all allegiance to 
the Mozambican state.
In order to understand the real implications of the establishment of the GLTFCA 
on the communities, I had to identify an area that was geographically affected by 
such  a  gigantic  project  because  of  its  cultural  bonds  and  livelihood  strategies. 
Because of its location and because it is the ultimate outpost before beginning the 
journey across the border, as well as being closely connected with populations in the 
two  other  countries  involved,  Dumela  was  deemed  an  excellent  case  study  to 
produce grounded theories and scenarios on the future of the GLTFCA, and so it 
proved to be
4.2 THE NEED FOR QUANTITATIVE DATA
The  main  objective  of  the  research  was  to  provide  detailed  geo-referenced 
information  of  a  case  study  which  was  representative  enough  to  explain  other 
communities either in the GLTFCA or experiencing a similar situation of ambiguity 
20 See also Connor, 2003.
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in terms of political decision-making.  In order to do so, the extensive and exhaustive 
PRA survey21 was  carried  out  by  CESVI  (an Italian NGO) in  most  villages  from 
Crooks’ Corner to the Majinjii Pans, was taken into account, and so were the research 
by Connor (2003) and Koch  et al. (1995). Moreover, the ethic continuity across the 
border indicated that survival and subsistence patterns might have been very similar, 
thus rendering a specific data collection effort rather pointless. However, one issue 
was shifting the situation to the Mozambican side of the area in relations to both 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. In the first case, in fact, Mozambicans had an official 
border which allowed for legal (hence safer) import/export of goods, and contacts 
with relatives living in the immediate proximity of the border in the no man’s land 
between the two gates. In the second case, the relocation of the Makulekes in 1969 
created a distance between the people and their spacial geography thus hindering 
the relations between the community and their old social and economic network22. 
The communities of Pafuri in the Mozambican side, therefore, are the only ones to 
have retained their original socio-economic status (despite war-related disruptions) 
within  their  original  geographical  boundaries,  thus  providing  an  interesting  case 
study to analyse the present and make projections for the future, bearing in mind the 
experiences of the other populations. 
Within the Géstion du Terroir approach, quantitative methodology was necessary 
to  (a)  confirm  the  information  on  livelihood  strategies  gathered  in  Sengwe,  thus 
proving continuity across the border;  (b) provide basic information on the village 
and  its  inhabitants.  As  McNag  points  out,  obviously  facing  the  same  dilemma, 
questionnaire surveys represent a critical tool in innovative mixed methodology approaches23, 
for geographers. Furthermore, since limited descriptive information was sought by 
21 Participatory Rural Appraisal  is  a technique of survey which involves a varied methodology to 
understand communities,  and it  is  used in  many NGO-based  field  projects.  The World Bank has 
produced  a  series  of  guidelines  to  carry  out  PRA  and  are  available  on  the  site 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sba104.htm. 
22 Friedman, J., 2005 explains in her BA dissertation the drawbacks of the relocation process, which 
were not addressed in land claim process, although having impacted on the social patterns of the 
community. 
23 McNab, 2004, p.61, quoting Sporton (1999).
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this  means,  questionnaire  surveys  were  deemed  necessary  to  gather  relevant 
information, with little misunderstanding, and in a short time. Selected information 
was then layered  onto  ArcExplorer,  so  as  to  geographically  reproduce  the  living 
space of the people, at Dumela. Thanks to satellite imagery, available with Google 
Earth, in addition, the GPS positioning of each surveyed house was layered on the 
aerial  view,  which  provides  a  real  mapping  of  the  land  use.  It  must  be  stated, 
however, that on the River banks land is seasonally used for agriculture, which does 
not appear from the satellite image, even though the local community marks each 
plot  and  each  year  land-ownership  can  be  traced  back  despite  the  floods. 
Quantitative  research  was,  therefore,  essential  to  reproduce  the  village  and 
contextualise its geographical and social frame within the border areas, and the most 
effective way to obtain such information was a questionnaire survey of all dwellings 
which, in the Shangaana tradition, house the extended family of the husband. The 
questionnaire was prepared after the first two field visits. The survey was carried out 
alongside  qualitative  analysis  which  provided  all  background  information  and 
allowed for a deeper, and more objective, understanding of the community, as ‘one-
to-one  interviews’  were  the  preferred  method24.  At  this  stage,  moreover,  it  is 
important to note that each field research was carried out independently, and with 
the  exception  of  the  first  field  trip,  all  other  visits  involved  locally  hired 
assistant/translators.  Finally,  to  simplify  the  presentation  of  methodologies,  this 
section will only address issues related to risks in undertaking ethnological research 
and the questionnaire design, included in Attachment 7.
4.2.1 Scoping visits: placing the researcher into perspective
It is a common warning in all ethnographical manuals that the researcher  must 
be aware of being objective in his/her evaluation and that his/her presence in a place 
must be so discrete so as to transform data collection into a daily practice, rather than 
making an event out of it25. In this specific case, the type of research to be conducted 
24 De Gabriele (1999) in McNab (2004).
25 See Copan, 1999, pp. 34-43; Rossi, 2003, pp. 69-92; Burgess, 1984, p. 191.
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and the area under investigation was particularly sensitive for local communities and 
could  easily  attain  to  misleading  results,  especially  in  relation  to  a  quantitative 
survey. First of all, access had to be considered in terms of permissions of working in 
the area, due to the highly bureaucratic type of government in Mozambique. Upon 
the first visit, therefore, presentations were required both from the Administrator of 
Pafuri Post and from the border officials in order to avoid issues of discrimination. In 
Dumela, of course, both the leader and the secretary had to give their approval, as 
well as the community. A meeting was therefore organised to explain the aims of the 
research and ask for cooperation.  Secondly, it was necessary to understand what the 
community knew of the LNP and the GLTFCA, which was brought up by some 
participants at the meeting, and to make sure the population was not associating this 
research to the Park strategy, whether nationally or internationally.  This issue was 
particularly important as the research had to be understood as a study only, not an 
assessment of the community leading to a project for development. This message, 
however, did not pass in either of the community meeting, despite the careful use of 
the  word  projecto referring  to  the  study  project  only,  because  of  the  immediate 
identification  of  foreigners  as  people  who  will  invest  in  the  area26.  Thirdly,  the 
unstructured methodological frame was aimed at transforming research into a social  
process27, of which field experience and interaction with people was to be an essential 
part. In fact, living for such an extended amount of time in the country and meeting 
people of all ages and walks of life, deeply increased my sense of objectivity over the 
recent history of the region, and the social and cultural changes which have been 
affected not only by national politics but also by globalisation. 
26 This pre-conception was found not only in Dumela, but around the country, and is common due to 
the amount of poverty relief projects in the country. Furthermore, the knowledge of the involvement 
of  foreign  people  in  the  GLTFCA  would  have  lead  local  villagers  to  assume  I  was  working  in 
conjunction with this project, despite I repeatedly stated I was an independent researcher. Finally, it 
must  be  stated  that  during  my stay  in  September,  the  District  Administrator  held  a  community 
meeting in Dumela, during which he stated in his speech that it was time for local people to stop 
waiting for White people to give them help, but to start helping themselves by working. (Field diary: 
15th September 2006)
27 Burgess, 1984, p. 31, refers to many scholars to discuss methodology not as a linear procedure, but as 
an ever changing process which adapts to the reality and the contingency of the field experience. See 
also Keesing, 1981.
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The field research was therefore planned and revised, bearing in mind on the one 
hand ethical and social issues, and on the other hand logistics. As mentioned before, 
in fact, the journey was by no means an easy one because of distances, type of roads, 
as  well  as  the lack of on-the-road and on-the-spot facilities.  Driving up to Pafuri 
involved either crossing the Limpopo National Park, which was done upon the first 
trip, or driving the Chiqualaquala road to Mapai, then use the trail to Pafuri, which 
was driven on the way back from the second visit, or cross the border at Ressano 
Garcia to South Africa and drive along the KNP to Punda Maria, enter the Park, and 
re-enter Mozambique at Pafuri, which became the preferred route due to the type of 
road, as well as the network of petrol stations, mechanics and grocery stores. This 
experience  per  se explains  a  lot  of  how  Mozambique  could  develop  to  increase 
tourism in the whole country  and loose the focus  on the coast,  so  as  to  weaken 
human pressure on fragile wetlands, mangrove systems and coral reefs. 
Finally, as a foreigner in a foreign country, the language barriers were not easy to 
overcome.  However,  having  mastered  Portuguese,  I  realised  it  was  much  more 
welcome  as  a  means  of  communication  as  opposed  to  English,  which  was 
understood almost at the same level. Of course, the use of Portuguese also pleased 
the authorities, despite the fact Chief Muklave does not speak or understand it, and 
showed that effort was being made to get closer to the Mozambican reality; since all 
attention had always been paid to the neighbouring countries.  It is surprising to see 
how  well  informed  local  people  were  of  what  was  happening  in  other  villages 
because  of  the  GLTFCA,  then  again  rumour  has  it  that  the  moment  the  Peace 
Agreement was signed in Rome to end the civil war, the bush drum spread the news 
so quickly that in less than twenty-four hours the ceasefire was respected throughout 
the country regardless  of political factions28.  From the second visit,  moreover,  the 
chief and one of the elders were keener to explain the little history they remembered 
28 Of course the use of radios in rural areas as the only means to feel in touch with the rest of the world 
helped  a  lot,  nonetheless  the  degree  of  people  moving  around  the  country  by  means  of  public 
transports, bicycles or on foot is incomprehensible to the European mind.
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and the livelihood strategies in times of drought, which to me implied the barrier 
was being broken despite all differences.
The first scoping visit was carried out in March 2005 and lasted four days only29. 
During this time, all government representatives were met and all permissions were 
granted  to  work  in  the  area.  The  village  was  explored  and  the  main  informant 
showed the  problem-areas,  because  of  wildlife,  the  routes  to  Zimbabwe and  the 
agricultural  project  set  up  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  explaining  the  main 
difficulties of living in the area. On the third day, the community meeting was held 
and the research  presented,  with a heated discussion on  the  Park30,  land use and 
relocation, as opposed to agricultural projects to provide food for the people. The 
teacher was proposed as the main translator, together with the dRiver, who was a 
representative of IUCN – Mozambique, my hosting organisation. This visit allowed 
me to establish a first contact with the local community and gather the first set of 
qualitative  data  to  prepare  the  questionnaire.  Another  short  visit  followed  two 
months later, when it was possible for me to better understand the work potential of 
the chief and the community in relation to my research.
4.2.2 Questionnaire design: needs and constraints
The aim of the questionnaire was to confirm or confute the livelihood strategies 
and  social  system  of  the  community  in  Dumela,  in  relation  to  the  research 
undertaken in Zimbabwe31. Since the main focus was always the border, and the way 
its  people  perceive  and  use  it,  the  questions  were  directed  to  understand  how 
dependent local people are on the border and its meaning. Notwithstanding the aim, 
I had to take into account the fact that all previous research had been conducted with 
Participatory  Rural  Appraisal,  within  the  SLA  umbrella,  which  is  very  time-
29 Originally a week was planned, but as contingencies may change, a sunstroke forced me to leave 
and seek medical help in South Africa. 
30 This is the depreciative expression by which the local people in western Gaza refer to the GLTFCA. 
31 Many documents have been written on the villages settled between Pafuri and the Gonarezhou 
National Park in Zimbabwe. Most of the published and unpublished works are collected at the CAAS 
library of the University of Zimbabwe, Harare. The most complete papers are Mpofu  et al.; CESVI, 
1999, pp. 11-17, and CESVI 2001.
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consuming, involves the use of a team of assistants, and consists of prolonged visits 
in the field, which in my case were not possible due to the variability of the climate. 
A major constraint in the frequency and length of the staying was, in fact, the rain, 
since until May 2006 I had to cross the River every other day to reach Pafuri BP and 
get  drinkable  water,  or  to  get  assistance  in  case  of  a  health  emergency.   The 
questionnaire, therefore, had to be exhaustive enough to get comparable results with 
the  Géstion  du  Terroir  method,  but  simple  enough  not  to  generate  any 
misunderstanding in the translation. 
I  chose to  divide it  into four separate  sections:  1.  demographics,  dealing with 
identification card ownership (ID), schooling and main livelihood sources; 2. trade 
with people coming from other countries; 3. temporary and permanent migration for 
work and remittances; 4. family relations across the border. In this way, the three key 
subjects  were  covered  with  close  questions,  thus  providing  simple  but  strategic 
information to evaluate the respondent  and his/her  family life.  Moreover,  having 
personally followed all interviews, I was able to assess the validity of the answers 
and ask for more detailed information or historical facts if the interviewed person 
showed special interest in the study. Despite the methodology of a similar research 
conducted in the Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area, in Kwa-Zulu Natal32, 
with the help of onsite collaborators who carried out the field investigation, after two 
visits in Pafuri I was felt that my presence on the field was very much required, in 
order  to  combine  the  questionnaire  with  other  qualitative  methods,  particularly 
direct observation. To simplify the understanding of the questionnaire, finally, the 
questions required either a yes/no answer, or specific information on locations and 
frequency. The only open ended questions referred to the products sold or bought by 
those people trading with foreigners33. 
The choices on the type and number of questions were therefore contingent on 
the impression I gathered of Dumela, upon my first visits. In fact, I tried not to be 
32 See Jones, undated, pp. 8 –11.
33 See Attachment 7 for the full questionnaire.
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very specific on issues that were too personal, such as income, but rather understand 
more about the way  people live and survive. I also asked how many people had an 
ID or a Passport,  although the ID card is not enough to cross the border,  so the 
respondent would not feel uncomfortable showing that he/she might have jumped 
the border.  I  was only specific about people working permanently or temporarily 
abroad, since I assumed that people working permanently would very rarely visit 
home  and/or  send  remittances.  Despite  the  constraints  in  terms  of  specificity, 
therefore, the questionnaire was structured so as to convey an idea of understanding 
rather than investigation.
4.2.3 Data analysis and modelling
The type of data gathered with both quantitative and qualitative investigation 
needed to be placed in a geographical context in order to understand the connections 
between  the  border  people  and  the  border  area.  A  recent  method  of  analysis 
stemming from GIS is Community-Integrated GIS, for which there still  exist  very 
little  bibliography34 and  a  few  experimental  studies  in  the  world.  This   is  to  be 
considered ‘an interdisciplinary multiple scale’ tool, which enables researchers to see 
communities for what they are: social processes in a local and global context35. As it is 
understood, furthermore, CiGIS presents itself as a data analysis method which is 
easily inscribed in the Géstion du Terroir, by allowing the geographical correlation of 
social data.
It was decided to use different sets of data for two different types of analyses: (1) 
mapping; (2) descriptive analysis. In the first case, a selection of the most relevant 
data was used as layers for a GPS based map. Each household was used as a case, for 
which the location was shown and other attributes could be added. The layers were 
(1) the number of people per household, for demographics; (2) whether the family 
34 See Jones, undated, where only three publications are mentioned: Jones et al., forthcoming; Weiner 
et al., 1995 and Harris and Weiner, 1998). A website is dedicated to CiGIS, that is http://www.up.ac.za/
academic/centre-environmental-studies/Asard/aboutCiGIS.htm, from the University of Pretoria, South 
Africa.
35 Ibid.
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was trading,  to  plot  the  location  of  the  household  in  relation  to  main roads;  (3) 
whether the respondent had family working abroad, to understand the incidence of 
migration  on  families;  (4)  whether  the  respondent  had  relatives  abroad,  to  plot 
family ties.  This was a screening process of the information gathered,  which was 
aiming at testing the inferred connections between the location of the household and 
the dependence to the border. In addition, by using also a Google Earth imaging, it 
was possible to understand the system of agricultural land around the village, thus 
being able to see the total extension of Dumela.  This was particularly important as 
during the field investigation the GPS positioned half  of  the Western part  of  the 
village in Zimbabwe, whereas the layering on geo-referenced maps, Google Earth 
and ArcExplorer  show that  the whole village and  machambas are  in  Mozambican 
territory.
All the data gathered with the questionnaire were then loaded onto SPSS in order 
to  get  a  descriptive  analysis  of  Dumela  in  terms  of  livelihood  and  border 
dependency.  Again,  because  of  the  contradiction  between  qualitative  and 
quantitative results it was deemed more cautious to make little inferential statistics 
and relate more on questionnaire data to produce a general description of the village, 
although the use of cross-referenced and multi-variable tables produced interesting 
results on inferred assumptions.
4.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF QUALITATIVE DATA
The field trip was extended over one year and a half, with periodical journeys 
back to Italy, during European summer holidays or Christmas holidays;  qualitative 
data  was  therefore  the  most  important  set  of  information  gathered  on  the  field, 
whereby I refer to Pafuri,  Mozambique, and East Southern Africa. By spending such 
a long time in the country, I was exposed to an unexpected amount of information 
which  shifted  the  focus  of  my  research  from  the  pure  utilitarian  aim  of  socio-
economic research to a more investigative multi-disciplinary approach involving the 
political and human geography, in relation to border studies. Generally, one of the 
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first issues that I perceived as crucial, while discussing my research area with people 
was  the  remoteness  and  the  sense  of  forgetfulness.  First  of  all,  both  white 
Mozambicans  and  South  Africans,  as  well  as  and  black  Mozambicans  were 
astounded to hear that a European young woman knew about the existence of such 
place, thus implying that the creation of the biggest TFCA in Africa and the world 
was very little news in fact. Secondly, everyone considered my idea of conducting 
my field research there quite absurd because of the lack of facilities:  a perception 
which referred to the war times, not to a present when conservation attracts tourists 
and tourists attract lodge-owners. Thirdly, they would not believe how willing I was 
to listen to stories about their idea of Africa, Africanism and negritude36, the wars and 
the independence, conservation and politics, without judging what was being said. 
Curiosity  and objectivity,  therefore,  allowed me to  meet  an incredible  amount  of 
people, coming from various walks of life in Mozambique, but also in South Africa 
and Swaziland. I also took up small voluntary jobs and consultancies, which allowed 
me to  travel  with  different  collaborators  from Cape  Town  in  the  South  West  to 
Pemba city in the North East. Finally, linguistic abilities were also crucial in being 
able to reach people, whom  I found generally reticent to befriend newcomers;  being 
highly fluent in English helped me with both the South African (white and black) 
community and the International community, as well  as with those Mozambicans 
who wanted to improve their skills by practising conversation. In addition, being 
Italian,  allowed  me  to  learn  the  basics  of  Portuguese  (the  official  Mozambican 
language) very quickly, with my mistakes resulting into sympathetic understanding 
of the learning effort. Finally, having studied some Dutch and German, and having a 
general logic approach to languages, I was able to pick up some Afrikaans which 
helped  again  with  a  very  open  but  conservative  community,  especially  in  some 
former Transvaal enclaves such as the Sabie area in Mpumalanga and Musina in the 
36 The term  negritude is  used here in the original  acceptation of an anti-colonial  sense of common 
African heritage, which would eventually lead to independence, as posited by the Martinican poet 
Aimé Césaire in the third issue of L’étudiant noir (Paris, 1935), as well as in the critical view proposed 
by Fanon of the combination of violence with the sense of negritude, as the latter alone is still imbued 
in a sense of subjugation (Seidman, 2004).
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Northern Province. As for the local African languages, I knew how to greet in Zulu 
based languages, thus covering all the border area from Durban to Pafuri, with the 
exclusion of the Ronga people, the main ethnic group in Maputo, and the Venda in 
the Eastern part of the Limpopo Province, who were not object of this research.
4.3.1 Creating the occasions to mingle
Having moved to Mozambique alone, I had to create any  possible occasions to 
meet people and eventually mingle. This process was very time consuming in the 
beginning, but at a later stage the number of people I was in touch with for work or 
social purposes grew unexpectedly. I firstly used my presence at IUCN to introduce 
myself  in  the  TFCA  Unit  of  the  Ministry  of  Tourism,  responsible  for  nature 
conservation in Mozambique. This is how I participated to the  AWF workshop on 
the  Limpopo  Heartland and  met  with  all  the  major  stakeholders  in  the  project, 
working specifically around the Massingir Dam, planned as a ‘high-density tourism 
area’, despite three villages counting between 2,000 and 3,000 people in total, whose 
relocation will soon be enforced. It  must be said that, after this workshop, I have 
travelled extensively in the Gaza Province, both for my research and other voluntary-
based projects I got involved with. This is, in fact, the only Mozambican Province 
which I know in-land as well along the coast. As for the rest of the country, I visited 
the coastal areas, as they are the principal tourism attraction during both peak season 
(that  is  Christmas and Easter  holidays)  and low season,  thus witnessing touristic 
movements and the impact on road traffic  and accidents.  In South Africa,  on the 
contrary, I was lucky enough to travel extensively in the former Transvaal area, now 
composed  of  Mpumalanga  (capital  Nelspruit),  Limpopo  (capital  Polokwane, 
formerly  Pietersburg),  Gauteng  (main  cities  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg)  and  the 
North West Province (capital Mafikeng), as well as spending a few days both in Cape 
Town and the Franschoek area, and Durban. Not all these trips were planned;  for 
instance my first visit to the Kruger National Park happened in a situation of great 
distress, because I had a sunstroke and was looking for a hospital or a doctor with 
useful medicines. This is how I ended up at the Skukuza Police Station to recover as a 
134
guest of Chief Inspector Coetzer for two days, and got a lift back to Mozambique 
through an informal gate with a South African land owner in Massingir and his 
conservation manager, whom I had met at the AWF workshop. This was, it must be 
said,  the first  of  a  series  of  unfortunate  events  which developed into  long terms 
friendships, thus allowing me to discuss many issues freely with people belonging to 
all strata of society and ethnic groups. 
Moving in with a Portuguese lawyer, of my same age, I  also became acquainted 
with  the  very  confined  world  of  the  Portuguese  people  who  moved  back  to 
Mozambique,  whose  familiar  roots  are  divided  between  the  two  continents,  but 
whose breeding is unmistakably European. Despite the differences in the reasons, 
which brought about the return to Africa, even among the most liberal people I met 
there was a disenchanted feeling over the future of the country and the region, such 
as amongst the South African, stemming from the nature of the local people. As I 
recorded in my diary, sitting at the very posh Hotel Polana with my flatmate and her 
friends, I was asked by a Mozambican-born Portuguese man, whose physical traits 
barely  hid  mixed blood,  what  was  the  difference  between  a  tourist  and a  racist. 
Without waiting for my reply, he added ‘one month’.  37 The group of Portuguese 
people I  met through my flatmate were, undoubtedly, the most varied ensemble of 
professionals  who found a place within the working society despite  being rather 
isolated in terms of social life. This was very different from the South African groups 
of people who were either isolated both work-wise and socially, or very selective in 
their work life, bending mostly towards people with similar backgrounds and origin. 
Amongst the people I met, finally, the third group I would define the ‘Mozambican 
Portuguese’ was overall the most congruent.  This is a group of white people who 
were  born  in  Mozambique  and  maintained  their  Mozambican  identity  after 
independence, either because they were sympathising with the cause of FRELIMO or 
because they considered themselves Africans,  more like South African whites  but 
37 Diary entry: 10th March 2004, just over a month after my arrival in Mozambique, and was to me 
shocking to see people willing to live  in a country whose majority of the population represented a 
despised or unwanted group.
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with a consistent difference: they would fit into the society, instead of creating their 
own. This does not mean that they are blind to the problems of the country, in terms 
of hierarchies and bureaucracy, as well as poverty and underdevelopment, but their 
every  day  life  is  not  dissimilar  or  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  Mozambicans 
belonging to their social class. On this issue, what a friend from Pretoria once told me 
was rather eye-opening. He said that differences between black and whites, within 
the  apartheid  system,  were  never  about  race  but  about  class,  that  is  social 
stratification  of  society38.  This  perception  derives,  undoubtedly,  by  the  social 
upbringing  of  the  single  person,  but  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  whole  country, 
considering  that  ‘the  [official]  motivation  for  Apartheid  was  to  prevent  –  in  the 
mechanical  metaphors  of  the time –  friction  between the races  and nations,  since 
racial  difference  caused  friction between  race  groups,  and this  caused  heat,  that  is, 
violence’39.  A question of class,  particularly,  in South Africa is barely pertinent to 
describe  the  present  situation,  whereas  in  Mozambique,  due  to  the  events  that 
marked it independence and post-independence period,  class is a discriminator to 
social  contact  more  than  race  is,  for  those  who  consider  themselves  Africans, 
regardless of skin colour. 
4.3.2 Unstructured meetings for a comprehensive perspective
My  field  research,  therefore,  was  extended  from  the  locality  of  Dumela  to  a 
deeper social analysis of the impact recent history had into modern lives. Having the 
border as the focus of the research, and cross border relations as the key aspect of my 
analysis, to live in an environment that was so intercultural allowed me to discuss all 
my readings about the recent history and the politics of the region with people who 
have lived through all changes and wars, and have overcome events in very different 
ways. I have kept a diary of all the meetings and conversations I had, as to keep 
notes in fieri was almost impossible due to the extemporaneity of most conversations. 
These were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the most interesting ones since they showed the 
38 Personal conversation on growing up in the apartheid system as a white South African, and on the 
impact of the changes brought about by independence, Maputo, 17th February 2004. 
39 Thornton, 1994, p. 11, Italics substitutes inverted commas in the original
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paradox within countries whose nations are so different from each other and whose 
changes in societal behaviour are constantly challenged. For example, I was once told 
by an Afrikaaner lawyer and farm owner in Rustenberg (North of Pretoria) that he 
‘fully understood the Palestinian cause’, not because of any political empathy, but 
because he knew what is felt ‘to have the land taken away from you’40, whether by 
forcible sales to the government or because of contingency, from repeated robberies 
in South Africa to life-threatening situations in Zimbabwe. 
None of the formal interviews listed in Table 4.1 were recorded, but the minute of 
the notes  taken during the conversation was discussed with the interviewees  for 
confirmation. All  other  interviews stemmed out of these or other encounters  and 
were mainly informal, which is why writing a diary was the most important method 
for recording experiences.  For instance, after the interview with Dr. Ferrão, I was 
invited to participate in the AWF workshop, where I met, amongst others, Dr. Marc 
Stalmans  of  Conservation  International,  with  whom  I  discussed  my  PhD  project 
endless times and who provided me with important documents on the GLTFCA in 
terms of conservation and community development strategies; Dr. Marcus Wishart, 
who supported the research in Massingir on the cultural landscape around the dam, 
now working at the World Bank in Washington D.C.; Mr. Declan Hofmeyr, who took 
me back to Mozambique after my sunstroke was under control and opened my views 
on South African society, now working at Madikwe Game Reserve; Mr. Paul DuPont, 
owner of the Xhonghile Game Reserve, Massingir, who was always present at the 
right time and in the right place to support me; Dr. Harry van der Linde, of the AWF, 
who was bearing with me at a time when I was trying to find my place and my 
research.
40 Conversation with Mr. Deandré Botha – lawyer by training, farmer and lodge owner by trade – at 
his town home in Mooi Nooi, Rustenburg, Sunday 9th April 2006.
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Name of interviewees Position Objective
Dr. Jorge Ferrão International  Coordinator  of 
the GLTFCA - Mozambique
To understand the  objectives  of  the  TFCA 
unit in zoning, their position on relocation, 
on  the  minefield  in  Zimbabwe  and  the 
Pafuri area.
Dr. Jean-Michel Pavy World Bank project manager 
for the GLTFCA
To  evaluate  his  field  knowledge  over  the 
implementation  of  the  project  and 
understand his vision for the GLTFCA.
Dr. David Grossman Ecologist  –  writer  of  the 
management  plan  for  the 
Limpopo-  Banhine  and 
Zinave National Parks
This interview was conducted thanks to and 
with  Jessica  Milgroom,  a  PhD  student,  to 
understand his position over the progress of 
the  GLTFCA and  the  conflict  between the 
management and the local communities.
Mr. Ted Reilly Conservationist  –  initiator  of 
Protected Areas in Swaziland 
and  writer  of  the  strictest 
Conservation   and  Anti-
poaching Law in the world
To understand the role played by the Swazi 
kings  in  protecting  privately  managed 
conservation projects and the role played by 
the  Swazi  government  in  recent  years  to 
establish protected areas.
Mrs. Coleen Mullen Manager of the Pafuri Camp 
for Wilderness Safari, SA
To understand the agreement between WS, 
the  KNP and the Makuleke community  in 
managing  the  Makuleke  concession  within 
the KNP.
Chief Inspector 
Tshabalala
Chief  of  Police  at  Pafuri 
Border Post
To  evaluate  the  type  of  traffic  using  the 
border,  the  role  played  by  the  police  in 
patrolling and the impact of the GLTFCA.
Table 4.10: Interviews conducted for the field work
Through my former flatmate, Dr. Taciana Catarina de Peao Lopez, I met part of 
the Portuguese community and people working for the United Nations coming from 
the Western world, with whom I tried to confront my ideas and understandings. By 
working for a week at the Maputo trade fair, FACIM, I met the first South African 
people, whom I became friend with and who triggered an endless series of meetings 
within a very close but consistent group of South-Africa, Rhodesians41 and British 
people who had been in the area for a long time. With a volunteer research project in 
Massingir,  I  met  people  working  for  CMC  Africa  Austral,  the  Southern  African 
branch of the Italian constructions cooperative. By partaking in a consultancy for the 
Ministry of Environmental  Affairs,  MICOA, I  travelled all  the way up to Pemba, 
where  I  realised  that  urban  planning  in  Mozambique  was  and  is  inexistent 
41 It  is  true  that  Rhodesia  has  changed  its  name  into  Zimbabwe  in  1981,  however,  it  would  be 
anachronistic to call Zimbabweans all the people born in Rhodesia, because (1) most of them still hold 
an invalid Rhodesian Passport, not a Zimbabwean one because they left the country; (2) they fought 
for Rhodesia and believed in it, regardless of all ethical and moral judgements; (3) they are bonded by 
a subconscious sense of homelessness, as they are neither South African, despite having lived there for 
at least 20 years, nor Mozambican (in this cases), they belong to a land that  no longer exists.
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considering that the local government allocated to private owners plots of lands on 
the beach.  The paradox,  again,  is  firstly  that  all  access  to  the sea  is  blocked and 
nearby communities  whose main survival  resource is  fishing will  be deprived of 
their livelihoods; secondly that this is happening in a stunning area, next door to a 
new research centre for biological and marine studies,  whose targets also include 
poverty alleviation and community fisheries. This situation obviously reminded me 
of the planning and management strategies in the GLTFCA. Of course for each new 
person, there were many others to meet; everyone added value to my research by 
introducing  new  facts,  perspectives  and  commentaries  on  the  history  of  three 
countries, on the use and meanings of borders, on the adjustment to changes, on the 
future. The best Mozambican experiences were the cultural evenings organised either 
by the Franco-Mozambican cultural centre, where I first realised what it means to 
come from different cultures42. of The Nucleo de Arte, at times, organised Mozambican 
poetry reading sessions where people could go and read either their own work or 
famous local  poems.  Amazingly, for me,  poetry reading is   practiced more as  an 
alternative  gathering  for  the  youth  up  to  University  students,  and  is  very  often 
organised  by  the  international  cooperations  cultural  initiatives.  The  most  known 
evenings, organised by the Nucleo, were also attended  by older people who fought 
for and lived through the freedom of Mozambique and to see them now in the safety 
of their own independence was enlightening.  Political issues were seldom touched 
at the table, with the exception of international politics and globalisation, the current 
state of the country was not even thought of, if not in relation to the damage caused 
by foreign investors, and in general it seemed that young writers were proposing 
memories older people had long forgotten, and suggesting paths former fighters had 
long  abandoned.  On a  different  tone,  instead,  I  was  surprised  to  see  how many 
Rhodesians and South Africans came back to Mozambique as civilians after having 
fought  the  dirty wars  from the  1970s  to  the  1990s,  some with a  positive attitude 
42 During the European Film Festival, for instance, while watching ‘The Windows in Front’, only the 
Europeans and North Americans realised that the numbers carved on the old man’s arm meant he had 
been in a Nazi concentration camp, all the others missed the point and most the movie.
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towards the future, others with a tendency to let themselves go to memories, which 
of course were recorded in my note book. The general idea is that the past might 
have had its reason then, but now the situation has changed and they must adapt to 
survive. In a way, this behaviour reflects the spirit of the pioneers who adapted to 
the new frontier, just like these regional expatriates adjust to living or trading across 
the border, often without scruples, but then again not many Mozambicans have them 
either. 
As I met and socialised with most of these people outside working hours, I was 
often taking mental notes of the topics discussed and then writing at  home. This 
delayed transcription,  however,  allowed me to be more objective in my analysis, 
because I had gathered information and perceptions from different people, and I had 
to make  distinguos in order to see the differences in each person’s interpretation of 
the same fact. I  have only used recordings and transcriptions in the focus groups 
with the communities around Massingir for the cultural landscape project and with 
the chief  in Dumela,  because of the need to translate  from Shangaana into either 
Portuguese or English. All the people I talked to and whose comments are reported 
in this text knew about  my research and the type of information I was looking for. 
Some asked not to be named and this will be respected. 
4.3.3 Research in Pafuri and Dumela
Qualitative research in the localities was essential to complete the basic set of data 
acquired with the questionnaire. Because I had to plan time not only for work, but 
for emergencies,  including taking people to the Doctor’s   or to hospital,  going to 
South Africa for fuel  and food and fetching water,  my field activities  were more 
scheduled than in Maputo. In the early mornings and late afternoons I would go and 
interview  people  with  questionnaires,  which  also  included  some  extra  open 
questions if the people were either interested or interesting or both.  In the other 
hours of the day I would meet the chief, talk to the people and look at the general 
movements in the village from my primary position right in the centre.  Being the 
only white girl, with a white friend, meant that a lot of people spontaneously came to 
140
see what had brought me there, and this is how I met a father and his two sons from 
Pretoria, going back home after spending several weeks in the bush and the Zinave 
National Park for holiday, and a group of American driving on the northern Mapai 
road to reach one of Inafrica Safaris hunting reserve near the Gonarezhou National 
Park, owned by the Coetzee family of Vaalwater.  These small encounters showed 
that there is potential for tourism as an income-generating activity in the area, due to 
its physical and geographical characteristics. A group of Zimbabwean deminers also 
came to introduce themselves and this is how I got to know that the demining of 
Sengwe Corridor had started. I also participated in all community meetings with my 
two  research  assistants,  Lavie  one  of  chief  Muklave’s  nieces  from  Dumela 
(Shangaana-Portuguese)  and  Lydia,  a  girl  from  Makuleke  whose  parents  are 
migrants from Dumela and whose uncle is a plumber in Johannesburg and owner of 
the only  spaza shop43 in the village with a fridge. To me, Lydia,  still represents the 
best example of cross-border relations in the area. I spent time at the border talking 
to the Immigration officers, particularly Chief Serrano, who had been at Pafuri for 
many years and had witnessed the ruining of the Border Post especially after the 
2001  floods.  He  is  disenchanted  but  loyal  to  his  country,  thus  making  each 
conversation interesting especially when a new border jumper was being caught and 
a new fine or punishment needed to be enforced. By punishment, he meant social 
work, either in the machamba44 of the officers or cleaning the offices, until the person 
repaid his debt with the government. The law at Pafuri is always applied, but it is 
adapted to the reality of the place. This was the case until the new Limpopo National 
Park Rangers arrived and were placed in charge of border patrol to prevent illegal 
immigration – and that is when abuses and theft started and poor people in search of 
a job were left stranded in the bush. 
43 Spaza shop  is  a  South  African  term  indicating   small  shops  normally  in  poorer  areas  where 
necessities  can be found and occasionally a phone boot.  In disadvantaged or  rural  areas they are 
normally built of grey bricks with steal roofs. 
44 Machamba is a Shangaana term, used widely in the southern provinces,  for orchard, or small 
cultivated field for subsistence. 
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Direct  observation  was  the  most  important  source  of  knowledge  of  the  area, 
complementing  formal  and  informal  interviews.  To  observe  and  note  people’s 
behaviour, the types of approaches and attitudes towards me or fellow villagers, the 
mood swings according to who is present and who is not was not only interesting 
but precious. The oldest man in  Dumela to be very active on the public scene is 
Simon Chaukwe who is originally from Chicumbane, some 100 km south towards 
Mapai. He went to Pafuri for the first time to work in the mines, then opened his own 
shop, but the wars were never clement on him, and eventually he settled in Dumela 
with his  wife  and daughter.  He is  a  very straight  person,  attached to traditional 
values but  understanding of modernity,  however,  he does not condone drinking, 
which he rightfully sees as a social plague. People around him do not drink alcohol, 
not even a sip of beer,  and moderately maize beer,  because they are afraid of his 
judgement. I have never even seen the chief drinking in front of him, he prefers to 
leave and go to  Lydia’s uncle  spaza shop. He sees the potential brought about by 
events and people, and the fact that he accepted me on my first visit and introduced 
me to Chief Muklave when he came back from Pafuri, was my fortune. He organised 
everything for me, and people obeyed. In retrospect, his character was stronger than 
the Chief’s and the local Nyanga’s (witch doctor), the Chief’s brother. 
It is definitely through qualitative investigation that my research was successfully 
completed, firstly because all my readings about the three countries were discussed 
with people who lived those years; secondly because by working with private and 
governmental  organisations  I  had the  chance  to  see  more  of  the  country  and its 
policy-makers,  thus  becoming  aware  of  incongruences;  thirdly,  because  power 
relations between people and the conceptualisation of borders, nation and state into 
everyday  life  would not  have  been  so  clear  with  the  questionnaire  survey,  only. 
Selfishly,  I  must  admit,  I  would  also  never  have  had  a  personalised  tour  of 
Swaziland’s main conservation areas with their founder discussing paradigm shifts 
in conservation practices and policies, and the reality of it all. 
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4.4 PLACING DATA INTO CONTEXT
The research was carried out using a multi-disciplinary mixed method approach 
that included both qualitative and quantitative data collection as a primary source of 
data,  complemented  by  secondary  data45 collected  both  through  academic 
bibliographical  research  and  in  loco,  specifically  all  the  books  referring  to 
Mozambican history and the programmes of the FRELIMO party now out of print. 
Secondary data was used to evaluate the type and quantity of information available 
on the local field area, in order to avoid duplication of information, and provided the 
context to analyse the current implementation of the GLTFCA.
As mentioned before,  the field work lasted  one year  and a  half,  and deeply 
affected the aim and objectives  of  the  research.  Such  adjustment  was due to  the 
context I was presented with upon my arrival in Mozambique and its development 
trough time. Both the local and the regional fieldtrips, in fact, allowed me to place the 
GLTFCA  into  a  context  that  was  historical,  but  drawing  heavily  from  political 
geography,  which  is  why  from  a  pure  socio-economical  investigation,  the  scope 
shifted to a more complex view of the processes in place. Particularly, the zoning of 
the  LNP which  was decided  and approved just  before  my arrival  showed me a 
reality that  was completely  different  from the descriptions on official  documents. 
Moreover, by engaging in various activities and travels throughout the KNP and the 
Gaza Province, I became aware of the influence geography had and has on political 
decision-making, primarily in border areas. 
This section will briefly outline the essential information on the field research and 
the  methodology,  in  order  to  show  how  the  combination  of  both  academic 
methodology and life experiences provided the vast amount of information used in 
writing this thesis, which, to reiterate, was conceived out of a learning process and is 
written accordingly. 
45 Burgess, 1984
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4.4.1 Planning the research
The project  was  divided  into  three  main  phases:  planning;  investigating;  and 
writing-up.  However,  it  would be  very simplistic  to  describe  it  accordingly  as  it 
would  overlook  all  the  other  processes  that  prolonged,  hence  constructed,  the 
research.  Table  4.2  will  describe  schedules  specifically,  with  reference  to  all  the 
experiences undertaken while on the field. This will provide a rather comprehensive 
idea of how the field research developed into a field experience. The amount of time 
spent in Mozambique was initially planned to four plus four months, however, the 
situation  changed  due  to  mis-comprehension  and  non-compliance  to  agreements 
(First field work); delays in payments and the priority given to the funded project 
(Second field work); changes in the scope of the research towards political geography 
and  border  studies,  travelling  to  complete  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
investigations (Third field work). The time dedicated to the actual writing-up was 
unexpectedly reduced to a few months, instead of the canonical year which I had 
planned for, had contingencies not taken such a heavy toll on the research.
Project phase Timing Scheduled activity Real activity
Planning the 
project
January 2004 - 
January 2005
To plan activities; to find a link 
with IUCN, the selected 
research institute of affiliation, 
in Maputo;  and to update the 
bibliographical research.
An agreement was established 
with IUCN for an internship 
period of 4 months, which 
included support towards my 
field work. 
First field work February – May 
2005
To complete scoping visits to 
the research areas and begin the 
mapping of Dumela, whilst 
gathering generic information 
on the local history and socio-
economic relations
Only one field visit was possible 
with IUCN due to failure to 
maintain the agreement. The 
other was organised privately.
First review
(Italy)
June – August 
2005
To review the data collected and 
plan the quantitative survey.
The organisation of extra 
funding through a different 
project, and financially plan the 
field research.
Second field 
work
August – 
December 2005
To carry out the exploratory 
field work for the PhD and 
undertake the financed project.
The gathering of all information 
for the funded project, due to 
delays in organisational process 
for the acquisition of a vehicle. 
Second review
(Italy)
December 2005 
– January 2006
To review the data collected and 
plan the final phase of the field 
work with the quantitative 
survey.
The planning of the field work 
both exploratory and final.
Third field January – To carry out the field research The undertaking of various 
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work September 2006 and complete secondary data 
collection.
activities to complement the 
field research (qualitative data), 
and complete the field work.
Third review
(Italy)
September – 
November 2006
To review all data gathered and 
begin processing all 
information.
The data were reviewed and 
processing with Excel began.
Final field work November – 
December 2006
To begin writing-up and finalise 
all information with final 
interviews
Write-up began and field work 
was concluded.
Writing-up
(Italy)
December 2006 
– March 2007
To complete the thesis The thesis was completed
Table 4.11: Research phases
4.4.2 Quantitative research
The quantitative survey was essentially a four sections questionnaire, available in 
Attachment  7,  whose aim was to  confirm all  descriptions  of  livelihood strategies 
from the Sengwe Communal Land. Each question represented a topic, and questions 
on income were  inferred  by addressing  other  issues  such as  trading and family-
members working abroad. Considering  the case study was the village of Dumela, 
only, due to its geographical position, the population was not sampled but taken as 
total, that is 89 households. Unfortunately, the coordinates of one household do not 
have their matching questionnaire, and this is the only missing set of data, which 
was discarded during the statistical analysis, although being mapped. 
The sets  of  maps produced complement  the maps available  on the area from 
DINAGECA, the National Institute for Geography and Cartography of Mozambique, 
in terms of district distribution and villages locations, as well as the maps produced 
by  the  Peace  Park  Foundation  and AWF on the  GLTFCA.  The new maps  were, 
subsequently, used to ‘localise’ all assumptions and verify them against the primary 
and secondary data collected.
4.4.3 Qualitative research
Qualitative  research  was,  of  course,  more  varied  and  flexible  to  changes  in 
methodology. The primary data collected was the main contributor to the research, 
since  it  gave  the  research  an  innovative  scope,  as  well  as  serving  to  reach  the 
expected conclusion. 
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The most relevant data is derived from personal observation and recordings on 
my diaries. Considering the different experiences of living in Dumela and in Maputo, 
I decided to keep two sets of diaries: the first for the regional fields where all my 
travelling was recorded as well, and the second for Dumela and Massingir (the field 
area for the funded project). All the information was recorded either on the same day 
or on a weekly basis if the time was uneventful. Most of the information was cross-
referenced with photographs and documents, referring to a particular topic (such as 
the wars or conservation strategies).  In this way, I was able to keep a live memory of 
the  occurrence  that  could  be  incorporated  into  the  research,  and  automatically 
disregard those entries which were not relevant.
Semi-structured interviews were used to understand the point of views of major 
stakeholders in the GLTFCA and other conservation projects  in the region. Apart 
from a few questions that were serving the objectives of each interview (see Table 
4.1), the rest was a conversation, whose topics were varied according to how willing 
the  interviewee  was  to  go  into  details  about  conservation,  community-based 
approaches and informal vs. illegal activities.  In some cases, the first interview was 
followed by a series of updating meetings, particularly with  Dr. Ferrão discussing 
the outcomes of field research, the involvement of private investors, in and outside 
the LNP, and the governmental policies for the implementation of the GLTFCA.
A series  of meetings and informal conversations, finally,  were conducted with 
different  people,  whose  experience  of  Mozambique  varied  from  political  to 
militaristic, from conservationist to business activities, in order to discuss key topics 
for the research. All the people involved in such conversations were fully aware of 
the reasons why I was in Mozambique, of the nature of my studies and of the aims 
and objectives  of  my research.  I  occasionally engaged them into conversations to 
either  discuss  my  research  (particularly  with  Dr.  Stalmans  and  Dr.  Wishart),  or 
record  some  perceptions  on  the  recent  histories  of  the  three  countries,  both  in 
Mozambique and South Africa, as well as discuss the role of conservation in land 
distribution and the socio-economic development of the areas involved. 
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Typology Key informants Objectives
Conservation policy 
in Mozambique
Dr. M. Stalmans, Dr. M. Wishart, Dr. M. 
Couto, Prof. J.  Hutton, Mr. P. DuPont, 
Mr.  D.  Hofmeyr,  Chief  Insp.  Coetzer, 
Dr.  S.  Norfolk,  the  group  of  PhD 
students on the GLTFCA,
To establish the value attached to the 
GLTFCA  project  by  different 
stakeholder  and  professionals,  and 
evaluate the process.
History of the three 
countries and present 
time
Ms. Ana Leao, Mrs. Taciana Warburn, 
Ms. N. Thurton, Ms. P. Rolletta, Ms. S. 
Dos  Santos  ,Ms.  C.  Rocha,  Mr.  D. 
Bosman,  Mr.  P.  McIntosh,  Mr.  G. 
DuToit, Mr. D. Botha, Mr. T. Young
To  evaluate  perceptions  on 
colonisation  and  apartheid  regimes 
on the people who grew up within 
them and were directly or indirectly 
involved in the wars, as well as the 
current political situation.
Table 4.12: Informal conversations
4.5 CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF MOZAMBIQUE
The  context  in  which  the  research  was  carried  out  was  mainly  the  urban 
Mozambican  environment  of  Maputo,  the  neuralgic  centre  of  political  decision-
making with resonance in the remotest rural areas, with visits to Dumela and Pafuri, 
as  well  as  other  areas  in  Mozambique,  South  Africa  and Swaziland.  During  the 
period  I  spent in Mozambique,  the implementation of the GLTFCA moved giant 
steps towards international cooperation for different reasons. Firstly in terms of anti-
poaching and anti-migration across the border with South Africa, especially in view 
of the opening of the Giryiondo Border Post, near Letaba in the KNP in December 
2005, and the dropping of the fence protecting the wildlife sanctuary in the LNP, thus 
exposing communities to a higher risk of human-wildlife contact. Secondly, because 
the relocation of the three communities north of the Massingir Dam was approved by 
the  WB  and  other  donors,  namely  GTZ,  despite  all  argumentations  from  the 
villagers,  specifically Mavodze, where the administrator seats.  Thirdly, because of 
the talks to build a bridge over the Limpopo River, possibly at Mapai, to improve 
access to the GLTFCA from the northern section (Pafuri – Punda Maria).
In  the  past  two  years  the  country  has  generally  seen  an  increase  in  foreign 
investment,  particularly  South  African  and  Chinese,  in  tourism  and  general 
economic development related to the use of natural resources. This increase was due 
not only to the governmental complacency towards foreign capital, but also to the 
strategic  creation of  tax-free industrial  zones south of  Maputo,  along the Maputo 
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Development Corridor, and in the north along major routes to the sea in Nampula 
and  Cabo  Delgado46.  In  some  cases,  fisheries  for  instance,  the  government  had 
informal  (or  private)  interests  which  allow for  the  predation  and  devastation  of 
coastal resources by Chinese long-liners. Despite the war and the militaristic type of 
regime in place until the 1990s, however, the military and police sector have failed to 
keep  up  to  date  with  modern  technologies  that  would  contribute  to  reduce  the 
impact of illegal activities (from poaching to smuggling), due to lack of investment 
by  the  government  into  their  security  system.  Also  considering  the  poor  wages 
offered to officers, corruption has now taken over within the army and the police, 
from the cinzentinhos47 to higher ranks, thus affecting all visitors to the country. 
Tourism grew in 2005 by 37% (WTO source),  which is  the highest  rate in the 
world,  and despite  acceptable  arguments  that not all  entries  into the country are 
tourists due to visa requirements for businesses, it must be said that all people who 
come  to  Mozambique  do  engage  in  tourism  activities  and  do  visit  areas  in  the 
country other than Maputo, which is where most business deals are signed. Donors, 
finally, have continued to pour money into the country since the end of the civil war, 
which  created  an  addiction  to  foreign  currency  both  for  the  government  and 
privates, without requiring much accountability as to the destination of such funds. 
Overall,  Mozambique  is  a  stable  country  with  a  democratic  political  system, 
although it is very easy to argue the democracy48 of a country where two parties are 
sharing the pie, one of which will never manage to take over ‘democratically’ due to 
the capillary diffusion of  FRELIMO in urban and rural areas. The de-facto mono-
46 For further information see the website of the Centre for the Promotion of Investment (CPI), the 
governmental agency in charge of favouring and regulating foreign investment in all sectors. 
47 The term cinzentinhos refers to the lowest grade of policing, and it is derived from the colour of the 
uniform (greenish grey). These officers patrol the streets for illegal people, hence they are allowed to 
check passports and visas only and must conduct the illegal person to the police station for further 
checking and eventually detention. However, they do stop cars on the road pretending to act as traffic 
wardens, whose job is to patrol the streets and fine people who do not respect the code of the road. 
Since the cinzentinhos do not have a fine book with them, they usually threaten the person who has 
been stopped to be taken to the station unless  he/she pays the fine  there, which is  totally illegal. 
Unaware people or those not willing to waste time do pay the corruption fine and begin a never 
ending cycle, as information over the cars and owners are passed by to colleagues.
48 See Colliers, 2006, who discusses democracy and democratic values in Africa.
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party system has allowed for the private involvement of governmental ministers and 
officer  in  business  deals,  whose  detriment  to  the  country  socio-economic 
development  is  often  more  outstanding  than  the  benefits.  However,  since  the 
implementation  of  the  free  -trade  agreements  within  the  SADC  region,  which 
involves  the  suspension  of  the  VISA requirements  for  SADC nationals,  southern 
Mozamabique and especially the Maputo district experience soaring rates in violent 
crimes  which include car-highjacking at  gunpoint,  as  well  as  armed robbery  and 
burglary, which are typical of the South African crime scene and relatively unknown 
to the country.
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5. CROOKS’ CORNER, THE HEART OF THE GLTFCA
Where the Luvuvhu River twists its way through 
the wilderness to join the great Limpopo, there  
lies a forgotten corner of the Transvaal, left alone  
to brood in the solitude and the silence of the  
bush. (Bulpin, 1954, p. 21)
This is  the first  line of  Bulpin’s  introduction to  Crook’s  Corner:  a  very poetic 
image for the types of deals and ordeals which gave the name to the place, yet to 
paraphrase Donnan & Wilson1, some things can only happen at borders. The area is 
the  geographic  core  of  the  GLTFCA  and  bears  both  an  ecological  and  cultural 
significance for the objectives of the PPF and the land management of the TFCA. 
This,  in  fact,  would  be  the  area  attracting  most  animals  on  the  migratory  route 
towards the north, because the rivers would provide water on the way and the intact 
riverine forest would be a real shelter. The high presence of wildlife in the Pafuri 
area, actually, validate its ecological importance. Culturally, it is crucial because of its 
history as a cross-road of ethnicities, traders and history makers, which are inscribed 
in the historical background discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
This chapter aims firstly at describing Crooks’ corner and Pafuri using the little 
literature available,  which can be reduced to Bulpin (1954), Koch  et al. (1995) and 
Connor (2003) for the locality of Pafuri and the corner, with few integrations from 
South African promotional websites for tourism, which aim at portraying the cultural 
history of the countries many ethnic groups. The qualitative and quantitative field 
research, therefore, will contribute to this presentation and to the discussion of issues 
at the stake for the TFCA. Information will mainly be drawn from conversations with 
Chief Insp. Coetzer, of the Skukuza Police Station; interviews at the Pafuri Border 
Post with Chief Serrano of the Mozambican Immigration Office, and Chief Inspector 
Tshambalala of the Pafuri Border Post Police;  from conversations with Mr. Simon 
Chaukwe and Chief Muklave of Dumela, as well as the SANP guides who took me at 
the Thulamela archaeological site; from direct observations both in Kruger Park and 
1 See quote of the introduction Donnan & Wilson, 1999.
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the Limpopo Province, as well as in Mozambique. Secondly, the chapter will discuss 
the role engaged by Peace in promoting and implementing conservation in the TFCA. 
This last section will be theoretical, yet based on field work experience. 
5.1 THE HISTORY OF A LEGENDARY SPOT
Pafuri is a stretch of land situated in the north-east part of South Africa, which 
geographically  extends  into  both  Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe.  The  original 
inhabitants of the areas are Venda, a Congo-Niger Bantu group, which settled along 
the  Limpopo  River  and  whose  ancestry  lines  goes  back  to  the  Mapungubwe 
civilisation extending  from the Soutspanberg mountain range in the South to the 
Matopos hills in the north. The kingdom declined around the mid of the XIII century, 
but Vendas kept their territory along the River and their identity intact despite the 
migrations brought about by the Voortrekkers and the mfecane.  The territory which 
became an independent Bantustan in 1979, however, covers only a small portions of 
the original area of influence, as the population patterns had already been disrupted 
by the arrival of the Matabele and Tsonga-Shangaan people in the border area, and 
its political geography had changed by the state divisions and by the northwards 
expansion of the Kruger National Park. 
In  order  to  understand  why  this  place  is  widely  known  as  the  frontier  par  
excellance by all people in the three countries who have heard of it or been there, it is 
necessary to know what characteristic made it so famous. Firstly, the people of Pafuri 
have different clans of similar ancestry regardless of which country we are talking 
about. This is why this chapter will address the area as a whole, notwithstanding the 
borders. Secondly, the foreigners at Pafuri contributed to the creation of the myth of 
Crook’s Corner, where the legendary baobab so big to hide poachers was found and 
the border beacon could be moved according to which police was looking for you2. 
Thirdly, the border wars presented in the previous chapter in a national geo-political 
2 Found in The Ivory Trail, Bulpin (1954), these myths are part of the history of the place through the 
biography of the most famous poacher of all times, Bvekenya, whose sons and daughter still live in 
the Pafuri area: one works for the Wilderness Safari  - Pafuri Camp; the other used to work for CESVI 
in Zimbabwe. It remain a mystery whether they know of each other or not.
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perspective had a great impact locally, and contribute to explain why Peace is so 
essential to in land management for conservation along the border.
5.1.1 Tracing back the people of Pafuri
The waves of migrations to the Limpopo River began, of course, with the first 
Bantu tribes from East Africa, which gave origin to the first interbreeding with native 
San and Khoi Khoi people:  this pre-Iron Age period marked the formation of the 
Venda culture. The second and most important wave of migrations, to the purpose of 
the text, however, is the one generated by the mfecane of Shaka Zulu, and causing a 
dispersal of clans and families in the area that spans from Northern Zululand to Tuli 
Circle in the West, the Zambesi in the North and the Limpopo-Sabe in the East. The 
available bibliography on the  mfecane is  wide and varied to  the extent that  some 
events such as the arrival of Mzilikazi into Shona and Venda territory are widely 
documented, but the origin of the Shangaane-Tsonga empire is less clear, and so is its 
development3.  According  to  historical  accounts,  Shaka  succeeded  his  father 
Dingiswayo in 1818, and the  mfecane began only two years later. According to his 
research,  Du  Preez  states  that  Shaka’s  desperation  on  the  death  of  his  mother 
released his evil and the violence against his own and other people began4. As true as 
this story can be, it is more likely that other political and economical factors triggered 
the military power of the Zulu thus changing the human geography of the region for 
ever. Reader5 brings together the slave and other trades which were being dealt with 
in Delagoa Bay directly by the chiefs of the local peoples, despite the presence of the 
Portuguese at the Fort of Laurenço Marques (present day Maputo)6. To control the 
people around Delagoa Bay as well as the present day Tembe corridor connecting 
KwaZulu Natal to the Matola River estuary, therefore, meant the total control over 
3 This statement is particularly referred to Marks, 1967, and her commentary on four ‘new’ books on 
the history of Zulu in Natal. Other texts attempting to provide a chronological account of the Nguni of 
Soshangaane are both authored by Liesegang (1969 and 1970). 
4 Du Preez, 2004, Charter 9 is dedicated to the history of Shaka, but he figures in other chapters as 
well. Walter, 1966, also refers to the insanity of Shaka’s grief, but he clearly states it was a ruse to hide 
his ingenious plan of dividi et impera, based on social control and terror. 
5 Reader, 1994.
6 Information found in Liesegang, 1969.
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trade with Europeans. Hence, Shaka opened war against all the chieftainships along 
the corridor,  and forced them into a vassalage system of tributes.  From Du Preez 
account, it is very clear that Mzilikazi and Shoshangane, being both generals of the 
Zulu kingdom, left because threatened by Shaka himself, driven insane by grief and 
pain. In the historical accounts, however, the reasons which forced both generals to 
move are not clear,  although in both cases it  is stated that they continued to flee 
whenever Shaka was getting closer to their new location, which implies a degree of 
fear over past and future events7. The story of movement is very complex and not 
often consistent, since it has been traced back on governmental papers and epistles, 
imprecise maps, and oral accounts. What is clear though is that Mzilikazi moved 
north and was defeated once by the Voortrekkers, thus learning the importance of 
European weapons,  which were eventually used to defeat  the Kalanga Shonas of 
Great Zimbabwe by his successor Gundwane in 1873, at the climax of their power8. 
Soshangane,  instead,  moved  east,  thus  avoiding  the  Ndwandwe,  of  present  day 
Swaziland, but he was not the only leader in the migration eastwards. The first two 
Nguni chiefs to have left,  Nxaba Msane and Ngwana Maseko, moved into Rozwi 
areas in Southern Mashonaland, which extended to the Limpopo River in the South 
East. It is uncertain, however, if the two chiefs marched together and for how long. 
Similarly  the  later  migrations  of  two  other  Nguni  chiefs  Soshangane  and 
Zwangendaba, cannot be clarified as to whether the two operated together in the 
conquests  or  not9.  Transvaal  and  Southern  Mozambique,  anyhow,  had  been 
influenced  by  Nguni  migrations  since  1821.  This  would  explain,  therefore,  why 
elders  in  Dumela  refers  to  the  ‘Nguni  wars’  as  to  the  reason for  their  dispersal, 
instead of the mfecane10. Considering that every time the elders were talking about a 
war-related displacement they were referring to the initiator of the war, as was the 
case for the ‘Ian Smith war’ referring to the independence fights in Rhodesia, the 
7 Du Preez, 2004, see above. Marks, 1967, Liesegang 1970, Beach 1974 and Etherington, 2004.
8 A full account of the relations between Matabele and Shona, based on secondary sources, is to be 
found in Beach, 1974.
9 See Liesegang, 1970.
10 Information drawn from fieldwork.
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naming of the ‘Nguni wars’ indicates that at the time of the scattering (difecane) of the 
Nguni people, other chiefs came into play, and Shaka was only one of them. 
Map 5.15: Map of the Nguni migrations (Source: Liesegang, 1970)
By assuming the authenticity of Liesegang’s reconstruction, also backed by Marks 
(1967) and Walter (1966), the period which followed the  mfecane was signed by the 
imposition  of  the  Zulu-style  vassalage  state  by  the  four  generals  in  the  areas 
conquered. Only Mzilikazi and Soshangane, however, came to close to the territory 
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the Zulus of Shaka and his successors wanted to acquire: the route to Delagoa Bay 
and the people in Transvaal, due to the beginning of labour intensive mine works in 
Kimberly. Mzilikazi, therefore, went north pass the Limpopo River into South West 
Mashonaland and Soshangane occupied the area north of Maputo, but eventually 
had to leave from his head-quarters at Bilene and escape inland, pass the Limpopo 
and the Sabe River.  The lower Limpopo valley,  however,  was the area where he 
settled eventually due to the break-out of tse-tse fly at the Sabe River. The Gaza-
Nguni, eventually, had a king and a kingdom extending from Matabeleland, after the 
victories over the Shona, to the Indian Ocean coast from Bilene to Inhambane11. By 
the second half of the XIX century, therefore, Pafuri was no longer a Venda territory, 
but a melting pot of Ndebele and Gaza-Nguni who found in common language and 
culture the means for peaceful co-habitation: after all, both groups had moved away 
from their kraal in Zululand less than a century earlier. 
5.1.2 Crooks’ Corner: the cultural melting pot
The core of the varied Pafuri area, of course, would have to be a place bearing 
useful qualities for local inhabitants, and this was Sesengamabwene, or ‘the Place of the 
Sandstone’12, but it was also known to the white hunters and renegades as Crook’s 
corner:
the name man gave long ago to this secluded and sinister wedge of land. It was  
the  last  home  for  many  a  curious  and lawless  character:  a  sanctuary  from 
civilisation,  whose  solitary  state  was  paradise  to  all  those  whose  deeds  or  
inclinations made imperative a retreat to some last stronghold of the lawless  
(Bulpin, 1954, p. 20)
This description alone serves over a thousand descriptive words for the place, which 
surprisingly still conveys the same sensations despite over a century and many a war 
have passed by. Notwithstanding the presence of at least three cultural groups, the 
Venda, the only original population, now found along the Zimbabwean border in 
11 See full account in Beach, 1974.
12 Bulpin, 1954, p. 20, explains that Crooks’ corner lays ‘atop a low, 500 feet high ridge, which formed a 
sort of topographical backbone to this wild wedge of land between the Rivers [where] the huntsmen 
found the stone they used in braying and dressing skin’. 
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South Africa; the Tsonga, from the Gaza empire; the Makuleke of arguable origin as 
described in Chapter 1.6.2, some white people decided to move up there following 
the Ivory trail, a trading route which did not use Delagoa Bay, rather the modernising 
Northern railway in South Africa, through Transvaal.
The old adventurers’ way to Makhuleke left the Great North Road, Midway 
between the railhead at Pietsberg and Louis Trichard. It dropped down in the  
bushveld, and for some fifty miles made a thirsty journey through the heat and  
dust to what was known as Klein Letaba […] a major milestone along the Ivory  
Trail. […] Beyond the hotel […] it went east-wards to a solitary store standing  
a the headwaters of the Shingwidzi. This store […] marked the boundary of the  
lion country. From thence east-wards, all travellers proceeded with increased 
caution […] (Bulpin, 1954, p.22)
This  was the first  trait  of  the Ivory Trail,  now the main tourism route in the 
Limpopo  Province,  connecting  Johannesburg  to  the  northern  part  of  the  Kruger 
National Park, through former Bantustans and archaeological sites. The name of the 
route is, of course, emblematic of the main resource at Pafuri and explains also why it 
attracted Europeans in search for both fortune and adventure. Wild game, including 
big tuskers (elephants) and rhinos, were available both in Mozambique, where no 
attempt of formal conservation was made until the 1960s, and in South Africa, where 
the  border  area  of  the  Shingwedzi  became  a  game  reserve  in  1903  and  was 
incorporated into  the KNP in  1926 only13.  As  Koch  et  al. point  out,  conservation 
practices in Zimbabwe were ahead of their time thanks to the application of the 1900 
London Convention on the Preservation of Animals, and the heritage left by Sir Cecil 
Rhodes upon his death in 1902, leading to the creation of the Rhodes-Matopos and 
the Nyanga National Parks. As a consequence, game hunting was forbidden, but to 
native population only, who had already been relocated in the 1920s in the African 
Reserves  (Tribal  Trust  Lands),  on  the  driest  parts  of  the  country14.  The 
implementation  of  conservation  strategies,  therefore,  severely  impacted  the 
13 Aside from Bvekenya’s biography, Koch et al., 1995, refers to Carruthers, 1989, when stating that in  
the Transvaal, Boer and African polities prospered from a joint trade in animal products. The decline in wildlife  
species accelerated in the late 1800s with the discovery of diamonds in the Cape and then gold in the Transvaal  
and the accompanying influx of European settlers (p. 8).
14 See Koch et al., 1995, pp. 11 – 12.
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livelihood of the natives who hunted for both trade and food-stock, hence it is not 
surprising that local people at Pafuri would be so kin to contribute to the hunting 
trips of white hunters, in exchange for meat. The Shagaan, according to Bulpin, were 
particularly good trackers and were often used by professional poachers in the Pafuri 
area,  also  because  of  their  knowledge  of  the  Mozambican  territory.  As  the 
particularly  harsh  climate  still  forces  local  population  in  the  Pafuri  area 
(Mozambique and Zimbabwe) to live on tree berries, their knowledge of the types of 
bushes and the fruit they bear is particularly significant of their knowledge of the 
bush and its inhabitants15. As the story tells, however,  the fact that there were no 
protected areas in Mozambique does not imply that the Portuguese were not jealous 
of their own ivory stock16.
Assuming  that  Europeans  and  African  whites  began  to  arrive  at  Pafuri,  and 
Crooks’ Corner area, in the second half of the XIX Century, before the first migratory 
influx to the Kimberly  and Johannesburg mines was settled in South Africa,  it  is 
plausible to posit that people at Pafuri have been used to trading and dealing with 
foreigners for at least half a century, which made them accustomed to identify and 
evaluate  goods  and  information  that  are  precious  to  the  white  people.  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  local  people  did  understand  the  value  of  money  in 
transaction, just as their chief understood the value of weapons to fight a war. The 
opening of the mines, more than the plantations in Natal, in fact, began to attract apt 
men  to  South  Africa  in  order  to  gain  small  fortunes  through  hard  work17.  The 
Shangaan were  much sought after  also  for  the mines  because  they would accept 
three years contracts, as opposed the averaged six months on natives in South Africa, 
and would accept to work underground18. Without any issue on papers and ID cards, 
15 A detailed account on edible berries was given by Mr. Simon Chaukwe, Dumela, during the field 
trip of May 2005, yet a real classification was not possible due to the short stay. On the other visits, the 
changing season did not allow for identification. 
16 See Bulpin, 1954, many references throughout the book.
17 Kanyenze, 2004. 
18 Maloka, 1997, in commenting four books on the labour migrations to the Rand mines since 1885. The 
preference for the Shangaan resulted in 1893 in the negotiating with the Portuguese authorities of an 
agreement for their emigrations, reaching’ a Luso-Transvaal ad hoc labour agreement’ (p. 215)
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people would cross rivers and mountains to get to the place where workers were 
sought,  and  only  there  were  issued  with  documents  to  allow  them  to  stay  and 
work19.  Only  towards  the  end  of  the  XIX  century  during  the  war  against 
Gungunhane, the Gaza Emperor, did Shangaan people leave their jobs to fight for 
their  king20,  which  is  symptomatic  of  the  duality  of  their  life  system,  based  on 
modernity to earn a living, yet faithful to traditional chieftainship for administration. 
The traditional  practice  of  the  lobola (bride  price)  which was customarily  paid in 
cattle during pre-colonial time, then in hoes due to the 1860s epidemic, was finally 
paid in gold pound sterling as mine work became a customary activity of young 
men21. This shows on the one hand the understanding of the value of money, and 
also the fear that by accumulating wealth the youth would overpower the elderly in 
the hierarchical structure of villages22, which had already been subdivided by mine 
structures  of  boss  boys and  mafunda23.  These  facts  are  essential  to  understand 
mechanisms within the border  milieu, which are still valid at present, although in a 
different  perspective.  Unfortunately  for  the Shangaan,  Gungunhane was defeated 
and  in  1897  a  new  agreement  was  signed  for  ‘the  regular  supply  of  Shangaan 
labour’24, which also implied a deal in the payment of labourers, part of which was 
going directly  into the gold reserves  of  the Portuguese  government25.  For Pafuri, 
finally,  the regulation of  work in  the mines through WENELA/TEBA,  to  avoid a 
modern,  yet  not  less  harsh,  slave  trade26,  involved  the  establishment  of  two 
19 Bulpin, 1954, however, also suggests that local hunters at Crooks’ Corner would act as touts, thus 
creating a personalised network of work supply, which could have been compared to slavery. It was 
this informal trade that WENELA sought to halt.
20 Ibid. pp. 214 – 216.
21 Ibid, and Roesch 1991. 
22 As  confirmed  by  Lubkemann  (2005),  referring  to  Machaze,  in  the  north-east  part  of  the  Gaza 
Province. 
23 Manghezi, 1998, is the only author to discuss this division between those who had a position as 
‘boss-boys’ thus endangering survival strategies of normal workers,  mafundas, in order to acquire a 
position, which in turn reflected in their life back home.
24 Maloka, 1997. p. 216.
25 Manghezi, 1998.
26 This doesn’t necessarily mean that similar persuasive strategies were not used by recruiters, such as 
the sending of gifts to the chiefs and the employment of tradesmen and missionaries living in the 
areas or, as a last resource, force. This practices lasted until the 1920s (Maloka, 1997), when the supply 
became stable as working in the mines became a sort of passage rite for all youngsters.
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recruitment  posts  on each  side  of  the  borders,  whose  remnants  are  still  visible27. 
These were the only landmarks of a border division between the two countries, since 
the  border  post  in  itself  was  not  operational  as  a  node  of  entry.  The  area  was 
therefore  stuck  into  a  paradox  of  living  within  a  cultural  milieu  divided  into 
economic and political areas: a multi-level geographical scale. 
5.1.3 The bush war: disrupting traditional livelihoods? 
The bush war originated from the militarisation of political movements in both 
Rhodesia and South Africa,  for the implementation of majority rule against racial 
segregation.  These  political  movements,  by  accepting  the  armed  struggle,  were 
labelled  and  fought  as  terrorists  in  both  white-ruled  countries.  The  physical, 
economic  and  military  support  provided  by  newly  independent  Mozambique, 
moreover,  paved the way for exogenous insurrectional  acts  of  civil  disobedience, 
which escalated into a civil war, both as a punishment for its regional involvement 
and as a warning against the endorsement of Marxism-Leninism. Despite having a 
regional and international scale, the war was actually fought between neighbouring 
countries,  hence  the  borders  became  the  core  of  all  fighting,  particularly  in  the 
Rhodesian phase. The salient events of this sad period in the contemporary history of 
Southern Africa have been presented and discussed in Chapter 3; here, instead, it is 
important to note the effect on the cultural milieu, for Pafuri and the Limpopo valley 
in Mozambique.
The  officialisation  of  Shangaan  migrations  into  South  Africa  contributed  to 
sustain rural livelihood, as well as to maintain the cultural milieu of Pafuri as the 
convergence of former Zulu chieftainships whose history had been reconciled in that 
part  of  Southern  Africa:  remote,  because  peripheral  to  all  centres  of  political  or 
economic  power.  The  independence  of  Mozambique,  in  1975,  impaired  this 
equilibrium because of the support that the new FRELIMO government granted to 
military organisations from Rhodesia, first, and South Africa, second, in their fight 
27 The recruitment post in South Africa, in fact, was so well kept that has been turned by TEBA into a 
lodge, operational since 2005.
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for majority rule.  Furthermore, the development of RENAMO, as a Ndau (Shona) 
group from the centre of Mozambique28, and the controversial policies of aldeiamento 
and  dynamisation29 of the rural areas pursued by FRELIMO, contributed to bring a 
regional war to the local scale: the civil war was, in fact, based more on traditional 
and  cultural  allegiance  than  on  military  and  political  affiliation.  In  order  to 
understand the effects of the war, whether we agree or not with those researchers 
who firmly believe in the escalation to a Mozambican civil war30, on the population at 
Pafuri, it is very important to bear in mind the differentiation in post-independence 
African countries between the State and the Nation. Although FRELIMO contributed 
greatly to the liberation of Mozambique from the Portuguese yoke, the government 
was  still  struggling  with  creating  a  nation  within  the  colonial  boundaries,  by 
interrupting all connection to tradition and ethnical differences. If on the one hand 
the population was ‘grateful’ to FRELIMO for newly acquired independence, on the 
other hand the continuation of Portuguese policies in terms of land distribution, the 
substitution  of  traditional  with  political  leadership,  and  the  enforcement  of 
positivism in education, were not often appreciated by rural people31. This division 
28 Roesch,  1992,  thoroughly explains  the NMR project  as a  typical  dividi  et  impera strategy on the 
Rhodesian side, by involving former FRELIMO ruling elites which had been excluded because of their 
incapacity to accept a nationalistic view of the State, able to encompass ethnical divisions. The Ndau 
characterisation of RENAMO became stronger under the South African patronage as the movement 
became more independent and the new leadership of Alfonso Dlakama implemented military strategy 
based on ethnicity. See also Lubkemann, 2005. 
29 Dynamising rural Mozambique was one of the priorities of the FRELIMO Marxist-Leninist approach 
to economic growth, which included the maintenance of Portuguese-style aldeias, small villages with a 
health centre and a school, which allowed to provide for basic needs as well as to maintain control 
over  people.  Grupos  dynamisadores (dynamising  groups)  were  formed  by  the  government  or 
spontaneously  to  ‘explain  the  party  line,  carry  out  basic  governmental  functions,  prevent  the 
destruction of local businesses and factories,  and maintain production (Pitcher, 2002, p. 48). In the 
many discourses of Samora Machel, however, the idea of dynamising groups appears between the 
lines, as work supervision is needed to maintain levels required (Machel, 1975, pp. 11-23).
30 The debate is fully exhausted in the introduction of Roesch, 1992.
31 See Roesch (1992) and Hermele (1998). S. Machel, discussing the role of education in the formation 
of national unity is worth quoting here: ‘O colonialismo procurou acentuar todas as divisões étnicas, 
linguísticas, religiosas, culturais que podiam exsistir entre a população moçambicana. Por outro lado, 
a educação tradicional, exaltando o culto da comunidade linguística a que a pessoa pertence, inculcou-
lhe uma attitude de desprezo, por vezes mesmo de ódio, em relação às outras comunidades’ and ‘A 
educação deve dar-nos uma personalidade moçambicana, que sem subserviência alguma, assumendo 
a  nossa  realidade,  saiba  em  contacto  com  o  mundo  exterior,  assimilar  criticamente,  as  ideias  e 
experiências de outro povos, transmitindo-lhes também o fruto da nossa reflexão e prática’ (1975, pp. 
36 and 35) [Colonialism managed to stress all the ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural divisions 
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between political obliging and cultural affiliation was more representative along soft 
permeable  borders  where  flexible  citizens,  to  paraphrase  Ong,  had  created  a  safe  
space32, characterised by a network of kinships and employment opportunities. 
The  Ian Smith  war,  as  known to local  people at  Pafuri33,  marked the first  and 
harsher period of disruption for the Pafuri  safe space, as Gaza became a frontier for 
the Rhodesian army during operations against ZANLA army. NMR was unheard of 
at the time in Pafuri, but the war was very much part of the lives of people, crushed 
between the Limpopo River and the mined border.  It  was at this time that Chief 
Dumela led his people across the River into a safer area some 12 kms south from the 
border post on the main road to Mapai. The kraal stayed there from 1975 until 1980, 
and despite connections with family in Zimbabwe were impossible, the movements 
towards South Africa continued both legally through TEBA and illegally, jumping 
the border along the KNP fence. The conflict, however, took its tool and if 1975, as 
Wardman remarks,  was a peak year for mine recruitment,  with 19% of the active 
male population of Gaza being employed through TEBA only, the percentage fell to 
4% in the following year34. Since mining was the main source of livelihood, hence of 
agricultural investment in the Province, it is also possible to assume that the reduced 
number in migrations was due to the change in agreement over mine employment 
between FRELIMO and South Africa, in line with Machel’s pledge35 to put an halt to 
which would have existed amongst the Mozambican population.  Similarly traditional education, by 
exalting the cult of linguistic communities which a person belongs to,  instilled an attitude of spite, 
occasionally even hate, in relation to other communities. (…) Education must give us a Mozambican 
personality,  which without  subservience  and understanding our reality,  can be in  touch with the 
exterior world, can critically learn ideas and experiences of other people, while transmitting the fruit 
of our actions and reflections – Translated by the author]
32 Hughes, 1998, thoroughly discuss in the introduction to his paper the borderlands of Mozambique, 
within the anthropological framework of border studies. Ong, 1993, is quoted in this paper.
33 The name was always used to indicate the conflict with Rhodesia, denoting a knowledge of current 
political affairs in the neighbouring country.
34 Wardman, 1985, p. 296. 
35 Despite his father had been a cotton grower in the Colondado do Limpopo and miner himself, and 
through this activity was able to buy plows and cattle, thus becoming a very successful farmer by 
1940, Machel considered mine recruitment a new form of enslavement, unarguably a demonstration of 
the evils of capitalism. This view he summarise in this few lines discussing the most cruel forms of 
exploitation at  the hand of the enemies  of  the revolution:  ‘Há a venda dos trabalhadores para as 
minas, os jovens partem fortes para as minas. Muitos morrem nos desastres nas minas. Mais de 2500 
morrem nas minas por ano. Outros, não sabemos o número, voltam sem um braço, sem uma perna, os 
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South  African  enslavement  of  Mozambicans  in  the  sector36.  This  change  in 
international  agreement  did  happen,  but  it  was  not  due  to  FRELIMO’s  ideals  of 
freedom,  rather  to  the  direct  involvement  of  South  Africa  in  the  war  and  its 
government refusal to allow Mozambican citizens in the mine. The practice was, in 
fact, on the one hand supplying FRELIMO’s coffers with South African gold, thus 
financing the war, and on the other hand allowing potential terrorist and subversives 
in the very heart of South African economy.
RENAMO only arrived in Gaza in 1983, that is after South Africa had taken over 
the destabilisation project, and within five years the war had spread to the whole 
province,  from  the  coast  to  the  much  more  impacted  borders,  causing  the 
displacement  of over 100,000 people37.  The traditional looting system enforced by 
RENAMO to feed its militia and the civilians, which were part of the small guerrilla 
groups,  the  importance  bequeathed  to  traditional  spiritual  beliefs  and  magical 
practices  and  the  maintenance  of  the  Ndau  origin  as  an  ethnic  discriminatory 
element38, all contributed to the development in Gaza of an unfair conflict between 
the bandits 39and the people who were Shangaan first and Mozambicans, as well. The 
combined effect of the most severe droughts of the decade in the first half of the 
1980s40 and  the  presence  of  RENAMO  on  the  territory,  produced  a  period  of 
starvation  affecting  up  to  700,000  people  between  the  Provinces  of  Gaza  and 
pulmões comidos pela tubercolose’. [There is the selling of workers for the mines, the youth leave 
strong for the mines. Many die in the disasters on the mines. More than 2500 died every year because 
of the mines. Others, we do not know how many, come back without an arm, without a leg, with their 
lungs eaten by Tuberculosis – Translation by the author]
36 Roesch,  1992, also claims that mining was not only a source of livelihood but,  in some cases,  a 
contribution towards small entrepreneurial initiatives in rural and agricultural areas. Wardman, 1985, 
affirms that those peasants who, after independence, tried to go back to the mines found out that ‘this 
alternative was no longer open’ (p. 296) without adding further explanations. 
37 See Roesch, 1992, p.468.
38 Lubkemann (2005), Roesch (1992), and Hall & Young (1992) all describe in detail the characteristics 
of the RENAMO guerrilla war, ideologies and practices as opposed to the traditional Mozambican 
way of life.
39 During the field research in Dumela and other parts of Mozambique, it was noticed that RENAMO 
was never mentioned in discussing the war, the rebels were referred to as bandits,  a terms which 
marks not only the illegality of the movement but also the social exclusion of people who were outside 
both the national and traditional system. Other researchers have noted the term ‘bandit’ as opposed to 
FRELIMO, and these are Lubkemann (2005) and Roesch (1992).
40 Hanlon, 1991.
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Inhambane. For the community of Dumela, this period translated into high mobility 
as narrated by an old widow (respondent of questionnaire no. 8). This lady, unlike 
most villagers, had no relatives in neighbouring countries, and so had no options but 
to hide in the bush with her family of four, and eat out of natural resources. Both her 
husband and one of their children did not survive to the war, whereas the one who 
did  survive  now lives  in  South  Africa,  but  never  comes  home41.  The  rest  of  the 
inhabitants went to either Zimbabwe or South Africa, at first hosted by relatives then 
into refugee camps, where some also learnt a living. Respondent to questionnaire no. 
11, actually, is a pastor and was trained as a tailor in the Sengwe refugee camp. He 
returned  to  Mozambique  only  a  few  years  ago,  because  his  ministry  had  been 
continuing amongst the Sengwe people. Him and his wife live mainly off their own 
resources, and subsistence agriculture in their  machamba (orchard). Their son works 
on  temporary  contracts  in  South  Africa  but  does  not  earn  enough  to  send 
remittances. 
The general reaction to the violence produced by what Lubkemann refers to as a 
fragmented  war,  for  its  geographical  and  social  characteristics42,  was  therefore 
migration.  Helped by the physical  geography of  Crooks corner,  such movements 
followed partially the usual channels of TEBA, and that is until 1987 when South 
Africa banned the recruitment of Mozambicans in the mines43, but used above all the 
traditional migratory patterns of border jumping into South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
where family and social networks were in place. By the end of the war, displaced 
refugees  in  these  two  countries  were  counted  at  about  one  (1)  million  people, 
amongst whom almost the entire population of Dumela. Despite the suffering and 
the  disruption,  therefore,  the  war  contributed  on  the  one  hand  to  create  a 
Mozambican identity, as a reaction to the ethnic separation which was at the basis of 
41 This story was collected on the field, while surveying the village. The woman, a well-know user of 
maize beer and ilala palm wine, was not very clear about what happened during and after the war. 
Her story is also told in Connor, 2003, although with some differences. From the description, however, 
the two women are the same one.
42 Lubkemann, 2005.
43 See Hall & Young, 1997.
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RENAMO, and on the other hand tied those ethnic and cultural knots with people 
across the border, thus maintaining the separation between the state, the nation, and 
the cultural belonging which paradoxically created a safe border area for post-war 
survival at Pafuri. 
5.2  PAFURI: WHAT TYPE OF BORDER?
“If you ever get into trouble, just remember that beacon. That’s  
why most of us live here. Whoever comes for you, you can always  
be on the other side in someone else’s territory; and if they all  
come at once, you can always sit on the beacon top and let them 
fight over who is to pinch you”. (Bulpin, 1954, p. 29).
Ranger  stated  in  1994  that  Great  Britain,  France  and  Portugal  drew  African 
borders  as  ‘sifters  of  labour  rather  than as  barriers  to  its  movement’44,  and local 
communities not only took advantage of this but, as Hughes (1998) points out, have 
erased inconvenient borders thus creating a free movement of people,  goods and 
services,  way  before  the  SADC ever  considered  it  feasible.  This  situation  is  also 
typical in cases where one state is considerably wealthier and better administrated 
than the other(s), as it is the case of the three countries object of the research. In the 
previous chapters, the nature of borders in general have been discussed as well as the 
historical  formation  of  African  borders,  beginning  with  the  Political  Geography 
definition of a border as the container of a nation-state, a political and economical 
model developed in Europe and imported in the colonies. The role of borders in the 
context of local activities and national political decision-making were then presented 
to argue that Pafuri, as many African borders, was treated as a remote frontier zone 
unless there existed a political or economic requirement to tighten control: as it was 
the case of the bush wars, first, and transfrontier conservation at present. Finally, the 
perception of borders as areas of ‘socio-political ambivalence’45 has been discussed 
with  reference  to  illegal  and  informal  cross-border  activities.  Situated  in  such  a 
peripheral area, in relation to all centres of decision-making, and having a history of 
44 Quote from Ranger, 1994, found in Hughes, 1998, p. 537.
45 Asiwaju, 1985, in Hughes, 1998, p. 535.
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transnational kinships, Pafuri lends itself  to exemplify the geo-physical and social 
characterisation of border areas. 
Event Border of crossing Date of event Frequency of trips
Rescued by a Zimbabwean 
donkey-trained cart from 
Sengwe coming from the Pafuri 
border post.
Mozambique – 
Zimbabwe
5th  March 05 At least one a 
week.
Given a lift to a Mozambican 
Police officer to Dumela. He 
was then proceeding to Sengwe 
to drink ilala palm beer
Mozambique – 
Zimbabwe
6th March 05 Whenever 
possible
Visited by demining team at 
Dumela
Mozambique – 
Zimbabwe
3rd Sept. 06 On holiday day - 
Sundays
Found an old Zimbabwean 
man, visiting a priest who was 
in Sengwe as a refugee
Mozambique – 
Zimbabwe
6th Sept. 06 Occasional
Table 5.13: Events indicating cross-border relations with Zimbabwe.
Pafuri is a soft border area allowing uncontrolled movements within the three 
countries.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  local  police  both  in  South  Africa  and 
Mozambique is not aware of these fluxes, yet with the understanding that most of 
them  are  related  to  culture,  friendship,  and  economic  need,  action  is  not  often 
required.  During the field research,  for instance,  a few incidents  showed that the 
Dumela-Sengwe relations are so strong in the social and economic context, that the 
border  (marked  by  two  poles  only)  has  in  fact  been  erased.  Table  5.1,  actually, 
provides  four  examples  showing not  only  that  movements  along the borders  are 
many, but that even officers who should be preventing these from happening engage 
in crossing the border, thus indicating that the area has adjusted to a self-regulatory 
code for movements: condoned fluxed are those related to livelihood strategies and 
contingencies, only.
The questionnaire  survey in Dumela,  in addition, shows the extent  of kinship 
relations,  with  exclusion  of  direct  family,  that  is  son  and  daughters.  Table  5.2 
indicates that only a small percentage of villagers do not have relations in the two 
closest  countries.  This  is  either  because  the  respondents  do  not  have  family  any 
longer, as it is the case for two respondents, or because they have moved to Dumela 
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from elsewhere  in Mozambique.  The most significative case,  in this  sense,  was a 
young boy,  who was  born  in  Pafuri  as  his  mother  (from Xai-xai,  southern  Gaza 
Province)  had been working at the border post.  As he began to migrate to South 
Africa to work as a garden boy in  a private house, he had a shelter in Dumela, but 
no family in the village nor in the two neighbouring countries.
Cross-border 
kinship 
20 11 41 
27,8 15,3 56,9 
Coun
t Row % 
yes Relatives in 
other countrie
s 
South 
Africa 
Zimbabw
e 
Both 
Country of the 
relatives 
Table 5.14: Percentage of Dumela villagers with kins across the borders.
Finally, the number of visits paid to each other is only slightly higher in relation to 
Zimbabwe.  What must also be taken into account is  that most interviewees  were 
elder people who are receiving visits mostly from people of their own age, within the 
group of family and friends.  Without means of transport,  therefore,  it  becomes a 
strenuous undertaking for them. This is how personal observation shows, instead, 
that crossing the forest is a frequent trip for younger people or people with means of 
transport.
Secondly, Pafuri is a permeable border area in terms of legal and illegal trading 
and migrations towards South Africa.  Having considered informal movements of 
people and goods for livelihoods, such as the selling of agricultural produces, it is 
important to note that there are three preferred routes in and out of the countries by 
illegal traffickers: (1) the power lines corridor; (2) Crooks’ Corner; (3) the Madimbo 
corridor (from Zimbabwe) into Venda area46. 
The  case  represented  by  the  Madimbo  Corridor  into  Bennde  Mutale,  a  little 
Venda Village on the main road from Pafuri Gate to Tshipise, fully explain the extent 
of the sense of common heritage which transcends borders. At the end of the month, 
in fact, people receiving their pension exuberates the number of people living in the 
46 Interview with Chief Insp. Tshambalala, Pafuri, 12th Dec. 2006.
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village.  Despite  the  permanent  army  patrol  along  the  River,  in  fact,  many 
Zimbabweans still manage to get through. From the Mozambican side, instead, it is 
job seekers who attempt illegal crossings and are occasionally caught by the Police of 
both countries,  and now by the two armed park rangers  in  Mozambique.  Again 
indicative of the variation of the law, which are endemic in remote borders where 
people and government officers live, when a border-jumper is caught, he/she would 
contribute to the running of the border post until the debt with the government is 
paid. In September 2006, a young boy from Inhambane (almost 1,000 kms away) was 
caught and was in charge of looking after the orchard of the Immigration officer and 
help with other daily menial tasks. Yet, at the end of the day, no one of the elders 
were  refusing  him a  drink  or  two.  In  Pafuri,  jailing people  would not  solve  the 
problem,  and  the  border-jumper  are  more  likely  to  learn  a  lesson  and  render  a 
service to the government community before going back home, also because, unlike 
the South African counterpart, the Mozambican immigration and police would not 
have the means to escort the person to the police post of competence (in this case 
Maxixe, near Inhambane) and be tried there. The rangers of the Limpopo National 
Park, however, have taken a tougher route, as their procedure is to strip the person 
of all his/her belongings and take them back on the road to Dumela. This methods 
are both arguably legal, as the wealth of the person would most probably increase 
the wealth of the guards themselves, and do not even attempt at conveying a lesson 
as the methods of Chief Serrano of the Immigration would. 
Illegal  trading,  finally,  includes  stolen  vehicles  imported  into  Mozambique, 
although the Police officers of both sides claim the number is diminishing due to 
tighter  controls  at  all  border  posts,  whereas  the  Chiqualaquala  post  between 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique is a lot worse. As mentioned in the previous Chapters, 
stolen goods are also finding their way through the border, yet the main problems 
for the income of the Mozambican government would be the tax evasion. On the 
South African side, Chief Insp. Tshambalala laments the absence of the VAT offices 
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for the inspections and the collection of duties on goods exported47, in the form of 
both remittances and items to be sold at the three  spaza shops in Dumela, the one 
place selling cool drinks only in Pafuri (since the shop closed in 2005), and the spaza 
shop on the road to Mapai, some 40 km on the main road from the border where 
petrol and diesel can be found as well. The lack of specialised officers on the South 
African side, and the lack of  a shop on the Mozambican side have also contributed to 
the creation of a border milieu that re-adjusts the laws according to real needs, since 
importers and spaza shop owners are the only means for Mozambican officers to get 
food supplies. 
The characteristics of softness and permeability that relates  to the Pafuri  areas 
extend to the Beitbridge-Musina border to the west and to the Chiqualaquala border 
to the east, although the mine contamination does act as a deterrent outside of  the 
Pafuri riverine forest.  The explanation for this is of course the cultural and ethnic 
heritage, the conflicts of the past, but also the presence of South Africa as a pulling 
economy, which can guarantee a chance of survival and economic development. The 
establishment of a TFCA in and around this area, therefore, might have a political as 
well  as  a  socio-economic  impact  over  the  lives  and  livelihood  of  the  border 
communities, particularly in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Researchers tend to agree 
that by inscribing the TFCA project into a political ecological perspective, there will 
be a tightening of border security for the benefits of tourism and conservation, which 
is confirmed by the objectives set for the Peace Park48. 
5.3 DOES WILDLIFE MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER?
As  national  politics,  economics  and  communications  go  global,  so  does 
environmental concern in the form of organisation, problem-response and resources 
management49.  In  this  context,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  failures  of  previous 
resources  management  approaches  for  sustainable  socio-economic  development 
have  led  to  a  change  in  perspective  and  scale  going  transfrontier.  Within  the 
47 Ibid.
48 Duffy, 2001, and Wolmer, 2003.
49 For a general overview see Doherty & Doyle, 2006.
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sustainable  development  frame,  the  transnational  character  of  many  African 
populations despite ‘colonial’ borders was originally used to explain how would a 
transboundary approach attain  what  a localised approach had failed.  As van der 
Linde et al. claims many local communities have been implementing TBNRM at a local level  
for a long time, which is not surprising since cultures often straddle international borders50. 
TBNRM, as practiced by native populations, however, simply describes a way of life, 
whereby  people  live  in  nature  regardless  of  a  boundary  which  was  their  own 
creation. As a feasible NRM approach, instead, the financial pulling-factor exercised 
by conservation programmes in Southern Africa, shifted the attention from socially-
driven NRM to ecological-driven NRM.  
5.3.1 Transfrontier migration routes
In  all  official  documents,  beginning  with  the  original  funding  and  feasibility 
study  from  the  WB-GEF  to  the  PPF  website,  conservation  and  particularly  the 
restoration of traditional migratory routes of large mammals, interrupted by colonial 
and  post-colonial  state-building,  replaced  sustainable  development  as  the  key 
objective for the Transfrontier management of wildlife and its environment51. In the 
case of the GLTFCA, the large mammals at the centre of attentions were of course 
elephants, which were passing carrying capacity levels in the Kruger National Park, 
whilst culling was being frowned upon by the international community and some 
local  ecologists,  and  the  illegal  trade  in  ivory  was  heavily  affecting  populations 
within and without protected areas52. The opening up of the borders was justified by 
50 Van der  Linde  et  al.,  2001,  p.  3.  This  text,  however,  already mention the  migratory  routes  and 
ranging species as a key element of TBNRM policies, yet the ecological issue features as a component 
of   a  framework  encompassing  socio-cultural  and  economic-financial  opportunities  as  well.  This 
revealed  an  initial  focus  on  the  local  scale,  whereby  the  locality  is  the  place  where  people  live, 
regardless  of  national  boundaries.  At  a  later  stage,  however,  the  scale  of  TBNRM grew with  its 
inscription in TFCA projects, thus shifting inevitably towards conservation.
51 World Bank, 1996.
52 The April 2006 edition of the Africa Geographic is focussed on elephants, with special features on 
culling, conflict and the KNP debate. Van Aarde & Jackson argue that only large conservation area can 
allow for the right separation of dry and wet seasons range, thus enabling traditional migrations, on 
the contrary Hans explains that habitat alterations caused by elephants prompted culling from the 
1960s as a countenance measure, considering the life-span and the daily dietary requirements of these 
massive herbivores. Only the head of SANParks, actually, admits that culling becomes a worldwide 
problem only where dealing with megaherbivores, whose populations increase in protected areas. The 
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the fact that wildlife, particularly elephants, would have found their old migratory 
routes,  and by  using a  wider  territory  would have had less  impact  on the  local 
environment. 
Table 5.15: Behaviours of large herbivores found in the GLTFCA (Source: Anderson, 2002, p. 4)
The only study to assess the legitimacy of such assumptions was conducted by 
Dr.  J.  Anderson  and  published  in  2002.  After  having  looked  at  the  literature 
available, he conducted a field research aiming at understanding the existing barriers 
to  animal  movements,  be  them  anthropomorphic  (the  railway  line  Chiredzi-
Chiqualaquala-Maputo,  cutting  across  transversally  in  a  north-west  to  south east 
direction  the  interstitial  areas  in  Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe)  or  natural  (the 
Lebombo  Mountain  Range).  Dr.  Anderson,  then,  analysed  each  of  the  large 
herbivores present in the GLTFCA and their migratory potential.
Q&A section will provide an insight on the divisions of the scientific community over viable economic 
opportunities within the TBNRM frame. Finally, the CITES decision will be explained in references to 
the illegal, yet thriving, ivory trade (Various authors, 2006).
170
Species Spatial 
behaviour
Home range or 
Territory size 
Km2
Water 
dependence
Maximum 
distance from 
water
Migratory 
behaviour
Elephant H/range 523 Obligate >10 No
White rhino Territorial 1-13 Obligate < 10 No
Black rhino   Territorial 4-130 Obligate <10 No
Giraffe Non Territorial 20-160 Facultative >50 No
Zebra Nomadic 100-200 Obligate 6 Yes
Buffalo Non-Territorial 10-250 Obligate 17 No
Wildebeest Territorial 3 Obligate 10 Yes
Tsessebe Territorial 4 Obligate <5 No
Lichtenstein’s 
Hartebeest
Territorial 8-13 Obligate <5 No
Eland Nomadic 170-400 No >50 Yes*
Kudu H/range 5-11 Obligate 4 No
Nyala H/range 3.6-5.5 Facultative <5 No
Roan antelope Territorial 60-120 Obligate <10 No
Sable antelope Territorial 15-30 (300*) Obligate 3 No
Waterbuck Territorial 1.5-8 Obligate 2 No
Reedbuck Territorial 1.2 Facultative ? No
Impala Territorial .08-0.5 Facultative 1.6 No
Warthog Home range 0.6-1.7 No 3 No
Lion Territorial* 20-400 Obligate ? No
Leopard Territorial 10-63 Facultative ? No
Spotted hyena Territorial 10-1776 Obligate < No
Brown hyena Territorial 215-461 No 100 No
Wild dog Yes 1000 Obligate < No
Table 5.3 summarises the spatial behaviour, water dependence and known migratory 
behaviour  of all large herbivores in the protected areas that are part of the GLTFCA. 
The findings,  in addition, produce a picture which is not exactly in line with the 
paramount  objective  given  by  official  publications  on  the  restoration  of  routes 
disrupted by colonial politics, state demarcation and human intervention. In fact, the 
species with a known migration within the boundaries of the KNP are Wildebeest 
and  Zebra,  with  concern  to  two  subpopulations:  the  Western  Boundary  and  the 
Sweni/Mlondozi53.  The  Shingwedzi  elephant  population,  furthermore,  has  a 
tendency to transfrontier  migrations within a reduced range,  as  part  of  the rainy 
season migratory route. Finally the Pafuri Eland do take advantage of the Riverine 
forest on both sides of the River and tend to move around in the three countries, yet 
within a very close range.  
Field research, finally, shows that there is an elephant population in the dense 
forest  on  the  southern  side  of  the  Limpopo  on  the  road  to  Dumela.  The  local 
communities cannot confirm their provenance, and elephants in the northern section 
of the KNP have been found at Pafuri, west of the main road to the Gate, therefore it 
may be assumed that the group found in Mozambique might come from the South 
African  side.  In  September  2006,  elephants  have  come  close  to  the  Dumela 
agricultural project twice only, within the same week, and have been scared off by 
the guard, without the need to shoot in the air54. More apt to transfrontier migration 
are Vervet monkeys and baboons, the main problem animal for people in Dumela, 
since they steel seeds, crops and berries.
5.3.2 Wildlife migrations and human security
The  absence  of  a  strong  rationale  for  the  creation  of  TFCAs  based  on  the 
migrations of animals undermines the foundation of the concept of TFCAs as Peace 
Parks  for  wildlife,  that  is  all-encompassing  projects  providing  a  solution  to 
53 Anderson, 2002, p. 6.
54 The Ministry of Agriculture has allowed one rifle in the village to protect people from problem 
animals. Since the village falls within the TFCA, however, people are not allowed to kill the animal 
but to simply scare it away by shooting in the air. This is in agreement with the LNP management.
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conservation,  land  management  and  economic  development  in  remote  and  rural 
areas, whilst promoting Peace. This, however, should not mislead from a stringent 
reality, that is the presence of wildlife close-by inhabited areas.
The geographic conformation of Crooks’ corner, particularly, allows for the easy 
movements of animals within the three bordering countries, as demonstrated by the 
eland population of Pafuri. The elands, however, are shy animals, with a tendency to 
stay  away  from  human  settlements,  hence  they  do  not  pose  a  threat  to  local 
communities. Other species however, like monkeys, baboons and elephants, can be 
very destructive and crocodiles and hippopotamuses life-threatening.  If on the one 
hand people are aware of the presence of crocodiles in the Rivers and of their nesting 
season,  the  occurrence  of  other  threatening  species  is  not  so  easily  dealt  with. 
Baboons and monkeys, for instance, are those creating most conflicts, as they use the 
Crooks Corner territory as a place, not as a space divided in different land-uses. The 
presence of a permanent guard at the site of the agricultural project, in fact, is more 
related to them than to elephants, which rarely reach the area. 
If on the one hand the IUCN category of a TFCA allows for the continuity of human 
settlement,  on the other  hand it  poses a  great  security  threat  to  local  population 
whose risk of encountering wildlife will rise exponentially with time. The idea of 
living within a National Park and an ecological corridor, in fact, feeds discontent and 
angst within the population of Pafuri, and Dumela in particular. Its location between 
the Limpopo and the internal lake, actually, may attract an important quantity of 
animals  once  the  corridor  is  demined  and opened.  This  co-habitation scenario  is 
rather difficult to propose, in the light of the inexistent traditional migratory routes 
of wildlife, which lay at the basis of the TFCA project. It is paramount therefore, that 
people living in interstitial areas feel protected against the risks and threats of living 
within a conservation area. This will mitigate conflict and reduce the potential for 
poaching  activities.  Anderson,  in  fact,  suggests  to  rely  on  (a)  wildlife  utilisation 
strategies  in interstitial  populated area;  (b)  fencing as disease control measure,  as 
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well  as  protection for the Sengwe people55.  The utilisation of  wildlife,  replicating 
either a CAMPFIRE or a Makuleke experience, or a combination of the two, would 
undoubtedly increase rapidly the income of local population with trophy-hunting, 
based on quotas, and create skills within the tourism sector.
5.3.3 Conclusions
The foundations of the GLTFCA project into the re-establishment of traditional 
migratory routes for big fauna, particularly herbivores have been dismantled by the 
study  conducted  by  Dr.  Anderson  (2002).  According  to  his  findings,  six  sub-
populations of four species only do move across the borders from South Africa to 
Mozambique, and in the Pafuri area, which does not substantiate wildlife migrations 
as a key objective of the TFCA. It is, however, true that, with a few exceptions in the 
Limpopo National Park, animals have crossed by forced relocations only, namely the 
first ‘marketing’ relocation of elephants in 2001 to celebrate the signature of the MoU; 
the movement of herbivores for the LNP sanctuary to re-create populations of extinct 
species;  the  final  movement  in  March  2007  to  repopulate  the  LNP.  Spontaneous 
movements have been recorder at the Xonghile Game Reserve, south of Massingir, 
the Massingir Game Reserve next to the Cubo community on the reservoir and into 
the  LNP  itself.  Such  movements  involve  both  carnivore  (lions  and  hyenas)  and 
herbivores  (antelopes  and  elephants)  and  happened  in  areas  where  the  non-
electrified fence marking the eastern boundary of  the KNP has been taken down 
without authorisation or damaged.
The  increased  presence  of  animals  poses  a  serious  safety  threat  to  local 
communities in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Those inhabiting the LNP will be 
relocated soon, whereas the people living in the interstitial areas will have to cope 
with the situation without being able to kill a problem animal if posing a serious 
threat.  This  will  exacerbate  the  existing  tensions  between  people  and  park 
management, in the Pafuri area of both countries. The Sengwe Ecological Corridor 
55 CESVI, 2001, the communities of Sengwe, Chipise and Dite 2 have requested a protective fence to 
contain elephant, buffalo and carnivores. The fence will have to be two metres high, multi-stranded 
and electrified, stretching for about 80 km. (pp. 9 – 10)
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will increase the potential for animal movements around the Crooks’ Corner area, 
thus threatening people in both Sengwe Communal Land and Pafuri Administrative 
Post,  along  the  Zimbabwean  border.  The  solution  proposed  by  Anderson  and 
CESVI56 is  to  use  veterinary  fencing  to  channel  animals  and separate  them from 
communities. These fences are, in fact, necessary to the spreading of Foot and Mouth 
disease and Tuberculosis into Zimbabwean healthy populations of buffalo, impala 
and lions. In addition, the establishment of wildlife utilisation as posited both by 
Anderson and CESVI57,  would contribute  to  generate  income and food provision 
amongst local people,  thus improving their  acceptance of wildlife protection, and 
decreasing the potential for poaching. 
5.4 FUTURE PEACE THROUGH CONSERVATION?
Geopolitics  and  national  security  concerns  have  diverted  attention  away  from  
challenges like the maintenance of biological and cultural  values. In this political  
climate,  transboundary  conservation  deserves  close  attention  because  it  has  the  
potential  to  help  bring  peace  to  troubled  border  regions  while  also  playing  an  
essential  role  in  the  protection  of  endangered  species,  ecosystems  and  cultural  
groups. (Dr. William Jackson, IUCN, 2003)58
In recent years conservation has been asked to fulfil roles that were ecological in 
principle  but  political  in  implementation,  ranging  from  the  simple  protection  of 
endangered  ecosystems  in  unstable  countries  to  the  incorporation  of  local 
communities in related activities such as sustainable tourism, fair trade and trophy 
hunting. As discussed in the previous chapters,  conservation moved on from the 
sanctuary conception to become a source of development through the sustainable, 
yet  consumptive, use of natural  resources and tourism-related activities  wherever 
urban  or  peri-urban  centres  were  found  on  the  doorstep  of  Protected  Areas.  In 
developing countries, the dislocation of native communities at the psychological and 
physical  margins  of  society  created  a  conflict  with  conservation  practices,  only 
possible in natural areas along the geographical boundaries of anthropic zones, in 
terms of governmental priorities on land use and distribution.  This conflict became 
56 Anderson, 2002; CESVI, 2001.
57 Ibid. and CESVI, 2001.
58 ITTO/IUCN, 2003, p. 1. 
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part of sustainable development strategies at the end of the 1980s, when discourses 
over  the  equality  of  socio-economic  and  political  human  rights  were  also  being 
addressed, and the first concerns over the depletion of natural resources was gaining 
momentum.  The  theories  of  CBNRM  are  embedded  in  this  socio-environmental 
background, which grew to incorporate geopolitics and national concerns in both 
developed and developing countries, where the contrast between urban and rural 
was generating social turmoil and conservation was no longer endurable as a land 
management practice. 
As  summarised  by  Figure  5.1,  conservation  embraced  the  holistic  approach 
suggested  by  the  scientific  and  political  community  and  became  the  all-
encompassing solution to (1) environmental protection, its classical and fundamental 
role; (2) cultural heritage enhancement, by promoting the local cultural ethnicities, 
who had been marginalised until  a few years earlier;  (3) political engagement,  by 
continuing to provide uninhabited areas acting as buffer zones along state borders, 
thus promoting border  security  strategies;  (4)  peace  keeping,  by going across the 
frontier and promoting the re-unification of people and countries once at war, now 
pacified under the common goal of conservation.
Fig. 5.1: Multi-level of conservation as for Peac Parks, as  understood by the scientific 
community (Source: primary and secondary bibliography)
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The interpretation  of  Transfrontier  conservation as  a panacea  for  society and the 
environment, as posited by Dr. Jackson, is not surprising, particularly as it originates 
from  an  old  school  of  theories  over  the  key  role  played  by  nature  tourism  in 
providing  low-impact  income  generating  activities  even  in  fragile  environments, 
which have been discussed in the first part of the thesis. However, both theorisation 
and  implementation  of  TFCAs  in  Southern  Africa  demonstrate  that,  unlike  Dr. 
Jackson  states,  all  four  factors  are  strictly  related  to  the  shift  in  conservation 
paradigm.  This  section  will  discuss  firstly  how  conservation  strategies  serve 
geopolitics and national concern, and secondly how the GTLFCA, far from being an 
exception, may actually become the flagship project for the holistic approach nature 
conservation is called to serve.
5.4.1 The geopolitics of transfrontier conservation 
Transfrontier Conservation is strategic into converging the national and regional 
political interests since it does specifically target geographic areas that are remote, in 
relation to the political and economic cores of a country: the border areas, or in some 
cases the frontier. Despite the influence of the European nation-state, in fact, African 
border areas are centres of human development and community aggregation, which 
are already transfrontier as they rely on traditional social affiliation for livelihood 
generation.   These  areas  represent  a  difficult  management  riddle  in  terms  of 
geopolitics,  because they are (1) the physical representation of permeable borders 
where the movements of people and goods often hide away from the vigilant eye of 
the law; (2)  the battleground of  many past  and present  civil  wars.  The two case 
studies  hereby  summarised  will  show  how  conservation  and  geopolitics  are 
interrelated when transboundary issues are so important as to bring together various 
lobbies of power. 
In South Africa, the national concern regarding illegal immigration related to the 
raise in crime rates  focuses on the need to strengthen borders security,  to halt  or 
restrict the fluxes of illegal destitute immigrants from poorer neighbouring countries. 
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If on the one hand such fears are grounded into a reality which particularly involves 
Mozambique,  for  human  trafficking59 and  spontaneous  temporary  migrants,  and 
Zimbabwe  for  daily  visits  and  refugees,  as  the  Mugabe  dictatorship  is  forcing 
thousands out of the country, including defecting armed forces60. On the other hand, 
there is a general denial over the fact that South African crime is mainly homebred 
and derives both from a psychological sense of revenge over the apartheid years, and 
from  the  unconscious  understanding  that  despite  majority  rule  and  Black 
empowerment, only a small minority of the country has attained a decent quality of 
life61.  The  general  scenario,  therefore,  is  that  crime  stems  from  destitution  at  a 
national  and  regional  level,  but  concentrates  in  South  Africa  where  the  stable 
democracy of the rainbow nation has failed to deliver promises of freedom and justice, 
while showing all the incongruences of modern capitalism. To tamper, at least, the 
foreign side of crime, however, the government is asked to tackle illegal migrations 
and  trafficking  across  the  border,  despite  the  SADC  is  planning  to  create  a 
supranational space in Southern Africa62, following the European Union, in order to 
increase investments in the region, by re-directing them to less developed countries 
such as Mozambique. The two aims of stopping illegal migration and trade and of 
59 The trafficking of Mozambican young girls, who are sold as wives or forced into prostitution in 
South Africa, is a huge problem followed by the local UNICEF office of Maputo. The many posters 
displayed at the Ressano Garcia border post show the extent of the phenomenon (Source: field work)
60 Many articles witnessing the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe discuss also 
the  defection  of  many army and police  officers  who resort  to  border  jumping  into  South  Africa, 
instead of risking their lives for little money and a cause which is no longer their own. The most 
relevant article is Ncube, 2007.
61 Such perception is derived mainly from field-work analysis including (1) participation in the 2005 
presidential rally for Pres. Armando Guebuza, of Mozambique, where Pres. R. Mugabe was present 
and spoke to the country; (2) a collection of letters sent to the Mozambican newspaper Noticias over 
the role white people are thought to play in the underdevelopment of the country; the watching of 
Carte Blanche, a South African TV programme, with footages available online; (3) the pre-conception 
of black people towards my role as a white,  a woman and a researcher in rural South Africa and 
Mozambique, which were indirectly aired and led to untrue answers to the questionnaire. 
62 Some SADC Member States are in the Free Trade Area of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern  
Africa States  (COMESA), which envisages establishing a customs union by the year 2004 […]  SADC has 
[also] been implementing the Trade protocol, since September 2000 that will lead to a Free Trade Area by 2008.  
As one of the building blocs of the African Union, SADC has to keep pace with developments on the continent in  
order to avoid slowing down the continental  integration agenda of  achieving an Africa wide single market. 
These quotes are taken from the SADC RISDP, Chapter 4.10 on Trade, Economic Liberalisation and 
development (SADC, 2007)
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creating a free-space are only superficially in contrast with each other as the former 
hardly or ever uses the formal routes, yet poses into question the essence of a border 
as a barrier for state protection. The point which is being made here is the following: 
how can a state protect its borders whilst approving a border-free zone for goods and 
people?  The  answer  comes  directly  from  conservation,  especially  transfrontier 
conservation,  by  providing  buffer  zones  which  must  be  patrolled  to  prevent 
poaching, and at the same time any other illegal activity, whilst maintaining an open 
border policy for the region and its tourists, i.e. the legal migrants. 
The  Sub-Saharan  region  of  Central  Africa,  instead,  shows  that  transfrontier 
conservation  can  be  and  is  used  to  transcend  armed  conflicts  in  the  name  of 
important  ecosystems  and  endangered  species,  whilst  providing  a  less 
confrontational,  yet  politicised,  small  arena for dialogue between the parties.  The 
International  Gorilla  Conservation  Project  and  the  Albertine  Rift  Conservation 
Society cases, involving the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, are 
implemented  in  areas  where  civil  wars  have  been  ongoing  to  promote  the 
preservation of natural elements which, naturally, are cross-national. The Parks for 
Peace initiative in the Great  Lakes,  involving the above-mentioned countries  plus 
Burundi, furthermore, voices the need to support a reconciliatory process by using a 
common interest: the conservation of nature and the protection of highly endangered 
species,  including  the  Mountain  Gorilla  of  the  Virunga  National  Park63.  Central 
Africa case studies, therefore, show that Transfrontier Conservation may serve the 
interests of geopolitics between countries at war, by promoting peaceful resolutions.
5.4.2 Peace and protection in the GLTFCA and Peace Park
Unlike Central  Africa,  the need for  reconciliation and peace  processes  is  long 
gone in Southern Africa, where all the countries involved in the PPF projects have 
attained independence and have stable semi-democratic governments. The question 
of which Peace is transfrontier conservation promoting is legitimate, particularly in 
63 Wilkie  et  al.,  2001,  is  dedicated  to  TBNRM  projects  in  Central  Africa  and  fully  describes  the 
constraints of operating in conflict situations.
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consideration of  the GLTFCA, whose history of  conflicts  began in pre-imperialist 
time and continued until the mid 1990s. Of the three countries involved, only South 
Africa and Mozambique have reached stability, whereas Zimbabwe is experiencing 
an  ongoing  period  of  racial  and  social  turmoil,  which  is  concerning  to  all 
international observers. However, the GLTFCA has been neglecting the negotiation 
table with Zimbabwe, reduced to a few marketing appointments such as the opening 
of the Giriyondo border post64. By refraining from intervening at the national level, 
however,  the strategies  for the GTLFCA do not overlook the regional geopolitics. 
Therefore, two types of Peace may be the focus of the GLTFCA and Peace Park: on 
the one hand the celebration of the end of all past inter-cultural conflicts from the 
mfecane, the first big war leaving a mark in those border areas from the coast to the 
Limpopo, to the independence fights. On the other hand, the end of segregationist 
regimes and the creation of  multi-ethnic  society  would entail  the promotion of  a 
Peace between people of different ethnic background, which is long to be attained. 
The celebration of the past and the hopes for the future are also the key ecological 
elements  of  the  GLTFCA  as  it  proposes  to  protect  the  natural  heritage,  by 
acknowledging that only by being at peace can nature become a real transnational 
resource.  
One argument, however,  should be referred to this approach and concerns the 
dangers of using Peace as a marketing strategy. By engaging past divisions which the 
local population, particularly in Mozambique has been trying to forget65, the project 
risks of not being appreciated by the communities who should be integrated in it. 
Considering  the  ignorance  of  most  Mozambicans  over  the  South  African 
involvement with RENAMO, it is relevant to note that people have forgiven and re-
64 Whereas the relations between Pres. Guebuza and Pres. Mugabe have always been amicable, the 
official opening of the Border Post was delayed for half a year because Pres. Mbeki and Pres. Mugabe 
could not ‘sit together in the same room’, due to contrast over the management of Zimbabwe and the 
role played by Mugabe. (This detail was referred by Noemia Matholo, the admin officer of the TFCA 
Unit of MITUR, Maputo)
65 Both youth and elderly people, in fact, do not like to speak about the RENAMO war but as many 
have told during field research they want to forget and move on looking at the future, rather than at 
the past. (Fieldwork both in Maputo and in Pafuri) .
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integrated most of the former RENAMO combatants66,  yet have not forgotten the 
Whites for colonialism. Despite the violence involved in colonial practises, which in 
Mozambique  were  intensified  only  in  the  last  years  because  of  resistance 
movements67, in fact, colonialism never reached the brutality of RENAMO’s action 
towards people. However, the last conflict has been forgotten, or at least people do 
not want to talk about it, whereas colonialism is still blamed for the current economic 
and political situation: from underdevelopment to corruption. Since social divisions 
are still present and are at the very basis of crime in both countries, and the rural 
populations  are  amongst  the  most  disadvantaged  category  of  people,  the 
management should address ecological and cultural issues at the same time and with 
the same impetus. 
The general vision of Peace for the GLTFCA has currently been reduced to ‘peace 
with one self’ as claimed by the PPF web page, thus avoiding any political discourse 
on the role the GLTFCA is asked to have in promoting Transfrontier Conservation in 
the region. This is a remarkable loss, considering that the project is the flagship of the 
PPF, and of international conservation, because of dimensions and its ecological and 
social challenges. If, as Dr. Jackson states, Transfrontier Conservation does play an 
‘essential  role’  in  protecting  ‘cultural  groups’,  the  GLTFCA  should  start  by 
acknowledging  the  cross-border  nature  of  the  neighbouring  communities  and 
develop a strategy not for protection but for the enhancement of the traditional life-
style within its natural environment, instead of prioritising geopolitics and security 
66 People who were taken from RENAMO or used to be part of their army have mostly been re-
integrated in the society through different rites of cleansing, according to age and affiliation, following 
the concept of social pollution, part of traditional healing (Honwana, 1997). Field work indicated that 
only in the Chokwe district on the main road to Massingir RENAMO former combatants have been 
isolated by local communities and survive on the production of charcoal, regimented by private land-
owners or the government. This practice highly contributes to deforestation in a dry plain area. (Field 
work: March, September and November 2005 – March, September and November 2006)
67 The Portuguese colonialism has been notorious for its strength and violence on the prazo, in the form 
of  forced  labour,  as  described  by many authors  (Hall  & Young,  1997;  Pitcher  and Isaacman and 
Chilundo, 1995; Newitt, 1994) yet the sheer repression of human rights was not enforced until  the 
latest years of the dictatorship, when FRELIMO had began their revolutionary war, that the PIDE 
(Portuguese Secret Police) played a major role in imposing a regime of terror amongst local people. 
Yet, the few accounts of RENAMO’s brutal and generic violence, part of their looting and devastating 
tactic, was way beyond the limits reached by the Portuguese militia. 
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issues to halt the ‘free’  movements of the communities across the Crooks’ Corner 
area. Finally, the Peace to be promoted should be the peace of man within nature, 
whether one visits the area as a paying tourists or uses the area for living. Obviously, 
geopolitics impede such vision and focus on attainable results only.
5.4.3 Conclusions
Conservation is now covering a crucial position in the promotion of Peace on a 
transfrontier level,  whereby peer and international pressure for conflict resolution 
and  endangered  species  protection  are  hoped  to  act  as  major  drive  in  peace 
processes. In Southern Africa, however, peace has been established for over a decade 
now, and despite the current political situation in Zimbabwe and Angola, all other 
countries  enjoy a  degree  of  democracy  and development.  However,  the  PPF has 
sought to promote Peace Parks as yet another product of the rainbow nation who has 
managed  to  transcend  previous  conflicts,  whether  internal  or  regional,  for  the 
benefits of all people in the country and the region. Despite reality strongly refutes 
such  image  of  South  Africa,  the  ideal  remains  and  has  proven  to  be  highly 
marketable amongst international organisations and donors. 
The  words  of  Dr.  Jackson,  therefore,  seem  to  be  very  naïve  in  depicting 
transboundary conservation as the means to bring peace where there is conflict and 
protect nature and people. Geographically, in fact, the  PPF project might contribute 
to  the  perpetration  of  colonial  memories  as  Map 2.5  shows,  by addressing  areas 
which were deeply affected by racial segregation politics. Politically, the Peace Parks 
address more the security issues on illegal cross-border activities, protecting nature, 
yet still relegating local people to play a  minor role in the project. Geopolitically, the 
borders become areas of great concern because of the economic imbalance between 
South Africa and the rest of the region.
Finally, after having presented and discussed the history of the border area and 
its human geography, as well  as the political geography of the region, it appears 
clear that the GLTFCA is the flagship project for Southern African Peace Parks, as it 
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will have to address political, social and environmental issues, which have little to do 
with a forgotten past  and more to  consider  for a future  of  national  and regional 
socio-economic peace which will be very difficult to reach unless the governments 
tackle social injustice, corruption and crime on the national level first. 
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6. DUMELA: BRINGING THE PERIPHERY TO THE 
CENTRE
…residents of Pafuri can be viewed as citizens of a political  
state whose authority they are very much aware of, but  
also as free agents who are not irrevocably caught up in  
political processes over which they have no control. They  
are residents of a zone that contains diverse opportunities  
for them to retain control of their lives and make choices  
that stand apart from those made for them by officials of  
the state (Connor, 2003, p. 102)
The previous chapters  have discussed the history of  the area now part  of the 
GLTFCA,  from  pre-colonial  to  post-independence  times,  proposing  seven  key 
arguments: (1) the traditional ruling hierarchical order was medieval in conception in 
so far as both political and human geography are concerned, thus relied on frontier 
zones for protection; (2) the attack and loot tactics are a typical warfare strategy used 
by local population to extend their area of influence under a vassalage system, which 
also  granted  them  slaves  for  the  increasing  market  demand1;  (3)  the  physical 
geography  of  Africa  has  been  interpreted  unde  European  standards,  hence  it 
generated borders which were not respecting the human geography of the continent, 
yet  were  not  challenged  by  independence  governments2;  (4)  the  dividi  et  impera 
strategy  enforced  by  colonial  and  imperial  powers  relied  on  stressing  ethnic 
differences, not creating them, as native people were very much aware of clan and 
ethnic  belonging3;  (5)  the  end  of  imperialism  was  marked  by  independence  fights, 
which cannot be considered national struggles due to the human geography of each 
1 Points (1) and (2) are based on literature review: Beach (1974), Liesegang (1969) and (1970), Marks 
(1967), Etherington (2004).
2 This  statement  derives  from the  general  understanding  over  the  influence  of  nature  on  human 
settlements in Africa provided by Reader (1994); and the field research of Mpofu et al. on settlements 
in the Pafuri-Sengwe area of Zimbabwe (1999)
3 With particular reference to the role of missionaries as the best repositories of indigenous knowledge 
in a European perspective, some authors have proposed the dividi et impera strategy as a ex-novo tactic 
devised  by  settlers  to  rule  over  local  populations.  The  assumption  that  people  were  united  and 
peaceful before the settlers’ arrival is as naïve as the ‘merrie Africa‛ theory, also argued by Reader 
(1994), is here refused in favour of a more realistic view that changes in the ecological environment 
and population density for a specific site often led to inter-tribal wars based on ethnic differentiation.
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country4;  (6)  the  bush  wars  which,  in  Southern  Africa,  saw  the  end  of  racial 
segregation failed all their social objectives, because of the dualism arising from the 
conflicted,  pursued by the states,  and the social  connection,  which linked people 
together:  on  the  one  hand  people  fought  against  bandits  for  Mozambique  and 
FRELIMO, and on the other they rejoined families across the border for safety, thus 
balancing  the  dichotomy  between  state  loyalty  and  social  affiliation5;  (7)  the 
establishment of the GLTFCA runs an effective risk of impairing local livelihoods 
patterns  by  favouring  ecological  and political  logics  to  development  and societal 
imperatives, because of national concern issues6. Finally, it was implied throughout 
the  previous  chapters  that  South  Africa  is  playing  an  ambiguous  role  in  the 
implementation of TFCAs and Peace Parks because of three main  issues: (a) there is 
a  national  security  threat  due  to  increasing  illegal  migrations  from  poorer 
neighbouring  countries7;  (b)  the  carrying  capacity  of  damaging  species  (big 
mammals) is exceeded in many national parks, and the Kruger NP is at a crucial 
stage8;  (c)  following  from  apartheid  regional  strategies,  South  Africa  aspires  at 
leading  not  only  the  region  through  SADC,  but  also  the  continent  through  the 
African Union9. 
The  image  of  the  study  area,  deriving  from  this  historical  and  political-
economical analysis, is one of societal and cultural bonds built through the years, 
despite temporary conflicts through pre and post colonial history. Here the border 
(either the lack of it or the strengthening of it) plays a crucial role in defining patterns 
of  aggregation  and  survival  in  a  space  that  transcends  the  states:  the  Pafuri 
4 This point is argued extensively through Charter 3. 
5 This  statement  is  derived  from  the  literature  on  disengagement  practices  in  the  Mozambican 
fragmented war (Lubkemann, 2005),  and the field  work in Dumela  where the location of refugee 
camps in neighbouring countries were discussed whilst talking about familiar and social relations.
6 The priorities of the PPF and the GLTFCA management have been thoroughly discussed in Chapters 
2, 3 and 5. What appears is that animals, security and tourism are the main management priorities, 
whereas community development and cultural heritage are lagging behind.
7 See Whitman, 2000, and McDonald, 2000. 
8 See  Various  Authors,  2006,  for  a  basic  yet  exhaustive  panorama  on  elephants  in  Africa,  and 
Anderson (2002) for the GLTFCA specifics.
9 See Latini, Bayart, Koffi-Teya in the March 2006 edition of LIMES, as well as Thornton, 1994, and 
Whitman, 2000.
184
borderland. True to the description offered by Martínez, this borderland  milieu has 
not escaped any of the interactive typologies he identified. Pafuri was integrated up 
until  the establishment of the TEBA site for legalised migrations, when it became 
interdependent,  as  the  two  countries  were  establishing  a  ‘symbiotic’  relationship 
through channelled labour. With the wars Pafuri became an  alienated border, with 
people being prevented to move around and across the ‘supra-statal’ space of ethnic 
affiliation, and eventually turned into a coexistent area where all the state formalities 
are in place, but people’s movements and trades are not disrupted if they are legal or 
informal10. The ethnical affiliation of the native inhabitants of Pafuri, therefore, has 
become less relevant as history unfolded its pathways of migration and relocation, 
thus creating a social layer, which unifies the people within the geographic space: the 
people of Pafuri. Despite the forced displacements due to human and natural forces 
suffered by local  inhabitants,  there is  a  sense of  belonging rooted in the area.  In 
partial disagreement with the perspective offered by Connor (2003), however, it is 
argued that the return to previous location of most people, which were displaced 
because of the wars, drought and famine, demonstrates a sense of place and identity 
linked to the geographic space. Also, the memories of past migrations (Nguni wars) 
are  long  forgotten  by  the  younger  generation  and only  broadly  inscribed  in  the 
elders’ minds: this shows that the migration period is concluded and a new era of 
temporary migrations with the specific  aim of  economic development has begun. 
Most of the young men (aged 25 – 35) born in Dumela, in fact, do not contemplate 
leaving the village for longer than six months to find work, earn money and come 
back. Therefore, the freedom of movement across the border is a conditio sine qua non 
for both the creation of a geographical identity with the place, as the questionnaire 
survey will show, and the alternative generation of income for local inhabitants. The 
data discussed in this chapter aim at producing a relevant set of information which 
will allow for the understanding of how the partial  management of the GLTFCA, 
10 See Martínez (1994a, p. 10) in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p.51.
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towards ecology and tourism, would severe the fragile livelihoods of the people of 
Pafuri. 
In order to provide a logical strain of concepts, this chapter will be organised as 
follows.  The  first  section  will  describe  the  village  of  Dumela  using  personal 
observation  and  the  demographic  information  collected  with  the  questionnaire 
survey. The second section will argue the influence of the state and the government 
over  the  Pafuri  area  and  the  people  of  Dumela,  by  looking  at  the  hierarchical 
structure  on the  local  level  and the  national  policies  for  development.  The  third 
section will present livelihood patterns and discuss their relation to the border and 
the borderland, by discussing social and economic data. The fourth and last section 
will look at the different scenarios posed by the GLTFCA in terms of human-wildlife 
relations, by presenting the ecological risks of not preserving the ecosystem and the 
socio-economic risks of not addressing community needs in such an anthropological 
milieu as the Pafuri borderland.
6.1 A PEOPLE IN THEIR TERRITORY: DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY
Map 6.16: Boundaries of the village, the landscape shows marks of anthropisation in its near 
proximity.
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The  village  of  Dumela  is  present  in  the  colonial  cartography  of  the  Pafuri 
Administrative Post, thus attesting the longevity of the settlement11. Also in The Ivory  
Trail,  Bulpin describes  the area around Crooks’ Corner as inhabited by Shangaan 
people,  referring to  the natives of  Zimbabwe and Mozambique only, because the 
South  African  Makuleke  belonged  to  a  different  group.  What  characterised  the 
human geography of Pafuri is of course the River basin, with its sandy soils, fertile 
patches  and  rich  vegetation,  whose  inhabitants  have  learnt  to  exploit  to  their 
maximum advantage within the knowledge and the finance available to them. On 
the northern side of the Limpopo (Mozambique and Zimbabwe), where conservation 
practices  have  not  been  enforced,  the  non-forested  areas  are  used  for  livestock 
grazing and subsistence agriculture also know as ‘slash and burn’ typical of poor dry 
land populations whose survival  directly  encroaches  on the natural  environment. 
However,  the  natural  vegetation  of  the  immediate  catchment  areas  south  of  the 
villages  of  Dumela  and  Sengwe  is  still  remarkable,  considering  the  decades  of 
occupation, with only the immediate proximities of the villages bearing the marks of 
anthropisation as shown by the satellite image (Map 6.1). The average population 
density of 12 people per square Kilometre12, in Dumela, and the attentive use nature 
within its limitations, in fact, has contributed to maintain the natural forested areas 
both  on  the  River  banks  and inland.  This  is  remarkable  in  comparison  with  the 
Crooks’  Corner  (SA)  area,  where  signs  of  the  old  Maluleke  settlements  are  still 
distinguishable  at  first  sight,  despite  over  30  years  of  abandonment13.  Poverty  at 
Dumela compels native inhabitants to recycle everything from metal, to plastic, to 
pottery, whereas unusable leftovers are burnt: pollution from waste is therefore kept 
to  minimal levels  and degenerates  only because of  outsiders.  The field diary,  for 
11 A research on maps at the DINAGECA, the National Geographical Archives, Maputo, shows that 
the village had existed at least since 1970.
12 The population density was calculated measuring the area surveyed and the approximate number of 
inhabitants, gathered with the interviews. Even if the exact number of the population of Dumela had 
been calculated at the time of research, the values would not be the same at present. The average 
density  is,  therefore,  close  enough to the  real  value  in  a  changing  reality,  whose  demography is 
heavily dependent on migrations and high nativity.
13 The military occupation referred to in the previous chapters, in fact, is only relevant to the Makuleke 
store area, where the base was. 
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example, reports an event occurred upon the first scoping visit when a Mozambican 
Police Officer asked for a lift from Pafuri to Dumela14. While in the car, he wanted to 
throw my rubbish out, as if it was bothering him, and when I asked him to refrain 
from doing this, firstly he said ‘it’s only the bush’ then, when we approached the 
Limpopo, he said ‘I can throw it away now, because the River is going to take it to 
the sea so it will not pollute’, while trying to be ironic15. This attitude is typical of 
those  who  come from  the  urban  areas  and  have  little  or  no  education  over  the 
damages of waste pollution in a natural environment. To my surprise, my first guide 
from IUCN was sharing his attitude in the belief that the bush would sort itself out; 
then again he did not know there were crocodiles in the Limpopo River16.
This  section will  present  the  village  of  Dumela  under  a  social  and demographic 
perspective.  By using both field notes and the questionnaire  data,  the population 
patterns will be discussed in terms of age, education, access to valid identification 
(ID or Passport) and livelihood strategies. This is the basic information which will 
enable to draw from the other sets of data the necessary conclusions over the cross-
border nature of local relations.
6.1.1 Population data: the missing generation
It seems that tradition, government and religion are  
well integrated here (Field notes: 6th March 2005)
This was my first impression on Dumela and I confirm it two years later, as the 
reasons behind this integration have been clarified by the historical  analysis.  The 
local population is pacific, yet cunning, and knows exactly the potential a  mulungo 
(white person) can bring to the area from the rumours over what is happening with 
the TFCA and neighbouring countries. For this reason, I have understood that most 
14 His plan was to reach the area in Sengwe, close to the border, where the ladies make and sell ilala 
palm wine, a rarity in Mozambique, this is a very cheap and alcoholic drink.
15 Field diary, entry 7th March 2007. 
16 Field  diary,  entry  7th  March  2007:  ‘Since  Matola  was  still  in  disbelief  about  crocodiles  in  the 
Limpopo (and in Africa in general), after the meeting, while we were sitting with Chief Muklave, I 
asked him if it was true that there were crocodiles in the River and, naturally, he laughed at this silly  
question, so I told Simon to tell him that Matola could not believe it, and he gave him a look I’ll never 
forget. Sometimes, even a white European girl is knows things about Africa…'
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of  the  answers  given  to  the  questionnaire  survey  are  arguable  by  personal 
observation,  particularly  with  reference  to  those  questions  attempting  to  analyse 
income-generating activities. I was later confirmed by one of my informants, Lydia, 
that most people in the village tried to depict a worse economic situation in the hope 
I would bring them money, through development projects, even if I made it clear in 
every community meeting that my research had no such implication17. At first sight, 
the village looks suspended from the real world into a universe of its own where 
days go by slowly with the elder sitting in the shade of a tree, the kids looking after 
the  livestock,  the  men  in  the  fields,  and  the  women  washing  at  the  River.  On 
Tuesdays and Saturdays, the women gather with the elders to go to the field on the 
southern banks of  the lake where the Ministry of  Agriculture  had established an 
agricultural  project,  and donated a  pump to  the community18.  The only  occasion 
when such pattern is disrupted is on special events, such as the visit of the District 
administrator coming from Chiqualaquala.
The population of Dumela seems rather heterogeneous at a first glance, but after a 
few days some anomalies may be noted. The village is composed of 89 households, 
all surveyed, each counting between one (1) and 15+ people. Only eight households 
pertain to the last category, and their spatial distribution is rather curious: six are 
form the central part of the village, and only two of them are directly related to the 
Chief family. House 23 and 24 are set aside from the village, on the western side, and 
also own the dwellings on the lake where their fields are. The average household 
counts  between  5  and  10  members  (Cat.  2).  The  rough  estimate  of  the  total 
population is about 1500 people, whose gender and age distribution is rather bizarre. 
From personal observation, in fact, it was established that gender for both adults and 
17 I had to community meetings: one introductory on the 7th March 2005 and on the 6th September 2006. 
During both of them I presented the research and the questionnaire survey and answered to questions 
by participating villagers.
18 The pump was not working upon my first visit and only repaireed over one year later. The people in 
the village do not have the skills to repair a pump, so when it breaks they have to call the Ministry 
officer in Chiqualaquala, who will come to fetch it and take it for repairs.
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children  was  balanced:  the  practice  of  polygamy,  perhaps,  contributes  to  the 
presence of at least one female per each male person. 
Map 6.17: Population distribution, the circle are in relation to the size of the family (Source 
questionnaire)
In general, it was rarer to meet a widowed woman than man. Children, as well, were 
well  balanced which could be  seen  both at  school  and in  the village.  Teenagers, 
instead, were absent. The only persons met in the age between 13 and 20 were Lavie, 
my interpreter, niece to Chief Muklave, and Simon’s daughter, who was brought up 
very traditionally19. I have not met any boy who would fall within this age category, 
not only during the day, but also at night when people would gather at the new 
spaza shop  (providing  cool  drinks  and  music)  to  dance  and  have  fun.  A  rough 
calculation will show that teenagers should have been born in the last years of the 
war, when people had either adjusted to living abroad or were still trying to survive 
in the bush. Two hypothesis can be made on this issue: (1) teenagers are sent to work 
19 Lavie was the only fluent Portuguese speaker in the village and her attitude was one of confidence 
and  openness.  Simon’s  daughter,  instead,  was  always  working  or  sitting  at  home.  She  is  being 
brought up very traditionally, and at the time of my last visit she was wearing the traditional attire of 
the girls ready to be married.
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in South Africa to gather enough money to marry, considering that the  lobolo (the 
bride’s price) is still widely practiced; (2) this generation was either never born or 
never  survived  the  harshness  of  the  war.  Considering  infant  mortality  rate  in 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, due to cyclical famines and droughts,  as well as the 
lack of health posts and hygiene, it would not be surprising to discover that very few 
children  actually  made  it  to  see  the  end  of  the  war.  However,  considering  the 
discrepancy between family numbers and people actually seen in Dumela, it would 
be sensitive to assume that those teenage boys who survived are now working in 
neighbouring countries.
6.1.2 Tsonga: the language of the people
Ana,  the teacher  at  Dumela who left  in  2005,  stated that  the average  age for 
marriage is 10 to 15 years old and that the school drop-out rate from 4th grade is very 
high20. This would prove the existence of a teenage generation as well as explaining 
why  teenagers  are  not  easily  noted:  they  are  either  married  or  working  to  get 
married. Data on primary education, actually, explain a lot on family patterns in the 
village. As Table 6.1 shows the families counting between 6 and 15 members are also 
those having a significant number of members with a school certificate, even if this is 
still a small number in relation to family size. A total of 66.4% of interviewees count 1 
or 2 family members who have completed primary school.  Only four (4) families 
counting more than fifteen (15) members have between 3 and 5 members  with a 
primary  education  certificate.  These  numbers  should  refer  to  teen-age  people, 
considering that a very small group of refugees were able to go to school either in 
Zimbabwe or in South Africa, during the war, thus confirming the theory that male 
teenagers have left Dumela to find employment elsewhere.
The poor overall  schooling results  are also dependent on language fluency, as 
hinted by Ana. Considering the cross-border mobility of the inhabitants of Dumela, it 
is  not  surprising  that  Tsonga  is  the  only  language  which  is  spoken  widely  and 
20 In the Mozambican school system, primary education ends on 7th Grade at the age of 13. Children 
dropping out at 4th Grade, therefore are only 10 years old.
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fluently,  because  it  is  intelligible  both in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  Therefore, 
migrants do learn a new language (either English or Afrikaans) only if they work for 
white  people abroad.  A broken version of  the  Funnagalo idiom is  still  spoken by 
young  adults  and  the  elders  who  worked  on  the  mines,  whereas  Portuguese  is 
spoken only by the older people who worked for the government (the videchane21 is a 
good example).  Two women were fluent in Portuguese:  the first being Lavie who 
completed her education at the age of 15 in Mapai, the second being a lady who is 
originally from Xai-xai. Ana, the teacher, expressed the concern that children who go 
to school do not have a chance to practice Portuguese at home with their parents.
Respondent's household member * Members with primary education Crosstabulation
10 12 1 23
38,5% 22,2% 12,5% 26,1%
13 25 1 39
50,0% 46,3% 12,5% 44,3%
2 13 2 17
7,7% 24,1% 25,0% 19,3%
1 4 4 9
3,8% 7,4% 50,0% 10,2%
26 54 8 88
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Members with
primary education
Count
% within Members with
primary education
Count
% within Members with
primary education
Count
% within Members with
primary education
Count
% within Members with
primary education
1-5 members
6-10 members
11-15 members
more than 15 member
Respondent's
household
member
Total
zero 0-2a 3-5
Members with primary education
Total
Source: questionnaire survey.
the exact reference is 1-2 but SPSS does not allow the use of identical numbers in the value and the range.a. 
Table 6.16: Cross tab  - number of household members and members with primary education.
The cross-border and cross-cultural nature of the Tsonga language makes it the 
only  viable  communication  medium  that  did  not  disappear  through  time  and 
modernisation.  On the contrary, the Tsonga language is still used as the symbol of 
the Shagaan identity which has survived wars and displacement and always went 
back to its original place. In fact, even if there are non-Tsonga speakers in the area, 
these groups are well aware of past hierarchies and accept Tsonga as their ‘official’ 
language, despite speaking Venda, Ndebele, or Rozvi with the family. The past of 
21 The videchane is the FRELIMO party representative.
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vassalage is guaranteeing a present of identity based on language and tradition. If 
the choice of not learning a second language, unless required by life constraints, may 
be seen as laziness towards the acceptation of modernity,  yet  it  must actually be 
understood modernity has so far offered very little to the people of Pafuri in times of 
peace.
6.1.3 Identification and the power of the state
If the borders are the repository of state demarcation, as posited by many political 
geographers22, it should go without saying that the population of the state would be 
known,  hence  identifiable.  This  is  not  the  case  in  Dumela,  the  other  border 
communities in Mozambique, as well as most rural areas not located along the coast. 
As Table 6.2 shows, the missing value, corresponds to the families where no one has 
an Identification, which means that people in the village are identifiable only by the 
acknowledgement from their peers. 
This is a major security problem for a country whose cross-border movements 
often occur informally and illegally, as well for the country which receives migrants 
on a regular basis. The common language and lineage, in fact, may be and is used to 
gain residence into a different country to acquire benefits without indicating the real 
origin of the person. This is the case of the Venda women in Zimbabwe claiming 
benefits  in South Africa23 and of  the boy of  Dumela who contracted AIDS while 
working in South Africa as a gardener,   and whose ID indicated he was a South 
African citizen24. 
22 See Sahlins, 1998, as well as Muir, 1986; Glassner, 1995; Pounds, 1992; 
23 Discussed by Chief Insp. Tshambalala, Pafuri border post, 12th December 2006.
24 Field work, September 2007. The boy was taken to the hospital in Chiqualaquala were he was put 
under a treatment programme, without being asked to produce papers. This in turn indicates that any 
Zimbabwean Shangaan could use Mozambican hospitals, if the service provided is better than the one 
given in Sengwe.
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Missing 1-2 3-5 6-8
No. of family members with ID
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
C
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Unspecified ID card or Passport
Identifiability of villagers in Dumela
Table 6.17: Questions of identification in Dumela (Source :questionnaire survey).
Far from being a form of passive resistance to the state, the lack of identification is a 
sign of the marginalized economic and geographical condition of people at Pafuri. 
The direct and indirect costs of ID, in fact, are to be borne by the citizen and have a 
great  impact on the yearly income of a family.  Table 6.3 shows the type of costs 
involved for people leaving at Pafuri to get either a Passport or and Id card.
Direct costs Indirect costs
Photo Travelling to the apt immigration office
Taxes Pay for food and accommodation while waiting 
for the document to be ready
Notary stamp Travel back home.
Table 6.18: Costs incurred when in need of a valid ID card or a Passport (Source: fieldwork)
For  people  living  at  Pafuri,  the  apt  immigration  office  is  Xai-xai,  the 
administrative capital of the Gaza Province, some 1,000 Kms to the South East. The 
cost of a trip in itself requires a small fortune, and still does not include the expenses 
for staying on site until the papers are ready. Therefore, for some one who wants to 
emigrate to earn money, it is not only impractical, but often impossible, to have and 
spend a considerable amount of money for the right documentation. For example, a 
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young man was arrested by the Mozambican police while trying to cross into South 
Africa, who came from Maxixe (Inhambane Province) and used the all the money he 
had to pay for his trip from the coast to Pafuri,  because if he had used it for the 
documentation it would have defeated his purposes of migration as he would have 
not had anything left for transport, let along supporting himself while abroad25. As 
Chief Insp. Tshambalala also noted, it would suffice to have someone at the Border 
Post taking the photos and gathering all the necessary form, who would be in charge 
of going once a month to Maxixe to get the passport done. An Immigration officer, 
known as Lino, used to do this and was taking the papers to Xai-xai to have the 
passports done. But after he left, no one would take up this responsibility26. 
Anderson claims that borders are both institutions and processes. In this latter 
function borders are both the markers of identity and the instrument of state policy. 
In the case of Pafuri, however, the border is neither27. The lack of identification, in 
fact, implies a lack in state control over its citizens, as their nationality and existence 
cannot really be proven. This, in turn, indicates that cross-country movements could 
be more frequent if natural and man-made obstacles were not preventing them. For 
instance, now that the Sengwe corridor is being demined, it is no longer patrolled by 
Police officers, which means that people come from Sengwe more often to visit their 
friends and relatives. During the questionnaire survey, in fact, Sengwe people were 
found at a few households as daily visitors. Common language and culture, and the 
lack of  tangible  proof nationality,  therefore,  make the people of  Pafuri  extremely 
mobile and intermixing, as proved by marriages as well, thus easily escaping official 
and legalised control systems. 
6.2 REFLECTING GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICIES ON LOCAL PATTERNS
The  issues  of  schooling  and  identification  remark  a  failure  of  the  state  in 
providing basic services to its citizens, which should be regarded as a serious matter 
25 Personal interview with the prisoner, held with the supervision of Chief Serrano (Immigration 
Office) at Pafuri, 2nd September 2006.
26 Interview with Chief Insp. Tshambalala, 12th December 2006.
27 See Anderson, 1996a, quoted in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 5.
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in a country where the creation of the national identity has been a priority for the 
past  30  odd  years.  The  Mozambican  reality,  moreover,  shows  the  difficulty  of 
implementing strategies aimed at controlling the country  whilst being involved in 
heavy regional and national conflicts for over twenty years. If on the one hand it is 
true that the NMR-RENAMO project was the main cause of collapse of the Marxist-
Leninist project, one must also acknowledge that the modernising socialist approach 
implemented by FRELIMO did not encounter the mass support  it  was hoped for 
amongst  the  peasants,  whose  condition  of  socio-economic  pariah  never  changed. 
This section will briefly explain the national politics of Mozambique, by adding on 
specification from what discussed in the previous chapters, in order to discuss the 
impact of current policies in Pafuri and Dumela. The two segments discussed are the 
implementation  of  border  security  policies,  also  related  to  the  GLTFCA,  and the 
development strategies for rural communities.
6.2.1 The continuity of FRELIMO: from colonialism to capitalism
The  national  politics  promoted  by  Mozambique  must  be  framed  in  a  double 
context  of  pre  and  post  civil  war,  considering  one  major  change  in  the  general 
approach:  from  Marxism-Leninism  to  tamed  capitalism,  through  a  process  of 
paradoxical  decision making in  pragmatic  terms28.  True  to  the dogma of  African 
Nationalism, concerning the creation of modern liberated states, FRELIMO tried to 
promote the image of a unified country, by defying ethnic lineage and traditional 
belief.  As  Pitcher  (2002)  notes,  however,  the  transformation  was  more  based  on 
indoctrination than on renovation as the colonial system was maintained under new 
names when public,  and under secrecy,  when in sheer  contrast  with the original 
FRELIMO ideals.  This was the case of the agreement with South Africa for mine 
labour, which was continued until South Africa itself halted it due to the civil war in 
the 1980s. After independence, the prazos and the colonados29 became collective farms 
28 The transformation of post-independence Mozambique is fully discussed by Pitcher (2002) and Hall 
& Young, 1997.
29 Prazos and  colonados were examples of colonial agriculture based on chibuto (forced labour). The 
Gaza Province was notorious for the Colonado do Limpopo covering most of the lower Limpopo 
plains  from  Chokwe  to  Xonguene  (See  Vala,  unknown;  Roesch,  1991  and  1992;  Hermele,  1998; 
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around the old aldeamentos, the colonos were replaced by dynamising groups and the 
figure of the  régulo30 was maintained as a representative of the party31. Tapping on 
these incongruences between the preaching on freedom and the reality of  induced 
labour, NMR grew inside Mozambique as the anti-FRELIMO movement supporting 
ethnicity  and  traditional  customs.  It  could  be  argued  that  if  RENAMO  had  not 
stressed the Ndau affiliation to the point of re-fuelling inter-ethnic hatred and had 
not used traditional spiritual beliefs to justify its horror, present-day Mozambique 
could be a very different country. The post 1984 Mozambique, moreover, gradually 
lost the Marxist-Leninist drive, forced by nature with two serious droughts in 1982 
and 1983, and by politics with the acknowledgement that RENAMO was becoming a 
real Mozambican movement even though relegated to the Ndau ethnic group and 
the anti-Arab groups in Cabo Delgado, and by the acknowledgement that economic 
help for the government could have only come from the West. As Hanlon pointed 
out, the FRELIMO government was forced to negotiate a univocal peace with South 
Africa and abjure its  extremist  political  approach in favour of a more welcoming 
democracy  opened  to  the  favours  of  capitalism32.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the 
mixed political strategy of Mozambique, which still enforced the Socialist approach 
to maintain its original unifying and developmental strategy, whilst embracing the 
benefits of Capitalism in terms of foreign investment. The interference of both the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, however, could not be contained 
by the governments  and led to  open intrusion in structural  adjustment  plans for 
Wardman, 1985).
30 The figure of the régulo was created by the Portuguese government to reinforce state-sponsored political  
and economic hierarchies  in rural areas (Pitcher, 2002, p. 33), through a system called regedoria. Worse 
than imposing a Portuguese chieftainship, the colonial government appointed ‘traditional authorities’ 
to  promote  the  progressive  farmers  agricultural  scheme  thus  creating  a  power-system  based  on 
nepotism,  through direct  benefits  delivered to the  régulos and their  immediate family.  During the 
independence fights, FRELIMO actively sought to get the support of the régulos  to strengthen their 
approval  amongst  the peasantry,  yet  de-commissioned the same  régulos when in  power,  with the 
justification that they represented the colonial  power and were subservient  to it  (Pitcher,  2002, p. 
33-35; Virtanen, 2005; Roesch, 1991). 
31 The continuity between the Colonial and the independence government for politics concerning land-
use practices, agriculture, industry and regional trade, including the export of labour for the mines 
may be seen as controversial, yet it has been widely documented. See Hall & Young, 1997; Pitcher, 
2002; Hermele, 1998;  Roesch, 1991 and 1992; Meyers, 1994; Vala, unknown; Friedman, 1980.
32 See Hanlon, 1991, Introduction and First Chapter.
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recovery and development, until the present day33. The embracing of capitalism as an 
economic strategy, finally, surfaces in every aspect of governmental and social life, 
from the creation of  tax-free industrial  areas to boost foreign investment34,  to the 
growing number of shopping centre selling South African brands, as well as some 
international products.
6.2.2 PARPA – the last stronghold of socialism?
The dualism of the FRELIMO political approach, within the drive towards socio-
economic  development  taken  by  sustainability  practices  and  the  Millenium 
Development Goals, allows for the creation of broad strategies that may be socialist 
in  principle,  but  blurred  in  practice.  One example  of  this  is  PARPA:  the  holistic 
policy aiming to fight absolute poverty from education to agricultural production. 
The first PARPA plan was presented for the 2000-2004 period, but was superseded 
the following year by another quadrennial plan, which integrates all  the different 
sectors of action under a common fiscal frame. The bases for the creation of such 
framework are to be found in the IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), 
which were created in 1999 with the World Bank in order to establish a country-
based  strategy  for  poverty  reduction,  considering  the  high  rates  of  population 
growth particularly in developing countries35. 
Falck et al. explore the influence which PRSP had on the latest PARPA, in terms of 
the use of indicators, the ongoing consultation process and the mixed government-
independent monitoring system. The authors even go as far as to posit a new relation 
between  the  donors  and  the  recipient,  which  cannot  be  proved  since  the 
complications of Mozambican bureaucracy and the level of corruptions have highly 
affected aid in the country. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, the general 
33 Ibid.; Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 144, 154, 197-198, 226-231; and Pitcher, 2002, pp. 146 – 151.
34 The CPI, Centro de Promoção de Investimentos, was created by the GoM with a specific mandate to 
promote foreign investment by facilitating the concession of fiscal and customs incentives to investors; 
identify potential partners for joint ventures; assist with the implementation of investments projects. 
In addition, a law was passed in 2006 which allows foreigners to open a business without a local 
partner. 
35 For  a  comprehensive  presentation  of  PRSP  refer  to  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ 
prsp.htm
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assessment is positive as PARPA may contribute to the institutionalised changes which 
can support the effective implementation of poverty reduction policies36. However, 
this survey lacks a real evaluation of PARPA policies at the local level, particularly in 
so far as the agricultural schemes are concerned. 
PARPA, in fact, includes two types of agricultural projects: the first concerning 
the  production  on  the  family  and  industrial  level  of  the  four  main  produces  of 
Mozambique, namely cereals, Caju nuts, sugar and cotton, by exploiting the colonial 
land  use  system  for  the  Cooperatives;  the  second  involving  the  creation  of  an 
agricultural project in remote rural areas were intensive agriculture is not viable37. 
The second type of project involves areas such as Pafuri, and aims at supporting the 
community  by  providing  tools  and  basic  products  (oil,  salt,  sugar)  in  inverse 
proportion to the amount of produces obtained from the agricultural project. 
Far from being the last stronghold of socialism, on paper PARPA presents itself as 
the  most  feasible  solution to  counteract  growing poverty  in  rural  and dry  areas, 
particularly at times of great climate change, by exploiting international funds and 
knowledge. Unlike many a strategy, including conservation policies, PRSP stresses 
the importance of state-based programmes, which address national problems and 
priority, thus relying on both local expertise and commitment to result. PARPA is 
definitely the most emblematic policy created by the GoM as it shows the double 
nature of a ruling party coalescing into a pro-active and holistic strategy thanks to a 
global shift in the paradigm of economic development.
6.2.3 The demarcation and function of post-war Mozambican borders
The  question  of  African  borders  has  been  discussed  in  Chapter  3  and 
Mozambique is of course no exception to the general rule that the colonial borders 
were not discussed. However, the post independence history of the country shows 
that borders have been frequently breached by its neighbours in order to destabilise 
the country, while the border populations have been living in super-statal spaces 
36 Falck et al., 2003,  p. 260. 
37 See http://www.govmoz.gov.mz/parpa/source/matrizop.xls
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which belong more to the traditional social sphere than to the sovereign state. The 
migrations towards neighbouring states, during the war, intensified the search for 
safe  areas  and  were  based  on  ethnic  affiliation,  particularly  towards  northern 
Zimbabwe, from the Provinces of Tete and Manica38, and Southern Zimbabwe, from 
the Gaza Province. In this period, the national politics concerning border issues were 
contingent to the war, yet the scarce numbers of the Mozambican army combined 
with  their  required  presence  to  patrol  strategic  inland  location  (the  commercial 
corridors)  and to counteract  the guerrilla  warfare  of  RENAMO, left  border  areas 
virtually in the hands of the enemy, with the exclusion of border posts. Borders were, 
at one time, limits of isolation and frontiers that were constantly broken by refugees, 
formal and informal armies, and illegal traders. 
The situation shifted at the end of the war towards a more protectionist approach, 
supported by the repatriation of refugees and the reconstruction of a country, funded 
on a  stronger  national  identity  as  the ethnical  divisions  promoted by RENAMO, 
effectively marked its failure39. However, Leão claims that, a security policy had not 
been  envisaged  by  the  GoM  by  1994,  which  prevented,  on  the  social  side,  the 
effective understanding of  a country at peace and, on the political and security side, 
the launch of a strong sign against the traffic of small arms within and without the 
country40. By 1997, however, the regional stability and the similar political affiliation 
of the main governing parties were pushing towards a more cooperative approach 
towards economic development. As migrants from Mozambique were pouring into 
South Africa in search for a living, the increase in cross-border illegal activities such 
as the smuggling of weapons41, stolen goods and girls required attention towards the 
use of borderlands as the lawless frontiers of the pioneers’ times. Meanwhile,  the 
raising  of  conservation  as  a  cost-effective  solution  to  border  patrol  prompted 
cooperation  in  security  issues  to  the  benefits  of  all  countries  involved  in  such 
projects, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. It is not surprising, therefore, that the GoM 
38 See Hughes, 1999.
39 Lubkemann, 2005; Roesch, 1992.
40 Leão, 2004, Chapter 2 and Conclusions
41 Hennop, 1999; Vines, 1998.
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had to react to the South African efficiency in border patrol, due to national concerns 
over  security  breaches,  and  by  2005  it  had  begun  negotiations  over  the  border 
demarcations both at sea and in land. Such negotiations led to effective field projects 
in borderlands that had been previously unmanaged, such as:
1. Surveys for the understanding of the border situation between Mozambique 
and South Africa in the Matutuine District, which will be part of the Ususthu-
Tembe Futi TFP, including the Elephant Reserve in the South;
2. Research and data collection on continental border  in the Tete,  Manica and 
Gaza Provinces, the latter including Dumela, in order to reaffirm the continental 
borders of the Republic of Mozambique, in relation to South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia and Malawi42.
The connection between transnational conservation projects and the implementation 
of  border  securing  and  security  strategies  is  undeniable,  thus  underlying  that 
security at the border is becoming paramount not just for legality purposes but also 
for maintaining a full sovereignty over those borders areas which had been infringed 
in the past.
6.2.4 Dumela: addressing national influence – state hierarchy
The remoteness  and informality of  Dumela and its  villagers  still  transpire  the 
superimposition of the government. The presence of all hierarchical levels in such a 
remote yet strategic place is actually remarkable as the GoM is trying to bring the 
sovereign state to the people through symbols of nation and power43.  The village 
Chief (or  Nduna, in Shangaan) is both the traditional leader and the governmental 
appointee.  He participates in the meetings at the local and district  level,  and the 
symbolism of the official uniform is increasing with time. During the scoping visit, in 
fact,  there  was  no  sign  of  his  governmental  leadership  in  the  way  he  dressed, 
whereas one year later he had a pin and a belt with a big buckle showing the colours 
and coat of arms of Mozambique.  The uniform which should have been worn at 
official meetings was also forthcoming. In his yard the flag of Mozambique marks his 
leadership to villagers and visitors alike. The videchane, or régulo, is the representative 
42 Ministéiro da Planificação e Desenvolvimento, 2005.
43 Donnan & Wilson, 1999. 
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of  the  FRELIMO  party.  He  does  not  participate  in  official  meetings  where  the 
administration and the governmental policies are discussed, but he is the first and 
last one to speak at community meetings, which he mediates. Finally, the Nyanga (the 
traditional  healer)  is  the  repository  of  all  knowledge  concerning  traditional 
treatments and the divinatory arts. In the case of Dumela, the Nyanga is the brother 
of the Chief44.  The Chief  reports  to the  Chefe de Posto,  who resides  in Pafuri,  and 
organises  the  activities  and  the  policies  of  all  the  villages  falling  under  his 
jurisdiction. He reports to the District Administrator who resides in Chiqualaquala 
and acts as the main link between the local and the national government.  Within 
these four figures both the government and FRELIMO manage to maintain a degree 
of  control  over  local  affairs  and  implement  the  policies  of  reference  in  order  to 
contribute to development. 
6.2.5 Dumela: addressing national influence – PARPA and agriculture
Within the same ideal of the colonial government, agriculture has been used by 
FRELIMO  as  the  main  political  strategy  for  employment  and  growth,  with  a 
cooperative  system,  instead  of  the  Portuguese  latifond-based  prazo.  The  growing 
importance acquired by agriculture as the only possible solution for employment and 
development in rural and remote areas unfolded through strategical plans devised in 
the  post-war  period  to  resume  developmental  policies  and  facilitate  economic 
recovery, such as the PARPA.  
In  trying  to  address  absolute  poverty,  PARPA  is  also  accountable  for  the 
implementation of health and education policies. The latter,  in Dumela, cannot be 
considered  successful  against  the high drop-out  rate  and the failure  to  teach the 
Portuguese language,  thus impeding the transmission of  information required by 
normal education standards. Two teachers have been allocated to Dumela, who do 
not  receive  enough support  from the  state  and are  often  dealing  with  classes  of 
mixed age-groups thus making it very difficult to coordinate lessons, as it is the case 
44 Unfortunately, the role of the Nyanga could not be clarified as Mr. Frank Muklave was rarely seen 
sober. 
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for most peripheral rural areas.  The closest health post for Dumela, furthermore, is 
on the TEBA hill at Pafuri on the opposite side of the River, i.e. almost a one hour 
walk from the village. The doctor does not periodically visit the communities, and it 
is very unlikely that a diseased person would be able to reach him there, particularly 
children  and  elderly  people.  The  difficulty  of  the  long  walk,  furthermore,  is 
worsened by the crossing of the crocodile infested Limpopo River, thus making it 
more sensible to remain at home than to attempt the journey if not in good health. 
Map 6.18: The location and extension of the agricultural project area, south of the lake (Source: 
field work)
On  two  occasions  patients  were  taken  to  the  Pafuri  health  post  and  the 
Chiqualaquala hospital,  the former being a child with a mild malaria,  the second 
being a boy with suspected HIV infection. In both cases the people would not have 
been able to get treatment otherwise without paying transport money to get to both 
places.  The  endemic  cough  which  affects  both  children  and  adults  is  no  longer 
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considered  a  notable  disease,  even  though  some  severe  cases  have  been  noted, 
whereas  a lady with womb haemorrhage could not be helped because of lack of 
expertise,  and  because  she  showed the  symptoms  on  the  day  of  departure.  The 
PARPA  proposals  on  increasing  access  to  health  and  education,  therefore,  has 
miserably  failed  in  this  part  of  Mozambique,  where  the  number  of  children  and 
elderly people is considerable and the lack of protection from extreme temperatures, 
coupled with a protein-poor diet, creates a haven for viral diseases. 
Furthermore, due to the typology of the soil, Pafuri and Dumela do not benefit 
from  the  advantages  of  intensive  agriculture,  much  to  the  satisfaction  of 
environmental conservationists. The Ministry of Agriculture, therefore, in line with 
PARPA,  has  sponsored  an  agricultural  project  at  the  village  scale,  involving  the 
community on a voluntary basis,  as  a small  initial  investment  is  required to buy 
seeds. The participating families, under the leadership of the Chief, agree to dedicate 
two days of the week to work on the common field. Seasonally, if the field is non 
productive, each family receives 1 litre of cooking oil, 15 Kg of maize and 3 Kg of 
beans. The ration is reduced and will gradually stop when production suffices for all 
the families. The land chosen for the project is located by the lake, where a pump has 
been installed, as shown by Map 6.3. The women of the participating families work 
on the field on Tuesday and Sunday mornings. During the scoping visit it was noted 
that the intensity of work had diminished as the pump had broken down and was 
taken to the Administrator at Chiqualaquala and the rains had been scarce. During 
the extended field trip of September 2006, instead, the pump had been fixed and the 
first products were visible. A guard would, therefore,  stay at the field during the 
night to scare away baboons and elephants. The Ministry also provided a rifle for 
defence, but due to the TFCA land denomination and the laws on wildlife protection, 
the guard could only shoot in the air, if threatened, to scare the animals away. 
Agriculture is  the main source of  livelihood in Dumela,  as was stated several 
times during the first community meeting, even though it rarely produces surplus 
for  sales.  The  only  interviewee  to  openly  admit  selling  surplus  to  people  from 
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Zimbabwe was the owner of Machamba 1 (see Map 6.3), who is renown in the village 
for the good quality of his maize, which he grows on the River banks. Most of the 
other  villagers  rely  on  subsistence  agriculture  and  small  livestock  (chicken  and 
goats), since cattle is  the equivalent to a bank deposit and cows are not used for 
consumption. As shown by Table 6.4, 77.3% of the interviewees rely on Machamba 
(subsistence  agriculture)  to  survive.  Some of  the  participants  to  the  MoA project 
declared that the project itself was their main sources of livelihood, whereas virtually 
all of the people who trade have a  machamba as well. The level of remittances and 
employment is irrelevant,  in fact only two people were permanently employed in 
governmental  institutions  locally,  with  the  exclusion  of  the  Chief.   In  Sengwe 
Communal  Land,  instead,  livestock  was  classed  as  the  first  source  of  livelihood, 
agricultural  produce  being the second,  remittances  third and Ilala palm products 
(wine or baskets) last45.
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Livelihood strategies
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Table 6.19: Livelihood strategies – Source: questionnaire survey.
45 See Mpofu et al., 1999, p. 106.
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6.2.6 Dumela: addressing national influence – the border post and patrols
The influence of the state has so far only tampered the need for symbolism to 
reconstruct  national  identity,  which had been  promoted mainly  by  the  videchane, 
since independence. The influence of national policies at the local level, in Dumela, 
are deeply dependent  on the amount of economic growth they can create,  as the 
MoA project shows: when the pump was broken and taken away the general attitude 
was that the State was not good to them, as soon as the pump was fixed and re-
installed, confidence about the State was re-boosted. In the meantime, no one in the 
village was trained to fix the pump, so should an accident happen again the moods 
will swing likewise. In this precarious environment, however, the border plays a key 
role in creating the basis for survival by providing crossroads of encounter and trade 
between people whose sustenance heavily depends on the natural products, both to 
consume, to transform and to barter or sell. Dumela, and the broader Pafuri area, 
prove that  a variety of  border cultures gain their lifeblood from borders, while ironically  
providing  sustenance  to  those  state  structures,  like  the  police,  army  and  immigration  
authorities, whose task it is to make their borders less penetrable in the political and economic  
interest  of  the  state46.  In  fact  the  interactions  between  the  state  apparatus  and the 
border communities happen on a variety of levels, in order to protect the interests of 
the state, of the community, of the people.
The  first  level  of  interaction  is  of  course  official,  whereby  the  Police,  the 
Immigration,  the  Army  and  the  LNP  wardens  are  present  to  prevent  illegal 
emigrations towards the neighbouring state,  through border patrol,  to stop illegal 
cross-border transactions such as the trading of stolen goods and illegal weaponry, 
the failure to pay due import taxes and the trade in animals and by-products. This 
role of protection is understood by the local people but disregarded if it impacts their 
right to roam for grazing pastures, wedding planning and social encounters based on 
customary traditional law. Of course, this might cause other types of cross-border 
46 Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 89.
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crimes, such as the theft of livestock from Zimbabwean raiders, which was reported 
several times in the scooping visit, at the community meeting. 
The second level of interaction is economical, since the state authorities based at 
Pafuri cannot freely move around the territory, as they have no vehicles, they must 
be able to get all the supplies they need locally. Since the only shop in Pafuri closed 
in  2006,  some  officers  have  been  growing  a  machamba towards  the  River  banks. 
However, they still rely on traders and spaza shop owners, both in Dumela and along 
the Mapai road, for non-agricultural products. The years of permanence of the state 
officers  and the  frequency  of  travels  for  trade  could,  understandably,  produce  a 
series of verbal gentlemen agreements between the parties whereby the officers are 
increasingly more reliant on local traders than on the State for their well-being. 
The third level is traditional and communal, as the time spent in service at the 
border creates a sense of community between officials (who know both the territory 
and  its  people  very  well)  and  the  community,  who  is  aware  of  the  officers’ 
constraints on the local level. The interpretation of punishment for an unlawful act as 
a period of service to the community, for instance, was not suggested by any Western 
philosopher  or  social  scientist,  but  by  common  sense  only,  as  people  with 
dichotomous roles  and interests  are forced to share the same environment.  Some 
governmental officials also take advantage of local typical products if they have a 
day off and go, informally, to Sengwe to sit with the Ilala wine makers and drink the 
fermented lymph of this bush-size palm. If Dumela produces maize beer, which is 
very common amongst Shagaan people, the Ilala palm wine can only be produced 
where  the  spontaneous  growth  of  this  tree  allows  it,  and  it  is  uncommon  in 
Mozambique47. The liminality of socio-economic relations between state officers and 
local  communities  both  in  the  political  and  the  traditional  space,  makes  it  very 
47 The  production  of  the  Ilala  palm  wine  is  extensive,  as  a  lot  of  trees  are  required  to  make  a 
considerate amount of drink and highly impacting on the plant, as it halts the growth of the trunk. 
Due to the long fermentation under the sun, the drink is incredibly alcoholic and very bitter in taste. 
However, it is very much appreciated even by non-natives as Connor (2003) shows.
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difficult to determine the relevance of the State as a sovereign entity over its people 
and its territory.
6.3 BORDER DEPENDENCY: MOBILITY AND LIVELIHOODS
Table 6.20: Stratification of society based on income  (Source: Anonymous, 2003)
The Upper  Limpopo Zone,  of  which  Dumela  is  part,  is  a  perfect  example  of 
subsistence agriculture48, where the border is not a symbol of division, but a catalyser 
of benefits other remote areas do not have, which derive from the legal and liminal 
interaction between the state and the citizens.  As pointed out in a recent publication, 
three  types  of  households  compose  the  subsistence  agriculture  society:  poorest, 
middle and richer49. These terms, of course, are all relative to each other, yet depict a 
stratified society where traditional hierarchies work along side modern ones. Such 
divisions are visible in Dumela as well. However, unlike other villages in the Upper 
Limpopo,  Dumela  has  increased  market  opportunities  for  surplus  produces  and 
imported products, as it sits by two borders between populated areas where there is 
no access to basic necessities: the Border Post and the Sengwe. Furthermore, being 
the Pafuri borderland highly porous for the informal sector, Dumela acts as a real 
cross-road for various socio-economical interests. It is possible, therefore, to assume 
that  trade  with  foreigners  and  non-locals  is  higher  than  expected  in  a  normal 
peripheral area. The importance of the border to the community can be measured by 
48 Anon, 2003.
49 Ibid.
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understanding (1) the numbers and patterns of volunteers migrations; (2) the type 
and numbers of trade with non-Mozambicans; (3) the quantity and quality of family 
relations across the borders. These three sections were all part of the questionnaire 
survey and have led to interesting results, combined with personal observation of life 
in the village and its surroundings.
6.3.1 Changing migrations: exploiting the borderland 
As explained in the previous chapters, border trespassing in Pafuri dates back to 
the  XIX  century,  and  cross-border  migrations  intensified  with  the  need  for 
employment  to  earn  money and  the  opening  of  the  mine  requiring  man power. 
Confirming the data gathered in the Sengwe communal  land,  the main drive for 
migration is still employment. Very few families had members abroad because the 
daughters  got  married  in  South  Africa,  as  it  is  generally  the  male  member  who 
crosses the River and the border as part of a modernised passage rite from boyhood 
to adulthood50. If the main drive for migration is employment, however, what makes 
it  a  rite  of  passage is  not  the length of  the journey as such,  but  the risks  which 
migrants are exposed to, considering that they have to cross both a patrolled border 
and  a  protected  area.  Far  from  justifying  Frump’s  argumentations  over  the 
responsibilities  of  Park  Rangers  towards  the  illegal  migrants51,  including  their 
attempts to cover numbers of accidents in the name of conservation, it is true that 
there are mortal accidents caused by lions and other predators living in the reserve, 
to the detriment of illegal immigrants. However, the survey carried out in Sengwe 
shows that the first two constraints to migrations at Crooks’ Corner are the electric 
fence and the River floods, whereas crocodiles and wild animals are rated third and 
50 This  theory  is  mainly  derived  from the  introduction  of  channelled  labour  for  the  mines,  from 
neighbouring countries and have been explored by Elkan, 1980 and Niemann, 2003.  Maphosa, 2004, 
instead explores migrations as ‘rite of passage’ in the context on modern south-western Zimbabwe. 
51 Frump, 2006. The author’s personal opinion, in fact, is that people have been living and moving 
around this areas for two centuries and are well aware of the danger posed by wild animals,  it  is 
therefore their own free decision to still embark in the journey and must bear the full consequences of 
this decisions. Also, considering present environmentalists views over animal rights, it is thought that 
it would be pointless to cover numbers of accidents as the general overview would be that wildlife is 
dangerous and people must be afraid of it, although mesmerised by its beauty.
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fifth respectively52.  The threat  posed by an arrest  is,  thus,  greater  than the threat 
posed by a lion. The electric fence was taken down along the Mozambican border in 
200153, thus leaving arrests and wildlife as the main threat to immigrants from Pafuri. 
Being employment the main purpose of migrations from the Pafuri – Crooks’ Corner 
area,  Dumela and Sengwe reflect the argumentation posed by both Whitman and 
McDonalds54 that  migrants  are  changing  and  are  represented  now  by  a 
heterogeneous group of people who do not aspire to citizenship in South Africa, but 
want to earn money and go back to his/her homeland. 
Paired Samples Statistics
,78 88 ,718 ,077
,52 88 ,694 ,074
Family members
temping abroad
Family members
permanently abroad
Pair
1
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
Table 6.21: Comparing temporary and permanent migrations (Source: questionnaire survey)
In Sengwe employment and food are the main reasons for migrations, as stated 
by focus groups participants55.  Similarly,  in Dumela,  the household survey shows 
that  on average more people leave  for  temporary migrations than in  search of  a 
change  of  residence  (implied  in  the  permanence  in  the  selected  country). 
Furthermore,  the  adult  men  who  were  discussing  going  to  South  Africa  in  the 
summer  season (October  –  March)  declared  they  would  only  go  until  they  earn 
sufficient money, then come back to their families. The Shangaana calendar, in fact, 
shows the months between October and December as the barren period when nature 
is preparing to bear its fruits and the fields just need watering, thus allowing men to 
work elsewhere and come back by January –  Hoho – the month of ‘laughter  and 
festivity’ when the maroela fruit is ripe and ready56. 
52 Mpofu et al., 1999. 
53 Godwin, 2001.
54 Whitman, 2000, and McDonald, 2000.
55 Mpofu et al., 1999.
56 Bulpin, 1954, p. 115.
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Far from following the ancient migrations towards the mines, new migrants are 
using the border  as the possibility to  gather  the money they need to provide for 
themselves and their  family,  without abandoning their  home. As a matter of fact 
55.9% of the respondents stated that none of their direct family never returned home. 
Considering that South Africa is the place of migration, it is somehow rewarding that 
local  youth  is  not  lured  by  the  myth  of  the  rainbow  nation where  everything  is 
possible, but prefer a simple and harsh lifestyle in their home country, thus creating 
another paradox in the analysis of the Pafuri borderland.
6.3.2 The role of remittances in determining wealth
As  Maphosa  rightly  notes,  the  meaning  of  the  term  remittance is  still  quite 
controversial, though the general idea is that it refers to cash earned by a member of 
a family and sent back home to contribute towards household economy, whereas 
only a few scholars consider remittances as both cash and goods57. In agreement with 
Maphosa58,  and  in  line  with  the  findings  of  the  field  investigation,  remittances 
discussed here include both cash and non-cash commercial goods, from cooking oil 
to motor-vehicles, i.e. anything that may increase the status of a family within the 
village.  Such broad and encompassing use of the term is found to be closer to reality 
because  of  the  changing  type  of  migration  discussed  so  far,  and  because 
consumerism has, despite stark dichotomies between African cores and peripheries, 
penetrated  the  most  rural  societies  thus  creating  a  situation  whereby,  alongside 
cattle, the availability of luxury commercial goods may change the status of a family.
The Sengwe survey shows a certain seasonality in the reception of remittances. If 
April  and November  show the  same relevance  within the year,  December  is  the 
month  when  remittances  acquire  a  definite  importance,  probably  because 
accompanied by the migrant,  who will bring home more goods, as he would not 
need to rely on carriers and other people59. This is not surprising and can be deduced 
57 Maphosa, 2004.
58 Ibid.
59 See Mpofu et al., 1999, p. 105. Remittances are normally sent through an informal network of people 
who are affiliated to the remitter by either kinship or trade relation. Alternatively, public transport do 
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also for Dumela,  following the interviews with local adults  on migration, already 
mentioned.  However,  Table  6.7  shows  irregular  frequencies  in  the  reception  of 
remittances  both  from migrant  and from permanent  migrants.  A majority  of  the 
respondents  actually  claimed they never  receive  remittances  from family  abroad, 
which  should  not  be  taken  as  utter  truth  considering  that  many  families  had 
commercial  goods unavailable  in  the  area  such as:  plastic  chairs;  pots  and pans; 
radios. Case 12 is interesting as an example of the reliability of the questionnaire for 
familiar economy is concerned: the respondent stated that no family members were 
employed abroad, thus receiving no remittances, and that they were not trading with 
foreigner and had the  machamba and the maize beer as only sources of livelihood. 
This  was  said  at  the  house  of  the  respondent  which  was  stashed  with  modern 
electrical and electronic apparels (from radios to car batteries) as well as mechanical 
tools. The pots and pans hanging from the wood stacks were visibly new as were the 
plastic chairs laying in the yard. This family was visibly one of the wealthier in the 
village,  but  was  not  prepared  to  show it  to  foreigners,  and  when  the  lady  was 
questioned against observation, she just smiled and looked around, meaning she was 
not going to say anything else. Furthermore, her husband was spotted several times 
drinking  at  the  new  spaza shop  at  night,  implying  that  money  was  not  short. 
Remittances play, by definition, a key role in the local familiar economies as the main 
source of cash or products that are not available  in loco. If Sengwe shows a certain 
dependency on remittances, as they can reach up to 2,000 ZAR60, Dumela has proven 
the opposite in terms of questionnaire survey, as only 7% of the interviewees admits 
to  remittances  sufficing to  the household economy.  If  true,  this  poses  two issues 
pertaining  both  to  the  socio-cultural  and  traditional  sphere.  Considering  that 
employment  is  still  the  first  reason  for  migrating  and  that  social  bonds  in  the 
Shangaan community are traditionally very strong when it comes to help out the rest 
of  the  family,  indeed,  the  fact  that  most  interviewees  declared  not  receiving 
remittances  from  sons  and  daughters  in  South  Africa,  or  that  these  were  not 
accept parcels on provision that the receiver will meet the vehicle at the official stops.
60 Zuid Afrika Rand – the South African currency.
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consistently  contributing  to  household  management,  could  indicate  either  a 
misinformation, as exemplified by Case 12, or a change in the social pattern of family 
relations. 
Frequency of remittances
1 16,7%   1 6,7% 1 4,2% 1 4,0%   
  13 34,2% 5 33,3% 9 37,5% 6 24,0% 3 30,0%
5 83,3% 25 65,8% 9 60,0% 14 58,3% 18 72,0% 7 70,0%
once per semester
more often
never
Count %
How often is money
sent home
zero
Count %
How often is money
sent home
0-2
Count %
How often is money
sent home
3-5
Family members temping abroad
Count %
How often is money
sent home
zero
Count %
How often is money
sent home
0-2
Count %
How often is money
sent home
3-5
Family members permanently abroad
Temporary and permanent migrants
Table 6.22: Frequency of remittances (Source: questionnaire survey)61
Firstly, the Shangaana is a patriarchal society whereby married couples live with 
the family of the husband. When the latter leaves in search for a job, his wife stays 
behind and shares the wealth of his family.  If  the husband does not send money 
home, the woman might be either  bullied in increasingly contributing to familiar 
economy (smooth form of slavery) or asked to leave, as she is a loss to the family62. 
Such cases have been reported orally through other  researchers  in the areas,  and 
often presented as theories derived from the Shangaan traditional customs. Even if 
no such case was reported in Sengwe and in Dumela, it is understandable that when 
too many people compete for the same resource, it is the weakest or the outsider who 
will succumb.
Secondly, the case may be that when a person migrates to South Africa with the 
intention of permanently settling there, he/she deliberately avoids making contacts 
with the family back home. If true, this is due to the fact that when a Shangaana 
achieves a relative financial stability, the whole immediate and extended family will 
expect to see monetary returns, which may become unbearable. This was the case, for 
instance, of a fair number of Mozambican living in Maputo or in South Africa, who 
61 In the survey, it was not asked to specify if the remitter was either temping or permanently abroad, 
because most families had both type of migrants. This is the reason why for both ‘0’ values to temping 
or permanent migrant there correspond a positive answer.
62 Personal conversation with Dr. Giuliano Soncini, former consultant to CESVI in the Sengwe NRM 
project,  and  Dr.  Claudia  Gandolfi  project  manager  for  the  CESVI  project  ‘Fermiamo  l’AIDS  sul 
nascere’ (“Let’s stop AIDS at birth” – Translated by the author)
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are originally from the rural areas. Particularly a mechanic met in Giyani, who was 
originally from the Upper Limpopo valley, and never got in touch with his kins after 
leaving as he knew this would mean he had to support and help up to fifteen (15) 
people, claiming relations to him.  
Remittances,  to  conclude,  are  fundamental  in  determining  wealth  particularly 
when  it  comes  to  marriages,  since  traditional  authority  has  been  challenged  by 
politics and modernity. To be able to offer a good lobolo (bride price) to a woman’s 
family means to be able to marry whoever a man wants, as well as the number of 
women, since polygamy is still widely practiced. Even if statistics show that Dumela 
does not thrive on remittances, personal observation indicates that the situation is 
different  for  at  least  40%  of  the  population,  particularly  within  the  younger 
generation.  And the  simple  fact  that  three  spaza shops  can  coexist  within  a  few 
metres from each other, whereas none exists at the border post, demonstrates that 
local people have money to spend.
6.3.3 The socio-cultural sphere: kins across the border
The second scoping visit to Dumela (May 2005) was planned via South Africa. 
Travelling along the main road circumnavigating the Western border of the KNP, a 
village was noted bearing the name of Dumela in the Gazankulo areas past Giyani, 
its  main  town.  When  questioned  over  this  village,  Chief  Muklave  stated  that  a 
brother  was  the  chief  of  that  village  and  that  together  with  Chief  Sengwe  they 
formed the last Shangaana ‘triumvirate’ of Pafuri. Besides the questions of historical 
settlements  and  power  relations  this  statement  opens,  the  regular  meetings  held 
between the three chiefs are symptomatic of the divisions the border causes and the 
existence of a hierarchical and social level that is based on traditional leadership, thus 
implying a double affiliation of the chiefs to the country and to their ethnicity. The 
meetings with the Chief of Dumela in South Africa vary from one to two per year, 
because Chief Muklave only recently acquired a passport and it is costly to get to 
Dumela - SA. 
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Map 6.19: Frequency of kinship in neighbouring countries (Source: questionnaire survey)
The meetings with Chief Sengwe, instead, are more regular and happen at least 
once per semester. In both cases national politics are discussed as well as important 
issues such as the TFCA and Sengwe corridor, generally addressed to as ‘the Park’, 
from the colonial legacy of exclusive conservation entailing forced relocation63.  Of 
course,  if  the  trips  to  South  Africa  somehow follow the  legal  route  through the 
border post, this cannot happen for Sengwe as there exists no border post, which 
means  that  either  the  police  is  complacent  or  that  there  is  no  patrol,  although 
unlikely.
Including the chief, there is considerable 82% of villagers with relatives residing 
either Zimbabwe or South Africa, or both. These people can only visit each other by 
crossing the border, thus incurring the same costs and problems as the Chief would, 
with  the  major  difference  that  most  of  these  people  do  not  have  any  form  of 
identification, thus making it too risky to cross illegally. Obviously, however, since 
63 Diary entry – 23rd May 2005.
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the Chief is the first person to break the national borders, specifically when going to 
Sengwe, there is a silent legitimation for the rest of the population to do the same.
Cross-border kinships
20 11 41
27,8 15,3 56,9
Count
Row %
yesRelatives in other
countries
South Africa Zimbabwe Both
Country of the relatives
Table 6.23 Location of kin relations (Source: questionnaire survey)
Before discussing the frequency of the visits, however, it is important to note with 
Table 6.8 that Zimbabwe and South Africa are very close in the number of kins they 
host, with 56.9% of villagers having kins in both countries. Obviously, there is no 
geographical correlation between the proximity of a household to a border and the 
country of location of the kin, and the data demonstrate beyond doubt the cross-
border nature of Dumela and the Pafuri area. Furthermore, it could be inferred that 
there  exists  a  mutually  supporting  network  of  family  relations  which  were 
strengthened during the last war, with refugees movement, and might be in place 
again,  if  required  by  the  national  political  situation  in  one  of  the  countries  (i.e. 
Zimbabwe),  which  demonstrates  (1)  the  double  affiliation  to  tradition  and  the 
modern state; (2) the potential for the use of these cultural bonds through and for the 
TFCA. 
Frequencies of cross-border visits
Does the respondent visit them? yes Does the respondent get
visited? yes
2 2,8% 1 1,4%
1 1,4% 1 1,4%
34 47,2% 35 48,6%
    
every month
every 3 months
less often
never
Count %
How often does he/she
visit?
Count %
How often does he/she
get visited?
Table 6.24: Frequencies of cross border visits (Source: questionnaire survey)
Confirming the original  assumptions,  over  60% of  the respondents  who declared 
having relatives  across the border do visit  them and/or get visited regularly.  Six 
respondents  also  remarked  that  that  they  only  visit  people  in  Zimbabwe,  which 
confirms the facility of the crossing. The frequencies of the visits, however, are lower 
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than expected as almost 50% of the respondents either visit or get visited less than 
once quarterly. This would be understandable for South Africa, less for Zimbabwe; 
however,  it  must be noted that the length of the road from Dumela to the actual 
village of Sengwe, the presence of mined fields and the age of the people who would 
have tighter connections are strong enough obstacles to embark on the journey. As a 
matter  of  fact,  the regular  visitors  from Sengwe were  often on a  bicycle  or  on a 
donkey-trained cart, and rarely on foot.
6.3.4 Roaming people: the crossroads to modernity
The people of Dumela are well inscribed into a network of transfrontier cultural 
and economic relations, yet their proximity to the border cannot be limited to the 
analysis  of  local  centrifugal  movements.  Dumela  is  in  fact  the  centre  of  a 
geographical route network for people who want to emigrate or simply trade at the 
border.  For all  the people coming from the north west of the region (particularly 
north-west  Zimbabwe and Mozambique,  and southern  Malawi)  the  best  route  to 
follow is the same their forefathers took to go to the mines: through northern Gaza to 
Dumela, across the Limpopo, at Pafuri. 
Chiqualaquala is the second crossroad along the migratory route,  as it attracts 
people from Central Zimbabwe and the Gaza and Manica Provinces in Mozambique. 
Retracing the road backwards to the North, Chimoio is the third crossroad, located 
along the Beira corridor, the main transport route to the sea for Zimbabwe. Finally 
Mutarara, leading the road to the Vila Nova de Fronteira border post with Malawi64, 
and Caia, with the pontoon over the Zambesi River leading the way north, received 
and  receive  potential  migrants  from  both  Malawi  and  Northern  Zimbabwe.  The 
pulling factor South Africa always exercised by providing employment to millions of 
rural people across the regions is visible through a study of this long and dangerous 
64 The Dona Ana railway bridge was built in 1935 and was, at the time, the longest bridge in Africa. It 
is now closed for conversion to rail bridge again, after having been transformed into a motor vehicle 
bridge in 1995 by CMC Africa Austral. As of 2008, the bridge will be used by railway, pedestrians and 
bicycles, whereas a new bridge for motor vehicles will be built at Caia.
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journey that people were and are prepared to embark upon in order to get there: it is 
no wonder it became a rite of passage for many. 
Map 6.20: Main migratory route to Pafuri (Source: field work and bibliography)
The centrality of Dumela in respect to human migratory routes is very important 
in terms of cultural and economic exchange. Local people, in fact, occasionally offer 
‘accommodation’ to travellers on the way and the  spaza shops boost their sales in 
drink  and  food  as  the  day  turns  into  night,  a  more  profitable  time  for  border-
jumping. During  the field work, it  was noted that twice a week an open  bakkie65 
would come down from or going up to Chiqualaquala, with passengers or goods, 
either as private or public transport. During the second week of September a bakkie 
loaded with over twenty people arrived and dropped off the customers at Dumela. 
Here the people sat either at the  spaza shop or at the maize beer ladies until dusk, 
then walked to the River to cross for Pafuri. Of these people only one was caught and 
sent back penniless by the LNP warden66. Dumela, also sits on the secondary road to 
65 A type of car (either 4x4 or 2 wheel drive) used particularly in the farm to carry loads at the back. 
The cabin can seat two or five accordingly.
66 Diary entry – 15th September 2006.
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Mapai (on the main road to the coast) which runs along the northern River banks of 
the Limpopo River, thus accruing the number of people coming through, depending 
on the water levels.
Similarly,  Dumela  could  be  a  crossroad  for  the  tourists  of  the  TFCA  as  the 
obligatory  passage  towards  Game  reserves  and  National  Parks,  in  Central 
Mozambique. Whilst in Dumela, over the space of two weeks in September, about 
ten people (tourists, guides and professional hunters) were met at Dumela, as they 
stopped to pause. to get some cool drinks, or just to visit the place. In particular, a 
group of 5 American tourists and their South African guides stopped on the way to a 
private hunting reserve in Mozambique. The implication of such visits are enormous, 
considering  that  tourism  is  the  one  activity  which  should  bring  low  impact 
development  in  protected  areas,  such  as  the  GLTFCA.  Firstly,  by  admitting  that 
trophy  hunting  is  a  sustainable  tourism-related  activity,  the  amount  of  income 
generated by the  community  would be  remarkable  and prompt,  if  Pafuri  had to 
become a legalised and controlled Hunting Corner again. Secondly, the selling of 
traditional products such as reed mats, interwoven with woollen threads, and the car 
models  children  made  out  of  tins  and  scrap  iron  threads,  which  are  currently 
produced industrially in South Africa and sold in tourist shops and markets, would 
support  a  network for  locally-based produced touristic  objects.  Thirdly,  it  would 
contribute  to  maintain  the  cross-border  cultural  sphere  by  creating  a  safe 
environment where local people would roam freely (as there is no intention to leave 
their  community  at  present  either)  and  be  responsible  for  the  halting  of  illegal 
activities, unless their privilege is taken away. This, however, will be discussed in the 
last section of the Chapter.
6.4 CONSERVATION AND HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICT: POSITIVE SPIN-OFFS?
The  vision  of  Dumela  so  far  presented  is  one  of  the  core  for  cross-border 
movements, whose livelihood is highly dependent on the presence of the border on 
three  different  levels.  Being  the  core  of  centripetal  and  centrifugal  movements, 
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Dumela  can  aspire  to  recuperate  a  centrality  that  is  not  only  geographical  but 
developmental in the context of the GLTFCA, by sustainably using its history, its 
culture and its natural resources. This rests upon three key conditions which must be 
analysed against the provisions and the aims of the TFCA. 
Local Province Nation/Region
Kin and traditional 
movements with Zimbabwe 
are ‘overseen’ by official 
border patrollers
Traders from the northern 
section of Gaza are obliged to 
go through Dumela to reach 
Pafuri
Migrants who want to reach 
SA67 from the North East 
must reach Dumela as the 
last outpost before crossing
Personal and Spaza shops 
trade benefits from the 
peripheral location and 
isolation of border officers at 
Pafuri 
Border jumpers are dropped 
off at Dumela, where they 
embark upon their journey on 
foot
Tourists from South Africa 
wanting to reach the north-
east of the country must go 
through Dumela
Local border-jumper are very 
close to the border and know 
the area very well
Table 6.25: Cross-border movements from and through Dumela (Source: field work)
In the first instance, the USA-led ‘back-to-barriers’ trend in conservation presented 
by Büscher and Dietz68 should not be incorporated in PPF and TFCA implementation 
strategies. It is important to understand that CBC and CBNRM failed due to the lack 
of  power-devolution  and  training  at  the  grass-root  level,  and  that  participation 
begins with information. Secondly, human-wildlife conflict must be understood and 
addressed, if required, as one of the first steps towards the convergence of interests: 
the  institutions  want  protection  of  the  animals,  the  people  want  protection  from 
animal.  The conflict  of  interests  in place must  be solved in order  to  redress  past 
exclusion  of  local  people,  whilst  showing  that  cooperating  for  conservation  may 
work  if  planned  and  implemented  with  respect  of  all  stakeholders.  Finally,  the 
promotion of culture must be re-valued as an objective of the TFCA projects, in order 
67 SA – South Africa
68 Büscher and Dietz, 2005, warn that a U-turn in conservation strategies is currently enforced by US-
led group of scientists who claim that the failure of CBC and CBNRM is due to 1) the ineffectiveness 
of  CBC and Integrated Conservation  Development  Projects  (ICDP),  and 2)  the  mythical  status  of 
ecologically friendly locals. To redress the balance for conservation it is required to re-instate 1) the 
imperative  for  biodiversity  conservation,  2)  the  critical  importance  of  protected areas,  and 5)  the 
immediacy of the need for strict protection.
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to enhance the understanding of traditional cultures (for both local and international 
visitors) whilst promoting a real transfrontier cooperations amongst the people of the 
CA.
With the aim of demonstrating that the conflict between human and wildlife in 
interstitial  areas,  of  which Dumela could be a  centre  for  the GLTFCA, is  neither 
inevitable nor unaddressable, this last section will discuss the three conditios sine qua  
non for the effective and inclusive creation of a real Transfrontier Conservation Area. 
The case study of the GLTFCA will contribute to this analysis as it is tri-national in 
nature and the flagship of the PPF-TFCA project, as Büscher and Dietz claim: the 
‘make it or break it’ case69. Firstly the hostility of local people towards the GLTFCA 
will be argued in reference to the priority assessments of the management. Secondly, 
the  envisaged  solutions  will  be  presented  by  discussing  ecological  and  cultural 
strategies. 
6.4.1 Conflict generation between parks and people
Ever since the first land demarcations for nature protection in South Africa, the 
local populations have been cut off from their resources and land thus generating a 
conflict which lasted up to present day. The aggravations of this feeling, however, 
are derived from current conservation projects which, despite the call for including 
affected local populations in the process, still attempt to content the donors in spite 
of the people.  In the GLTFCA, the history of the border areas is one of suffering, 
exploiting  and  exclusion,  which  is  why  it  is  paramount  that  the  management 
considers  the  interest  of  local  population  in  planning  and  implementation.  This, 
however, has never been the case since the very beginning. 
When looking at the GLTFCA, it must be considered that South Africa is the main 
drive for the project and the main attractor for both donors and tourists due to the 
marketability of its political and ecological situation. Despite all agreements that each 
State  does  not  renounce  to  its  sovereignty  whilst  cooperating  for  common 
69 Ibid., p. 7.
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transfrontier goals (which seems a contradiction in terms)70, therefore, South Africa 
can play a major role in defining: (1) the pace of implementation; (2) the priorities; (3) 
the rule and regulations, based on its long experience in conservation. This is not just 
a theory if we is consider the responsibility of the then Minister of Environmental 
Affairs  and  Tourism,  Vali  Moosa,  in  reducing  the  agreed  action  plan  by  a  half, 
particularly in so far as the Community Working Group was concerned, in order to 
present the GLTFCA to his electorate by the end of his mandate71. Furthermore, the 
contribution of the PPF to logistics awarded the Foundation a great decision-making 
power within all the key institutions, as it has disseminated its officers in virtually all 
the segments related to the TFCA projects in South Africa, and has brought together 
all the main donors (such as the World Bank, USAID, and the German Development 
Bank - KfW)72.  The lobbying power PPF may exercise within the TFCA project  is 
much  stronger  than  any  pressure  from  either  the  Mozambican  or  Zimbabwean 
governments. Should it come as a real surprise, therefore, that local communities in 
the interstitial areas and in the populated parks (both the GNP and the LNP) have 
been neglected in terms of both information and pro-action? 
Rhetoric, of course, is of little use when action is required but it is important to 
note that both the Sengwe Ecological Corridor and the relocation of villages in the 
LNP have come to  an impasse  mainly  because  of  failure  to  compromise,  on the 
management side, and of lack of participative appraisal techniques which have been 
required  by  the  WB  but  never  implemented73.  In  2002,  CESVI  presented  a 
comprehensive  document,  based on community  consultation,  explaining both the 
reasons  behind  the  requirement  for  a  smaller  corridor  (to  reduce  relocation  to  a 
minimum) and the type of activities which could support the local community and 
70 See the treaty of the GLTFP.
71 Ibid., p. 9. South Africa, in fact, could afford to proceed without the Community Working Group as 
the KNP is unpopulated and the communities along its western borders are not part of the wider 
TFCA project either, whereas both Zimbabwe and Mozambique has to deal with some 10,000 people 
altogether. Also Spenceley, 2005.
72 Ramutsindela, 2004.
73 See the Refugee Research Programme report (2002) on the consultations in the LNP, carried out by 
IUCN and other contracted NGOs. 
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generate returns in the short term, while allowing the time for planning the medium-
long term strategy. The actual maps of the GLTFCA do not take into consideration 
the requirements of the Sengwe community nor does the Management Committee 
accept trophy hunting as a feasible activity in the TFCA, on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with the vision of the KNP and the projection of the GLPP as a safe 
haven for wildlife74. Similarly, the documents showing the IUCN consultation in the 
LNP which aimed at  spreading awareness  over  the creation of  the LNP and the 
GLTFCA are inconclusive over the people’s reaction to such affecting changes in land 
use that one wonders if the aims were actually met75. Overall, the only target met by 
the GLTFCA management committee is the relocation of animals in Mozambique; 
the creation of the sanctuary, now dismantled as the grown population have been 
freed; and the semi-completion of the demining of the Sengwe corridor, which was 
finally  funded  by  external  donors  (suspected  KfW,  as  GTZ  had  carried  out  the 
survey for mapping the mined areas).
The total disrespect towards local population shown so far by both the GLTFCA 
management and the PPF has generated a hostile behaviour from local communities 
both in Sengwe and Pafuri. The former lament they do not want to see maps with red 
lines showing areas that will no longer be theirs, the latter fear an increase in wildlife 
presence in and around their precarious fields76. The general attitude is one of verbal 
confrontation,  as  demonstrated  by  both  community  meetings  in  Dumela,  but 
practical respect  towards the laws they must abide by (such as the prohibition of 
animal  killing),  because  of  control  measures  enforced  by  the  LNP.  The  present 
discontent,  however,  could  and  will  degenerate  into  passive  resistance  and  civil 
disobedience  practices  which  Africans  have  continuously  put  in  practice  against 
white  rule  since the  Khoikhoi  destroyed  the first  padrão (marking stone)  and the 
74 Bocchino, 2002.
75 All  the  documents  concerning  consultations  in  the  Gaza  Province  undertaken  by  IUCN  were 
studied. The most significant are: IUCNa, b, and c – 2001. The documents lacking full bibliographical 
reference have been looked at but disregarded, yet they are available at the IUCN country office of 
Maputo, Mozambique. See also the Refugee Research Programme, 2002, to consolidate opinions.
76 Fieldwork : personal observation.
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wooden  cross  left  by  Vasco  Da Gama’s  party  in  149777.  Without  protection  from 
wildlife, the community could resort to self-protection through wildlife poisoning or 
poaching, thus obtaining safety and food, as well as other animal by-products. The 
attitude towards tourists, furthermore, would suffer and, from actual indifference, it 
could  escalate  to  unfriendly  and/or  deceitful  behaviours78.  This  would  of  course 
damage the peaceful image that the PPF and the GLTFCA management committee 
are trying to convey to the world in order to attract both donors and tourists, with 
South Africa being the gemstone of the conservation project with its KNP.
6.4.2 Measuring sustainability in the GLTFCA
Five years after the formal establishment of the GLTFCA, communities and their 
development are being relegated as the least important target from implementation. 
This is due mainly to the focus of lobbying stakeholders towards conservation, the 
general attitude that wildlife – including elephants – need protection against all odds 
and  that  communities  have  proven  unable  to  deliver  sound  sustainable  NRM 
practices79.  It  is  legitimate,  therefore,  to  consider  how  sustainable  is  this  non-
adjustable  conservation  principle,  against  the  evolving  concept  of  sustainable 
development,  in  the  light  of  the  Millenium  Development  Goals  towards  the 
eradication of absolute poverty and the emerging of tourism as the solution to all 
human-wildlife conflict in and around Protected Areas. Beginning from the assertion 
that  sustainable  development  has  always  discussed  economic  goals  within  the 
respect  of  the environment  and non  vice  versa80,  one must question what  type of 
sustainable  development  can  TFCAs  promote  when  located  on  the  doorstep  of 
77 Du Preez, 2004, p. 4.
78 Petty crime is  not expected to happen, as the people in Dumela are aware of social and wealth 
differences  and  throughout  the  whole  permanence  never  stole  anything,  even  during  prolonged 
absences  from the  field.  However,  the  sense  of  sharing  which  those  who  have are  made  to  feel 
towards the ‘have not’ may degenerate as more wealthy tourists pour in, furthermore cunning devices 
would undoubtedly be found to get some cash out of non-experienced visitors. 
79 These attitudes are discussed widely in papers which have been quoted in previous chapters, here it 
is relevant to quote Wyneberg, 2002; Büscher and Dietz, 2005.
80 UN-WCED, 1987, also known as the Bruntland report, provides the first definition of ‘sustainable 
development’ as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs’ – Chapter 2. 
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destitution  in  peripheral  areas  where  the  informal  economy  and  the  traditional 
bonds are stronger than the state and its law.
The  answer  to  this  question,  certainly,  does  not  lay  within  the  management 
priorities  of  the  GLTFCA,  despite  the  many opportunities  offered  by geography, 
history and culture to create a real Peace Park, a ‘make-it’ case where the human-
wildlife conflict could be solved and generate income at the grass-roots level, thus 
beginning the cycle of sustainable development through nature conservation, which 
has been theorised for two decades now. The solutions envisaged, after the presented 
Historical and Political Geographical analysis as well as the socio-economic data, will 
here be enumerated and discussed as separate paragraphs.
(1)Conservation priority  :  whilst  it  is  understandable  that  conservation is  the first 
priority of a TFCA, this should be implemented bearing in mind, first of all, that the 
population of one of the most protected species in Africa, the elephant, has passed its 
carrying capacity in the KNP, to the extent that culling would be needed to redress 
ecological balance, but this is not psychologically accepted by lay people and some 
environmentalist organisations. Of course, by increasing the conservation area, the 
elephant population will, hopefully, occupy a wider space thus redressing balances 
without  human intrusive  intervention,  but  this  may take  time.  The  general  idea, 
therefore, is that in the GLTFCA elephants are not endangered, and the same goes for 
all other species, since most poaching activities concern the Southern part of the KNP 
and  the  private  Game  Reserves  south  of  the  LNP,  and  target  primarily  rhinos, 
gazelles, antelopes and lions81. In fact, wildlife protection should give way to a more 
holistic  view  of  conservation  that  encompasses  ecosystem  whether  natural  or 
anthropised. Secondly, animal diseases present in the KNP, such as feline AIDS, TB 
and Foot and Mouth, should be prevented from spreading in the two neighbouring 
countries, where local populations are healthy (Banhine and Zinave NP should be 
preserved in particular as the population numbers of Gonarezhou NP could diminish 
81 Private  communications  from  Chief  Insp.  Coetzer  of  Skukuza  and  André  Du  Pont,  owner  of 
Xonghile Game Reserve.
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daily, considering the present situation). This is done, naturally, through a system of 
fencing posited both by CESVI (2002) and Anderson & Pariela (2005), which does 
progressively prevent migration to infected animals in neighbouring countries. 
Suggested  solution:  Considering  the  presence  of  populated  interstitial  areas, 
particularly  around water  access points,  and the creation of wildlife corridor,  the 
conservation  priority  should  be  shared  with  safety  and  security,  thus  creating  a 
systems of fencing which could protect animals and people, at the same time. 
(2)Economic priority  : The funds that governments worldwide can afford to allocate 
to conservation projects are plummeting, hence the theory that conservation must 
pay for itself has been widely accepted particularly  in developing countries  where 
many other  civil  society  problems  need  addressing82.  Due  to  its  potentially  low-
environmental  impact,  tourism  has  been  proposed  as  the  only  activity  able  to 
generate  income for  conservation.  A  number  of  prefixes  and  suffixes  have  been 
added to the word  tourism in order to characterise its requirements for tourism in 
and  around  Protected  Areas:  from  nature-based  tourism  to  eco-tourism;  from 
sustainable  tourism  to  pro-poor  tourism.  Rarely  these  theories  have  worked  in 
practice,  and  certainly  the  GLTFCA  is  not  an  example  to  follow,  despite  its 
potentials.  Due  to  the  lobbying  the  KNP  and  the  PPF  can  exercise  on  common 
management policies, in fact, it has been established that the only acceptable forms of 
tourism are the low-impact photographic safari and guided walks,  along side the 
more polluting 4x4 trails in Mozambique. Such decisions show, without a doubt, that 
the  only  economic  priority  at  a  stake  here  is  the  GLTFCA’s,  and  the  respective 
governments’. Even assuming that local communities would be taking part in this 
nature-based industry, in fact, this form of tourism would not be sustainable in the 
short  term  for  the  following  reasons:  (1)  only  a  small  number  of  people  would 
participate,  and the selection would be based, firstly, on education and languages 
spoken for interaction with tourists, which would leave out 90% of the population of 
Dumela and similar villages with low education density; (2) the training following 
82 Mowforth & Mount, 1998, p. 163.
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the selection would not guarantee a salary, thus making the people still dependent 
upon traditional livelihoods, endangered by a growing number of wildlife; (3) some 
real  income-generation would be perceivable  by the community only in the long 
term. Even the form of participation implemented in the Makuleke Land Concession 
is  not  enough  to  the  communities  of  the  local  villages  involved,  because  only  a 
certain  number  of  people  can  be  employed,  mainly  for  menial  jobs  whilst  being 
trained, and yet conservation is generally not perceived as a profitable activity, by 
most of the community83.
Suggested  solution:  socio-economic  development  for  local  interstitial  population 
should  be  addressed  by  understanding  the  potential  offered  by  the  Pafuri 
borderland. In the case of Dumela both the cross-road essence represented by the 
geographic  location  and the  presence  of  tradeable  handicrafts  as  touristic  objects 
should be considered for incorporation in the planning for tourism, with the creation 
of an ad hoc market within the GLTFCA boundaries, such as it is done by the KNP 
with Venda-cloth objects and in Swaziland by projects for women empowerment, 
such as ‘Gone Rural’. Finally the more varied tourism options are, the easier it is to 
incorporate interstitial areas in their running (See point 4). 
(3)Security priority  : this addresses the key ‘main characters’ of the GLTFCA project, 
yet  in  different  ways.  Whilst  animals  and  tourists  are  the  categories  to  be 
safeguarded and protected against crime, populations in interstitial areas are seen as 
the perpetrators of crime (poaching, border jumping, smuggling and so forth). From 
the analysis of Dumela and Pafuri, it emerges that the supra-statal space works on 
the traditional principle of mutual help, not of illegality, with the only exception of 
border-crossing by job-seekers.  Only one man is renown for poaching, but he has 
been isolated by the community and lives some 25 Kms away from the Zimbabwean 
border. However, the security priority is still aimed at preventing local people from 
damaging  the  outcome  of  this  mega-project,  without  understanding  the  reasons 
83 Interview with Colleen Mullen, WS Pafuri Camp lodge manager, 11th December 2006.
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behind possible sabotages: their own security from  wildlife and their own chance of 
economic development. 
Suggested solution: instead of focussing on the negative aspects of having populated 
places in a protected areas, which seems a rather backward approach, management 
committees should pay more attention to local communities as actual exclusion and 
condemnation may backfire through acts of civil disobedience once the number of 
wildlife are no longer endurable by the local populations and the threat will raise. 
The creation of a well trained Problem Animal Control Unit, as posited by Anderson 
and Pariela (2005), which would in turn train local units in the prevention of conflicts 
with  communities,  should  be  implemented  before  animal  migrations  increase  in 
numbers.  This  unit  should  be  supported  also  by  volunteer  Honorary  Wildlife 
Officers, who would deal with specific and highly problematic cases whenever PAC 
is not sufficient84.
(4)Tourism  priority  :  tourism  should  not  be  limited  to  activities  that  are  deemed 
complacent with ‘ideal’ conservation, but should coalesce the needs for conservation 
and  the  needs  of  the  people  who  have  found  themselves  within  or  close  to  its 
boundaries.  As  culling  is  not  condoned  as  a  management  practice  by  some 
professionals, animalists and lay-people, so trophy-hunting is not tolerated in CA, as 
it  is  considered  to  be  against  the  principles  of  conservation85.  What  is  seldom 
understood, however, is that trophy hunting by quotas is much less impacting than 
driving around in a 4x4 along the trails  (as more quiet  and less polluting),  could 
contribute to the management of wildlife populations (with selective hunting based 
on  population  numbers)  and  makes  conservation  ‘pay  for  itself’,  whilst  leaving 
money and meat behind for local communities,  who normally act as trackers and 
porters. Anderson and Pariela have shown that most problem animals present in the 
GLTFCA are  highly  valued  for  trophy hunting,  these  being  elephants,  lions  and 
84 Anderson and Pariela, 2005.
85 A very interesting publication on this topic is Alastair, 2001
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buffalos, with crocodiles and hippos bearing a limited value only86. The same animals 
have a high value for non-consumptive tourism, but practicing trophy hunting does 
not mean they will disappear.  The previous experiment of trophy hunting within 
NRM projects, such as the one in the Chiredzi district under the CAMPFIRE project 
(Zimbabwe), has been successful in delivering food and income to the participating 
communities who were able to pay for their own social development (health and 
education)87. The study conducted by CESVI does include trophy hunting by quota 
as  a feasible  income-generating activity for the section of the Sengwe Communal 
land outside the western boundary of the Ecological corridor, however this option 
was taken in by the management committee.
Suggested solution: the lobbying power of conservationists within the stakeholders 
group of the TFCA should be over-ridden by the government in favour of a holist 
approach that is ecologically, economically, socially and politically sustainable. If this 
approach does include trophy hunting as a feasible activity in some populated area, 
as  it  would  be,  it  should  be  implemented  with  the  direct  involvement  of  the 
communities  who  would  benefit  both  economically  and  materially  (meat). 
Agreements, therefore, should be sought with CITES to (1) allow the ivory stockpiles 
of the KNP and other relevant areas to be worked into touristic objects and marketed 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  GLTFCA,  with  a  special  certificate  indicating 
provenance  and  justification;  (2)  allow  trophy  hunting  in  areas  where  wildlife 
populations  are  present  and it  is  viable  to  set  seasonal  quotas  to  implement  the 
project88.
86 Anderson and Pariela, 2005.  Crocodiles have been deemed important for farming, but a network 
should be in place and the activity carefully planned. On this issue,  it  was heard that a crocodile 
hunting licence (with quotas) was awarded to a group of people in Maputo for the Massingir dam 
(Personal communication by an interested party, whose identity cannot be disclosed). Hippos have a 
remarkable ecological value, but not a high value for trophy hunting.
87 Baker,  1997,  proposes  a comprehensive  analysis  on trophy hunting as  a  sustainable  practice  in 
conservation. Child, B., is a major researcher over the benefits and mistakes of CAMPFIRE, see Child, 
1991, and Child  et al., 1997. A general outlook of the CAMPFIRE project, instead, can be found in 
Wolmer & Ashley, 2003.
88 This second idea is also found in Anderson and Pariela, 2005.
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In addition to the above points, special attention should be awarded to protective 
fencing.  For  Dumela,  particularly,  and  for  all  the  villages  along  the  Pafuri  – 
Chiqualaquala border it is essential to plan a fence that would prevent animals from 
trespassing into communal land. This, however, does conflict with the general idea of 
a park without borders. As brilliant as this idea is, it is unfortunately not feasible as 
competition  for  land  is  incredibly  high  in  African  peripheral  areas,  due  to  the 
relocation of native populations during imperialism and racial segregation. As much 
as the idea of killing wildlife for conservation is not appreciated, so is the idea of 
fencing  in  villages  of  native  populations  as  this  would  remind  immediately  of 
concentrations  camps,  imprisonment  and social  injustice  –  fortunately  so,  as  this 
would  also  completely  halt  any  existing  traditional  cross-border  relation.  The 
compromise would therefore be to study a fencing system based on a CI-GIS map 
indicating all the populated areas in the interstitial zones and their socio-economic 
characteristics. However, from a scoping analysis conducted while in Dumela a fence 
demarcating  the  Sengwe  corridor  on  both  sides  would  prevent  human-wildlife 
conflict in both countries, but would halt the traditional network of relations. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the governments and the park management to carry 
out consultation on how to solve this issues. 
6.4.3 Conclusions
Far from trying to present local populations as the Rousseauvian ‘bon sauvage’, 
this section has attempted to demonstrate that conflict is inevitable, if humans and 
animals share the same space,  but may generate positive spin-offs if the needs of 
local populations are understood and addressed. In order to do so, the governments 
should really put pressure over their right to sovereignty and create opportunity for 
their citizens thus proving to be a State in full command of its own territory and 
people. 
Unfortunately the pressure exercised by South Africa and international donors 
seems to be too strong for stable countries like Mozambique to counteract, and Pafuri 
is stuck in between a rock and a hard place, whereby both traditional practices and 
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modern  understanding  will  be  crushed  by  the  old  principle  of  conservation  for 
conservation’s sake. The fear, having looked at the past and present of Pafuri, is that 
neglecting important socio-economical and political issues will eventually result in 
the failure of a mega-park which could have really promoted peace between peoples, 
between  people  and  wildlife,  and  within  one-self  thus  reconciling  a  history  of 
conflict, which is apparently destined to last.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The frontiers are there, the frontiers are sacred. What else, after  
all, could guarantee privilege and power to ruling elites?
Yet the peoples. It would seem, see matters differently… The  
frontiers, for them, remain a foreign and unwarranted  
imposition… So that even whole a ‘bourgeois Africa’ hardens  
its frontiers, multiplies its control, and thunders against the  
smuggling of persons and goods, a ‘peoples’ Africa’ works in  
quite another way. For it the smuggling of goods and persons  
appears perverse and wicked when seen by governments in  
place, peoples in place can evidently find it right enough, end  
even natural. (Davidson, 1986, pp. 43 – 44)1
Political Geography defines Borders, Frontiers, State and Nations drawing from 
principles that are derived from European history and philosophy, to which African 
countries only abide by formally: and this is why, throughout the text, the term State 
was used in reference to African governments not African country. If  the State is 
generally accepted to be the Nation-State thus implying a strong sense of nationhood 
which balances centrifugal forces, then Africa is an exception to the theory. African 
nationalism was born out of African political philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s in 
order to accelerate  the independence of the colonies from motherland and finally 
return Africa to Black Africans: it was meant to embrace all Africans in the struggle 
to re-conquers their land centuries after the first colony was established. The political 
failure to implement on-going lamentations over the fact that African borders are not 
representative to its peoples, however,  has created paradox situations which have 
evolved  into  inter-ethnic  conflicts  in  many  countries  of  Central  Africa.   The 
continent, in fact, is a puzzle of ethnicities whose identities are split between cultural 
and  political-geographic  affiliation,  and  the  state  may  be  either  an  enemy  or  a 
support  according  which  ethnic  group  is  in  power.   In  this  contested  scenario, 
borderlands  become  alienated  peripheral  spaces  integrated  into  a  transcendent 
system of aggregation based on cultural and geographical belonging, where borders 
are at once a source of income and a threat  to livelihoods. Alvarez affirmed that 
borderlands  evoke  the  geo-political  and  the  metaphorical,  the  literal  and  the  conceptual2, 
1 Found in Cheater, 1998, p. 191. 
2 Alvarez, 1995, p. 448, in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 36.
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which is particularly true for Africa, considering its history of land conquests driven 
on the one side by pioneers who were breaking frontiers to create their own polity, 
such as the Vootrekkers, or to increase their wealth and follow a dream, as Sir Cecil 
Rhodes;  and on the  other  side  by  native clans  who wanted both to  increase  the 
chances of trade with Europeans to get weapons and to fight them off their land 
whenever  political  disagreement  would pull  the Whites  apart.   This  violence  has 
prompted movements and migrations following two phenomena,  which occurred 
both  separately  and  simultaneously,  according  to  the  historical  timeline:  (1)  the 
explosion  of  demand  for  natural  resources  of  the  world  market  (generating 
exploration  and  exploitation);  (2)  the  raising  of  populated  territories  to  areas  of 
strategic importance in the struggle for hegemony of two powers3. 
At present, over forty years after African colonial borders had been accepted by 
independent governments, the frontiers are broken in the name of another dream: 
conservation without  borders.  This  research  has  sought  firstly  to  understand  the 
multidimensionality of  borders  and borderlands  in  Africa,  focussing on Southern 
Africa,  secondly  to  prove  that  conservation  always  had  an  implicit  geo-political 
purpose  in  Southern  Africa,  thirdly  to  show that  Transfrontier  Conservation  has 
maintained a political character which does not allow to acquit local communities 
from a history of conflict  and exclusion. The case study of the Limpopo National 
Park proved an excellent choice because of the importance assigned to this mega-
project, the number and type of stakeholders concerned, the special history of cross 
border movements and migrations attached to the broader area and specifically to its 
geographical core: Pafuri. 
This last chapter aims at drawing the conclusions on the many topics argued in 
the  text,  and  eventually  answer  to  the  main  question  asked  in  the  title:  is 
Mozambique the new South African frontier? In order to do so a section reflecting on 
the  history  of  displacement  which  characterise  the  people  of  Pafuri  will  follow. 
3 Burger, 1997. 
233
Secondly, conclusions will be drawn as to whether TFCAs can aspire to resolve long-
lasting socio-economic and political conflicts within the actual framework for action. 
Thirdly, the impact of the GLTFCA on the local community will be discussed against 
a ‘what if’ scenario, i.e. what is the park was not there. Finally, the main findings will 
be summarise and the implications for further research will be outlined.
7.1 REFLECTIONS ON A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND DISPLACEMENT
African history is constellated by episodes of violence,  as is the history of any 
continent of the earth, yet there must be a difference between Africa and the rest of 
the world because violence has capillary penetrated the civil society for centuries and 
is  still  a  huge problem at  present,  as  demonstrated by the amount and brutality 
conflicts  and  crime  rates.  What  makes  this  difference  is  impossible  to  tell,  but 
violence cannot be ascribe to one ethnic group only as each of them, regardless of 
skin colour, has at least once committed an act of violence worthy of note, it would 
have depended on who was stronger at the time of the conflict. However, the portrait 
that is generally presented is one of a continent populated by happy people, living 
peacefully and in close touch with nature, up until the white man arrived to destroy 
this delicate and ancestral equilibrium. Nothing could be further from the truth, with 
the exception of the real ancestral Khoi Khoi peoples of South Africa: slavery was 
widely practiced in Africa amongst Africans, and derived from the ‘raid and loot’ 
war tactic, which has always characterised African conflicts and guerrilla warfare. 
Trade with Arabs and Chinese had been in place for at least a century before the first 
Portuguese ships set foot on the continent. And the changing ecology forced people 
to move around the continent, thus breaking their own frontiers in search for greener 
pastures, richer resources, and safer places. True enough, however, the arrival of the 
Europeans added more violence to the place, in line with the moral code of the time, 
whereby torturing prisoners was considered a right of the capturer not a crime. Thus 
violence spread and as conflict  for natural resources escalated in conflict  between 
ethnicities,  whilst  the slave trade  was already changing the human geography of 
Southern Africa, the African colonies were shaped. How affecting is the history of the 
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continent on the fact that it now hosts more civil wars and brutal dictatorships than 
any other  continent  could be  the  subject  of  another  thesis  but,  judging from the 
descriptions of the Zulu warfare and the Nguni conquests, it could be substantial. 
As the last stronghold of white segregationism, Southern Africa – from Angola to 
Mozambique across South West Africa, South Africa and Zimbabwe – was  exposed 
until very recently to both inter-racial and inter-ethnic violence, which disrupted the 
civil society particularly in border areas, were the wars were fought and weapons 
supplied. The wars in Mozambique and Angola, both engaging South Africa, were 
particularly sui generis as combined guerrilla and contras warfare to African military 
tactics  with  the  aim of  destabilising  the  two newly-independent  countries  in  the 
name  of  both  enforcing  South  African  supremacy  on  the  regional  scale,  thus 
enfranchising apartheid rule,  and crush the influence of Communism in the area, 
hence the heavy financing from the USA – CIA. The displacement which followed 
the  ‘fragmented  war’  in  Mozambique  demonstrated  the  strength  of  the  cultural 
bonds existing with people of the same ethnic affiliations who had been enjoying the 
benefits of an alienated peripheral area for years and suddenly had to abandon their 
home and seek refuge  elsewhere.  In the process of  constructing national  identity 
implemented by the post-independence Mozambican government, the displacement 
of  millions  of  people  in  border  areas  posed  a  threat  to  Mozambicanisation of  the 
country, since ethnicity was looming on the horizon of modernity and positivism, 
and was at  the basis of RENAMO values.  Yet,  this did not happen as identity is 
strictly associated with place at Pafuri, as demonstrated by the history of Dumela. At 
present, the Pafuri border areas still bears the sign of a controversial past from the 
Makuleke store at Crooks’ Corner were professional poachers would find freedom 
by moving the beacon, to the TEBA recruitment centre on the hills above the border 
post where millions of South-east Africans have been inspected and  sent to South 
Africa mines, from the electrified fence demarcating to political systems at war to the 
broken bridge on the Mwanezi. Yet, the local people only want to forget and move 
235
on, a typical Mozambican attitude to be respected4, also because now that peace has 
arrived in the three bordering states, the border has become a direct  and indirect 
source of livelihoods, which are liminal: informal, at times illegal.
The  analysis  of  the  Pafuri  border  history,  in  the  broader  regional  and 
international context, has proven that decades of displacement, conflict and violence 
at a time when independence was hoped to bring development and justice,  have 
produced parallel realities each addressing a different sphere of the social life: the 
statal and the traditional. The pervasive hierarchy enforced by FRELIMO in the early 
years of government  and pursued,  although discontinuously throughout the war, 
proved able to create a sense of loyalty towards the state (more a permanent sense of 
gratitude for independence) which is visible in local formalities, such as hailing to 
FRELIMO or the liberation fight before  speaking at  a  community meeting or the 
warning not to cross the poles demarcating the Zimbabwean border, because it is not 
legal5. Counteracting this reality is the traditional sphere, where there is no state and 
no border, where Pafuri is Pafuri and the Shangaan are Shangaan, all belonging to 
the same history and sharing the same territory. This sphere was also enforced by the 
war with the creation of refugee camps in Sengwe and Gazankulo, both Shangaan 
populated  areas.  In  this  sphere,  illegal  and  legal  migration [for  instance]  is  best  
understood as functioning within an extended community which transcends the border itself  
and within which  people occupy differential roles. Whereas in the statal sphere,  People’s  
economic strategies and the resources on which they draw would differ markedly if the border  
were not there6.
The history of violence and displacement which characterised Pafuri began in the 
mid XIX century, yet is far from being over as another reality is layered onto the two 
existing ones: Transfrontier Conservation.
4 Honwana, 1997, and Lubkemann, 2005.
5 Field work – March 2005 and September 2006.
6 Whiteford, 1979, p. 134,  quoted in  Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 97.
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7.2 SOUTHERN AFRICAN TFCA ARE THE FUTURE FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC COHESION?
It  has  been  argued  in  the  text  that  wildlife  protection  in  Southern  Africa  has 
always had a political character, from the creation of the first reserves, the nucleus of 
present-day Kruger National Park, to its extension into the Pafuri area in 1969, as can 
be inferred by simply looking at political cartography from the past century, whilst 
bearing in mind the chronology of independence and the political issues it brought 
about. Conservation strategies are intertwined with the notion of state and its role on 
the  national and regional scale, with the idea of nation both as a unification symbol 
and as a disclaimer for identity,  encompassing the protection of boundaries  from 
enemy states.  At  present,  the  creation  of  Transfrontier  Conservation  Areas  raises 
even  more  argumentations  about  the  role  played  by  politics  into  planning  for 
conservation, which has expanded research in a specific sector as political ecology. 
Contextually, the evolution of conservation principles has been said to have taken a 
U-turn  towards  protectionism7 after  the  progress  made  since  the  Rio  Summit  in 
19928. This may be ascribed to one of the paradoxes of environmental globalisation, 
whereby the same state which has been and is degrading the environment is asked to 
plan,  and  pay,  for  its  protection9,  and  the  TFCA  projects  have  been  agreed  to 
exemplify such paradox for Southern Africa10. 
The concept of Parks for Peace and TFCAs is neither new nor African, but the 
ideological  boom which followed the end of  intra-state  conflict  amongst  regional 
politicians and international environmentalist organisations served as a catalyser of 
attention11. The concept is both political and ecological, as it divides nature in man-
defined bioregions which straddle borders, thus requiring a concerted international 
7 Büscher and Dietz, 2005.
8 For an exhaustive overlook see Wyneberg, 2002
9 Duffy, 2001.
10 Duffy, 2001, and Ramutsindela, 2004.
11 Of course, the interest shown by Mr. A. Rupert heavily contributed to the project due to the facility 
of gathering international interest and funding, but unlike Ramutsindela (2004) it is not though that 
his TFCA project could be part of the Afrikaaner plan to secure land for a Volkstaat in case of civil 
war, also posited by Ellis, 1994. This opinion is based on discussion with a close friend of the late Mr. 
Rupert, Mr. Reilly, founder of Swaziland conservation and writer of the national law for nature 
protection – the strictest in the world.
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effort for protection. To this was attached the TBNRM concept, aspiring to raise from 
the ashes of CBNRM in promoting the devolution of decision-making at the grass-
root  level  to  effectively  sustain  socio-economic  development  in  areas  where  the 
population  are  highly  dependent  on  nature,  yet  need  to  implement  sustainable 
practices and change income-generating practices through conservation. The political 
nexus  of  TFCA, therefore  cannot  be  argued;  what  should be,  instead,  is  the role 
played by politics in either promoting or impairing the nexus between conservation 
and socio-economic development.
Thanks to the great international and regional interest in TF projects, shown by 
SADC, NEPAD and the AU, Peace Parks and TFCAs have not escape the long arm of 
the national, regional and international politics represented by governments,  pan-
African organisations, and international donors. This raised many critiques, yet the 
most  powerful  one  was  written  by  two  professionals  who  had  actively  worked 
towards the creation of the GLTFCA: Steekamp and Grossman.
Particularly on park level, but also on other levels of the organisation, SANP actors  
continue to act in a manner aimed at maximising their control over the conservation 
estate. This is particularly the case when it comes to the less than lucrative relations  
with neighbouring communities and flies in the face of any notions of community  
empowerment.  […]  The  reiteration  of  expressions  of  goodwill  and  the  need  for  
harmony between people and parks will not be sufficient to establish a constructive  
relationship  between  communities  and  parks.  Achieving  synergies  requires  that  
conflicting interests are explicitly accepted and dealt with transparently. Only once  
this happens will it be possible to deal rationally with the next major issue, namely  
the complex political dynamics that come into being within communities once they  
gain access to resources within parks. (Steekamp & Grossman, 2001, p. 4)
These few lines summarise the political constraints of transfrontier conservation in 
Southern  Africa:  local  communities  are  not  powerful  stakeholders.  Despite  the 
acceptance  of  the  need  for  socio-economic  development  in  rural  areas,  and  for 
conservation  to  become  an  point  of  convergence  between  people,  nature  and 
government, TFCAs are failing miserably to redress the unbalances of the past, in the 
name  of  westernisation  of  African-based  concept  and  practices.  It  should  be 
questioned, in fact, how can an African government take more into account radical 
environmentalist and animalists movements in the west than destitute communities 
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at home. One possible answer comes immediately to mind: finance. Major donors to 
TFCAs projects are either European or North American, and it will be international 
tourism which will make conservation pay for itself, once the TFCAs are in place. If 
Southern Africa was portrayed as the place where elephants are culled and trophy 
hunting  allowed,  most  the  Western  world  would  close  their  eyes  in  horror,  the 
horror of ignorance12. Consequentially, the paradigm of the PPF and its projects have 
quietly  scrubbed  away  any  remnant  of  socio-economic  development  which  was 
considered the second objective in the promotion of Peace, up until a few years ago 
as article published on the subject demonstrate, as opposed the actualised web pages.
This thesis has argued that so far TFCAs have concentrated on conservation and 
animal relocations to also follow the priorities of the South African National Parks 
authority,  which  in  turn  have  been  ‘infiltrated’  by  PPF  officers,  able  to  lobby 
governmental  decision-making.  Similarly,  the  key objective  that  were  driving the 
TFCAs,  namely conservation and socio-economic development,  have been  slowly 
modified  to  conservation  and  border  security,  following  the  priorities  of  South 
African  politics  over  (1)  escalating  illegal  migrations  from  poorer  neighbouring 
countries,  (2)  soaring  crime  rates,  also  dependent  upon  the  illegal  smuggling  of 
weapons  from  Mozambique,  (3)  persistence  of  poaching,  particularly  in 
Mozambique,  as  the  political  situation  in  Zimbabwe  does  not  allow  for  a  real 
investigation. If on the one hand TFCAs could be fully inscribed in the SADC project 
of a border-less Southern Africa, similar to the European Union, on the other hand 
the failure of governments to address security problems locally cannot allow for the 
implementation of this project. The general view is that border communities are still 
perceived as the procrastinators of illegal criminal cross-border activities, which is 
not always the case as  shown by Dumela,  thus placing them in a disadvantaged 
position against the implementation of TFCA. The exclusion of local communities is 
dangerous in so far as borderlands are becoming again strategically areas for  local 
12 This view over the paradox brought about by TFCA is shared by many researchers on the impact of 
TFCAs on local livelihoods in interstitial areas, mostly using the GLTFCA as a case study. See Doherty 
& Doyle, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2004; Ferreira, 2004; Wolmer, 2003; Heher, 2003; Duffy, 1997, 2001, and 
2006.
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and  international  politics,  whilst  the  only  beneficiaries  will  be  animals,  tourists, 
national  governments  and  the  private  sector.  As  tourism  is  envisaged  to  make 
conservation pay for itself,  the exclusion of local communities from planning and 
development of TFCA will directly impact the industry.  The investigation on the 
principles  and  the  actual  implementation  of  the  TFCA,  in  fact,  led  to  the  same 
conclusion drawn by Burger exactly twenty years ago, that tourism resorts built on 
indigenous lands offer them as tourist attraction, as much as an elephant or a lion 
could be, and if local communities are excluded from the decision-making process 
and the implementation of tourism projects, their culture will be treated as an item 
for sale which will make conflict escalate13. This is the risk that TFCA run at present, 
and if  the  threat  to  both  animals  (human-wildlife  conflict)  and tourism  (human-
human conflict) is not enough to force the management and donors to reconsider 
their  approach  to  local  communities  in  interstitial  areas  (Mozambique  and 
Zimbabwe),  the  local  geopolitical  situation  should  act  as  a  warning  alarm,  with 
Zimbabwe being on the verge of economical and political collapse. The review of the 
TFCA process in Southern Africa matched with field work has shown that TFCAs 
have  the  potential  to  implement  socio-economic  development  at  the  local  level 
through a varied portfolio of tourism activities, based on the geographic locality and 
the state of natural resources,  but the lack of political will to do so is  preventing 
Peace  Park  to  answer  to  their  first  call:  the  promotion  of  international  peace.  If 
exclusion is perpetrated in communal land by the same governments who called for 
Black  empowerment  and  social  justice,  and  the  same  donors  who  call  out  for 
donations to save Africa from destitution in rural areas, this will generate a new level 
of conflict  which could degenerate no longer in civil disobedience but in national 
struggle, whereby the sense for nationhood is no longer driven by the hate towards 
the White minority rule, but by the understanding that a state must represent the 
interests of the nation it is trying to build, rather than of the people and organisations 
13 Burger, 1997.
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who  financially  sustain  it.  Zimbabwe,  in  this  sense,  could  become  the  first 
battleground for the new African state.
7.3 THE IMPACT OF THE GLTFCA ON PAFURI: BUT WHAT IF?
The GLTFCA, the flagship Peace Park of Southern Africa, is the most researched 
by scholars in various disciplines, from ecology to political ecology, from cultural 
anthropology to human geography, which also makes it the target of most critiques. 
A SWOT analysis may help to clarify the actual position where the GLTFCA has 
been  placed  in  relation  to  its  objectives:  (1)  foster  transnational  cooperation  for 
ecosystem management;  (2) promote governmental,  private and local alliances for 
conservation; (3) sponsor community participation for the sustainable use of natural 
resources; (4) endorse ecotourism for socio-economic development. 
The  positive  effects  and  potentials  of  the  GLTFCA  are  mainly  related  to 
conservation and NRM, whereas the negative issues refer to the relation between 
conservation and sustainable socio-economic development practices. This division is 
generated not only by the refusal of the management committee to get involved into 
costly and time-consuming Participatory Appraisal practise, but also by disregard of 
those reports which either present the weaknesses of the project (see Anderson and 
Pariela,  2005)  or  suggest  solutions  already  negotiated  with  interested  local 
communities (CESVI, 2002). Therefore, the main threat posed by the GLTFCA derive 
from the deafness so far shown by the management committee to alternative NRM 
solutions in interstitial areas, thus acknowledging on the one hand the difficulty of 
implementing  effective  sustainable  NRM  theories,  and  on  the  other  hand  the 
intention to  let  the private  sector  deal  with  local  communities  if  required by the 
location of the concession.
This must be added to the forced relocation of some 27,000 people living along 
the Massingir reservoir (the high density tourism area),  and the Shingwedzi River 
(the low density tourism area),  for their own security,  the security of the wildlife 
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(anti-poaching)  and  the  security  of  international  borders  (illegal  migrations  and 
smuggling). 
STRENGHTS:
•Secure land for conservation;
•Improve the management of large mammals for 
habitat conservation;
•Stop poaching activities in the protected areas 
and adjoining private reserves;
•Market the image of a different Africa based on 
peace  and  cooperation,  instead  of  conflict  and 
divisions.
WEAKNESSES:
•Associate conservation with security, instead of 
development;
•Do not allow time for implementing pro-active 
community participation;
•Do  not  involve  local  communities  in  anti-
poaching activity;
•Promote  an  image  of  Africa,  which  does  not 
correspond to reality on the field.
OPPORTUNITIES:
•Create a supra-national space for conservation 
based on cultural heritage;
•Use  interstitial  area  to  experiment  effective 
alternative NRM practices;
•Show  that  conservation  is  adjustable  to  local 
needs;
•Promote Africa at peace with its own past.
THREATS:
•Return to protectionist conservation;
•Succumb to international lobbies for funding;
•Exclude  local  population  from  NRM  in 
interstitial areas;
•Cause  an  escalation  of  inter-class  and  inter-
racial crime which may result into genocide.
Table 7.26: SWOT matrix summarizing the potentials and constraints of the GLTFCA (Source: field 
work and literature review)
The promotion of ecotourism, furthermore, has been relegate to the last objective, 
thus  confirming  the  original  assumption  that  community  socio-economic 
development is not a priority. Yet, it also implies that there is no agreement over 
what  can  be  included  in  ecotourism in  interstitial  zones  where  conservation  is 
superseded by sustainable NRM, and controversial activities such as trophy hunting 
may be practised if ecologically feasible, thus effectively contributing to short-term 
income generation and power-devolution at the local level. 
The impact of the GTLFCA on Pafuri, therefore, must be measured on different 
scales  because  of  the  glocal  nature  of  the  mega-park  project,  to  paraphrase 
Ramutsindela  (2004).  Firstly  there  will  be  a  security  impacts,  as  the  number  of 
animals roaming freely in the Pafuri area will increase.  Security, here, is intended 
both as life-threatening situation and food-security due to the damage animal cause 
to crops. Secondly, the economical impact will show as the current implementation 
of the GLTFCA impinges on traditional livelihood strategies by:
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1.preventing  the  informal  sector  from  benefiting  from  cross-border 
movements of goods and people;
2.threaten  subsistence  agriculture  by encouraging  animal  migrations  in  a 
fenceless conservation area;
3.halt, or at least plummet, the movement of temporary jobseekers.
This will happen without the provision of a valid alternative to the current livelihood 
system. 
Thirdly, the  cultural impact of the GLTFCA must be taken into account as the 
planned Park impedes the existing accessibility  between borderlands communities. 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique, moreover, will be most affected as the inter-marriages 
still constitute a strong bonding practice. The implementation of the Sengwe corridor 
in itself, whether fenced or unfenced, will impair the communication, and obviously, 
the wider the strip of land is the more difficult contacts will become. 
As currently planned and enforced, the GLTFCA will create a buffer zone along the 
South  African  border  where  security  issues  are  paramount,  thus  geographically 
isolating the rainbow nations from its problematic neighbours, whose government 
have agreed that the prevention of illegal border activities are essential for successful 
conservation. The borderland, therefore, are set back to frontier zones where states 
cooperate  to  increase  security,  whilst  maintaining  sovereignty  over  their  own 
territory. Yet how effective is land demarcation once the barriers have been taken 
down?  And  who  will  coordinate  such  concerted  effort?  The  answer  to  the  first 
question resides upon field operators to answer,  whereas the second is rhetorical 
considering the efficiency of South African Police,  Defence Force and Intelligence 
over their Mozambican and Zimbabwean counterpart, particularly as they have been 
used to patrol borders in war times for over fifty years. 
The long arm of South Africa, therefore, began to extend across its own borders by 
suggesting  the  GLTFCAs at  a  time  when  the  first  priority  for  Mozambique  was 
reconstruction, progressed by promoting cross-border security at a time when the 
main threat was felt in South Africa, and continued through the promotion of free-
243
trade  areas  within SADC for private  investment  and development  with a special 
interest  on Mozambique were most private companies are already South African, 
and tourism thrives because of South African visitor. Whether state sovereignty is 
maintained  or  not,  more  subtle  devices  have  been  enforced  to  transform 
Mozambique into a South African frontier, thanks to its dependency on foreign aid 
and investment to  boost  economic growth and the ‘ideology of  the blank page’14 
which has characterised FRELIMO’s  governments  and their  understanding of  the 
country. By looking at the history of Mozambique, in fact, it can only be agreed with 
the Hall and Yong (1997) that the initial drive for Marxism-Leninism was associated 
with the possibility of gaining military and financial support to the armed struggle 
and the independence government, yet when the support failed to arrive during the 
wars with Rhodesia and South Africa, FRELIMO resorted to liberism in order to get 
financial support from the USA and the western international organisations. What is 
next, by looking at the condescendence shown towards South Africa leadership in 
the TFCAs project, in the SADC and in the AU, may as well an open border to South 
Africa  economic expansion,  whether  driven by the government  or by the private 
white farmers disposed by Pres. Mbeki’s land redistribution programme.
Finally,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  GLTFCA  regardless  of  the  type  of 
implementation will have positive spin-offs on local environment and populations, 
by  preventing  environmental  degradation  and  create  employment  opportunities 
through land concessions to the private sector.  The analysis of Dumela,  however, 
show  that  is  the  existence  of  the  border  which  catalyse  income-generating 
opportunities  for  border  communities,  not  the  presence  of  a  conservation  area. 
Furthermore, the impact of local communities on the environment is very low and 
could be cost-effectively prevented simply by enforcing tree-planting to counteract 
the use of local wood for fire.  However,  the used of damaged trees only and the 
visible health of the close forests on either side of the Limpopo show that the wood-
fire does not pose an immediate threat to the local ecosystem, unlike the Massingir 
14 An expression coined by Geffray and used by Hall & Young 1997, to indicate the adjustability of 
FRELIMO’s ideology to anything that would give them financial support to rule the country (p. 219)
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area, where on both sides of the reservoir the only close forests remnants are in non-
accessible  places.  The  GLTFCA,  therefore,  would  bring  positive  spin-offs  for  the 
border communities only if able to interact with them, beginning with informative 
campaigns,  proceeding  with  consultation  processes  and  land  demarcation  to 
understand  the  amount  of  space  each  community  needs  to  sustain  itself,  and 
continuing by focussing on nature-based tourism, that is tourism based on natural 
resources  who  are  sustainably  used  to  promote  socio-economic  development  for 
people who livelihoods are precarious to say the least. However, since the human 
problem is only Mozambican and Zimbabwean, it is up to those states to set the right 
pace  for  implementation,  thus  showing  to  South  Africa  that  transfrontier 
conservation  is  not  enforced  upon  lawless  frontiers  but  is  negotiated  amongst 
sovereign states.
7.4 MAIN FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This multi-disciplinary research was driven by three objectives, each referring to 
a specific sphere affecting Pafuri as the geographic centre of the GLTFCA, with a 
complicated history of violence, displacement and migration, whose livelihoods are 
threatened by the implementation of the TFCA, despite general discourses over the 
need for socio-economic development in rural areas, the end of conservation as an 
exclusive process,  and the role  of  tourism to address  poverty  in rural  areas.  The 
objectives were:
1. to  critically  evaluate  the  impact  of  recent  history  into  traditional 
livelihood strategies;
2. to present  the political agenda of conservation in South Africa,  in the 
past  century,  and  assess  its  influence  on  NRM  and  socio-economic 
development;
3. to understand how TF Conservation can effectively transform a border 
into a frontier and sacrifice community livelihoods to political targets.
The first objective was engaged in two phases. The fist  phase was the analysis of 
African  history,  within  the  perspective  of  Political  Geographical  processes  and 
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definitions  of  State  and Nation,  Border  and Frontier.  The  bibliography used was 
drawn  from  the  timeline  of  European  penetration  in  Africa,  which  included  an 
outlook on the European divisions of power,  the general history of post-Westphalian 
Europe, the application of both Political Geographical and Social Theory issues to the 
evolution  of  African  countries.  The  second  phase  was  the  analysis  of  papers 
produced especially in the 1960s and 1970s on the history of the Nguni populations 
of South Africa, in order to produce an account of the movements which created the 
current  ethnic  geography of  the  GLTFCA, as  well  as  the  historical  events  which 
marked local livelihood strategies. 
The most relevant findings are of course theoretical. Firstly, the interpretation of 
landmarks (water sources and hills)  for border demarcation in European Political 
Geography led to the creation of African borders which separated clans and ethnic 
groups,  who converge along water  points  due to  the aridity of  the environment. 
Secondly, the use of the expression ‘national struggle’ is not correct when discussing 
the fights for independence in Africa as the main drives for rebellion were (1) the 
injustice perpetrated by racial segregation and (2) the widespread hatred toward the 
white  domination,  in  the  context  of  an  African  nationalism.  The  expression 
‘independence fight’ has been suggested as the movements fought for majority rule 
and independence from the European mother country, but nationalism was never an 
issue as post-independence inter-ethnic conflict demonstrated. Thirdly, the presence 
of a border deeply affects local livelihood strategies, which are funded on both the 
informal  sector  and liminal  activities  such as  cross-border  movements  of  people. 
Fourthly, that borderlands form an independent polity which transcend the countries 
of  affiliation  and  enter  the  cultural  and  traditional  sphere,  thus  presenting  a 
challenge and a threat to the sovereign state.
The second objective was addressed firstly by reviewing available literature on 
conservation in South Africa against the historical timeline, in order to understand 
the  extent  of  political  influences  over  conservation  strategies.  Secondly,  primary 
sources on conservation, TFCA, Peace Parks and NRM strategies was reviewed and 
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analysed against secondary sources, i.e. critical publications over the role played by 
governmental  and  non-governmental  institutions  in  Southern  Africa  TF 
conservation. The interviews and conversation with key informants, such as Dr. J. 
Ferrão, Dr. M. Stalmans, Dr. M. Wishart, Mr. T. Reilly, and Chief Insp. Coetzer, were 
also used to put critiques and praises into a real-life perspective, which was enforced 
by field work in Pafuri, the LNP and the KNP.
The main finding was the confirmation that conservation in South Africa is strictly 
connected  to  political  requirements,  regardless  of  the  government  in  power.  By 
accepting  this  statement,  it  was  then  posited  and  confirmed  that  the  failure  of 
alternative NRM strategies to conservation, which include community participation 
for rural socio-economic uplifting and may involve controversial activities such as 
trophy-hunting,  would  not  be  implemented  unless  politics  make  a  serious 
commitment towards the eradication of absolute poverty in rural areas. 
Finally,  the  third  objective  was  addressed  by  bringing  together  the  theories 
developed and the field research, which showed that (1) the border is a source of 
livelihood; (2) cross-border cultural bonds are still strong despite the nationalisation; 
(3)  the  main  reason  for  cross-border  migration  is  employment;  (4)  wildlife 
conservation  is  seen  as  a  threat  not  an  opportunity.  These  were  combined  with 
conversations over the role played by the local government to pro-actively address 
social  problems  with  a  varied  group  of  people,  from journalists,  such  as  Ms.  P. 
Rolletta, to lawyers as Ms. T. Lopez, from experts in social studies such as Ms. S. A. 
dos Santos and Ms. A. Leão to expatriates such as Ms. N. Turton. 
The main finding was that information over the TFCA is not widely available to the 
public thus implying hidden political agenda, in the hasty implementation of projects 
which should require careful planning considering the issues at the stake and the 
sensitive procedures involve, not least people relocation. Consequently, the idea that 
Mozambique  may  become  a  new  frontier  for  South  Africa  to  conquer  did  not 
suddenly seem so out of place, considering that socio-economic development which 
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is  paramount  in  rural  Mozambique  has  been  degraded  in  the  list  of  the  GTLP 
priorities to serve South Africa’s key interest of border security. 
These findings lead to the multi-disciplinary implications for further research in 
at  least  three  fields:  (1)  cultural  ethnography and human geography;  (2)  political 
geography  and  TBNRM;  (3)  TFCA  and  strategic  implementation.  The  latter, 
however, should be conceived as project work with an institutional stakeholder in 
the GLTFCA in order to be taken into consideration in planning. 
The  first  research  should  begin  from  the  findings  on  the  Congo-Niger  Bantu 
migrations and produce a comprehensive research on the controversial origin of the 
Shangaan community beginning with the role of Soshangane/Manicusse at the court 
of  Shaka  and  concluding  with  the  arrest  of  Gungunhane,  his  grand-son  by  the 
Portuguese army. This research would finally tap onto current disagreement over the 
migratory path, the settlement areas, and the duality between the Tsonga and the 
Shangaan which was here resolved as a linguistic issue only. The findings of such 
research could be used to implement the concept of transnational cultural heritage in 
the GLTFCA, and the role of Pafuri as a symbol of this heritage.
The second research should work on two levels: (1) a political geographical analysis 
of  the areas  currently  involved in  TFCAs project  in  Southern  Africa;  (2)  the role 
assigned  to  TBNRM  at  a  time  when  the  only  politically  acceptable  NRM  is 
conservation. The findings should converge to discuss the future, if any, of TBNRM 
in a region where politics only look after the interests of those sectors able to provide 
more  power  in  the  regional  and  international  arena,  such  as  conservation  and 
tourism at the time being. This would in turn allow to discuss various scenarios in 
which (1) conservation is no longer able to attract international funds; (2) crime and 
violence on the national and regional scale, escalate to the point of threatening the 
state’s authority, thus taking security issue onto a higher level.
The third research areas should replicate the questionnaire survey, with necessary 
adjustments, to all the communities along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border so as 
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to create a consistent database of information and maps to create an accurate human 
geographical cartography of the areas directly impacted by the Sengwe corridor in 
Mozambique. This would contribute to draw the attention of decision-makers over 
the  results  of  creating  a  fenceless  ecological  corridor  on  the  doorstep  of  local 
communities and, hopefully, promote strategic implementation. If carried out with 
ORAM, the Mozambican association for rural mutual assistance, this research could 
lead to land demarcation and the issuing of a land deed, similar to the one held by 
the  Makulekes,  which  will  give  local  communities  national  and  international 
negotiating power against possible relocations and threats posed by human-wildlife 
conflict.
The last research is deemed the most important at this stage, considering the bid 
opened by the LNP over the concession for private tourism investment inside and 
along the borders of the park, including Pafuri. 
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ATTACHMENT 1: THE SOUTHERN AFRICA TFPS AND TFCAS
Map indicating all the planned and existing TFCAS in Southern Africa (Source ESRI, 2007)15
15 http://gis.esri.com/library/userconf/proc02/pap1244/p1244.htm 
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ATTACHMENT 2: THE GREAT LIMPOPO TRANSFRONTIER PARK
Map indicating the GLTFP, the interstitial area and the land uses south of Massingir Gate (Source: 
the TFCA Coordination Unit –MITUR)
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ATTACHMENT 3: THE BANTU LANGUAGES IN AFRICA
Map showing the full number and extension of Bantu languages in Africa (Source: 
http://www.sil.org/ silesr/2002/016/bantu_ map.htm)
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ATTACHMENT 4: GUTHRIE’S CLASSIFICATION
List of the relevant  linguistic groups, mentioned in the research (Maho, 2002)
253
ATTACHMENT 5: A LETTER FROM AFRICA
Dear Mr. Westerner, 2005
My name is Potsotso Motchopi and my family and I still live in a mud hut near a 
great River you call the Okavango.
Many foreigners visit these last years to witness our country and even ask to buy our 
land, or for concessions to start businesses for tourism or other industry, saying that 
they will employ many of our young people and pay us money in exchange for long 
time control of large areas of our land, and over the years we have agreed to forfeit 
land and we have received money. 
But our children and our lives, are no longer our own. Things have changed from our 
customary ways to that of the white peoples. We are not sure of who we are any 
longer.
Our children sometimes send money home, but we don’t see them any more as we 
used to. They prefer to live in the cities now, and have forgotten our culture and 
ways. They have become westernized, and who can blame them for wanting to drive 
a shiny new car and live in an air-conditioned house of bricks and iron? 
But I do not see their happiness as I used to. I do not see them full of life now? I only 
see them chasing a demon they cannot catch. They are like the white men now. 
______________________     _____________    ______________
In our tribe, we understand that we need to stay together to survive, and that each 
person from the very small to the very old, has a purpose in the community, and that 
each person has to fulfill that purpose for all of us to be able to survive in this harsh 
place. Now when our young people, with new ideas, come and visit, they think that 
money can buy that survival, and it can most times, but it cannot buy our culture, 
and it cant buy our community, or our tribal ways – it only undermines them, just as 
we have been undermined by the money that has been paid to some within our tribe.
In our village we now have schools that teach western teachings and values, and we 
have children who disobey their parents just as they do in the wester schools. Our 
culture  is  being  eaten  away  from  within.  We  are  being  cloned  to  be  like  the 
westerner. We wear their clothes and speak their language. We talk of business and 
profits. We fight over the money. Who are we now?
There are those that say that we are poor, and that they feel sorry for us, and that 
they want to improve our miserable lives by introducing us to ‘profits’ and ‘returns’, 
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that we now suddenly need to survive. They say that we should ‘invest’ and save 
money in the banks for our old age, and when we one day have ‘succeeded’ that we 
will be able to buy a Mercedes Benz car. They say that we should strive to do better, 
to  improve  ourselves,  to  uplift  us  from poverty.  This  they  say  is  what  they  are 
teaching our children and young men.
 
------------------------
Have  you  ever  witnessed  a  monkey  in  a  tree  when  he  eats,  and  deliberately 
drops/shares some food to feed the other animals below who can’t climb? Have you 
ever seen how many animals benefit from the death of another? Have you ever seen 
anything wasted in  nature?  We know of these things,  and we could not  survive 
without this understanding. We are a part of the same whole.
We do not have a dogs dish – we throw our waste/sharing down, and it is cleaned by 
the dog/jackal/ant and we all rely on each other for this cycle of life. 
There  are many things  that  separate  our  culture  from that  of  the westerner.  For 
instance we don’t have a jail.  If  we have a wayward person, we take him to the 
Kgotla/meeting place, and explain the delicate fabric of our culture, and the elders 
and all the people listen and speak of the problem, and administer the adjustment to 
bring the person back within the group immediately – even if you consider it be 
harsh,  and the value of the system is  that  everyone knows the truth of  who this 
person is, and he knows that they know, and this knowledge forces him to behave in 
a manner that will benefit us all again as a community.
 
If I got a windfall, I would share it with my friend, my mother and others, because 
we understand that someone else would also share in my time of need, without even 
knowing me - our spirit is one. We understand the harshness of survival in nature.
-----------------------
And then you brought non-biodegradable shiny ‘things’ into our life, that entice our 
children  away  and  pollute  our  lives,  and  destroy  our  environment.  We  don’t 
understand these things and they are not a part of our lives. We are loosing our 
power base and being belittled, and our fabric is collapsing. Who are we now?
A white friend of mine was describing how in London he would not greet passers by, 
and how every person would looks away or down when passing, and that he does 
not know any of his neighbors in any direction – he was confused when I asked, “but 
why do you do that?” He has no real friends and no-one to come to his assistance in 
a time of need. I sensed a loneliness of spirit in him, a great empty barrenness of his 
soul.
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Who are you then Mr. Westerner?
I have seen that as a species, the westerner has managed to destroy as many natural 
things as he has managed to develop amazing technological advances. We now have 
pollution,  global  warming,  weather  out  of  control,  rising  tides  and  plagues  that 
frighten, and the World is at war over greed.
Your prisons are overflowing and you have many thieves who care nothing for your 
life – it is cheaper to shoot you and take your wrist watch, as the cost of the bullet is 
less. Your legal system allows the criminal to be anonymous, fancy lawyers who can 
bend the truth, and ‘rights’ that the criminal can hide behind - this encourages the 
wayward mind to do it all again.
You are rushing around in that mad world of yours like a chicken without a head, 
and the aim seems only to be self destruction. Your money god seems to be a useless 
companion who has left you with only a great loneliness.
You plunder others for their resources …. and you call me poor!
I feel great pity for you white man, because all you have is money, and this money 
god of  yours  has  given  you the  arrogance  to  call  me poor  without  the  slightest 
knowledge of who I really am. 
I am a rural Africa still living unchanged the way we have for thousands of years, 
with respect for each other, and the environment. This is our culture. We understand 
that if you hurt one that you are actually hurting yourself.
Yours culture seems to be one of dog eat dog.
Yes I live in a mud hut and we have to collect scarce food and water very far away – 
and when the surroundings no longer support us, we move on to a new area and 
start again. This is why we move on, and the old area recovers - this is the cycle of 
life – we are a part of the cycle of life of nature. We don’t plunder resources from far 
away to sustain ourselves, and pretend that we are living economically. We live off 
this land.
We have our Gods who protect us, we have our sunshine, land, animal’s and water 
all free – we are rich and fulfilled.
--------------------------
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I sometimes wonder if these ‘donations’, to better our ‘poverty stricken’ lives, is not 
just a way to appease you conscience, or just to give you a hold on us so that you can 
plunder our resources without conscience, or maybe in desperation you see it as the 
only legacy you will leave on the world?
Yes there is  a  poor person – he is  the half  westernized African who has lost his 
culture and his way – he needs all our pity and help. He is the poor soul who is many 
generations away from being able to  compete with a long family line of  western 
industrialist on their own playing field. 
Can you not have the common decency to leave us as you found us? We don’t want 
your money, we don’t want your value system. How can the earth be owned by one 
at the expense of others – we each have our donkeys and goats and that is our value, 
as its our food reserve and that is our measure of wealth.
There is an interface where we could live with each other – we know what is done is 
done and it cant be reversed, but if you showed us the common respect we deserve, 
we would be able to have a place where many people (even your white people) – 
where all people, could live in harmony as common respect would be our cord. 
We obviously need to be able to read and write, so that we can interface with the 
world, but the disregard for our mud huts and bare feet is an extremely arrogant not 
constructive attitude.
-----------------------
Yes there are obviously times when small isolated communities need assistance to 
get back on their feet after a natural disaster – but only for the shortest time to get 
them to get back on their feet. Don’t give them what they never had – as you know 
you don’t value what you got for nothing. It better to teach someone to fish than give 
them food.
On the subject  of  fishing –  you westerners  have given us fine gill  nets  from the 
goodness of your compassionate hearts. We then decimated the natural environment 
with your stupidity. We caught all the fish, and bought the trappings of the west, 
and now that the fish are all gone, we are hungry – please feed us!
The poorest man is not without a dollar – but without a life.
A good story I once heard was that a rich industrialist once found a lazy fisherman 
relaxing under a tree. The rich man asked the fisherman why he was not out there 
catching more fish as the day was still  young. The fisherman replied that he had 
caught enough fish for the day.
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The rich man patiently explained that if  the fisherman worked harder,  he would 
catch more fish and then be able to buy a motor for his boat, which would mean that 
the fisherman could catch more fish and therefore make more money. The fisherman 
asked…… “and then?”
Well said the rich man, you could buy more boats and employ people to work for 
you so that  you could catch more fish and make more money.  ……“And then?” 
asked the fisherman again. “Then you could relax like me” answered the rich man. 
The fisherman replied “but I am relaxing already”?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In  conclusion,  we African  together  with  the  Bushmen understand  nature,  nature 
understand us, in that everything of creation must not be the same, however it was 
created to be in co-existence and this should be respected, and if need be it should be 
protected from being ruined.
We  are  not  interested  into  the  Whiteman’s  type  and  style  of  development  that 
complicate a man’s life and threatens the existence of nature and the balance of life. 
Leave the world and especially Africa to be diverse and distinct. 
      
Maybe you could use your spare money to buy yourself some time, and then you 
could come learn about who we really are …..
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